European development cooperation: in between the local and the global by Hoebink, Paul
www.ssoar.info
European development cooperation: in between the
local and the global
Hoebink, Paul (Ed.)
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Sammelwerk / collection
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
OAPEN (Open Access Publishing in European Networks)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Hoebink, P. (Hrsg.). (2010). European development cooperation: in between the local and the global (EADI).
Amsterdam: Amsterdam Univ. Press. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-334732
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
European Development 
Cooperation
Paul Hoebink (ed.)
A m s t e r d a m  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s
In Between the Local and the Global
A m s t e r d a m  U n i v e r s i t y  P r e s s
P
au
l H
oebin
k (ed.)
European Development Cooperation
Official Development Assistance, or foreign aid, disbursed by the eu member 
states reached record levels in 2009, when several member states raised their 
assistance considerably and when some of the new member states became 
donors again. European Development Cooperation: In Between the Local and the 
Global analyses a wide range of aspects of European development cooperation, 
covering, among others, some hotly debated issues such as the Economic Part-
nership Agreements, policy coherence and the participation of civil society or-
ganisations in negotiations with the European Union. The contributors offer 
valuable new insights into the established aid instruments such as food aid, 
support for energy projects in Africa and security-related development assis-
tance in the programmes of some smaller European donors, as well as an over-
view of these new donor programmes. They also discuss the role of local and 
regional authorities in development cooperation in the Netherlands, Germany 
and Spain.
Paul Hoebink holds an Extraordinary Professorship in Development Coopera-
tion at the Centre for International Development Issues Nijmegen (cidin) at 
the Radboud University Nijmegen.
“The Lisbon Treaty puts European international and development cooperation at a cross-
road. Will the Union be able to keep up its strong joint record? Hoebink et al provide a 
well-chosen, inviting mix of insights in some of the multiple challenges emerging.”
                                            Paul Engel, Director, European Centre for Development 
                                                                                                Policy Management – ecdpm
“Paul Hoebink and his co-authors make two important contributions in this volume. 
First, they bring clear-headed analysis to bear on the important question of Europe’s 
contribution to global poverty reduction. And, second, they help build a community of 
scholars and practitioners whose collective effort will translate analysis into action.”            
                             Simon Maxwell, Senior Research Associate and former director 
                                                            of the Overseas Development Institute, London
www.aup.nl
9 7 8 9 0 8 9 6 4 2 2 5 7
Hoebink_20.indd   1 30-06-2010   15:22:18
european development cooperation
European Development Cooperation.indd   1 29-6-2010   21:04:24
European Development Cooperation.indd   2 29-6-2010   21:04:26
European 
Development 
Cooperation
In Between the Local 
and the Global
Edited by
Paul Hoebink
European Development Cooperation.indd   3 29-6-2010   21:04:26
Cover illustration: © Paul Hoebink
Cover design: Mesika Design, Hilversum
Lay-out: V3-Services, Baarn
isbn 978 90 8964 225 7
e-isbn 978 90 4851 228 7
nur 754 / 759
© Paul Hoebink / Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2010
All rights reserved. Without limiting the rights under copyright reserved above, no part 
of this book may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or trans-
mitted, in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise) without the written permission of both the copyright owner and the author 
of the book.
EADI – the European Association of Development Research and Training Insti-
tutes – is the leading professional network for development and regional studies 
in Europe (www.eadi.org). 
European Development Cooperation.indd   4 29-6-2010   21:04:26
Table of Contents
 Some Recent Developments in European International and   
Development Cooperation: An Introduction 7
 Paul Hoebink
I The Hotly Debated Issues
 Policy Coherence: The Newest Fad in the International 
Discourse? 25
 Rolph van der Hoeven
 The Interim Pacific Economic Partnership Agreement 47
 Stephen J.H. Dearden
 Mainstreaming Non-state Actors: Assessing Participation in 
EU-Pacific relations 73
 Maurizio Carbone
II New Insights on Old Instruments
 An Overview of European Programs to Support Energy 
Projects in Africa and Strategies to Involve the Private 
Sector 95
 Lars Holstenkamp
 Is There an Advantage to Being Small? Security-related 
Development Cooperation of Four Smaller European 
States 125
 Jan Pospisil and Stefan Khittel
European Development Cooperation.indd   5 29-6-2010   21:04:26
 Evaluating the Best Delivery Mode of Food Aid: Some 
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from Northeast 
Africa 145
 Francesco Burchi and Sara Turchetti
III The New Emerging European Donors
 The Emergence of International Development Policies in 
Central and Eastern European States 175
 Simon Lightfoot and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizarreta
 Hungarian Development Policy 195
 Beata Paragi
 Policy Coherence for Development of the Czech Republic: 
Case Studies on Migration and Trade 223
 Ondřej Horký
IV From the Global to the Local
 The Role of European Local Governments in Development 
Cooperation: Examples from the Netherlands and 
Germany 261
 Mariken Bontenbal
 The Role of Local and Regional Authorities in European 
Community Development Policy: Beyond Decentralised 
Aid 291
 Jokin Alberdi Bidaguren
 List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 311
 About the Authors 325
 Index 329
European Development Cooperation.indd   6 29-6-2010   21:04:26
Some Recent Developments in European 
International and Development Cooperation
 An Introduction
Paul Hoebink
Development cooperation by the European Union and its member states is un-
dergoing a process of rapid change. Changes in the international architecture and 
within the European Union itself are contributing to this process. The first and 
perhaps most important change is that a large and growing number of new play-
ers have entered the arena, while some old players have returned in new guises. 
Among them are the new member states of the European Union. There is also 
a wide variety of new multilateral organisations, like the Global Fund, and new 
emerging donors like China and India, and – one should not forget – non-gov-
ernmental aid organisations, some of which have considerable funds at their dis-
posal. This proliferation of donors is both impressive and worrying. It is a cause 
for concern because of the high transaction costs for aid recipients in dealing with 
a large number of donors, often with small volumes of aid.
 A second important change is not only the global compact to focus on eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), with 18 targets and 48 indicators, but 
also the willingness to cooperate, coordinate and harmonise the effort needed 
to achieve them. While the MDGs emerged from a series of UN conferences in 
the 1990s,1 the conferences on financing for development in Monterrey (2002) 
and Doha (2008), as well as the Paris Declaration (2005) and the Accra Agenda 
for Action (2008), can be seen as expressions of the combined effort to mobilise 
a wide range of resources to achieve the MDGs. The MDGs provide both aid 
recipients and donors with a common goal, which leads to better cooperation 
and coordination. Although some may say it is not happening fast enough, the 
Paris Declaration is now rapidly changing how donors cooperate not only among 
themselves, but also with partner countries.2
 Thirdly, donors are coming up with new instruments that show much greater 
respect for the idea of country ‘ownership’ than former instruments, like project 
aid.3 A number of European and other donors still have to make this change, 
but North European countries in particular have changed to instruments like 
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Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) and Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAps). 
A central element of these instruments is that they take recipient governments’ 
plans as a starting point, and that they call for dialogue and harmonisation with 
the recipient’s plans and procedures, and for coordination between donors. They 
also aim to rationalise recipient governments’ budgets through Medium Term 
Expenditure Frameworks and by fighting corruption.
 Fourthly, political relations within recipient countries and between recipient 
governments and donors are changing. Recipient governments in Asia have always 
been stronger in their dealings with donors than governments in Africa.4 But re-
cent economic successes (which the global economic crisis may temper in some 
way) and successful processes of democratisation in particular have given new le-
gitimacy to a number of African governments, putting them in theory in a better 
position to negotiate with donors. State capacity in Sub Saharan Africa has been 
growing slowly in recent decades, hindered by patrimonialism and corruption, but 
several African governments have witnessed the arrival of a new generation of 
politicians who are much more closely controlled by the media and civil society.
 These changes are all about the aid-relationship and aid itself. Aid is an im-
portant ingredient of development cooperation, but not the only one. Relations 
between Europe and developing countries are wider in scope, encompassing po-
litical cooperation and a broad variety of trade relations. Trade relations include 
access to the European market and exports from Europe to developing countries.5 
Both have been under scrutiny for more than 40 years. Access to the European 
market, because a variety of restrictions have hampered it, ranges from export 
quotas to tariffs to subsidies for European producers. The sugar campaign started 
more than 40 years ago. It promoted the consumption of cane sugar from Third 
World countries rather than beet sugar, which was highly subsidised by the Eu-
ropean Community. This shows that these kinds of subsidies under the Common 
Agricultural Policy have been the subject of criticism in Europe itself for a very 
long time. Exports from Europe were criticised because they were often highly 
subsidised and had a negative impact on world markets. Meat exports to West 
Africa were was a celebrated case here. The European Union is also subsidis-
ing the exportation of overcapacity. The Common Fisheries Policy and Fisher-
ies Agreements are examples of using subsidies to buy access to coastal fishing 
waters in developing countries, exporting overcapacity, particularly that of the 
Spanish fishing fleet.
 The European Union – and this is a fifth change – has been trying to be more 
coherent in changing, reducing and abandoning its export subsidies, in reform-
ing its agricultural policies and the fisheries agreements, and changing its access 
policies. At the same time, however, it has been criticised for changing only after 
external pressure and for trying to impose new trade relations.
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 Not all of these changes are dealt with in this volume. It does, however, offer a 
series of interesting analyses on some hotly debated issues in European develop-
ment cooperation, and a discussion of some of the instruments, old and new. It 
takes a look at the policies of ‘new’ emerging European donors and, finally, pro-
vides an insight into local initiatives from regions and municipalities in the field 
of development cooperation.
 Th e Hotly Debated Issues
Since Maastricht’s Triple C – coordination, complementarity and coherence – 
policy, coherence for development (PCD) has been one of the most hotly debated 
themes in European development cooperation.6 Coherence is relatively new as an 
important concept for development cooperation, being introduced by the DAC at 
the end of the 1980s. It can be defined as: ‘The non-occurrence of effects of a par-
ticular policy that are contrary to the intended results or objectives of that policy’. Pol-
icy coherence can be defined either narrowly or broadly. A narrow or restricted 
definition would be that the objectives of policy in a particular field may not be 
undermined or obstructed by actions or activities in this same field. A wide or 
broad definition would be that the objectives of policy in a particular field may 
not be undermined or obstructed by government actions or activities in that field 
or in other policy fields. PCD found its way into Europe in Article 130V of the 
Treaty of Maastricht which reads: ‘The Community shall take account of the objec-
tives referred to in Article 130 U in the policies that it implements which are likely to 
affect developing countries’. This is known in the field of development cooperation 
as the Maastricht Treaty’s ‘coherence article’. It was retained in the Treaties of 
Amsterdam and Nice under Title XX, as Article 178. After several Commission 
documents referring to these articles and elaborating on its principles – what 
Carbone (2009) calls ‘a decade of non-decisions’ – the European Consensus on 
Development was signed in 2005 as an ambitious new agenda. In 2007, the Euro-
pean Council adopted the ‘Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division 
of Labour in Development Policy’ and later that year the first biannual report on 
PCD appeared.
 Rolph van der Hoeven, in his article, indicates that increased or improved 
policy coherence is often proposed as a new and superior goal for activities by 
international organisations and national actors. He sees policy coherence not as 
a neutral concept but as value loaded. Achieving better results with policy co-
herence therefore depends on the national and international political context, 
as discussed, for example, in the report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization. Van der Hoeven also reviews how different interna-
European Development Cooperation.indd   9 29-6-2010   21:04:26
 Paul Hoebink
tional agencies approach policy coherence and tries to show that, despite progress 
in some organisations in establishing institutions or mechanisms fostering policy 
coherence, actual implementation and results in terms of increased aid, declining 
poverty or declining inequality are still often found wanting.
 PCD is also a contested concept in relation to the Economic Partnership 
Agreements (EPAs). The Cotonou Partnership Agreement, which succeeded the 
earlier Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, retained some of the benefits of these 
earlier treaties, like their contractual nature and predictability. However, the 
Agreement also stipulated a change in trade relations, in which there would not 
be only one form of preferential trade access, as in Lomé, which the Commission 
considered incompatible with WTO rules, but a differentiated set of six regional 
trade agreements, the EPAs. The way the Commission negotiated these agree-
ments was seen by many European parliamentarians and others as insensitive to 
historical relations and as being driven only by a free-trade agenda. The Commis-
sion and the ACP countries7 were under pressure to finalise the negotiations by 
1 January 2008, when the WTO waiver expired. The negotiations finally resulted 
in a series of interim EPAs, which led to serious splits, even between countries in 
the same regional grouping. Some countries signed interim-EPAs, while others 
refused to sign any agreement at all.
 In his paper, Stephen Dearden, who has previously examined hot topics in 
EU-Caribbean relations (Dearden 2002), reviews the negotiation of an Interim 
Economic Partnership Agreement for the Pacific group of the ACP (PACP). He 
starts with a summary of the existing trade agreements between the PACP coun-
tries and their major trading partners, and considers the relative importance of 
their trade with the EU. He then takes a look at the various impact assessments 
which have been undertaken to inform the PACP countries’ negotiations on an 
EPA, before considering the progress of the negotiations themselves, identify-
ing the issues which were to prove most problematic. The paper concludes by 
outlining the Interim Agreement, which was signed only by Fiji and Papua New 
Guinea, and by assessing the likely prospects of a Final Agreement being achieved 
by the end of 2009.
 Maurizio Carbone also looks at the Pacific and the Cotonou Agreement. In 
his eyes, the participation of Non-State Actors (NSAs) is one of the innovative 
aspects and fundamental principles of the Agreement. He assesses this partici-
pation by looking at the extent to which NSAs were consulted in the process of 
formulating Country Strategy Papers (CSPs). In the early years of this century, 
the first generation of CSPs were especially contested on their sections on PCD, 
because they were copied from one country to another (Hoebink 2005b). Car-
bone concludes that a big step forward could be observed, at least in terms of 
participation.
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 New Insights into Old Instruments
In addition to sector-wide approaches and budget support, this volume also fo-
cuses on a number of older development cooperation instruments. Some of them 
are uncontested, but have very complex set-ups and frameworks. Others have a 
long history of discussions on their efficiency and effectiveness in combating the 
problems they address. Food aid is a good example. The discussion about the 
inadequacies of this instrument has been going on for more than 40 years now. 
More recently, however, there have been discussions on energy use and on the role 
development cooperation can play in fragile states.
 Lars Holstenkamp’s article provides an overview of European initiatives to 
provide better access to energy services and more efficient and reliable energy 
supplies in Africa. The main source of energy on the continent is biomass (in the 
form of firewood), which causes all kinds of problems, including indoor air pol-
lution. It is often claimed that, without private sector involvement, political goals 
regarding energy services cannot be reached. On the other hand, private actors 
are reluctant to invest because of barriers on the supply and the demand side, with 
regard to the framework conditions, and in the financial sector. Holstenkamp 
shows that none of the initiatives adequately address demand-side barriers, and 
that there is a highly complex institutional structure comprised not only of differ-
ent policies (Africa and development, climate change, energy security), but also 
several networks and partnerships that serve as forums for exchange and coordi-
nation, and operate at different levels (bilateral, EU, multilateral/international).
 At the 1996 World Food Summit, the international community agreed to ‘pro-
mote triangular food aid operations’ to fight world food insecurity. In their article 
on food aid, Francesco Burchi and Sara Turchetti ask why countries chose this 
delivery method of food aid rather than other methods. Their paper does not 
take the validity of this objective for granted, but challenges it on a theoretical 
basis. By developing the concept of ‘best food aid’, founded on the criteria of effec-
tiveness, efficiency and transparency, they find that the objective of preferring to 
provide food aid in a triangular operation has a conceptual justification, but that 
either triangular or local purchases can be the best delivery mode, depending on 
the context. With this conceptualisation in mind, Burchi and Turchetti analyse 
food aid trends in four recipient countries in North-East Africa: Kenya, Uganda, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Using data from the WFP they conclude that no significant 
steps have been made towards better use of food aid. A further empirical analysis 
outlines differences in food aid practices between major donors. Germany is an 
example of ‘good’ practice, while Denmark and the United States are examples of 
‘bad’ food aid practices. As Scandinavian countries are usually considered good 
models of development cooperation, the authors raise the question whether ad-
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ditional quality aspects should be introduced in the more general indicators of 
development assistance.
 Jan Pospisil and Stefan Khittel compare development cooperation of small 
European states in the context of violent (or potentially violent) conflicts and 
fragile states. They refer to this as ‘security-related development cooperation’. 
Their main question is whether small states can be characterised by specific, e.g., 
innovative or conflict-sensitive approaches. They wonder what opportunities 
could emerge for these states if they were to use their ‘smallness’ productively to 
position themselves favourably in the international arena. The article compares 
the respective strategies and programs of four small European states (Austria, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland) and the tangible activities in four selected 
target regions (Colombia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, and Uganda).
 The study concludes that the four donors pursue very different policies, de-
spite the fact that three of them are members of the European Union. These 
differences reflect different traditions of development policy, which have conse-
quences both in strategic issues and interventions in the field. This shows that the 
process of unifying European foreign policy at the level of development coopera-
tion is still only in its early stages. The results generally indicate that smallness in 
itself does not automatically guarantee advantages in the field of security-related 
development cooperation. Nevertheless, it is possible to use this factor produc-
tively under delicate political circumstances, but only if the donor’s material (in 
terms of ODA volume) and political (in the sense of a unified, coherent strategy 
and working with existing long-term partnerships) commitments are steadfast.
 Th e New Emerging new European Donors
European development assistance has continued to rise in recent years. The 
EU is the world’s largest provider of development assistance. In 2008, the com-
bined assistance of the European Commission and the member states reached a 
record high of nearly 50 billion (about $67 billion or about 56 of total ODA 
for that year). In the preparation of the Financing for Development Conference 
in Monterrey (Mexico) in 2002, the old European member states reiterated that 
their objective is still to provide 0.7 of their Gross National Income to develop-
ment assistance. This target was adopted by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations nearly 40 years ago in November 1970.8 However, only four member 
states (Sweden, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, plus non-EU mem-
ber Norway) complied with this figure. The old member states of the EU agreed 
that they all will reach the 0.7 target by 2015. They have to achieve interim tar-
gets of 0.56 collectively and 0.51 individually by 2010. This is reaffirmed in the 
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European Consensus on development. At the G-8 summit at Gleneagles in 2005, 
the attending countries also pledged to double their aid to Africa.
Chart 1 Net Offi  cial Development Assistance in 2008
Source: Development Assistance Committee, OECD
Chart 2 Net Offi  cial Development Assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2008
Source: Development Assistance Committee, OECD
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If we examine the most recent ﬁ gures, it is hard to believe that the old member 
states will meet these targets. Th e United Kingdom, Germany and Belgium still 
promise to achieve the 2010 and 2015 targets, but others refer to their economic 
problems or remain silent about these commitments. Th e country lagging furthest 
behind is G-8 member and the organiser of the last G-8 summit in Aquila, Italy. 
Italy’s development assistance was artiﬁ cially high in recent years due to debt re-
lief that was extended by the Paris Club to Nigeria and Iraq, which accounted for 
more than 60 of Italy’s bilateral budget. Italian aid is expected to fall below 0.1 
in 2009, which not only means that Italy is a smaller donor than the Netherlands 
and Spain but also, relatively, a smaller donor than some of the new member states.
 The European consensus of 24 April 2005 also indicated that new member 
states would reach 0.17 in 2010 and 0.33 in 2015. Table 1 shows that half of the 
new member states (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Latvia) 
are far behind the projected targets. Only Cyprus and Slovenia will most likely 
achieve the EU goals. In fact, aid volumes actually dropped to even lower levels in 
several new member states (i.e., Bulgaria, Estonia and Hungary) in 2008.
Table 1 ODA from a number of Central and East European donors
Net disbursements in millions of euros
2005 2006 2007 2008 2007 ODA/
GNI (%)
2008 ODA/
GNI (%)
Bulgaria 2 1 16 13 0.06 0.04
Cyprus 12 21 18 27 0.12 0.17
Czech Republic 135 161 179 146 0.11 0.11
Estonia 8 12 16 14 0.12 0.09
Hungary 80 119 75 72 0.08 0.07
Latvia 8 10 12 14 0.06 0.06
Lithuania 12 18 30 41 0.11 0.13
Malta 8 7 8 6 0.15 0.11
Poland 165  236 265 264 0.10 0.08
Romania NA 3 80 94 0.07 0.07
Slovak Republic 45 44 49 65 0.09 0.10
Slovenia 29 35 38 51 0.11 0.14
Total EU-12
(new member states)
479 634 739 805 0.09 0.09
Total EU-27 45,336 47,673 45,668 49,468 0.37 0.40
Sources: DAC (2009); European Commission (2008) and (2009)
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When the Eastern bloc collapsed in 1989, the political and economic transforma-
tion of the former Soviet bloc in Europe happened quickly. The support pro-
vided by the former Soviet bloc to fellow socialist countries or ‘friendly regimes’ 
throughout the developing world quickly fell apart and, in a short period of time, 
the ideological and political underpinnings of the development policies of Cen-
tral and Eastern European (CEE) states disappeared. In light of this recent past, 
there are authors who refer to some of the new member states as ‘re-emerging 
donors’, suggesting that they could turn to their historical experiences as donors 
in the pre-1989 period. That is arguable, as many of the people who gained that 
experience have either retired or have been removed from the ministries that un-
dertook these activities. Simon Lightfoot and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizarreta 
provide an overview of this transition in their article. Upon acceding to the Euro-
pean Union, the ten CEE states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) made a commitment 
to contribute to the EU’s development cooperation policy, and, in particular, to 
meet specific targets for official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of 
gross national income (GNI). They also pledged to work towards achievement of 
the Millennium Development Goals. In their article, Lightfoot and Zubizarreta 
assess how these new donors are progressing and organising themselves.
 Beata Paragi’s paper examines the early years of Hungary’s contemporary de-
velopment policy. Hungary joined the OECD in 1996 and became an EU member 
state in 2004. These steps played a unique role in the realisation of Hungary’s 
participation in the arena of international development cooperation. Hungary’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs selected 16 partner countries in 2003. Apart from debt 
cancellation and international obligations (such as reconstruction in Afghanistan 
and Iraq) Hungary has been conducting effective and ongoing relations bilater-
ally with strategic partner countries like Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Vietnam 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungary claims to have comparative advantages in 
these countries ranging from sharing experiences of democratic transition to a 
professional contribution to water and agricultural projects.
 Paragi stresses that, as far as a general evaluation of Hungary’s development 
policy is concerned, there are certain methodological difficulties in analysing or 
assessing its framework – the relationship between the country’s foreign and 
development policies. In general, ordinary taxpayers in Hungary are not prop-
erly informed about the role of development assistance or the need to provide it, 
though public awareness is an increasing concern. The NGDO sector is only able 
to raise its voice and assert its values and interests to a limited extent, despite the 
inevitable role the sector plays in implementing these policies. Furthermore, rel-
evant information provided to the public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends 
to be inconsistent or statistically obscure.
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 For Paragi, the most important conclusions are that Hungary’s international 
development cooperation policy and practice have improved a lot over the past six 
years. Nevertheless, and unfortunately, the accuracy of the data, whether commu-
nicated regularly and publicly or provided on an ad hoc basis, is often question-
able. Moreover, professional terminology used by Hungarian stakeholders lacks 
consistency and the evaluation methodology applied by the foreign ministry is 
not made public. As a result, a lot of progress can still be made, as is the case with 
the other emerging European donors.
 The Czech Republic is a re-emerging donor, but the country is no less inte-
grated into the global economy and migration networks than the other European 
donor countries. As a new EU member state, its national policies, including those 
regarding development trade and migration, are being strongly Europeanised. 
This means that the Czech Republic also has to adhere to the principle of policy 
coherence for development (PCD). In two case studies on migration and trade, 
Ondřej Horký tries to analyse Czech discourses and practises of PCD, and its in-
stitutionalisation. He explains the positions regarding PCD of the development 
constituency and of the actors involved in migration and trade policy. He high-
lights the incoherencies in these policies, involving brain drain, remittances and 
agricultural subsidies. In the context of the reform of Czech bilateral develop-
ment cooperation, the case of migration shows that, while PCD is not generally 
reflected in the policies, it can be used by actors whose roles are endangered by 
the reduction of priority sectors in development cooperation. The case of trade 
proves that there are severe conceptual disagreements between government de-
partments and that these prevent a consensus on the significance of trade issues 
for developing countries. They also hamper further implementation of policy co-
herence practices. This leads to the conclusion that, when the concept of PCD 
is applied by ‘new’ donors, an awareness of incoherencies and agreement at the 
conceptual and analytical levels is needed as much as institutional provisions.
 From the Global to the Local
The new actors entering the development cooperation stage are not limited to 
only donor countries or philanthropic foundations. European regional and local 
governments are also becoming more and more active. Municipalities in several 
European countries have been active for more than 20 to 30 years, and thus can-
not really be considered new players. This is often referred to as ‘decentralised 
cooperation’ in Southern Europe. Municipal initiatives often stem from citizens’ 
activities supporting local projects in developing countries. Because of globalisa-
tion, and the enormous growth of international travel and communication, many 
European Development Cooperation.indd   16 29-6-2010   21:04:29
Some Recent Developments
more of these private initiatives have been initiated in the last ten years. Citizens 
support schools, orphanages and hospitals in developing countries because they 
have visited places and have more trust in, or place more value on, person-to-
person relations. In the Netherlands alone, there are more than 6,000 of these 
private initiatives, but the trend is also visible in other European countries. Mu-
nicipalities often support these types of activities with relatively small amounts 
of their budgets. They also enter into twinning relationships not only with Euro-
pean cities or villages, but also with cities in developing countries. For example, 
you might find second-hand fire equipment, buses or machinery from French 
cities in many cities in Mali.
 Marike Bontenbal explores the role of European local governments in interna-
tional development cooperation. She says that worldwide, local governments have 
become prominent players in the international development cooperation arena. 
Through various city-to-city cooperation (C2C) structures, cities partner up and 
seek to contribute to the improvement of local governance and the enhancement 
of local development in young democracies and areas affected by poverty. Within 
these structures, local governments share municipal expertise and knowledge to 
address needs in urban management and service delivery in the South. Th ere is 
a lack of knowledge of the position of local governments as development agents. 
Th is article presents the ﬁ ndings of a comparative empirical research study of 
four North-South city partnerships between Dutch and German municipalities 
and partner cities in Latin America and Africa. It examines the conditions under 
which local governments operate in international development cooperation with 
regard to existing policies, capacities and political will, and discusses the impli-
cations of these factors for the practice of city-to-city cooperation. Th e ﬁ ndings 
reveal that, due to the voluntary character of municipal involvement in North-
South cooperation, C2C eﬀ orts need suﬃ  cient local political support and have to 
be institutionalised in order to be sustainable. Th is includes a formal international 
cooperation policy framework and the availability of ﬁ nancial and human capital.
 Something that may be rather new is that regional governments are also en-
gaging in development cooperation activities. In Germany, the ‘Länder’ (states) 
have more experience in this field while, in Belgium, under the state reform act of 
the 2001 Lambermont Agreement, the language communities and regional gov-
ernments have been allowed to implement development programs since January 
2004. The ‘Länder’ and regional governments support NGO activities or private 
initiatives, usually with relatively small investments. Nevertheless, some regional 
governments have also selected partner countries. The Dutch-speaking part of 
Belgium has selected three countries in Southern Africa as preferred partners. 
Spain also has regions that have become active in the field of development coop-
eration.
European Development Cooperation.indd   17 29-6-2010   21:04:29
 Paul Hoebink
 Joki Alberdi refers to European Council regulation 1659/98 of July 1998 on 
decentralised cooperation,9 with which the European Union’s institutions rec-
ognised local public bodies as partners in this kind of cooperation. He observes 
that the most recent strategy documents on the Union’s development cooperation 
(in particular the European Consensus on Development) go no further toward 
recognising the activities of European sub-state entities as part of the EU’s devel-
opment cooperation policy. Alberdi concludes that regions and local authorities, 
unlike member states, are not regarded as relevant actors in Europe’s coopera-
tion. Despite the countless initiatives and actions by decentralised (mainly non-
governmental) aid actors, there is a palpable lack of coordination between the 
policies of local entities, European regions, member states and the Community as 
a whole.
 Alberdi indicates that the next revision of provisions for managing decen-
tralised aid may offer a chance to include the growing importance and consoli-
dation of sub-state development aid in general EU policy. He says that sub-
state aid needs to be included if European cooperation policy is to become 
more global in nature. Alberdi provides a review of the legislation, instruments 
and institutional structures of European decentralised cooperation, with the 
aim being to search for greater coherence and complementarity between the 
cooperation policies of non-state bodies. He also analyses possible formulae for 
the direct and indirect participation of non-state authorities in the Commu-
nity’s aid policy and possible forms of collaboration between public (Commu-
nity, state and sub-state) administrations. In this context, the article discusses 
the following topics: the distribution of competence in international coopera-
tion, the limits to development aid from sub-state authorities, their capacity 
for initiatives in relation to international aid treaties, forms of participation in 
the Union’s institutions that design and carry out the European Union’s devel-
opment policy, and the creation of institutions for dialogue and cooperation 
between different administrative forms and levels. His article ends with some 
reflections on the challenges and the dilemmas facing decentralised aid in the 
European Union.
 Conclusion
This book presents a panoramic overview of recent developments in European de-
velopment cooperation. Of course, it is easy to identify missing aspects or themes. 
There are no articles on the development policies of the old member states, but 
that is because they were part of an earlier volume (Hoebink and Stokke 2005). 
Nor are there any articles on new aid instruments and present coordination and 
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cooperation between donors and between donor and recipient governments. We 
hope that they will be subject of a subsequent volume. There is no analysis of the 
European NGO world and its relations with European governments, because a 
special volume is being produced on that subject (Hoebink and Schulpen 2010). 
Other instruments, themes and donor and recipient activities could be identi-
fied that are not included here. This book is not an encyclopaedia of European 
development cooperation, but it does offer insights into a series of topics and new 
developments.
 What can be concluded is that, at the beginning of the new century, numerous 
important changes have been taking place in European development coopera-
tion. Some of these might be a cause for concern. I repeat that the proliferation 
of types of donors and the fragmentation of development assistance might in the 
end hinder the reduction of worldwide poverty. However, the other side of that 
coin might be that thousands of initiatives produce more drops to erode pov-
erty away than the previous hundreds. Other changes undoubtedly show positive 
trends, such as the trend towards more policy coherence in the European Union, 
towards higher volumes of aid in particular from some old member states, to-
wards a better use of the instruments, and towards the improved monitoring of 
development effectiveness.
 Development cooperation has received criticism from many quarters in re-
cent years. It has not only been called ineffective, it has also been accused of 
fostering corruption and of obstructing democratisation.10 In general, these 
criticisms are not very convincing. Most of them echo the negative results of 
econometric studies on aid effectiveness, ignoring similar studies that show 
positive results. They also fail to reflect the wide variety of actors with different 
aid rationales and intentions, different organisation and differences in efficiency 
that can be found in development cooperation. Finally and surprisingly, they all 
attach high expectations to aid, overestimating what it can and will do, and thus 
ending up with a negative view of what it has achieved. Initiatives and activities 
to reduce poverty must, in the first place, come from aid recipients themselves. It 
is they who have to do the job. International donors can only offer a climate and 
a system which offers chances and opportunities, and some assistance in taking 
advantage of these opportunities. In that respect, aid is and cannot be anything 
more than a small contribution, an accessory, a temporary relief and at best a 
catalyst. That being said, it remains important to discuss, study and analyse the 
different forms of development cooperation so as to ensure, in the end, that it is 
as efficient and effective as possible, and can make its own contribution to end-
ing poverty.
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 Notes
 For summaries and critical reflections see: Black/White () and Summer/Tiwari 
().
 Hopefully a new volume in the EADI-series will devote attention to these changes, which 
are not addressed in this volume.
 This is not to say that project aid should be stopped everywhere, but that the new aid 
instruments are better suited to certain sets of circumstances (like in the social sectors), 
while project aid might be a better instrument in others, like infrastructure. This holds 
for some very large projects, like road or energy construction works, but might also apply 
for small projects outside the public sector.
 For a discussion on donor-recipient relations that does not always correctly capture the 
tensions between them, see Whitfield ().
 For an overview of trade relations, but not on European exports, see chapters five to eight 
in Holland ().
 For a discussion and analysis of the concept, see Hoebink ( and ) and, for some 
more recent debates, Carbone ().
  countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific which are signatories to the Lomé 
Conventions and the Cotonou Agreement. 
 The resolution on the strategy Second Development Decade no.  (XXV) reads (para 
): ‘In recognition of the special importance of the role which can be fulfilled only by 
official development assistance, a major part of financial resource transfers to the develop-
ing countries should be provided in the form of official development assistance. Each eco-
nomically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance 
to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount 
of . of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the decade’. One can 
argue that this was a general statement and, although repeated in  and many times 
thereafter, it was more of a moral than a legal obligation. If one agrees with that argument 
the European commitments of  and  legally bind European members states to 
the . norm for the first time.
 Council Regulation (EC) No / of  July  on decentralised cooperation.
 Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Aid is an example of this. I am not going to repeat my critique 
of that book, which can be found on the CIDIN website (www.ru.nl/cidin) and, in an 
abridged version in NORRAG News, no. , June .
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The Hotly Debated Issues
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Policy Coherence
 Th e Newest Fad in the International Discourse?
Rolph van der Hoeven1
 Policy Coherence
It took a considerable amount of time before even economists began con-
sidering economic policy as a coherent entity. In most text books on eco-
nomics or on economic policy, separate components such as trade policy, 
agricultural policy, credit policy and wage policy are considered without 
much attention to their interdependence and targets and instruments of 
each of these components are often considered in isolation. Th is means that 
the general coherence has been neglected. Th is interdependence is a reality, 
however, and that is why the unit that needs to be considered is the totality 
of all measures in execution at any given moment or those being proposed 
simultaneously; this we shall call a system of economic policy or an eco-
nomic policy.2
Tinbergen 1952, p. 68
The above quote stems from one of the major theoretical works of the first Nobel 
laureate in economics, Jan Tinbergen: On the Theory of Economic Policy. Tinber-
gen3 clearly explains that coherence lies at the heart of economic policymaking. 
The quote, although from a 1952 publication, is very appropriate in describing 
the actual situation. However, when the debate on policy coherence (re)surfaced 
in the 1990s, Tinbergen’s elegant formulation got lost in the literature.4 In a less 
well-known sequel to his theory of economic policy, Tinbergen expands his anal-
ysis of policy making by introducing multiple actors, each with different objective 
functions (Tinbergen 1954). Here he demonstrates that in a situation of multiple 
actors, with different objective functions and with certain boundary conditions, it 
is difficult to define and achieve an optimum economic policy and to find a maxi-
mum solution for the various parties concerned. The latter argument is taken 
up, as Picciotti (2004) recalls, by Arrow (1963) with his impossibility theorem in 
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which he argues that only under a full dictatorship can optimal economic solu-
tions be achieved.
 Hoebink (1999 and 2004) and others (especially Winters 2002) have indeed 
argued that any meaningful discussion of policy coherence should first indicate 
the of what, the by whom and the for what of policy coherence. This simple ob-
servation may seem semantic, but many authors and analysts have failed to an-
swer these basic questions. But any assessment of whether policies are coherent 
depends on what these policies are supposed to achieve and on who can take the 
necessary action to implement them.
 This paper develops the following lines of argument. Most commentators and 
analysts see Policy Coherence as a system to achieve better policy coordination 
among different actors (e.g., UN 2006), but actors often have different objective 
functions and that is what we observe in many cases. This leads not infrequently 
to what Hoebink (2004) calls intended policy incoherence5. In this paper we (re) 
confirm the observations of Tinbergen and Arrow that it remains difficult to 
achieve policy coherence at a national level, and that this difficulty to achieve 
policy coherence at the national level is actually reinforced by the current process 
of globalisation, which is, amongst others, leading to greater inequalities within 
most countries. Current globalisation often limits policy choices at a national 
level and therefore leads to or reinforces incoherence between various national 
economic and social policies. This process of national incoherence, which is man-
ifested, for example, in the growing inequalities within countries, strengthens the 
calls for increased policy coherence at the international level.
 But policy coherence at the international level in the current context of globali-
sation cannot be isolated from two important questions: Firstly, which countries 
and which groups are benefiting or losing out in the current process of globalisa-
tion? And secondly, does the current process of globalisation actually necessitate 
a process of growing national inequality for being successful (Pronk 2003). If the 
latter was the case, one might have to conclude that arguing for greater policy 
coherence at an international level, without questioning the current process of 
globalisation itself and the growing inequalities it brings about is naïve and may 
result in discussing the wrong or less appropriate solutions.
 The focus of this paper is consequently on whether coherent policy alterna-
tives exist for a fairer globalisation and under which circumstances policy co-
herence for a fairer globalisation will achieve poverty reduction and decreasing 
inequality. A prior version of this paper showed that poverty cannot be reduced 
permanently and in a sustainable manner through hand outs or transfers and that 
reducing inequality as well as full and adequately remunerated employment is a 
‘conditio sine qua non ‘for poverty alleviation’.6
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 Diﬀ erent Notions of Policy Coherence for Development in the 
International Debate
Hoebink (2004), in his detailed analysis of Policy Coherence for development, 
mentions the coherence debates between, the EU and the OECD DAC secretar-
iat and also refers to the coherence debate between IMF, World Bank and WTO. 
Since then, more notions of coherence have been proposed, notably in 2004 by 
the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation, created by the 
ILO, which emphasised coherence between economic and social policies at the 
national and international levels and by the UN panel on System-Wide Coher-
ence in 2006 on improving global governance by the UN and its related organs. 
See table 1.
Table 1 Overview of Major Strands of Policy Coherence for Development Debates
Time Major publication Purpose in short Brief assessment 
IMF, World 
Bank, WTO
1994 Marrakech 
Declaration
Trade, fi nancial and 
economic policy 
Some progress
OECD 1996 Shaping the 
21st century and 
consequent DAC 
country review 
Development Various attempts, but 
outcome poor
EU 1992, 1997 Treaties of Maastricht 
and of Amsterdam 
Development Creation of various 
institutions for policy 
coherence , but mixed 
results
WCSDG/ILO 2004 Report WCSDG Employment, social 
and economic policy 
Objective accepted, 
but diffi  cult 
implementation
UN 2006 Report: Delivering 
as One
Improved global 
governance and 
development 
Hardly any progress
An overview of these five major strands of policy coherence for development fol-
lows. As argued above, there is a correlation between the lack of national poli-
cies for coherence and the coherent policies of international organisations. The 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation has argued that 
policy coherence starts at home. The following section thus intermittently dis-
cusses national and international aspects of Policy Coherence for Development.
European Development Cooperation.indd   27 29-6-2010   21:04:29
 Rolph van der Hoeven
 Policy Coherence between the IMF, World Bank and WTO
According to the Bretton Woods Project, the first mention of the concept of 
policy coherence relating to the Bretton Woods Organizations (IMF and World 
Bank or WB) and the WTO, appears in the ministerial declarations that pre-
ceded the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in 1993 (BWP 2003).7 Policy 
coherence was embodied in the 1994 WTO Agreement,8 as it was assumed that 
it contributed to more rapid economic development, an objective both for the 
BWOs and the WTO.
 Grabel (2007) provides a useful overview and notes that these original co-
herence commitments have been reaffirmed and extended in different fora since 
the issue was first discussed. For instance, the WB and the IMF each signed 
separate agreements to cooperate with the WTO in 1996. At the 1999 Seattle 
WTO ministerial meeting, the WTO, WB and IMF issued a ‘Joint Declaration 
on Coherence,’ a statement that reflected a shared belief that trade liberalisation 
was essential to the promotion of global growth and stability (BWP 2001). Fol-
lowing the Doha declaration of 2001, the WTO established a Working Group on 
Debt, Trade and Finance, which was charged with examining the potential of the 
organisation to ‘strengthen the coherence of international trade and finance poli-
cies with a view to safeguarding the multilateral trading system from the effects 
of monetary and financial instability’.
 Grabel (2007) argues:
In the hands of the IMF-WB-WTO, it is hardly surprising that coherence 
has come to mean the need for the simultaneous pursuit of complementary 
policies that further the neo-liberal agenda. Today, the drive toward policy 
coherence has been entirely subsumed under this agenda.’ He goes on to say 
that ‘One of the most visible manifestations of this drive has been the em-
phasis on trade liberalisation and integration of developing countries into 
the WTO as critical components of WB-IMF work over the last decade.’ 
Indeed, UNCTAD notes that ‘the principle vehicle for trade liberalisation 
are conditions attached to IMF-WB loans (UNCTAD 1999: 87 in Rowden 
2001).
The WB’s commitment to facilitate a countries’ accession to the WTO began in 
1996 with the launch of the ‘Integrated Framework’ program. These comments 
point to perhaps the greatest concern about the abuse of the concept of coher-
ence. The emphasis on policy coherence by the WB-IMF-WTO constrains the 
national policy space available to developing countries, creates a ‘locking in’ of 
neo-liberal policies, and validates neo-liberal arguments about the limited role of 
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the state in the development process. It is becoming far more difficult to pursue 
diverse types of national policies and for policy makers to engage in any type of 
policy experimentation because of the interlocking power of the IMF-WB-WTO 
and because of the formidable dispute settlement mechanisms in bi- and multi-
lateral trade agreements that threaten severe sanctions for any departures from 
the neo-liberal regime.
 A similar concern is being raised by the South Centre (2003), which argues 
that:
[A]ll too often today, many developing countries are required under their 
WTO commitments or ‘advised’ as a consequence of World Bank/IMF 
loan conditionality to focus on trade and trade policy in ways that may be 
inappropriate for them and their development plans. Th erefore, at the level 
of economic policymaking, multilateral economic institutions such as the 
WTO, World Bank and IMF need to ensure that global trade and ﬁ nancial 
integration are carefully balanced with the promotion of social and eco-
nomic development, especially in developing countries.
Its analysis provides an overview of the Coherence agenda at the WTO and tries 
to inject a new perspective on how such an agenda can be made to serve the devel-
opment goals and interests of developing countries. It emphasises that the recog-
nition of ‘policy space’ and the placement of development goals as the central foci 
of coherence in global economic policymaking, can be used to form the core of a 
more positive ‘Coherence Agenda’ in favour of developing countries development 
interests in the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions.
 Winters, is also sceptical on more theoretical grounds of greater policy coher-
ence between IMF, World Bank and WTO. He argues that it make little sense 
to force more policy coherence upon these organisations because the concept is 
basically non-operational because it defines no joint issues or positions around 
which to cohere. According to Winters, coherence is a rhetorical device... (Win-
ters 2004: p. 1).
 Policy Coherence for Development: Th e EU and OECD
The Policy Coherence activities in the OECD and EU are among the most ana-
lysed and discussed in development literature (see especially Hoebink 1999; 
2004; Picciotti 2004; OECD 2004a etc.; Ashoff 2005).
 Although the EU and the OECD are different entities, the nature and details 
of the discussions on Policy Coherence in these institutions are both concentrat-
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ed on spotting and trying to avoid policy incoherence between narrow develop-
ment cooperation activities and policies, national economic, social and environ-
ment policies and policy stances in international fora on these issues.
 According to a senior official at the OECD (Lhanalampi 2007), the dimen-
sions of coherence considered are:
– Internal coherence within development co-operation policies
– Intra-country coherence: consistency between aid and non-aid policies of a 
single donor
– Inter-donor coherence: consistency of aid and non-aid policies of many donors.
– Donor-partner coherence to achieve shared development objectives: consis-
tency of donor and developing country policies.
Th e OECD, through it Development Assistance Committee (DAC) country re-
views, discusses their commitment and application of sound coherence in mem-
ber states policies with member states. Th e DAC publication: Shaping the 21st 
century: Th e contribution of development Cooperation describes policy coherence 
as a major responsibility of the donor countries, (OECD/DAC 1996, p. 15). Th e 
2001 Development Committee’s guidelines on Poverty Reduction also emphasised 
Policy Coherence for poverty reduction and suggested institutional requirements 
for improving policy coherence in the shaping of the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) in which the DAC played a major role (OECD/DAC 2001). As a 
follow-up, it organised a major conference on Policy Coherence in 2004 at which 
DAC members were asked to report on the progress of policy Coherence (OECD 
2005). In reviewing the OECD policies, Ashoﬀ  (2005), argues that:
... the recommendations focus on policy Coherence primarily from the per-
spective of the centre of government (Head of government, oﬃ  ce of the 
head of Government)... Th e call for Policy Coherence is usually voiced by 
the department responsible for development policy and not by the centre... 
a study by the OECD Public management Service concentrates on policy 
management within the system of government and largely ignores the po-
litical arena in which government action is taken... (p. 50).
In the EU, Policy Coherence for Development as a notion was introduced in the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (article 130V). It was first mentioned explicitly in the 
Commission’s decision on Beef export subsidies in 1994 but only indirectly re-
ferred to in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 (Hoebink 2004). Political pressure 
from parliamentarians and NGOs has since resulted in the Commission assum-
ing a much more active attitude on coherence. Hoebink (2004, p. 203-206) de-
scribes various drafts of the Commission and discussions in the Council of Min-
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isters from 1999 to 2002, with a proposal for impact assessments. The adoption of 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG)9 prompted the EU to become more 
explicit on Policy Coherence for Development. Communication 2005-134 stated
Th e EU commitment to Policy Coherence is not only a key political com-
mitment in the context of the MDGs. It also has a ﬁ rm legal basis in the 
EU treaty (Art. 178). Th e new EU constitution upholds this commitment 
to coherence in even stronger terms (Art III-202, Art. III-316). When ex-
ploring ways to accelerate progress towards achieving the MDGs, the EU 
is committed to looking beyond the frontiers of development cooperation, 
and consider the challenge of how non-aid policies can assist developing 
countries in attaining the MDGs’ (EU 2005 pp. 3-4).
In this communication, the Commission also promised a progress report on co-
herence at the mid-term evaluation of the MDG.
 Since the discussions and proposals for Policy Coherence for Development 
began, in some cases already 10 years ago, it may be useful to gauge whether all 
these combined donor efforts in the EU and OECD have improved development 
results. We do this using 3 cases.
 Firstly, we analyse a recent review of a major program, which the European 
Commission launched to foster governance reform in ACP countries receiving 
donor support from the EU. Secondly, we review the Commitment to Develop-
ment Index, which the Centre for Global Governance in Washington has been 
publishing since 2003 to mark progress on donor policy coherence. Thirdly, we 
use an evaluation on coherence between economic and social policy operations of 
the World Bank. EU and the OECD members are the major shareholders in the 
World Bank. Their concern for greater Policy Coherence should thus be reflected 
in the World Bank’s operations.
 Th e Commission of the European Union Governance Incentive 
Tranche Program
Molenaers and Nijs (2008) describe a European Commission initiative (the EC 
Governance Incentive Tranche – ECGIT-Program) to incite ACP countries to 
formulate action plans for governance reforms. In this program the countries that 
formulate effective action plans are rewarded with an additional tranche of EC 
support. The European Commission regards the ECGIT program as one of its 
most important and innovative development programs.
 Based on desk reviews and interviews Molenaers and Nijs note weaknesses in 
both the design and implementation of the program. They review whether the 
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modalities of the program by rewarding different tranches to countries which 
exhibit ‘better governance’ and live up to aid effectiveness norms of selectivity, 
principles of ownerships, harmonisation, alignment and mutual accountability 
as formulated in the OECD Paris Declaration on Aid (Paris High-level Forum 
2005). They conclude that this is often not the case and explain that this is due 
to incoherent behaviour between three sets of actors, i.e., national interests (EU 
member states), specifically European interests (emanating from European Insti-
tutions and member states) and the bureaucratic interests of the European insti-
tutions. They argue that the interplay of these different interests groups in this 
program that rewards developing countries with increased aid allocations has led 
to many of the pitfalls of incoherence of earlier aid programs, which the OECD 
Paris declaration tried to rectify.
 Th e CGD Commitment to the Development Index
A way to assess the progress in coherence by donors is to track certain indices 
over a longer period of time. This allows for inter-temporal and inter-country 
comparisons. Indices are always fraught with methodological problems in deter-
mining the different components of the indices and in determining the weighting 
of the different components in the overall index. Assigning weights to different 
programs is often based on an implicit notion of a welfare function of those con-
structing the index. But, as long as the construction of, and the different weights 
within, the index are explicit, these indices can be a useful analytical tool.
 One of the few indices that allows one to review progress on development 
intentions and activities of major donor countries is the Commitment to De-
velopment Index constructed by the Centre for Global Development. The 2007 
version of the CGD’s Commitment to Development Index is reproduced below 
(table 2). The purpose of the index is to raise awareness that developed (donor) 
country policies on various issues such as aid, migration, intellectual property 
rights, financial policies etc. is important for development and that discussions 
on development consequently need to include these in conjunction with devel-
opment aid and aid programs. The index’s objective four explicitly states that 
coherence matters. An analysis of the index over the past years explicitly reveals 
3 issues: Firstly, that there is a wide variety in development practices among the 
major donors (hence, no overall coherence between EU and OECD members 
states); secondly, that even the countries with the best scores, still score too low 
in at least one or more areas of development policy (hence, the need for improved 
national coherence); and thirdly, that the index changes very little over time. It 
becomes obvious that there is no clear sense of progress among the different 
countries (hence, inertia in achieving greater policy coherence) (See graph 1). The 
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Table 2 Commitment to Devolopment Index 2007
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OECD DAC secretariat has admitted this and has warned that most members 
have made little or no progress in focusing on the need to improve development 
policies and increasing development aid.
 As indicated above, it may sound unfair to judge the efforts of donor countries 
based on a simple index, but, in terms of our thesis, a discussion based on the 
index is appropriate; firstly, because the construction of the index is extremely 
transparent. All elements are in the public domain and can thus be used to dis-
cuss the strength and weaknesses of the index and, secondly, because this overall 
assessment can feed into the broader debate on policy coherence, rather than have 
the debate become bogged down in discussions about details.
 Coherence in Developing Countries Aid Supported Development 
Strategies
One of the ultimate aims of Policy Coherence for Development is to enable devel-
oping countries to take responsibility for the development assistance they receive. 
One of the instruments used to achieve this is the so-called Poverty Reduction 
Strategies, which are elaborated in the so-called Poverty reduction Strategy Pa-
pers (PRSPs). The World Bank and the IMF have been introducing these strate-
gies since the end of the 1990’s (at the same time as the debate on policy coherence 
came onto the agenda of the OECD and the EU) as a necessary aspect of securing 
HIPC debt relief and access to other funds. These strategies are intended to in-
crease national ‘ownership’ of the poverty reduction programs, through extensive 
participation of national and donor stakeholders.
 Stewart and Wang (2003) argue that
as far as civil society is concerned, the PRSPs currently permit little signiﬁ -
cant contribution to program design. Governments appear to have taken a 
larger role, but are also very constrained, especially with respect to macro-
policy. Th e fact that the content of PRSPs is very similar to previous adjust-
ment packages, suggests that little real change has occurred through this 
process. Moreover, some large IFI programs are unaﬀ ected by the process. 
Hence, PRSPs do not signiﬁ cantly empower poor countries.
Th ey may give the appearance of greater ownership, but as long as there is 
no signiﬁ cant underlying change, a change in perceptions about ownership, 
which could make IFI designed programs more eﬀ ective and thereby em-
power them, is likely to be short lived (p. 1).
Many other observers have also echoed this assessment. For example, Morgandi 
argues that ‘the role that PRSPs have played over recent years in shaping the ac-
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tual policies of the World Bank and the country-level operational zing of these 
policies, as carried out in the Country Assistance Strategy, the WB country busi-
ness plan, is overestimated’. In effect,
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have had a minimal impact on the pol-
icy content of World Bank-IMF operations at the country level, especially 
where the policies of the PRSPs do not coincide with the pre-established 
priorities of the World Bank. In eﬀ ect, the WB Country Assistance Strat-
egy (CAS), which guides all WB country-level lending and programs, se-
lects from the PRSPs only the topics it considers important according to 
the WB strategic priorities’ (Morgandi 2007, p. 1).
Morgandi argues that even in countries where Core Labour Standards (CLS) are 
highlighted in the PRSPs, the CASs never even acknowledged let alone opera-
tionalised CLS in any project. Thus, efforts at the country level to make national 
laws and policies compatible with each other are undermined if not obliterated 
by overlapping the WB’s own programs and policy blueprints. In more than one 
case, technical assistance at the country level to improve regulations was reversed, 
or confuted by subsequent analytical work carried out by the WB. Furthermore, 
prioritising the PRSPs to focus on employment-intensive investment has been 
disregarded in actual WB operations, since employment is never considered a 
progress indicator for WB operations, even if the government made employment a 
specific outcome indicator in its own PRSP.
 Morgandi also observes that WB operational successes are never assessed 
against the PRSPs objectives (such as employment creation), but only against 
CAS objectives and the PRPS’s Joint Staff Assessments (which the WB uses to 
highlight the elements in the PRSPs that are ‘acceptable’). All this does not imply 
that PRSPs are unimportant; other bilateral donors make some use of them to 
direct their development strategies, and PRSPs can also still direct the use of 
national resources and polices (to the extent that donors and creditors do not 
contradict them directly). However, due to the increased coordination efforts of 
the Paris Declaration Alignment and Harmonization Process, it will become in-
creasingly important to monitor the policy content of the WB and the IMF, as 
these institutions are likely to have a greater influence than national PRSs in also 
coordinating bilateral donors’ assistance. Hence, it is essential that more policy 
coherence be sought both upstream and downstream within the PRSP process, 
before it can become more development oriented.
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 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation: 
Policy Coherence for Fair Globalisation
The growing importance the international community is giving to objectives such 
as poverty reduction, full employment, decent work provisions and the reduction 
of inequalities has necessarily led to a greater demand for the coherence of poli-
cies pursued by national governments and the multilateral system. The current 
practise is increasingly challenged for at least three reasons. Firstly, although the 
consensus about newly formulated objectives has been large, the policy instru-
ments and the coherence between these instruments still leave much to be de-
sired. Secondly, at a national level, policies are defined and implemented through 
sectoral and specialised departments and are not always harmonised and coordi-
nated for either practical or political reasons. Thirdly, globalisation of trade and 
capital flows and the tighter integration of world markets and societies have not 
only weakened these national coordination efforts, but have also heightened the 
international consequences of national actions on labour and social outcomes.
 These new challenges for policy coherence between economic and social issues 
stand in contrast to the situation back in the 20th century when policy making, at 
least in developing countries, was mostly informed by the so-called Washington 
Consensus, which set the parameters for international policy coherence and was 
heavily influenced by the policy setting of the IFIs, although it was not accepted 
by all of the involved parties.10
 Th e World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization in its 2004 
report ‘A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All’ (ILO, 2004), enlarged 
the then current notion of policy coherence between trade, aid and ﬁ nancial poli-
cies and added the need for greater coherence between economic and social policies 
to it. Th e World Commission identiﬁ ed particular weaknesses in global govern-
ance. ‘Th e normal pressures in national politics to strike a compromise based on a 
trade-oﬀ  between competing economic, social and environmental goals are typi-
cally absent in the global context’ (paragraph 352). Th e Commission observed that 
international organisations should ‘apply their mandates in practice in ways that 
do not place their members in contradiction with obligations which they have also 
undertaken in other international instruments and treaties’ (paragraph 603).
 The World Commission report makes the point that the benefits of globali-
sation are not reaching enough people and are badly distributed within and be-
tween countries. It concluded that individuals, families and communities judge 
globalisation positively or negatively mainly based on the impact it has on their 
lives at work. That the ‘jobs issue’ is at the heart of people’s priorities worldwide is 
confirmed by polls and politics. If full employment were the norm, the backlash 
would be significantly weaker.
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 In this context, the Commission proposed ‘decent work for all should be made 
a global goal and be pursued through coherent policies within the multilateral 
system. This would respond to a major political demand in all countries and dem-
onstrate the capacity of the multilateral system to find creative solutions to this 
critical problem.’ Specific suggestions were made to promote policy coherence for 
development. At the national level, the Commission suggested regular national 
reviews of the social implications of economic, financial and trade policies.
 At the international level, the Commission proposed that Policy Coherence In-
itiatives should be launched by the relevant international organisations to develop 
more balanced policies for achieving fair and inclusive globalisation. Th e objective 
would be to progressively develop integrated policy proposals that appropriately 
balance economic, social, and environmental concerns on speciﬁ c issues.
 The first initiative addresses the question of global growth, investment, and 
employment creation. As Lee (2004) argues, an underlying notion in the Com-
mission’s reasoning is that the sustained creation of more and progressively bet-
ter employment can only be achieved in the context of high and stable sustain-
able growth in the global economy accompanied by domestic policies focussing 
on productive employment and decent work. This, in turn, depends on ensuring 
high levels of productive investment and consumption. Moreover, both ‘growth’ 
and ‘investment’ are strategic economic variables that depend on a wide range of 
policies and institutional arrangements. Those governing the flows of trade, di-
rect foreign investment, finance, and technology are of obvious importance. Each 
of these is also increasingly interrelated to the others as a result of increasing 
globalisation. This has been clearly recognised by the WTO, IMF and the World 
Bank in their arrangements for ensuring coherence between these policies. Em-
ployment and Decent Work is not merely a by-product of these economic vari-
ables. Labour market policies and institutions also exert an influence on growth 
and investment through their impact on skill formation, labour mobility, the mo-
tivation and productivity of workers, the degree of wage and income inequality, 
the resolution of distributional issues either through confrontation or social dia-
logue and the resulting effect of all these factors on productivity. In addition, poli-
cies towards enterprise creation and technology development also have an impact 
on investment, growth and employment. In particular, it is important to focus 
on institutional and policy reforms to enhance the contribution of the informal 
economy to growth and employment creation.
 The notion of Policy Coherence introduced by the commission clearly em-
phasised Tinbergen’s aforementioned notion and underscores the need for policy 
space for developing countries.
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 United Nations Reform and Policy Coherence
Coherence among the policy spheres of labour, finance and trade is central to 
the original vision of the post-Second World War United Nations multilateral 
system. These were supposed to be embodied in the ILO, the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and an International Trade Organization, with each of these insti-
tutions having overlapping rather than exclusive mandates among these policy 
spheres. For the ILO, this vision of policy coherence became further embodied 
in the Philadelphia Declaration of 1944, which states that ‘it is a responsibility of 
the International Labour Organization to examine and consider all international 
economic and financial polices and measures in light of this fundamental objec-
tive’, where the fundamental objective is ‘social justice’.
 Article I of the International Monetary Fund’s Articles of Agreement states 
that one of the purposes of the International Monetary Fund is to ‘facilitate the 
expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby 
to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income 
and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary 
objectives of economic policy.’
 Provisions for the protection of workers’ rights in trade agreements were ad-
dressed by the Havana Charter of 1948, which was supposed to lead to the crea-
tion of an International Trade Organization. Indeed, Article 7 of the Charter 
is titled ‘Fair Labour Standards’ and states: ‘The Members recognise that unfair 
labour conditions, particularly in production for export, create difficulties in 
international trade, and, accordingly, each Member shall take whatever action 
may be appropriate and feasible to eliminate such conditions within its ter-
ritory.’ Tellingly, the Havana Charter was the product of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment and the participants clearly recognised 
the link between the two spheres when they pledged to work together under 
the International Trade Organization to ‘facilitate ... solution of problems relat-
ing to international trade in the fields of employment, economic development, 
commercial policy, business practices and commodity policy’. Instead of an In-
ternational Trade Organization as proposed by Keynes, there was for a long 
time only the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1948 dealing 
with trade issues. When GATT was finally supplanted by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) in 1994, not much changed, because neither GATT nor the 
WTO address labour concerns in their regulations. At the WTO’s Ministerial 
Conference in Singapore in 1996, however, the participants confirmed their com-
mitment to respecting basic workers’ rights and further agreeing that the ILO 
was the appropriate agency in the multilateral system for setting and enforcing 
international labour standards.
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 This multilateral system has been challenged recently by globalisation and has 
thus increasingly stressed the importance of facilitating national and global ac-
tion in support of sustainable development ‘in its economic, social and environ-
mental aspects’ as was stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome.
 Such a holistic approach stands in sharp contrast to the current practise of the 
multilateral system organised along sectoral lines, divided between economic and 
financial institutions, specialised agencies of the UN system and various funds 
and programs established for particular purposes and groups. This explains why, 
alongside the establishment of a global consensus on the creation of ‘an environ-
ment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to the develop-
ment and to the elimination of poverty’ and the identification of key priorities for 
development as those found in the Millennium Declaration, calls for an increased 
coherence of policies have multiplied. Indeed, the Millennium Declaration it-
self resolves ‘to ensure greater policy coherence and better cooperation between 
the United Nations, its agencies, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the World 
Trade Organization, as well as other multilateral bodies, with a view to achieving 
a fully coordinated approach to the problems of peace and development’.
 In 2000, the United Nations General Assembly supported globalisation as ‘a 
positive force for all the world’s people’, noting both the opportunities it offered as 
well as the uneven sharing of its benefits and costs. Such concerns were reiterated 
in 2005 when the involved Heads of State ‘strongly supported fair globalisation 
and resolved to make the goals of full and productive employment and decent 
work for all, including for women and young people, a central objective of our 
relevant national and international policies as well as our national development 
strategies, including poverty reduction strategies, as part of our efforts to achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals’ (Paragraph 47). Further endorsement came 
from the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in July 2006 through 
a Ministerial Declaration, which ‘Strongly encouraged multilateral and bilateral 
donor and inter-agency cooperation and coordination in the pursuit of the goals 
of full and productive employment and decent work for all’.
 The Monterrey Consensus on the financing of development (March 2002) 
squarely established the principle of shared responsibility, committing develop-
ing and developed countries to specific principles and objectives allowing for a 
more equal distribution of the benefits of globalisation. The 2005 World Sum-
mit Outcome document recalled that ‘It is particularly important for developing 
countries, bearing in mind development goals and objectives that all countries 
take into account the need for appropriate balance between national policy space 
and international disciplines and commitments’. The Trade and Development 
Report of UNCTAD (UNCTAD 2004), echoes similar concerns: ‘The need for 
coherence between the international trading system and the international mon-
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etary and financial system has gained in importance with the abandoning of the 
system of fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates and the adoption of widespread 
floating, combined with a return of private international capital flows...’ (Trade 
and Development Report 2004, page vii).
 Most recently, the UN Secretary General installed a high-level panel on Unit-
ed Nations System-Wide Coherence, which delivered its report on 9 November 
2006. Although the report was well received, the political context of the report 
– commissioned by the outgoing UN Secretary General, which thus deprived his 
successor of a fresh new initiative – made the authors of the report reluctant to 
propose drastic changes.
 In effect, most of the report’s recommendations relate to country-level coop-
eration and to more coherent policy setting by different UN organisations at a 
country level. In this context, the role of the United Nations Development Pro-
gram (UNDP) should be strengthened and, in several pilot countries, joint ac-
tivities and development programming between various UN organisations are 
taking place to forge so-called One UN teams. These activities have been enthu-
siastically supported by various bilateral donor organisations.
 However, the recommendations of the report (UN 2006) have been rather 
muted on important global governance issues and especially on the coherence 
between activities of the UN and Breton Woods Institutions:
Th e United Nations and the Bretton Woods Institutions were established 
with the intention that they would work together in a complementary way. 
Over time, both the World Bank and the United Nations as institutions 
have gradually expanded their roles, so that there is an increasing over-
lap and duplication in their work. A balance needs to be struck between 
healthy competition and ineﬃ  cient overlaps and unﬁ lled gaps. Th e Bret-
ton Woods Institutions and the United Nations need to work more closely 
together to remove unnecessary duplication and build on their respective 
strength (p. 15).
The panel thus recommends:
... as a matter of urgency, that the Secretary General, the President of the 
World Bank and the Executive Director of the International Monetary 
Fund set up a process to review, update and conclude formal agreements on 
their respective roles and relations at the global and the country level. Th ese 
reviews must be periodically updated as ell as assessed (p. 16).
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This muted set of recommendations in relation to the important issue of Policy 
Coherence between the UN, its agencies and the Bretton Woods Institutions ap-
pear to be the result of lobbying efforts by major industrialised countries, which 
wanted to safeguard the ‘status apart’ of the Bretton Woods Institutions. This 
attitude by the major industrialised countries could be labelled ‘intended policy 
incoherence’ (Hoebink 2004). One reason why some industrialised countries want 
to maintain the speciﬁ c status of the BW organisations is that these organisations 
voice the concerns of some major groups within the developed countries, which 
want to keep the primacy of national policy making restricted to economic policy 
making (as recent discussion on the issue of central bank independence and the 
objectives of price stability and employment creation indicate). Moreover, Winters 
(2002) also mentions how international recommendations for giving more politi-
cal power to Central Banks to thus create an order of importance among speciﬁ c 
national institutions seems to resolve a problem of policy incoherence at the na-
tional level, without, however, dealing with the political implications of this.11
 Conclusions
The World Commission on Globalization, like many other analysts, has raised 
concern about growing inequality as a consequence of globalisation. Although, as 
Kanbur (2005) has argued, it sometimes depends on how and by whom statistics 
are interpreted, but it remains appropriate to say that, under various circum-
stances, globalisation will work to the disadvantage of the poor either absolutely 
or by increasing inequalities, whereby the poor profit less than proportionally. 
Birdsall (2002 and 2007) argues that these inequalities are created either because 
the market works – but against the poor – via the stagnating remunerations of 
unskilled workers caused by growing wage gaps between skilled and unskilled 
workers, and the fallout from financial crises affecting the poor disproportionate-
ly (Van der Hoeven and Luebker 2006) or, by contrast, because powerful groups 
prevent the market from working for the poor (the case of intellectual property 
rights and monopolistic behaviour). In both cases, however, the moral founda-
tions of the international system would require policy intervention at both the 
national and international levels to mitigate or to remove the underlying causes. 
(Birdsall 2007).
 The challenge for the current globalisation process is the fact that – even 
though markets are integrated – policies dealing with the consequences of these 
integrated markets are woefully limited or absent. Van der Hoeven (2001), for 
example, has argued that the integration of markets at a national level in industr-
ialised countries during the industrial revolution in the 19th and beginning of the 
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20th centuries resulted in the political acceptance of a social welfare state where 
currently some 10 to 20 percent of GDP is distributed, either as transfers, subsi-
dised access to services, or as an investment for disadvantaged groups (education, 
loan guarantees, etc.). With the growing integration at the international level, 
current agreements to transfer less than 0.5 percent of developed countries GNP 
are difficult to achieve, while most countries also fail to let their markets work for 
poorer countries and for the poor as the CGD index observes.
 The current challenges of globalisation have created a renewed sense of the 
need for policy coherence in the multilateral system. But, as Kazancigil and Sen-
arclens (2007) argue,
globalisation has turned the principles of multilateral cooperation and the 
institutional architecture to govern the international system, established in 
the wake of the Second World War, upside down. Th e mechanisms and or-
ganisations have in the present day become quite inadequate to deal with 
the economic and social challenges, foster development and human security, 
reduce inequalities and poverty, as well as coping with the resulting injus-
tices and violence. However, the universal political and legal principles, as 
expressed in the UN’s charter, the major conventions and resolutions dedi-
cated to justice, human rights or economic and social progress still provide 
a legitimate normative framework for global governance. Th ese principles 
have been neglected by the powerful actors of neo-liberal globalisation. 
Th eir reactivation is necessary if globalisation and its governance are to serve 
the common good and operate for the beneﬁ t of humankind as a whole (p. 5).
A major question is whether the coalitions among the various disadvantaged 
groups are strong enough to enhance a different type of globalisation governed by 
international policies, which take the concerns of all into account and repair the 
harsh effects of integrated and unregulated or poorly regulated markets. Stewart 
(2007) has argued that counter tendencies can be observed at various levels, but 
before these questions can be fully answered more research will be needed. Until 
then, the call for policy coherence can only remain an indication of the ineffec-
tiveness of the current system that governs globalisation. It might be more the ex-
pression of a wish and of a need for a fair globalisation, rather than a programme 
that could provide ready-made answers and generally applicable policy tools. 
Policy coherence is perhaps more than a new fad, but the lack of real political will 
to accept the full consequences of coherent policies for development12 among the 
many actors will require continued efforts to improve the policies in industrial-
ised countries to, in turn, foster greater development in developing countries in 
terms of poverty reduction, lowering inequality and increased employment.
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 Notes
 This is a revised version of a paper with the same title, presented at the th EADI Con-
ference, Geneva, - June . The helpful comments by Guido Ashoff, Paul Hoebink 
and other participants at that conference are greatly appreciated. Correspondence: ho-
even@iss.nl.
 Emphasis by Tinbergen. On the Theory of Economic Policy. FULL REF needed.
 Tinbergen was one of the most ardent supporters of development aid, structural change 
in the North and better global governance, especially in the latter part of his career.
 For example, Hoebink, in his very thorough reviews and essays on policy coherence for 
development (Hoebink , ) does not refer to Tinbergen’s work.
 Hoebink has provided various diﬀ erent ways of classifying policies with respect to policy 
coherence. One of them is the distinction between intended and unintended policy inco-
herence (Hoebink ). An example of intended policy incoherence is the current EU 
agricultural policy which creates a disadvantage for farmers in developing countries. But 
powerful pressures in EU countries has forced governments to create incoherence between 
their domestic farm policies and external development policies. An example of unintended 
incoherence is bureaucratic inertia between diﬀ erent development directorates. 
 This point is, because of space, not devleoped here, but see Van der Hoeven ().
 ‘[N]eed to improve the “coherence” of international policy making by establishing bet-
ter linkage mechanisms between the GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions’, (BWP 
, as quoted in Grabel ).
 ‘[A]chieving greater coherence in global economic policy-making, the WTO shall cooper-
ate, as appropriate, with the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (WB)...’ (Article III. of the  Agreement Establishing the WTO, (Caliari 
: fn  as quoted in Grabel ).
 The MDGs have been criticised for lacking a development concept by focussing only on 
goals and less on instruments, for ignoring inequality within a country and for ignor-
ing national development strategies. See Pronk (), Vandemoortele () and Saith 
() 
 The IFI’s strong policy influence in the ’s was also the consequence of the fact that 
more than  percent of all financial flows in the beginning of the s consisted of 
official flows. However, since the end of the s, growing capital resources available 
to developing countries (especially the larger ones and the LDC still depend on official 
flows) are private flows as a percentage of bilateral development aid and voluntary funding 
within multilateral resources has declined enormously as a percentage of flows to devel-
oping countries. Public capital flows in general support the agreed and newly accepted 
international objectives as expressed, for example, in the MDGs. However, private capital 
flows are less concerned with these. Its massive increase requires coherent international 
regulation to provide more stability as well as to take into consideration the economic and 
social development of the countries involved.
 ‘Interestingly, in most countries this dilemma has been solved (at least for now) by defin-
ing the seniority of different intermediate objectives and of institutions. Central Banks 
and curing inflation take priority, and coherence is expected to emerge as fiscal policy-
makers recognise this in the discharge of their responsibilities.’ Winters , p. . 
 ‘Addressing members of the European Parliament, EU commisioner for development, 
Louis Michel said last week that [the] EU’s policies will not always be coherent with de-
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velopment objectives. According to him, as a consequence, Africa will have to learn to live 
with the adverse effects these policies will sometimes have on their countries’ development 
situation’. Commissioner Michel, ‘Africa: Alive with EU’s Contradictions’,  July , 
www.eucoherence.org, visited  October .
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Agreement
Stephen J.H. Dearden
While the Pacific remains of limited political and economic significance for the 
European Union, both individually and collectively, historic ties and current geo-
political concerns, such as the potential for money laundering in Pacific offshore 
centres ensure its continuing involvement. Only France maintains any significant 
involvement in this region through its substantial overseas territories of New 
Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallace and Fortuna. The South Pacific is very 
much the ‘sphere of influence’ of Australia, both economically and politically, but 
China’s influence is slowly extending throughout the area. For the EU, it was not 
until 2006 that the EC published a Pacific Strategy (EC 2006) outlining the ra-
tionale for its continued involvement in the region.
 However, as part of the African, Caribbean and Pacific group of developing 
countries, the Pacific ACPs (PACP) were beneficiaries of the Lomé Conven-
tion, which offered both development assistance and trade preferences. But as 
a result of successful challenges within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
to these existing trade preferences, the successor Cotonou Agreement, signed in 
2000, provided for the renegotiation of these concessions by January 2008, when 
the WTO waiver expired. The new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) 
was to be negotiated with regional groupings of the ACP states. Although the 
EU committed itself to introducing trade agreements that would not worsen 
the position of the ACP states,1 it also required that the new EPAs should be 
WTO-compatible. While non-reciprocal trade concessions have been offered 
to the low-income developing countries under the ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) 
initiative since 2001,2 the ACP group includes both low-income and middle-in-
come developing countries. WTO compatibility therefore requires the replace-
ment of the existing non-reciprocal Lomé trade concessions with a reciprocal 
agreement.
 The interpretation of WTO compatibility has been one of the major sources 
of disagreement in the subsequent negotiations. Under Article 24 of the WTO 
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any agreement must cover ‘substantially all trade’ between the signatories of a Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA). Some have interpreted this as referring to the value of 
trade between FTA members, while others suggest the requirement refers to the 
coverage of tariff lines. ‘Substantial’ is also ambiguous, but a minimum figure of 
80 of trade between the parties in the previous three years is generally accepted, 
although any agreement is subject to challenge by other WTO members. There 
is also the possibility of asymmetric coverage in order to achieve the minimum 
coverage requirement – i.e., 100 of EU imports and 70 of ACP imports. The 
issue of the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement is particularly important for the 
Pacific ACP States (PACP) since the value of their imports from the EU is small 
and the commodity composition highly variable from year to year. Only case law 
would provide a clearer indication of this interpretation of Article 24’s ‘substan-
tially all trade’ requirement.
 Article 24 also allows for an interim agreement that leads to the formation of 
an FTA, but this should take place ‘within a reasonable period of time’. The Un-
derstanding on the Interpretation of Article 24, signed at the end of the Uruguay 
Round, suggests that these interim agreements should not exceed ten years except 
in ‘exceptional cases’. There is also the issue of whether the phasing out of trade 
barriers is ‘front’ or ‘back-loaded’ during the transition period and whether such 
phasing should be asymmetrical. As we shall see, this is a significant issue in the 
implementation of EPAs.
Table 1 EU Trade Agreements with the Pacifi c
Cotonou Agreement – Non-reciprocal, duty-free access for all non-CAP products off ered to 
all ACP states. To be replaced by reciprocal WTO-compatible EPA by 2008.
Sugar Protocol – Part of the Cotonou Agreement providing for a quota of duty- free sugar 
exports to the EU at EU guaranteed prices. Of importance to Fiji. To be phased out by 2010.
Everything-but-Arms – Non-reciprocal trade preferences for low-income developing 
countries. An alternative to an EPA for Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
General System of Preferences – An alternative default to an EPA for the remaining PAPCs. It 
off ers non-reciprocal preferences to all developing countries. The preferences are expressed 
as a percentage of MFN duties and range from 15% to 100%. The current GSP covers 7,200 
products from 179 countries.
GSP Plus – Off ered to ‘dependent and vulnerable’ countries. To qualify for these additional 
concessions countries must ratify 23 international conventions and demonstrate economic 
dependence, requirements that have thus far been met by 15 countries.
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 Under Article 37.7, a review of the negations was to take place in 2004, at which 
time alternative trade arrangements could be considered. From the beginning of 
the negotiations the main alternative to the adoption of the EPA has been seen as 
some variant of the existing Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The EU’s 
GSP, like that granted by other developed countries, offers non-reciprocal pref-
erential rates of duty for imports from all developing countries. As the GSP does 
not discriminate between developing countries, it is WTO compatible. The pref-
erences, expressed as a percentage of MFN duties, ranges from 15 for the most 
sensitive products to 100 for non-sensitive items. In 2006, the current GSP 
was introduced, covering 7,200 products from 179 countries. In addition, ‘GSP 
plus’ was offered to ‘dependent and vulnerable’ countries. To qualify for these ad-
ditional concessions, countries had to ratify 23 international conventions (e.g., 
human rights, labour standards, etc.) and demonstrate economic dependence,3 
requirements that have thus far been met by 15 countries. The EBA, which pro-
vides duty-free access for all EU imports from low-income developing countries, 
is superior to the existing Cotonou Agreement, which provides similar duty-free 
access for 94 of all ACP exported to the EU. However, access under Cotonou 
is significantly superior to the existing EU GSP scheme and any enhanced GSP 
scheme could not discriminate between developing countries if it is to be WTO 
compatible.
 Cotonou’s Sugar Protocol has been particularly significant for Fiji because 
95 of the value of its  100 million exports to the EU comes from sugar, 26 
of its total export earnings. The Sugar Protocol committed the EU to import-
ing 165,348 tons of sugar from Fiji at EU internally guaranteed prices. Moreo-
ver, an Agreement on Special Preferential Sugar (SPS) provides for additional 
imports from the ACP and India, based upon predicted shortfalls in the maxi-
mum needs of the EU’s sugarcane refineries. The price of SPS sugar is 85 
of the CAP guaranteed minimum price. Fiji has been allocated 30,000 tons 
(9.3) under the SPS. The Sugar Protocol has a legal status independent of the 
Cotonou Agreement but, as it is only available to 18 ACP states, it remained 
open to challenge in the WTO. Thus, in July 2007, the EU finally denounced 
the Protocol, and was phased out by October 2009. It has been estimated that 
this will cost Fiji  20.9 million during the phasing-out period (South Centre 
2007). At the same time, from 2006 to 2009, the ‘Everything-But-Arms’ trade 
agreement with low-income developing countries will provide for the phasing 
in of duty-free access for sugar. These quotas will be counted against SPS al-
locations, slowly eroding Fiji’s allocation. The value of the Sugar Protocol is 
dependent upon the EU guaranteed price, which will also be reduced by 36 
by 2009, but the proposed abolition of EU export subsidies under the Doha 
Round may raise world market prices. Currently, Fiji’s sugar preference is sus-
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pended as part of the EU sanctions following the military coup, but Fiji has the 
potential to establish an internationally competitive sugar industry if struc-
tural reforms are successful.
 Existing Trade Agreements
Trade between the 14 members of the PACP4 Intra-PACP is very limited, repre-
senting only 2 of their total trade (1 1995). Nonetheless, the foundations have 
been laid for the establishment of a FTA through the Pacific Island Countries 
Trade Agreement (PICTA). Created in 2003, it provides for trade liberalisation 
within eight years, although sensitive industries would continue to be protect-
ed until 2016. However, only the Cook Islands, Fiji and Samoa had commenced 
trading under PICTA by 2007. In addition, the Melanesian Spearhead Group of 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea (PNG), the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu committed 
themselves to moving towards trade liberalisation over an eight-year period from 
2005. Complementing these PACP arrangements is the 2003 Pacific Area Closer 
Economic Relations Agreement (PACER), a non-reciprocal trade agreement be-
tween the Pacific Forum island countries and Australia and New Zealand, the 
PACP’s major trading partners. A key feature of PACER is the creation of a 
Regional Trade Facilitation Programme. PACER also requires, under Article 6, 
negotiations to move towards an FTA agreement eight years after PACER comes 
into force or if the PACPs adopt an FTA with a third party. These negotiations 
are likely to be triggered by any EPA. Although PACER does not commit the 
PACPs to accepting any subsequent proposal, the principle that Australia and 
New Zealand should not be disadvantaged in their trade with the PACP’s rela-
tive to any other developed countries was accepted. Any meaningful assessment 
of the impact of an EPA upon the PACPs must therefore take into account the 
extension of such trade concessions to Australia and New Zealand.
 Further complications arise for the three PACP states (FSM, Palau, Mar-
shall Islands), which have a Compact of Free Association with the United States. 
Again, this requires that the US receive favourable market access equal to that of 
any other country. Thus, any EPA assessment must take into account the exten-
sion of duty-free access to US exports.
 Only Fiji, PNG, the Solomons and Tonga are members of the WTO. This 
creates a problem for the EPA, because the EU requires any final agreement to 
be WTO-compatible. Thus, the EU suggestion that the EPA should employ the 
WTO dispute settlement procedure would raise serious problems for the non-
WTO PACPs.
 Another specific interest that the PACPs have in the negotiations is the posi-
tion of the French Pacific Territories – New Caledonia, French Polynesia and 
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Wallace and Fortuna. For some PACP states, enhanced access to the high-income 
territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia is of greater potential signifi-
cance than the metropolitan EU. While under Joint Declaration 27 of Cotonou, 
the EU affirmed that any trade arrangements that applied to French Overseas 
Departments would not extend to French overseas territories.
 Article 41.4 of Cotonou envisages the ‘liberalisation of services in accordance 
with the provisions of the GATS’ under any EPA. However, this extension ap-
pears to be viewed as a later development and, under Article 41.3, requires the EU 
‘to give sympathetic consideration to the ACP states priorities for improvements 
in the EC schedule, with a view to meeting their specific interests’.
 EU Trade
In 2005, the EU15 exported goods valued at  568 million to the PACPs, a 79 
increase over 2004/5, and imported goods to the value of  1,245 million. But the 
EU accounts for only 2 of total PACP imports and is a minor source of imports 
for individual PACPs. By contrast, Australia (33 of total PACP imports), Singa-
pore (20) and New Zealand (13) account for between 50 to 80 of individual 
PACP imports, with the exception of the US’s ‘Compact States’.
 Similarly, only Fiji (sugar comprises 95 of the value of EU exports) and Pa-
pua New Guinea (palm oil 31, coffee 27, tuna 10) export significantly to the 
EU. The Sugar Protocol is particularly important for Fiji. In an average year, 
 50 million of sugar was exported to the EU, at EU guaranteed prices, involving 
35-40 of its total crop. It also enjoys preferential margins for textile and tuna 
exports. Nonetheless, there are particular exports from other countries, which 
are heavily dependent upon preferential access to the EU market. These include 
canned fish from the Solomon Islands, frozen fish and coconut products from 
Tonga and Vanuatu. Again, exports from the PACPs are dominated by Australia, 
New Zealand and the US. Thus, 20 of exports from the FSM (1999), 31 from 
Samoa (2001) and 26 from Fiji (2001) were to the US. Australia accounted for 
29 (2001) of exports from the Cook Islands, 27 from Fiji, 36 from PNG 
(1993) and 23 from Vanuatu (2001), while New Zealand absorbed 13 of Tonga’s 
exports. Japan is also a significant market for many of the PACP states.
 Given the lack of significant manufacturing sectors, services are of particular 
significance to many PACP states. Tourism is already important in Fiji, the Cook 
Islands, Samoa, Vanuatu and Palau, and the supply of seamen from Kiribati and 
Tuvalu. The potential for the further development of the service sectors of the 
PACP states is thus of particular importance in the EPA negotiations.
 Although, as we have seen for most of the PACPs, trade with the EU is rela-
tively insignificant, it nonetheless remains in surplus. The ratio of exports to the 
European Development Cooperation.indd   51 29-6-2010   21:04:30
 Stephen J.H. Dearden
EU relative to imports is 8.9:1 for PNG, 4.94:1 for Fiji, 4.8:1 for the Solomon 
Islands and 2.7:1 for Kiribati. By contrast, all of the PACPs have bilateral defi-
cits with Australia and New Zealand, which exceeds a ratio of 10:1 for all of the 
PACP states except Fiji (3.2:1).
 Impact Assessments
 Economic
The first comprehensive impact assessment of an EPA for the PACPs was under-
taken by Scollay (2002). While principally a qualitative assessment, it nonethe-
less identified the principal issues of economic concern to the PACPs in negotiat-
ing any EPA. In terms of the sectoral impact of an EPA, manufacturing is likely 
to be relatively unaffected. The manufacturing sector is only important in Fiji and 
PNG, and even here continued protection should be possible while still meeting 
the ‘substantially all trade’ requirement. Again, in the case of agricultural pro-
duction for domestic consumption, any EPA is unlikely to present difficulties as 
many food products already enter duty-free and local fresh food production has 
a measure of natural protection against competing imports, given high transport 
costs. Thus, the major interest for the PACPs is the potential for improving their 
export performance in those products for which they may have a comparative 
advantage.
 These products include tree crops, kava, garments, beef (Vanuatu) and fish. 
The fish industry has been identified as offering the greatest potential for future 
development with tuna canneries already existing in Fiji, the Solomon Islands 
and PNG. Under Cotonou, these tuna exports enjoy a 24 preference. While 
fresh fish is exported to the US and Japan, the EU is regarded as a potentially 
important market for intermediate quality fish. Trade facilitation assistance is 
regarded as particularly important in the future development of this industry. For 
Fiji, sugar exports are particularly important, however, the future of the Sugar 
Protocol has been excluded from the EPA negotiations by the EU.
 Of greater concern is the possible impact upon government revenues of any 
reductions in import duties. Many PACPs have traditionally relied upon import 
duties as an efficient form of revenue collection. The potential revenue loss de-
pends upon the size of the trade flows and the existing tariff rates. Given the 
relatively low level of imports from the EU, any EPA would appear to have very 
little impact. However, as with any broader economic impact, the central issue is 
the possibility of the extension of any FTA to Australia and New Zealand.
 With the adoption of this broader FTA, the risks of trade diversion and the 
likely adjustment costs are greater, as is the impact upon the PACP’s govern-
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ment’s revenues. An earlier study by Stoeckel (1998) suggested that such an FTA 
with Australia and New Zealand would yield significant overall economic wel-
fare gains for the PACPs, although the affect upon the Compact States, with 
their significant trade with the US, is less certain. However, given the PACPs 
significant imports from Australia and New Zealand, the impact upon govern-
ment revenues of duty reductions presents more of a challenge. Tonga (import 
duties are 65 of tax revenue), Kiribati (61), Tuvalu (48) and Vanuatu (40) 
are particularly dependent upon tariff revenues. There are three options for the 
PACP states: conversion of tariffs to excise duties, introduction of VAT or exclu-
sion of products from the FTA. Samoa, PNG and the Cook Islands are already 
shifting the burden of taxation to VAT, while Tonga and the FSM are considering 
its introduction. The conversion of tariffs to excise duties is an attractive strategy 
for Vanuatu.
 Within this context, Scollay identified the major issues that would need to 
be addressed if the PACPs were to realise the development potential of an EPA. 
Firstly, he emphasises the importance of the trade facilitation provisions. As 
we have seen, the fish industry has been identified as offering the greatest po-
tential, but to realise this will require assistance to meet EU phyto-sanitary 
requirements as well as the upgrading and expansion of production facilities. 
Secondly, satisfactory ‘rules of origin’ (RoO) must be included in the EPA. The 
Cotonou agreement committed the EU to review its RoO (Article 37.7) as part 
of the EPA negotiations. Again, RoO are particularly important for fish ex-
ports and it was recognised that a number of issues, such as the definition of 
‘territorial waters’, remain unresolved. RoO in fisheries are complicated by the 
existence of bilateral Fisheries Agreements. Thirdly, the issue of ‘safeguard pro-
visions’ must be addressed. The Cotonou Agreement (Articles 8 and 9, Annex 
V) allows the EU to apply ‘appropriate measures’ where the volume of imports 
may ‘cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury to domestic producers’. The Co-
tonou provisions are less circumscribed in their application than those in the 
WTO Agreement on Safeguards and they also do not provide for reciprocal ar-
rangements for the ACP states, who could argue, under the principle of ’special 
and differential treatment’, for their own more generous safeguard provisions. 
Again, the significance of the safeguard provisions under an EPA would prin-
cipally be of significance in setting a precedent for any FTA with Australia and 
New Zealand.
 One of the further complications of an EPA for the PACPs is that, unlike 
other regional ACP groupings, there is no immediate prospect of the creation of 
a customs union. Thus, although the negotiations have taken place on a collective 
regional basis, the possibility of only a limited number of PACP states actually 
subscribing to the EPA remained. For example, for the five low-income PACP 
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states the EBA provides non-reciprocal duty-free access to the EU market, and 
as it does not require reciprocal trade concessions, it will not trigger renegotia-
tion of PACER. But Grynberg and Onguglo have suggested further flexibility 
could be introduced into a Pacific EPA, to accommodate these diverging inter-
ests, through the adoption of ‘master’ and ‘subsidiary’ agreements. The ‘master’ 
agreement would set out the broad principles of the trade and development rela-
tions between the PACPs and the EU, offering the EU market access comparable 
to that enjoyed by other developed countries. The individual ‘subsidiary’ agree-
ments, to which PACPs could choose to subscribe, would cover such areas as 
the trade in goods, trade facilitation provisions, investment, services (including 
‘Mode IV’ issues) and fisheries. Scollay found resistance among some PACP 
states to the inclusion of a fisheries agreement within any EPA negotiations. 
From an EU perspective, the question arose as to whether there would be re-
sistance to the adoption of such a ’pick and mix’ EPA, for, although the PACPs 
are of little economic and political significance to the EU, any unconventional 
approach to the EPA negotiations might have set a precedent for other more 
significant regional negotiations.
 Scollay concluded by supporting a three-stage negotiating process; ACP-wide 
level, regional level (addressing configuration, structure of EPA) and formal re-
gional negotiations. Assurances could be sought to ensure that PACER negotia-
tions are not triggered until the final stage. For the PACPs, the principal issues 
to be addressed in the formal negotiations were to include rules of origin, safe-
guard provisions, trade related matters (e.g., competition policy, phyto-sanitary 
requirements, labour standards, certification etc.) and additional resources (e.g., 
trade facilitation). The PACPs would also need to develop detailed proposals in 
regard to fisheries, services and investment and identify products for exemption. 
There were other issues that lay outside of the EPA negotiations but that deter-
mined their context and that, Scollay argued, the PACPs would need to address. 
For Fiji, the Sugar Protocol was of particular importance, while all of the PACP 
states had a significant interest in any revision to WTO rules during the Doha 
Round, given the EPA requirement for WTO compatibility. Further, in anticipa-
tion of triggering PACER renegotiation, a number of the PACPs would need to 
develop alternative revenue strategies.
 Adjustment Costs
The most comprehensive assessment of the potential costs of adjusting to an EPA 
for the PACPs was undertaken by Smith (2006). This study refined the method-
ology adopted by Milner (2005) in his estimation of the overall ACP adjustment 
costs associated with an EPA. Milner defined five country-sized categories, the 
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smallest being populations under one million, which included all of the PACPs. 
He then identified four categories of economic adjustment costs – fiscal, trade fa-
cilitation, production and employment and skill development. Scollay discussed 
Fiscal adjustment and trade facilitation, while production adjustment and skills 
development would impose costs through support for the unemployed, the re-
training and restructuring of production lines and closures. His methodology 
involved categorising countries by the potential degree of adjustment necessary 
under these four categories and then allocating costs based on 14 comparable 
World Bank projects; with costs interpolated for missing cells in the resulting 
matrix. His study did not address any costs arising from the need for macroeco-
nomic adjustment, e.g., addressing a balance of payments deficit.
 The degree of potential fiscal adjustment was proxied by each country’s share 
of tariffs in total tax revenue. According to his analysis, only the PNG (25 trade 
tax) required medium adjustment; a reflection of his serious data limitations. 
The need for trade facilitation assistance is proxied by the share of manufactured 
exports in total exports. Fiji (35) is classified as requiring low adjustment while 
the Solomon Islands (4) and Tonga (4) are included in the high-adjustment 
group. The share of industrial production in GDP is used by Milner to meas-
ure the likely need for employment support. Tonga (15) incurs low adjustment, 
while Fiji (27) falls in the medium category. Finally, skills development is repre-
sented by secondary school enrolment rates as a crude indicator of human capital; 
the lower the enrolment rates, the greater the need for adjustment support. Van-
uatu (28) appears in the high-adjustment category.
 His overall ACP estimates totalled  9 billion;  3 billion for fiscal adjustment, 
 2.3 billion for trade facilitation,  1.5 billion for production and employment ad-
justment and  2.3 billion for retraining. To check his estimates, he also employed 
a ‘subsidy equivalent’ methodology, which suggested an overall cost of  6 billion. 
For the PACPs alone he suggests a total adjustment cost of  642 million; with 
a fiscal adjustment of  210 million, export diversification  175 million, employ-
ment/production adjustment  82 million and skills/productivity  175 million. 
His PACP estimates exclude the Cook Islands, Nauru, Niue and Tuvalu, while 
data limitations have compromised the classification of the remaining PACPs un-
der particular categories. Questions also remain about his choice of proxies and 
the appropriateness of the comparative projects underlying his cost estimates. In 
particular, he assumes a high degree of non-linearity (dis-economies of scale) in 
adjustment costs, i.e., smaller states incurring significantly higher costs than larg-
er states. This is a particularly important assumption in the case of the PACPs, 
which all fall into the micro-state category.
 Smith (2006) re-estimated Milner’s study with additional and more recent 
data, including previously omitted countries, resulting in a total adjustment cost 
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of   861 million. However, Smith regarded the non-linearity as excessive and, 
based upon lower per capita cost assumptions for the smaller countries, re-es-
timated the overall PACP adjustment costs at   430 million. Smith, however, 
was also concerned that Milner’s project comparators were mainly selected from 
larger countries, which will be of little relevance to the PACP states. He, there-
fore, revised Milner’s categorisation, drew upon more relevant PACP comparator 
projects and provided a separate estimate for service sector adjustment.
 The PACP states were subdivided into four population sizes, while fiscal ad-
justment was now proxied by trade taxes as a percentage of total revenue, produc-
tion employment by manufacturing production as a percentage of GDP and trade 
facilitation by total goods exports as a percentage of GDP. His final category of 
skills development and productivity enhancement was subdivided, with the latter 
proxied by the cost of enforcing contracts as assessed in the World Bank Cost of 
Doing Business Study 2005. For the remaining adjustment costs Smith followed 
Milner’s indicators. For the service sector estimates, Smith further modified the 
proxy for production and employment adjustment to utilise data on non-govern-
mental services as a percentage of GDP and for trade facilitation, tourism earn-
ings as a percentage of GDP.
 Table 2 presents Smith’s estimates of the adjustment costs for all of the PACPs 
and totals  170 million incurred over a period of five years. Again, the allowance 
for substantial fixed costs in the nonlinearity assumption may be excessive. If 
the smallest category of PACPs is excluded then total adjustment costs will fall 
to only   121 million. This is considerably less than Milner’s study and may be 
conservative given the need for some PACPs to adopt more export-oriented eco-
nomic policies.
 Smith also discusses some of the institutional innovations that will be neces-
sary to address the challenges of an EPA. The first aspect he addresses is the 
need for an enhancement of the national competition authorities, together with 
an integrated regional advisory service, which is estimated at   15 million. The 
remaining two initiatives would operate solely at the regional level. An Invest-
ment Protection and Promotion Agreement would require support, including 
the establishment of a regional office of the EU Centre for the Development of 
Enterprises and ProInvest, technical assistance to support the Foreign Invest-
ment Advisory Service and the strengthening of small business advisory services.5 
Smith estimates an additional cost of  6.1 million. Finally, he considers a Human 
Resources Development Facility, in particular, to facilitate a temporary labour 
mobility scheme (Mode IV).6 This he estimates at  7.5 million.
 Thus, the overall estimate of the EPA adjustment costs for the PACPs totals 
 184 million over five years. This contrasts with the existing  79 million Region-
al Indicative Programme for the PACPs under EDF 10, covering the period to 
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2008. It is unlikely that the gap in funding will be made up through the bilateral 
National Indicative Programmes. A further enhancement of approximately  100 
million in EU aid to meet the needs of EPA adjustment, would therefore appear 
to be justified. To manage these funds Smith advocates the establishment of a 
Pacific Regional Development Fund, encompassing a Trade Adjustment Fund. 
Given the significance of any renegotiation of PACER, as a result of the estab-
lishment of an EPA, such a Regional Development Fund would provide a frame-
work for the EU, individual EU Member States, Australia and New Zealand, to 
support the necessary adjustment in the PACPs.
 Political and Social Impact Assessments
Scollay (2002) offers a brief assessment of the likely social and political im-
pact on the PACPs by an EPA. Fiji and PNG have the largest economies, with 
substantial rural populations, and would thus be most adversely affected by a 
Table 2 Adjustment Costs by Country and by Adjustment Category (in € millions)
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Papua New Guinea Very large 3.1 14.5 7.2 3.3 4.7 32.7
Fiji Large 2.5 0.0 2.9 5.2 3.0 13.7
Solomon Islands Large 2.5 1.6 4.5 8.9 7.1 24.6
Vanuatu Large 4.1 1.6 5.4 2.2 5.9 19.3
Samoa Medium 0.7 1.8 5.3 1.6 1.7 11.1
Micronesia, FS Medium 0.7 0.3 3.2 2.1 2.5 8.8
Tonga Medium 2.0 1.8 3.2 2.1 1.7 10.8
Kiribati Small 0.6 0.1 3.0 1.6 1.3 6.7
Marshall Islands Small 1.2 0.1 2.0 2.0 1.3 6.7
Palau Small 1.2 0.3 2.3 2.0 0.5 6.3
Cook Islands Small 1.2 0.3 2.3 1.5 0.6 5.9
Nauru Small 1.9 0.1 1.5 6.4 0.6 10.6
Tuvalu Small 0.6 0.3 2.5 2.0 0.6 6.1
Niue Small 1.0 0.1 2.5 2.0 0.6 7.2
Total 24.5 22.8 47.9 43.0 32.3 170.4
Source: Smith (2006)
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failure to agree to an EPA. For Fiji, the future of the sugar industry is of prime 
importance, estimated to employ 100,000 people and accounting for 10 of 
GDP. However, the Sugar Protocol will not form part of the EPA negotiations. 
By contrast, the future of PNG’s exports of tree crops, including palm oil, cof-
fee, copra and cocoa, are heavily dependent upon continued EU market access. 
The impact of an EPA upon the PACPs urban sectors is likely to be limited, 
but the extension of trade concessions to Australia and New Zealand under 
PACER is of far greater significance. The manufacturing sectors of both Fiji 
and PNG would face significant adjustment costs. In Fiji, the loss of prefer-
ential access and enhanced competition from other developing countries has 
already resulted in the decline of the garment industry. In PNG, the extremely 
high rates of urban unemployment would make any structural adjustment so-
cially destabilising.
 For the other PACPs, the major political challenge will be changing the tax 
base and moving away from a reliance on customs duties. While the Cook Is-
lands, Samoa and PNG have already commenced fiscal reform, Kiribati, the 
Marshall Islands and Vanuatu had yet to overcome substantial opposition to 
change.
 Th e Sustainability Impact Assessment
In 1999, the EC introduced Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) to inform 
its trade negotiations. These are intended to assess the economic, social and en-
vironmental impacts of EU trade policy. The first application of this approach 
were the negotiations undertaken under the Doha Round of the WTO, but sub-
sequently PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2007) were contracted to undertake 
an SIA of the EPAs.
 The priority sectors for study within the EPA-negotiating configurations were 
selected in terms of their significance in trade flows, those that were likely to be 
influenced by anticipated changes in the trade regime and where there was likely 
to be a potential impact on sustainability. PWC then attempted to estimate the 
likely impact of liberalisation of trade in goods and services, in comparison with 
the current state of regional integration and trade preferences, utilising a series of 
indicators.
 In the case of the PACPs’ fish and fish products (especially tuna) were selected 
as the case study. Fish exports account for 7 of the total value of exports of 
the PACPs and are of particular importance to Palau (90 exports), the Cook 
Islands (50), Vanuatu (50) and Kiribati (18.5). Canned fish is also an impor-
tant export for PNG, Fiji and the Solomons. Half of the world’s tuna fisheries 
are located in the PACPs Exclusive Economic Zones, but 80 to 90 of the 
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vessels involved in the industry are foreign owned. Only one-third of the catch is 
landed in the region, with 10 of revenues retained in the PACPs (Forum Fish-
eries Agency) and several tuna species are already over exploited. However, the 
EU currently has limited involvement in this industry through Bilateral Fish-
eries Agreements with three PACP states. PWC selected three possible trade 
measures for impact assessment – market access, phyto-sanitary requirements, 
and foreign direct investment. The economic impact was indicated by GDP, gov-
ernment revenues, investment, and impact upon small-scale fisheries; the social 
impact by employment, wages, poverty, gender equality and food security; the 
environmental impact through measures of fish stocks, pollution and marine 
habitat. The qualitative assessment provided a large number of recommenda-
tions, ranging from the detailed, such as the development of a specific region-
ally based brand-name, to the more general, such as the establishment of prod-
uct standards, the development of strong environmental and social protection 
and capacity-building for greater added value to fishery products through such 
measures as investment protection. The fisheries component of an EPA should 
be compatible with the reformed Common Fisheries Policy through the adop-
tion of a Regional Fisheries Agreement. In particular, PWC recommended a 
lump sum payment for EU vessel access to a regional body responsible for the 
promotion of a sustainable fishery through improved monitoring and enforce-
ment, and economic development of the industry through such mechanisms as 
compulsory landing. However, it failed to discuss the important issue of Rules 
of Origin, which currently inhibit PACP fish product exports to the EU caught 
by non-EU foreign-owned vessels.7
 Any SIA presents a challenge in terms of adequate data and robust theo-
retical models that identify the causal relationship between economic, social 
and environment impacts and in identifying the adjustment process to a new 
equilibrium. However, this study left many broader questions unanswered, such 
as the selection of the base and alternative scenarios or even the selection of 
the fishing industry itself. Some critics have viewed this selection more as a 
reflection of EU economic interests than PACP priorities in any EPA.8 Indeed, 
the question of the ‘ownership’ and purpose of the SIA process itself has been 
raised. The PWC study even offered relatively little detailed analysis of the 
fisheries sector and mainly drew upon existing work. But most importantly, it 
failed to address the likely impact of any EPA upon the far more economically 
significant PACER trade agreement with Australia and New Zealand. Thus, 
unsurprisingly, we find that this SIA contributed very little to the wider Pacific 
EPA negotiations.
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 Th e Negotiations
 Th e Joint Roadmap
The first phase of the EPA negotiations were launched in September 2000 at the 
ACP level and concluded in October 2003, with the commencement of PACP 
EPA negotiations in September 2004. The agreed Joint Road Map (EC 2004) 
gives some indication of the EC’s thinking. It emphasised the objective of the 
integration of the PACPs into the world economy, with sustainable development 
and poverty eradication. To achieve these objectives, ‘the EC EPA must be an in-
strument for development and the development dimension reﬂ ected in all areas of 
negotiations’. Th e EC also places particular emphasis upon the contribution that 
an EPA can make to further the process of regional integration. Th us, the pace of 
liberalisation of trade under the EPA will be ‘a function of the degree of regional 
economic integration and realised in a ﬂ exible and asymmetrical manner’.
 It specifically recognises the need for special and differential treatment for all 
PACPs to account for their differing needs and levels of development. Such dif-
ferential treatment is not ‘limited only to longer transitional periods and techni-
cal assistance (para.14)’ and ‘may go beyond existing WTO measures’. ‘Flexibility 
will be built into the broadly agreed framework to allow individual countries to 
adjust the pattern and schedules of implementation’. The PIF proposal for a mas-
ter/subsidiary structure of an EPA thus appeared to be accepted in principle.
 However, it reaffirms the requirement that the EPA be ‘compatible with WTO 
rules then prevailing (para. 18)’. But it also commits the EU to working with the 
PACPs to identify and further their common interests in the ongoing Doha 
Round negotiations, which may change these WTO requirements, particularly 
in regard to the issues of the definition of ‘substantially all trade’ and ‘special and 
differential treatment’ for the developing countries. The implications of the EPA 
for PACER and that of the US ‘compact states’, is specifically acknowledged in the 
Joint Road Map and ‘will need to be reflected in all areas of negotiations’ (para. 
17). While acknowledging that adopting an EPA will require significant economic 
adjustment by the PACPs, no clear commitment is made by the EC to the provi-
sion of additional financial resources other than reference to the existing aid sup-
port mechanisms such as the EDF.
 The structure of the negotiations was to follow the normal pattern with a 
Ministerial-level Regional Negotiating Team (RNT) supported by Negotiating 
Groups (NG) addressing specific issues. Each NG was led by a senior Pacific 
trade official and composed of senior officials and technical experts, supported 
by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat. A Regional Preparatory Task Force 
(RPTF) was also expected to be created to support the negotiation and imple-
mentation of the EPA and to address the link between the EPA and development 
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cooperation. The National and Regional Authorising officers for EDF funding 
were intended to be members of the RPTF, together with EC representatives of 
DG Dev, EuropeAid and DG Trade. By contrast, in the RNT, the EC was repre-
sented by the Commissioner for Trade and in the NGs by DG Trade officials. It 
was anticipated that substantive negotiations would be completed by the end of 
2006, with a final draft completed by mid-2007, leaving sufficient time for con-
sultation with other relevant stakeholders.
 PACP 2006 Proposals
In June 2006, the PACPs presented their draft EPA text to the EC.9 It proposed 
the framework and subsidiary agreement structure that had been outlined by 
Scollay, despite the EC’s preference for a unified EPA. The framework or master 
agreement covers only the broad principles and does not involve any commitment 
to reciprocal free trade. However, it does include services and investment in the 
framework as advocated by the EU. It proposes a separate agreement covering 
Trade in Goods but does not address the issue of the definition of ‘substantially 
all trade’ nor the phasing in of the tariff reductions. However, it does focus on the 
issue of Rules of Origin (RoO), advocating the use of the change in tariff heading 
at the six-digit level as the criteria. This would mean that any fish caught within 
the PACPs EEZ would qualify for duty-free access into the EU. The Draft also 
proposes a non- reciprocal prohibition on the use of anti-dumping measures by 
the EU against Pacific exports, together with provisions for temporary tariff pro-
tection by the PACPs where there is a threat of damage to domestic industry or to 
support the development of an ‘infant’ industry. It also attempted to address the 
issue of an alternative to an EPA, which would still meet the guarantees offered to 
the ACPs under Cotonou (Article 37.6) by suggesting compensatory payments.10 
At this stage, only PNG, Vanuatu, the Solomons and Fiji had indicated their 
willingness to negotiate a Trade in Goods agreement.
 The Draft proposes a trade facilitation and promotion programme for each 
PACP and financial assistance for the private sector in Chapter 4. Similarly, for 
the agricultural sector, the PACPs proposed the establishment of a specific fund 
to support an Agricultural Development Strategy. However, as we will see, the 
EU resisted additional funding beyond that provided by EDF 10. The Draft also 
called for measures to address the restructuring of the sugar industry, principally 
of concern to Fiji, the establishment of a Regional Fisheries Agreement and the 
restoration of a mechanism similar to the abandoned STABEX to compensate 
for commodity price fluctuations.
 While the EU had made it clear that it is seeking agreements on services close-
ly modelled upon the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), 
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the PACPs sought to introduce a number of safeguards. These included a clear 
statement of the rights of governments to regulate in the public interest and the 
right to delay implementing liberalisation until an appropriate regulatory regime 
is in place. Moreover, they sought exemption from privatisation for public servic-
es such as health care, education and water supply. Labour mobility was included 
as part of the services chapter but applied only to the movement of skilled work-
ers. As this involved the politically sensitive area of Member States’ immigration 
policies, the EU was reluctant to negotiate a collective agreement with the PACPs 
in this area.
 In terms of the investment dimension, the PACPs proposed re-orienting 
the European Investment Bank, ProInvest and the Centre for the Development 
of Enterprise towards the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises. The 
PACPs also advocated a model for investment that limited portfolio investment, 
safeguarded preferences for local companies, required environmental and social 
impact assessments and transparency in the terms and operation of foreign in-
vestment.
 The EC response was mixed.11 While welcoming the proposed EPA structure, 
with an Annex on the trade in goods to be adopted by interested PACPs, it reject-
ed a number of other important elements in the Draft. The EC again refused calls 
for additional funding specifically linked to the EPA to assist with any necessary 
structural adjustment. While expressing their willingness to include transition 
periods and other bilateral safeguards, they emphasised the long-term positive 
benefits of trade liberalisation. The EC regarded the EDF as the appropriate 
mechanism for linking development assistance to the EPA, and expressed con-
cern that the Regional Preparatory Task Force (RPTF) had not been created. 
They argued that the lack of an RPTF had seriously inhibited the PACPs’ input 
into the programming discussions for EDF 10. However, the PACPs had chosen 
not to initiate the RPTF specifically to emphasise the need for separate funding 
for any EPA adjustment, arguing that without such additional funding the RPTF 
had little purpose.
 The call for a separate Regional Fisheries Agreement was also dismissed, with 
the EC arguing that the important elements could be integrated into the EPA. 
Critics, however, questioned whether an EPA would be able to address important 
issues such as local landing provisions, regulating by-catches and the local crew-
ing requirements.12
 In regard to the PACPs safeguard proposals for the liberalisation of the service 
sector, the EC appeared to be maintaining its hostility to any ACP concessions, 
as reflected in a November 2006 submission to the 133 Committee that coordi-
nates trade negotiations. For example, it introduces a necessity test for a universal 
service in posts and telecommunications. Despite a WTO agreement on services 
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that calls for flexibility in relation to developing countries and commitments to 
‘special and differential treatment’ under Cotonou, the EC appeared to be firmly 
committed to its call for reciprocal liberalisation of trade in services. The EC’s 
response to the request for enhanced rights of entry of unskilled workers into the 
Member States was specifically rejected as this lay beyond the competence of the 
EC. As for the investment proposals, the EC emphasises that it will not be able 
to ‘redefine what we have already jointly agreed in Cotonou’; the introduction of 
general principles for the protection and promotion of investment. The EC was 
more positive in its response to proposals on Rules of Origin, an issue that was 
still under internal discussion.
 Although the EC recommitted itself to achieving the greatest possible market 
access for Pacific EPA countries and recognised the need to address the problem 
of sensitive products amongst PACP imports, it nonetheless expressed concern 
that a number of major issues remain to be addressed, including government 
procurement, competition policy and intellectual property rights, ‘partly already 
agreed in the Cotonou Agreement’; the ‘Singapore issues’ previously rejected by 
developing countries in the WTO Millennium Round negotiations. ‘The sub-
mitted EPA draft text will have to undergo substantial amending before it can 
become a mutually agreeable EPA.’ As for addressing the possibility of an alterna-
tive to an EPA, this did not appear to be on the EU’s agenda.
 The EC also pressed for an acceleration of the negotiating process to achieve 
the 2008 deadline. But Kalipate Tavola, outgoing chief negotiator for the PACPs, 
in a letter13 to the EC’s Director General for Trade, Stefano Manservisi, rejected 
this demand. ‘We will not merely rush to conclude negotiations due to the dead-
line and risk ending up with a bad EPA.’ Moreover, he emphasised the importance 
that some PACPs attached to the Mode IV concession (temporary migration) – 
‘If the EPA is silent on this, then we can envisage reluctance on their part to be 
signatories of any EPA’. But the make-or-break issue, from his perspective, was the 
willingness of the EU to enter into a Regional Fisheries Agreement, instead of bi-
lateral agreements. He regarded it as essential to have EU political engagement, as 
technical discussions with EC oﬃ  cials would be unlikely to deliver success.
 Article 37.4 Review
Under Cotonou, a review of the state of the EPA negotiations needed to be un-
dertaken. At a meeting of the PACP Trade Ministers in November 2006, the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) was requested to undertake such an 
assessment. The ECDPM contributed to the internal review (Rampa 2007), with 
the Joint PACP-EC Review Report, which was included as an Annex in the over-
all ACP-EU final Joint Article 37(4) Review adopted in May 2007.
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 The ECDPM Report assessed the overall EPA process, unlike the Joint Re-
view, which focused on the outstanding issues for negotiation. The ECDPM 
Report identified the capacity limitations of the PACPs in undertaking the ne-
gotiations and the particular challenges of maintaining negotiating coherence 
over such a large geographical area. There remained, at the time of the review, 
considerable divergences within the PACPs in regard to their expectations of an 
EPA, their position on specific topics and their degree of interest in successfully 
concluding the negotiations. The negotiations appeared to be being dominated 
by the larger PACPs, who were imposing their national priorities. Fiji, in particu-
lar, was seen as pursuing its overriding objective of defending its interests in the 
parallel Sugar Protocol negotiations.14 Not only were the smaller state’s govern-
ments having difficulty participating but so were other stakeholders, including 
civil society representatives and the private sector. Serious concern was expressed 
about the lack of meaningful consultation and transparency. There were serious 
doubts as to whether the PACPs had the capacity and preparedness to complete 
the negotiations by the end of 2007 and implement any agreement.
 From the beginning, there were diﬀ erences in understanding between the 
PACPs and the EU, in that the former believed that any issues could be raised 
and discussed informally, although not formally negotiated. By contrast, the EC is 
seen as regarding certain areas as non-negotiable under an EPA. Further diﬃ  cul-
ties in the negotiation process, according to the PACPs, arose from the slowness of 
response by the EC and the prevalence of informal ‘non-papers’ in the discussions.
 The Joint Review (PIS 2007) identified five areas where progress was neces-
sary: trade in goods (including RoR), services (including Mode IV), investment, 
fisheries and adjustment assistance. At this stage, it was anticipated that between 
six and 11 PACPs might accede to the separate Trade in Goods Agreement. The 
EC had offered full duty-free quota-free access, subject to certain transitional 
arrangements for a few sensitive products. The PACPs market access offers em-
phasised the need for transition periods, appropriate exemptions and safeguard 
clauses. Both the EC and the PACPs intended to foster trade facilitation through 
addressing customs reform, sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and technical 
barriers to trade. However, in regard to RoO, there remained a clear divergence of 
views. The EC proposed basing RoO on value-added stipulations, but in the case 
of the PACPs this would have required the uneconomic import of intermediate 
products from the EU or distant ACP regions. Thus, as we have seen, the PACPs 
proposed basing RoO on a change of tariff subheading at the six-digit level. This 
would allow the PACPs to source intermediate materials from closer low-cost 
suppliers and would be easier to administer.15
 In relation to services, the Joint Review acknowledges that, under Article 41 of 
the Cotonou Agreement, the EPA must encompass the liberalisation of services 
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in accordance with the provisions of the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade 
in Services (GATS). The PACPs had indicated a strong preference for adopting 
the GATS methodology in specifying commitments. Again, the PACPs empha-
sised the importance of Mode IV access to the EC labour market for workers in 
sectors such as construction, health care and the maritime industry. While the 
EC, in a Joint Declaration adopted in March 2007, expressed its readiness to 
support provisions for the cross-border movement of PACP workers, it again 
emphasised that temporary worker migration fell within the competence of the 
Member States. In response to the PACPs proposals for reorientation, the EC’s 
financial and technical support institutions in the region (such as the European 
Investment Bank and the Centre for the Development of Enterprises) concern-
ing small-medium-sized enterprises, the EC claimed that these institutions fell 
within the realm of the overall Cotonou Agreement and that the potential sup-
port for the development of enterprises was best discussed within the context of 
the RPTF. The EC also acknowledged the importance of the fisheries industry 
for the future economic development of the PACPs. A detailed legal text had 
been submitted by the PACPs in January 2007 guaranteeing long-term access to 
EU flagged vessels to the PACPs EEZ, and addressing issues such as conserva-
tion and the development of the industry. The EC was preparing a reply at the 
time of the Joint Review.
 The issue of additional development assistance beyond that provided for un-
der the EDFs remained a major bone of contention. To emphasise their belief 
that additional funding will be required, not only had the PACPs failed to estab-
lish the RPTF, but they had also declined to discuss trade-related issues such as 
competition policies, government procurement, intellectual property rights, etc. 
on the grounds that these would be administratively burdensome and therefore 
would require additional development assistance for implementation. From the 
perspective of the PACPs, EDF resources were already earmarked for important 
regional priorities and, as the EPA will outlast the Cotonou Agreement, and its 
associated aid commitments, it was essential that an aid component should be 
directly associated with the EPA. As we have seen, Smith (2006) estimated that 
adjustment costs of  184 million will be incurred by the PACPs in implementing 
an EPA over a five-year period. The indicated budget for the EDF10 Regional In-
dicative Programme proposed  30 million for agriculture, forestry and fisheries; 
 40 million for education and training with  6.2 million remaining unallocated. 
In addition, there is the possibility of a further 25 enhancement to support 
regional integration and EPA adjustment. While making no commitment to ad-
ditional resources, the EC indicated it would support the creation of a regional 
financial facility to assist EPA adjustment to be funded by EU Member States’ 
bilateral aid and other multilateral donors.
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 Interim Partnership Agreement
Negotiations were not improved by the EC’s perceived threat to reduce the Pa-
cific EDF10 allocation in the event of a failure during EPA discussions. A meet-
ing of the PACP Trade Ministers in August 2006 expressed ‘grave concern and 
the disappointment’ at a Communication from the EC, which they interpreted as 
implying a reprogramming of approximately 48 of the Regional Indicative Pro-
gramme in the event of the failure of the EPA negotiations, or some 26 should a 
goods-only EPA be negotiated. ‘Our position remains that EDF10 programming 
and the EPA are separate processes’. The EC responded by confirming that the 
funds would merely be diverted from schemes to integrate the regions economies 
to other projects in the same region. ‘If no EPA is agreed [to] such assistance 
will be reassigned to other jointly agreed objectives within the regional support 
programmes. The total amount of support will not be reduced in any way. At no 
time has the EU used development assistance as a bargaining chip in EPA ne-
gotiations.’ (Financial Times August 2007). However, implicit in this response is 
the threat to reduce the share of the Regional Indicative Programme received by 
those ACPs that do not participate in the EPA.
 By October, it was clear that the EC was reconciled to an Interim Agreement, 
signed by only a limited number of PACP states, being adopted by its January 
2008 deadline ( Joint Declaration 2 October). But it was agreed that those PACP 
states that were not initially party to the Interim Agreement would be able to 
join at any future date upon comparable terms. The Interim Agreement was to 
include a goods schedule, Rules of Origin and safeguards and, depending upon 
the progress, fisheries, competition and development cooperation provisions. 
The EC had begun to respond positively to PACP proposals on RoO, an ‘in-
fant industry’ clause and dispute-settlement provisions. The EC also continued 
to support the PACP States in their negotiations with the Member States of the 
EU to obtain Mode IV access through bilateral Memoranda of Understanding. 
The PACPs, for their part, had finally established a RPTF, and the EC confirmed 
that human resource development would be an important part of EDF10.
 Ten PACPs had submitted their goods market access offers in late September 
2007, but after intensive negotiations, culminating in a Joint Ministerial meeting 
on November 14, it was clear that there were too many unresolved technical is-
sues remaining by the end of the year. The EC therefore resolved ‘to secure the 
position of those countries that account for the majority of trade with the EU 
and who have submitted WTO-compatible market access offers’ (Mandelson 20 
November). Thus, only Fiji and PNG signed a Trade in Goods Agreement on 29 
November. The market access provisions of the Interim Agreement are to remain 
in force until a full EPA is agreed upon.
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 Both Fiji and PNG are particularly dependent upon maintaining market ac-
cess to the EU for their exports of sugar and tuna respectively. For Fiji, sugar ex-
ports are worth  95 million per annum and, although their sugar allocation had 
been suspended for 2007 in response to the coup, it was expected to be resumed 
in 2008. A replacement for the Sugar Protocol was also required in October 2009, 
if Fiji was to maintain access to the EU market. In April 2007, the EU tabled a 
market access offer for sugar as part of any EPA, with the continuation of current 
ACP access provisions until 2009 and movement toward a quota- and tariff-free 
market for ACP sugar by 2015. Thus, by signing the Interim Agreement, Fiji guar-
anteed its existing preferences and acquired an opportunity to further expand 
its exports in the longer term. Tuna exports are worth  40 million per annum 
to PNG and it requires continued duty-free access to the EU to maintain its 
competitive advantage over Thailand and the Philippines. The EPA also offered 
concessions on the Rules of Origin; thus, as long as fish are processed onshore in 
the PACP, the nationality of the ownership of the vessel and crew will no longer 
be relevant.
 In terms of tariff liberalisation, the Agreement requires PNG to offer duty-
free access for 88 of the value of its imports from the EU. But, because 76 
of its tariffs are already duty-free, this commitment involves very little cost in 
duty foregone and will be instituted immediately. A phased reduction in duties 
on EU imports of Fiji will take place over a 15-year period and will cover 81.6 
of EU imports. Only 23 of EU imports will be duty-free upon the enactment 
of the Agreement. The largest reduction in duties – 40 – will occur in the 
years 6 through 10. The remaining aspects of the agreement are similar to those 
concluded in other interim EPAs. These include the provision for a review of 
the Rules of Origin after five years, clauses covering Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade, provisions covering anti-dumping, 
countervailing measures and safeguards, as well as for infant industry protec-
tion, a prohibition on new export taxes and a standstill provision preventing new 
or increased duties.
 Conclusion
The EPA provides for the extension of the Interim Agreement preferences to any 
other PACP signatory with a commitment to conclude a comprehensive EPA ‘in-
line with the Cotonou Agreement and previous ministerial declarations and con-
clusions’ by the end of 2008. But, as the EU has shown, considerable reluctance 
to concede to the PACPs in other areas of interest, particularly the employment 
of PACP nationals in EU territories (Mode IV) and additional aid-for-trade, it is 
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not clear how motivated the other PACP states will be in coming up with a more 
comprehensive agreement. More problematically, the Interim Agreement also in-
troduces a non-discrimination most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause.16 Thus, it 
would require any additional concessions offered to Australia and New Zealand, 
arising, for example, from the renegotiation of PACER, to be extended to the EU. 
More significantly for the PACPs, the Interim Agreement will almost certainly 
trigger such a renegotiation. Thus the provisions of the EPA have the potential 
to undermine the region’s own trade integration initiatives, including the MSG, 
especially if other PACPs accede to the Agreement.
 Moreover, no additional funds have been allocated to meet the needs of EPA 
adjustment. However, the EU’s new Strategy on Aid for Trade17 may offer some 
assistance. The EU committed itself to increasing trade-related assistance (TRA) 
from the current  1 billion per annum to  2 billion by 2010. The cost of this ad-
ditional assistance will be borne equally by the Member States and the European 
Commission. Since the European Commission is already allocating  1 billion to 
TRA, most of the additional funding will have to be provided by Member States’ 
aid budgets. This raises an element of uncertainty, as does the ability of the EU 
to achieve policy coherence in this area; ensuring coordination, harmonisation 
and alignment. The strategy is also intended to be ‘demand-driven’ and therefore 
requires potential recipients to be proactive in identifying and presenting quali-
fying proposals. It should also be noted that the TRA funds are available to all 
developing countries, not just those from the ACP group.
 Although the low-income PACP states18 will retain duty-free access under the 
EBA, it does not offer the same Rules of Origin advantages as the EPA. But it 
still remains a question whether the remaining PACPs, other than PNG and Fiji, 
will have the motivation to subscribe to either the Interim or a Final Agreement. 
There is also the question of whether the EU, faced with the rejection of EPAs 
across a large number of ACP states, will finally address the issue of an alterna-
tive. This is because many commentators since the commencement of negotia-
tions have argued that the EU is required to offer an alternative, other than the 
current General System of Preferences enjoyed by all developing countries, if it is 
to meet its commitments under Cotonou.
 Notes
 ‘A framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation’, (Article .).
 Of the  Pacific ACP states, Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu are 
low-income developing countries and will qualify for the EBA.
 Dependence is defined as the five largest sectors of GSP exports accounting for  of 
total GSP EU exports and being less than  of total EU imports under the GSP.
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 Fiji, PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu (New Hebrides), Federated States of Microne-
sia (FSM), Kiribati (Gilbert Isl.), Palau, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Cook Islands, Samoa, 
Tonga, Tuvalu (Ellice Island), Niue. 
 For a detailed discussion of investment protection and promotion see Hughes and Brew-
ster ().
 See Voight-Graf ().
 For a detailed discussion of the issues involved in a Fisheries Agreement between the EU 
and PACPs, see Oxfam New Zealand (a).
 For a critique of the Pacific EPA SIA, see Dearden ().
 For a critical review, see Oxfam c.
 For a discussion of a Pacific attitude to alternatives to the EPA, see Oxfam Slamming the 
Door on Development. Analysis of the EU’s response to the Pacific’s EPA negotiating 
proposals. December ..
 See Letter from Karl Falkenberg  October  ().
 See Oxfam b.
 As reported in Islands Business, Suva,  Jan .
 ‘Fiji’s position on the EPA is going to be dictated on what will happen to the sugar negotia-
tions’, I. Mataitoga, CEO Foreign Aﬀ aire and External Trade (Fiji Times  November ).
 For a detailed discussion of RoO, see Alavi () pp. -.
 In the Caribbean, the EPA this requires any concessions to a country accounting for more 
than  of world merchandise exports, or group, which collectively accounts for ., to 
be extended to the EU.
 EU Strategy on Aid for Trade: enhancing EU support for trade related needs in develop-
ing countries, October .
 Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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Mainstreaming Non-state Actors
 Assessing Participation in EU-Paciﬁ c Relations
Maurizio Carbone
The adoption of the Cotonou Agreement in June 2000 was seen as a watershed 
in the relations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific (ACP) group of states. The most radical changes concern aid, trade, 
and political dialogue: aid would be based not only on needs but also on perform-
ance; the existing preferential trade arrangement with the whole group would be 
replaced by free trade agreements, the so-called Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs), to be negotiated with six sub-regions; political dialogue would 
be strengthened and cover new areas of cooperation, including security and mi-
gration (Arts 2003; Babarinde and Faber 2005; Holland 2002; Mackie 2008). 
Another important change, often overlooked, concerns the issue of participatory 
development. By establishing that a wide range of non-state actors (NSAs) must 
be involved not only in implementing projects, but also in programming, evalua-
tion, and political dialogue, the Cotonou Agreement set up the most comprehen-
sive framework for integrating civil society in the development process (Bossuyt 
2000).
 Good intentions, however, do not always match reality. The outcome of the 
programming exercise in the context of the 9th and 10th European Development 
Fund (EDF) is mixed.1 Efforts have been made to involve as many actors as pos-
sible, yet the overall quality of participation is not satisfying (Carbone, 2008). 
While a number of evaluations have been provided on Africa (see, for example, 
Traub-Merz and Schildberg 2003; Crawford 2006), no attention has been paid to 
the Caribbean and the Pacific. This paper intends to partially fill this gap by look-
ing at the programming exercise in the Pacific countries, drawing on published 
and unpublished documents, newspapers, and interviews conducted by the au-
thor in January 2004 and between June and July 2005 in several Pacific countries.2 
To be able to do so, this paper is divided into three sections. The first sketches 
the evolution of the relationship between the EU and the Pacific. The second 
looks at the framework to involve NSAs under the various EU-ACP partnership 
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agreements. The third and most substantial section provides an assessment of 
how the theory of participation has worked in practice, with particular focus on 
the Pacific region.
 Evolving EU-Paciﬁ c Relations
The Pacific Islands countries (PICs) present several unique features, which dis-
tinguish them from the other two ACP regions. The first element is geographical 
distance, not only from Europe but also from one another. The Pacific includes 
a number of islands scattered over a vast area. For instance, Papua New Guinea 
is 4,500 km from Samoa. The total population of this area is about nine million, 
with more than half of the them living in Papua New Guinea and 11 states having 
a population of approximately 250,000. The second element is their diversity in 
terms of economic and social development, as well as human rights and demo-
cratic practices. Economic development is hindered not only by small markets, 
remoteness, and natural disasters, but also by high transport costs, low levels of 
food production, a shortage of skilled labour and increased urban migration. Five 
of the PICs fall in the low-middle income category of countries (Kiribati, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), the rest are least developed countries. 
Most of the PICs do reasonably well in the international rankings of political 
rights, freedom of expression, and civil liberties. However, in recent years, several 
coups and cases of civil unrest have made this region instable (Carbone 2006b; 
Dearden 2008; European Commission 2007b; Gani 2009).3 The third element 
is colonial heritage. While the majority of the African and Caribbean countries 
were either British or French colonies that gained independence in the 1950s or 
the 1960s, the PICs became independent in the 1970s and in the 1980s (with the 
exception of Samoa, which became independent in 1962), and not all of them 
were European colonies.
 The PICs have received low levels of foreign aid in absolute terms, but are 
among the highest in the world on a per capita basis, much higher than the other 
two ACP regions. The impact of these substantial aid flows on development has 
raised some controversy. Hughes (2003), for example, argues that not only has 
aid failed to lead to improved living standards but it may also have contributed to 
the chaos. Gani (2006, 2009) shows that the structural context (small countries 
with low population density), together with poor domestic policies are the major 
hindrances to economic development. Moreover, Gani claims, most of the micro-
states will continue to be highly dependent on foreign aid. Australia and New 
Zealand are the largest donors. The US also plays a significant role in some of 
these countries, while the importance of China’s aid has progressively increased. 
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As for the EU’s Member States, only France and the United Kingdom and, more 
recently, Portugal have shown any interest, though their levels of assistance has 
remained low. This situation gives the European Union an opportunity to be a 
significant player (Dearden 2008).
 Formal relations between the EU and (some of ) the PICs date back to the 
early 1970s, when Fiji, Tonga and Samoa signed the first Lomé Convention 
(1975-1980). Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Van-
uatu joined the ACP group under Lomé II (1975-80), after achieving independ-
ence.4 Finally, the Cook Islands, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, and Timor-Leste joined the ACP group under 
the Cotonou Agreement. These latter additions have made this an even more 
diverse group than before, not only in terms of resource endowment and stages 
of development, but also in terms of government traditions and political stabil-
ity (MacRae 2000; Carbone 2006b). For many years, however, the PICs received 
much less attention than the other two ACP regions. A symbolic change was 
planned for the successor of the Lomé Convention, which was supposed to be 
signed in Suva, but the coup in Fiji meant that the signing ceremony was moved 
to Cotonou.
 Aid to the region under the various Lomé Conventions and the Cotonou 
Agreement has been around   2 billion, with the EU actively involved in all 
of the PICs. As mentioned, only a few EU Member States have bilateral pro-
grammes, most notably France, the United Kingdom and Portugal. Trade ex-
changes are small and erratic, though there has always been a trade surplus for 
the PICs in its exchanges with the EU. The EU accounts for about 10 percent of 
the region exports and about 5 percent of its imports, with two countries (Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji for sugar) accounting for 90 percent of the total. In Decem-
ber 2004, the EU and 14 Pacific countries (all PICs except Timor-Leste) started 
negotiations of the EPA, but no agreement could be reached by the December 
2007 deadline. The EU has also signed fisheries partnership agreements with 
three PICs: Kiribati, Micronesia and Solomon Islands (European Commission 
2007b).
 Following the strategy for Africa and for the Caribbean, the European Com-
mission in May 2006 presented its strategy for the Pacific, which was later en-
dorsed by the Council. The Pacific strategy focussed on three priorities: a) en-
hanced political dialogue in a number of areas of common interest with the view 
to boosting the visibility and political profile of the EU-Pacific partnership; b) 
focused development action, with particular reference to good governance (in-
cluding efforts to fight against corruption, money laundering and terrorist activi-
ties), better trade opportunities through the EPAs, and sustainable management 
of natural resources (e.g., marine conservation, biodiversity, tropical forests, dis-
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aster preparedness); c) more efficient aid delivery, including better donor coordi-
nation and increased budget support (European Commission 2006).5 With these 
priorities, the EU tried to make its efforts more effective and visible in a region 
where the EU struggles for influence opposite Australia, New Zealand and in-
creasingly China (European Report, 30 May 2006).
 Participatory Approaches in EU-Paciﬁ c Relations
Despite the increased interest both at the academic and at the policy level, the 
role of civil society in the development process suffers from a terminological am-
biguity. The lack of consensus regarding a shared definition derives from the fact 
that there is no such thing as a typical civil society organisation (CSO). Civil 
society is generally understood as the space between the state and the family, 
where organisations, which are neither part of the state nor the market, interact 
with a view to achieving the common good (Lewis 2001). Things got even more 
complicated when the Cotonou Agreement introduced the term ‘non-state ac-
tors’ to include a wide range of actors (see following section). The interest in 
civil society in international development is the result of various factors, includ-
ing the crisis of the state, the process of democratisation, and the emphasis by 
international donors on participation (Lister and Carbone 2006). In fact, vari-
ous international donors have over the years substantially increased the level of 
funds transferred directly to Southern CSOs. The assumption was that these 
actors were more accountable and efficient in implementing aid programs than 
their Northern counterparts and that they contributed significantly to enhanc-
ing ownership (Carbone 2008).
 The proliferation of CSOs was also experienced in the Pacific. While com-
munity-based associations and church-related groups have a long tradition here, 
Pacific-based CSOs in a ‘Western sense’ are a more recent phenomenon. Many 
of the earliest CSOs were youth and women groups established by missionaries, 
with the aim to provide services to the poor. CSOs have become increasingly out-
spoken since the 1980s, seeking to increase their activities and participation not 
only in community life, but also in the overall policy-making process. The Pacific 
Conference of Church, founded in 1966, has championed reformist, radical and 
social justice causes. The Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) move-
ment was involved in anti-nuclear and anti-colonial campaigning. Greenpeace 
has often played a visible role in dramatizing environmental issues. Trade unions 
have been active on several regional political and security issues. But an impor-
tant step in the Pacific was the establishment of the Pacific Islands Association 
of Non-Governmental Organizations (PIANGO) in the early 1990s – though it 
European Development Cooperation.indd   76 29-6-2010   21:04:31
Mainstreaming Non-state Actors
had a long gestation period – and its various National Liaison Units (Henning-
ham 1995; Hill 1994; Prasad and Snell 2004).
 Nevertheless, the NSA sector has suffered from a number of problems. First, 
relations between governments and civil society have in some cases been hostile, 
in other cases tenuous, and in still other cases non-existent. Second, CSOs have 
lacked adequate financial sources, particularly to meet core institutional costs 
and build internal capacity. The view from the CSO sector is that while it is more 
likely to receive funds for projects, donors are less interested in providing funds 
for core administration issues (e.g., paying salaries, renting building, buying ve-
hicles for projects). Moreover, Pacific governments have never provided funds for 
recurring costs. Third, CSOs have not developed adequate capacities to design 
and implement larger projects, principally because their staff is not adequately 
trained (Klingelhofer 2002; Low and Davenport 2002).
 As for EU development policy, civil society started to play a role in the mid-
1970s, when a co-financing budget line was set up for European NGOs carrying 
out projects in developing countries in partnership with Southern NGOs. The 
co-financing budget line gradually became a victim of its own success, with too 
many proposals submitted and insufficient funds disbursed. Moreover, a number 
of thematic budget lines from the EU’s budget were made available to CSOs for 
projects in developing countries. The most important examples are the Euro-
pean Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Food Aid and 
Food Security budget line and the Humanitarian Aid budget line. As a result, it 
was calculated that about 20 percent of the EU’s overall external assistance was 
managed by NSAs (European Commission 2002). In November 2002, the Euro-
pean Commission issued a communication on participation, in which European 
NSAs were marginalized. The European Parliament, by contrast, was more sup-
portive of European NSAs. Similar views came from various Member States in 
the Council. This debate was protracted in the context of the negotiation of the 
Financial Perspectives for 2007-2013. A thematic program was eventually agreed 
upon for non-state actors and local authorities, replacing the co-financing and 
decentralized cooperation budget lines (Carbone 2006a, 2008).
 Under the Lomé Convention, the role of NSAs was rather limited. Initially, a 
number of micro-projects were implemented mostly in rural communities. Then, 
the idea of de-centralised co-operation in the 1990s allowed Southern NSAs to 
access funds without any intermediation by Northern NSAs. Despite some ini-
tial optimism, the results were disappointing. The negotiation of a successor to 
the Lomé IV offered the opportunity to discuss the issue of participation. During 
the negotiations, which eventually led to the adoption of the Cotonou Agreement 
in June 2000, the degree of involvement of civil society was one of the most con-
troversial issues, but an agreement was eventually reached in December 1999. The 
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European Union wanted NSAs to be actively involved in all stages of the develop-
ment process. By contrast, most of the ACP countries feared that this would lead 
to further weakening the role of the state (Carbone 2005).
 The discussions in the Pacific on the relationship between the EU and ACP 
group were convened by the Pacific Concerns Resource Centre (PCRC), which, 
with the assistance of the European Centre for Studies on European and Pacific 
Issues (ECSIEP), a European NGO based in the Netherlands, was involved in a 
number of projects. The first project (1997) concerned the debate on the future 
of the Lomé Convention. Two important meetings were organized, in May 1997 
in Suva and in October 1997 in Brussels, to achieve a common position among 
Pacific CSOs.6 The second project (1998-2000) concerned the issue of decentral-
ized co-operation. Although national experiences vary among Pacific countries, 
the decentralized cooperation process allowed CSOs to launch some projects, 
strengthen the dialogue between civil society and governments, and improve co-
operation among CSOs at the national level. Following two pilot seminars in Fiji 
and Tonga in 1998, additional seminars took place on all of the Pacific Islands in 
1999 and early 2000. A final conference was held in Fiji in March 2000. The third 
project (2001-2002) aimed at enhancing capacity building in the Pacific region. 
Workshops were held between March 2001 and July 2002 in 13 Pacific countries. 
A list of NSAs in each country was drawn up and national follow-up activities 
designed. Following each seminar, it was decided to set up national platforms to 
engage with governments and the European Commission on the new ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement (Euro-Pasifika, December 1998 and July 1999; Vere and 
Emberson 2004).
 As mentioned earlier, the Cotonou Agreement established that a wide range of 
actors must be actively involved in the planning, implementation, and evaluation 
phases of the ACP-EU partnership. Participation is included among the ‘funda-
mental principles’ of the EU-ACP partnership agreement and ‘apart from central 
government as the main partner, the partnership shall be open to diﬀ erent kinds of 
other actors in order to encourage the integration of all sections of society, includ-
ing the private sector and civil society organizations, into the mainstream of politi-
cal, economic and social life’ (Article 2).7 Th ree types of non-state actors were sin-
gled out: 1) private sector; 2) economic and social partners, including trade unions; 
3) civil society ‘in all its forms according to national characteristics’, including hu-
man rights groups, grassroots organizations, women’s associations, environmental 
movements, farmers’ organizations, indigenous people’s representatives, religious 
organizations, research institutes, cultural associations, and media. Interestingly, 
European NGOs were not speciﬁ cally included in this group, though this omis-
sion was considered irrelevant by European NGOs (Carbone 2005, 2006a).
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 Assessing Participation in the Programming Process
For the first time in relations between the EU and the ACP, NSAs were required 
to be involved in the programming process. The Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 
provides an outline of the political, economic and social situation of the coun-
try and the initial EU response. NSAs are encouraged to offer their views on 
the country’s development strategy. The National Indicative Programme (NIP) 
identifies focal and non-focal sectors, including the amount of resources allocated 
for NSAs. It covers five years, but revisions occur halfway (Mid-Term Review, 
MTR). NSAs should be fully involved in this case as well. The involvement of 
NSAs in the programming process was seen as a challenge for the Pacific, as 
noted by a local observer: ‘requiring governments to be inclusive towards organi-
zations without an existing tradition for doing so, or where the political culture 
excludes even contemplating such an idea, will prove challenging’ (Koloamatangi 
2003: 15).
 Th e 2002-2007 programming exercise
The first opportunity to assess the practice of participation occurred in the con-
text of the 9th EDF programming exercise. According to an unpublished Europe-
an Commission report (2004), the consultation process was mainly satisfactory. 
While a wide range of actors was consulted in almost all of the involved countries 
(62 out of the 68 reviewed CSPs), their inputs led to a change of the CSPs in only 
about half of the countries (36 out of 68). Various reasons were provided for the 
lack of effective participation in the remaining cases,: reluctance by local govern-
ments; difficulty in identifying credible interlocutors; late involvement or lack of 
coherent proposals by NSAs (European Commission, 2004).
 This optimistic view should be adjusted if a number of independent reports 
were to be taken into account. Eurostep, a European NGO, sponsored several 
Southern CSOs to make an assessment of participation in their country. The 
conclusion of these case studies was that ‘participation [was] equated with con-
sultation – which is not the same. These consultations were inadequately pre-
pared, had little consistency, and participation often seemed to be based on an 
arbitrary selection of civil society representation’ (Stocker, 2003: 20).8 Another 
study, funded by the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, a German political foundation, 
showed that CSOs were somehow consulted, but the depth of involvement var-
ied: in the majority of the cases, NSAs were consulted after a first draft had 
already been prepared (Traub-Merz and Schildberg 2003). However, an authori-
tative commentator urged people to put things in perspective: not only does it 
take time to change attitudes in Southern governments, but the CSO sector itself 
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was suffering from fragmentation, competition, poor governance, and dubious 
representativeness (Bossuyt 2006).
 The outcome for the Pacific region also received mixed results. From the 
analysis conducted by the European Commission (2004) and by the author in 
a number of interviews, it seems that consultations occurred, with a degree of 
variance, in 11 of the 14 countries (see table 1). On one end, we see three countries 
– Fiji, Samoa and Tonga – that had active NSA involvement in the consultation 
process. In Fiji, a wide range of actors was involved in various meetings and work-
shops. Moreover, the Fiji Forum of Non-State Actors (FONSA) was set up to 
coordinate all the sector’s efforts vis-à-vis the EU. A similar process occurred in 
Tonga, with the new Civil Society Forum in charge of coordinating inputs on the 
Cotonou Agreement, including reporting on project implementation. In Samoa, 
the NGO umbrella (SUNGO) was actively involved in the choice of the focal 
sectors. On the other end, NSAs were not consulted in Niue, Papua New Guin-
ea, and the Solomon Islands. In all three cases, NSAs were active in implement-
ing projects, in economic development at the village level (Niue) and in post-
conflict areas (Solomon Islands), in health and education and in the promotion of 
women’s rights (Papua New Guinea). Their capacity to affect the policy-making 
process was, however, weak. Strengthening the local NGO umbrella (NIANGO) 
prior to the receipt of EU funding became a priority for Niue. In Papua New 
Guinea, not only was the government unreceptive, but the NSA sector was also 
too fragmented and failed to achieve a common position. In the Solomon Islands, 
trade unions were mainly active in protecting workers’ wages.
 In between the two extremes, the participation process was limited in Micro-
nesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, and Vanuatu. In Micronesia, despite the fi-
nancial support given by the government to help establish a national umbrella 
(FSMANGO), NSAs complained about the lack of constructive dialogue with 
the government. Following the signature of the CSP, however, a National Author-
izing Committee was established to deal with EDF matters. Similarly, in Kiribati, 
after the signature of the CSP (though the consultation process lasted only three 
weeks), a group of local NSAs established the NSA Committee to consult with 
the government on EDF issues. This new entity merged with the Kiribati As-
sociation of NGOs (KANGO), which had faced a period of crisis. In Vanuatu, 
consultation was limited to the private sector and to a small number of NGOs. 
In the Marshall Islands, the inputs of the NGO umbrella were ignored (Author’s 
interviews, January 2004 and June-July 2005; ECSIEP 2001).
 The idea of consulting NSAs in the development process was new for the 
South Pacific. Three kinds of problems can be noted: a) NSAs lacked capacity 
in terms of human resources and funding; b) governments were slow in institu-
tionalizing NSA participation; c) geographical distance between states and the 
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two EU delegations in the regions negatively affected NSA participation in the 
programming process. In spite of these shortcomings, two members of the Pacific 
NGO community maintained that the Cotonou Agreement ‘heralded a major 
shift in relations between Pacific non-state actors (NSAs) and their govern-
ments. This positive climate was never witnessed during the Lomé Convention, 
mostly due to the lack of information regarding ACP-EU agreements. Within the 
region, the opportunities available under the decentralized cooperation facility 
were virtually unknown’ (Vere and Emberson 2004: 26).
Table 1 CSP consultation process and allocation of resources for Pacifi c NSAs in the 
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Cook 
Islands
2 Yes Yes 15 No Very 
positive
Fiji n.a. Yes, fully Yes 15 Yes n.a.
Kiribati 2 Yes, partially No 10 Yes n.a.
Marshall 
Islands
n.a. Yes, partially Marginal 15 n.a. n.a.
Micronesia n.a. Yes, partially Marginal 15 Yes Improving
Nauru n.a. Yes, partially Marginal 15 Yes Positive
Niue n.a. Yes, marginally No 10 Yes n.a.
Palau n.a. Yes Marginal 15 Positive
Papua New 
Guinea
2 Yes, marginally No 7.5 Yes Positive
Samoa n.a. Yes, fully Yes n.a. Yes n.a.
Solomon 
Islands
n.a. Yes, marginally No 15 No Positive
Tonga n.a. Yes, fully Yes 10 Yes Positive
Tuvalu 1 Yes Yes 10 Yes Positive
Vanuatu 2 Yes, partially No 5 Yes Positive
Source: European Commission (2004); Author’s interviews, PCRC (2004)
Type 1: relatively high level of participation and an organized civil society
Type 2: some tradition in participatory development and a somewhat organized civil society
Type 3: limited space for participation
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 Th e 2004 Mid-Term Review process
A key change introduced by the Cotonou Agreement concerns the issue of re-
warding good performers and penalising bad ones. Performance must be assessed 
‘in an objective and transparent manner’ on the basis of progress made in imple-
menting institutional and macroeconomic reforms and on the use of the allocated 
resources. The purpose of the Mid-Term Reviews is to appraise and adapt the 
CSPs and NIPs. The EU alone, however, decides on changes in the overall re-
source allocation, whether a country should be rewarded or penalized. Non-state 
actors must be consulted in the MTR process, thus contributing to the improve-
ment of the development cooperation program (Bossuyt 2000).
 Of the 77 ACP countries, 62 went under a formal MTR process in 2004. The 
remaining countries had either not signed a CSP or had been signatories of the 
Cotonou Agreement for too short a period (i.e., the seven new PICs). In 8 cases, a 
new CSP was drawn up; in 17 cases, allocations were increased; in 15 cases, alloca-
tions were decreased; in the remaining cases, no substantial changes were made 
(European Commission, 2005a). As for NSA participation, according to the Eu-
ropean Commission, in 20 cases there was no NSA direct involvement. This was 
mainly due to a lack of capacity of EU delegations or to a negative attitude of 
the recipient governments. In 38 cases, NSAs were appropriately involved. In 24 
cases, the process was well structured, involving a wide range of actors and result-
ing in a change of the MTR. In 14 cases, NSAs were simply informed about the 
MTR process. Most of these consultations took place as a result of an initiative 
of the EU delegations (European Commission 2005b). A survey conducted by 
the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) shows that 71 percent of 
the surveyed group was not consulted at all. As for the rest, consultations came 
in the form of information sessions rather than effective consultations; consulta-
tions were substantial and NSA views were taken seriously in only a few cases, 
(Sharma 2004).
 In the Pacific region, the MTR process took place in only ten countries (all but 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, and Palau). In five cases (Cook Islands, Micro-
nesia, Samoa, Tuvalu and Vanuatu), there was an increase of resources, whereas, 
in one case (Papua New Guinea), there was a decrease of resources. As for the 
involvement of NSAs, consultation occurred in eight cases, but only in five of 
them did this lead to a change of strategy. A successful case was Samoa, where 
the inputs of the NSAs were of a very high quality. In two countries (Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea), NSAs were not involved in the MTR process. 
In both cases, the NSAs were weak, though they had played a significant role 
during periods of social unrest.
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 Th e 2008-2013 programming exercise
The elaboration of the CSPs and NIPs for the 10th EDF programming exercise 
took place between 2006 and 2007. An unpublished report of the European Com-
mission (2007c) shows that some forms of participation took place in all the 
countries reviewed (64 in total, including all of the PICs). However, effective con-
sultation occurred in only 33 cases, with a broad range of NSAs being involved, 
various mechanisms being used, and sufficient time being provided for inputs and 
feedback. In the remaining 31 cases, dialogue was ad hoc and consultation took the 
form of information sessions at quite a late stage in the process. Eﬀ ective consulta-
tion depended mainly on the national context, though no signiﬁ cant correlation 
can be drawn from the link between participatory culture and the involvement of 
NSAs in the development process. In a majority of cases, the EC delegation took 
the initiative; consultation did not ‘come naturally to central governments’ and 
NSAs did not have ‘the reﬂ ex to demand consultation’ (European Commission 
2007c). A less optimistic view came from a number of case studies produced by 
Southern NGOs funded by Eurostep. Th ese studies underlined that the program-
ming exercise not only failed to adequately involve NSAs – lacking transparency 
in the selection of participants, providing inadequate preparatory information and 
giving limited feedback – but it also undermined the principle of ownership, with 
the European Commission often imposing its agenda (Sebban 2006).
 The PICs, once again, broadly confirmed this overall trend. In a majority of 
cases, NSAs were somehow involved in the programming exercise (see table 2). 
Th e best examples came from the Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Ton-
ga and Tuvalu. In the Cook Islands, NSAs were fully involved in the drafting of the 
CSP, particularly with those NSAs that were already involved in the 9th EDF. In 
Papua New Guinea, following various preparatory meetings, two workshops were 
organized on the focal sectors with key representatives of the NSA sector being 
invited. In Samoa, the focal sectors identiﬁ ed by the NSAs, together with other 
stakeholders, were eventually passed on to the Cabinet. In Tonga, various NSAs 
were actively involved in the drafting of the CSP. Similarly, in Vanuatu, the NGO 
umbrella organization (Vango) participated in the drafting of the CSP. Follow-
ing the consultations among NSAs, a number of their points were incorporated 
into the CSP, and the ﬁ nal text was returned to Vango before it was adopted. In 
Nauru, NSAs were actively involved in the programming exercise, also because the 
government had a very positive attitude towards the NSA sector. In the Solomon 
Islands, there were a few meetings held with NSAs, which led to the selection of 
the focal sectors. In Tuvalu, NSAs were involved in the drafting stage through 
regular consultations with the NAO. NSAs were also involved, though to a lesser 
degree, in other countries, such as Kiribati, Micronesia, Niue, and Palau.
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Table 2 Consultation process in the Pacifi c in the context of the 10th EDF 
programming exercise
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Cook 
Islands
2 Good Del Draft CSP sent to NGO 
platform, followed by 
discussion
Weak No Open
Fiji 2 Limited Del Presentations of draft CSP No 
inputs
No Suspicious
Kiribati Limited Del Draft sent to NGO 
platform, followed by 
discussion
Weak n.a. Open
Marshall 
Islands
2 Limited, 
but im-
proving
Del & 
Gov
Information sessions Weak No More open 
than past
Micronesia 2 Regular 
dialogue
Del & 
Gov
Weak No Growing ac-
ceptance of 
NSA role
Nauru 3 Good Del CSP discussed during 
mission
Weak n.a. Reluctant
Niue 3 Limited Del Information session No 
inputs 
No Reluctant
Palau 2 Limited Del Information session n.a. No Growing 
acceptance 
of NSA role
Papua New 
Guinea
2 Good NAO Extensive consultation Ad-
equate
Yes Positive
Samoa 1 Regular 
dialogue
Gov Regular meetings Good No Open
Solomon 2 Continu-
ous and 
informal 
dialogue
Del & 
Gov
Information sessions Weak Yes Positive
Tonga 3 Good Del Information sessions Good Yes Reluctant
Tuvalu 2 Good Del Information sessions Limited No Open
Vanuatu 2 Good Del & 
Gov
Information sessions Ad-
equate
Yes Good
Source: European Commission (2007c)
Type 1: relatively high level of participation and an organized civil society
Type 2: some tradition in participatory development and a somewhat organized civil society
Type 3: limited space for participation
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 Other Avenues for Participation
In addition to their advocacy role, non-state actors are actively involved in the 
delivery of services to the poor, but they also participate in the debate on trade 
issues.
 Implementing projects
Non-state actors can access the EU’s financial resources in various ways. First, 
the Cotonou Agreement established that a percentage of the NIP can be directly 
accessed via the EU delegations and can also be used for raising awareness and 
for capacity building. No ceiling was set up, but 15 percent of the total resources 
were established as the normal practice. Second, funds can be made available for 
micro-projects that do not fit into the focal sectors. Third, non-EDF funds in-
clude resources used in partnership with European NGOs, as well resources that 
can be accessed directly by Southern NSAs.
 In the case of the programming exercise for the 9th EDF, the percentage of 
financial resources earmarked for NSA activities in the PICs was higher than 
in the other two ACP regions. Seven countries (Cook Islands, Fiji, Marshall Is-
lands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, and Solomon Islands) received 15 percent of the 
total allocations, four countries (Kiribati, Niue, Tonga, and Tuvalu) received 10 
percent, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu received only 7.5 percent and 5 percent 
respectively. Finally, in the case of Samoa, all of the funding for NSAs came from 
the micro-projects, which represents about 20 percent of the NIP (see table 1). As 
for other resources, Pacific NSAs have benefited only marginally from decentral-
ized cooperation, micro-projects, and co-financing. However, Fiji was identified 
as one of the countries that would benefit from the EIDHR. This entailed a sta-
ble allocation for the period 2002-2004 (averaging  1.3 million per year), which 
was provided primarily to local NSAs, especially the Citizens’ Constitutional 
Forum (CCF). These resources aimed at enhancing political stability, following 
the coup in 2000 and the process of re-conciliation that was initiated by the new 
government (Carbone 2006b).
 In the case of the 10th EDF programming process, the issue of financial re-
sources earmarked for NSA activities was not considered among the priorities. 
In fact, the majority of CSPs and NIPs did not contain explicit references to the 
amount of resources available for NSA activities. It is not surprising that in a gen-
eral meeting organized by the EU delegation in Suva in August 2006, the most 
serious concern raised by the NSA sector was the lack of a separate allocation 
reserved only for NSAs.
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 Questioning the Economic Partnership Agreement
A radical change introduced by the Cotonou Agreement concerns the ACP-EU 
trade regime. After a transitional period (2000-2007), during which the Lomé 
trade regime was maintained, six Economic Partnership Agreements were to be 
enacted by 1 January 2008. The European Union’s objective with these new trade 
arrangements was to accelerate the integration of ACP countries into the glo-
bal economy by enhancing local production and capacity to attract investment, 
whilst taking into account different levels of development (Babarinde and Faber 
2005; Holland 2002). The Pacific was the last region to start negotiations in Sep-
tember 2004. Several reasons prevented the successful conclusion of the EPA by 
the agreed deadline: the geographical vulnerability of the PICs; declining prices 
for Fiji’s sugar; the role of Australia and New Zealand, the two major PICs’ trad-
ing partners; and the strictness of the rule of origin. There were numerous meet-
ings between Pacific ministers and Commissioners Mandelson and Ashton (in 
charge of trade) as well as Michel (in charge of development) and between senior 
officials for both parties, and a joint declaration was issued in March and October 
2007 (European Report, 11 September 2004).
 The role of the NSAs in these discussions was secondary. Relations became 
tense when a critical report written by Professor Jane Kelsey, but commissioned 
by the World Council of Churches Office, was released in 2005 (Kelsey, 2005). 
The Pacific EPA, according to Kelsey, was just a way for the EU to further ex-
ploit its former colonies, to impose its views without having done any preventive 
impact studies. Kelsey’s study presented the Pacific NSA views on the EPA. In a 
meeting held in Nadi (Fiji) in June 2006, NSAs from 12 PICs complained about 
the lack of consultation and transparency during the EPA negotiation process. 
‘It seems that it is only government trade officials and their counterparts in the 
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat who have the knowledge on the EPA and what 
it offers. The regional CSO group is fearful that the EPA trade negotiations are 
being carried out purely on the basis of theoretical economic analysis’ (www.bi-
laterals.org).
 An interim agreement was eventually signed with Papua New Guinea and Fiji 
on 23 November 2007. Relations with the other non-LDCs (Cook Islands, Micro-
nesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Marshall Islands, and Tonga) were regulated by the 
Generalised System of Preference (GSP) as of 1 January 2008. The region’s LDCs 
(Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu, and Timor-Leste,) were 
subject to the Everything but Arms regulation. The regional EPA was discussed 
in another workshop held in Madang (Papua New Guinea) in April 2008. In gen-
eral, the Pacific NSAs were concerned that Pacific states were unprepared for the 
EPAs and that they were being asked to compromise policy space that allowed 
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governments to discriminate in favour of local firms and suppliers in return for 
completely unproven and volatile benefits in the form of additional investment 
and non-binding promises for new development assistance. In particular, a back-
ground document prepared for the meeting stated the following:
We note that European trade negotiators have bullied Paciﬁ c Trade Minis-
ters during the trade negotiation process... We note that the EC has under-
mined regionalism in the Paciﬁ c by pursuing a ‘divide and rule’ strategy in 
the EPA negotiations with the Paciﬁ c countries... We note that the Euro-
pean Union is making considerable new funds available to ACP countries 
who sign an EPA through the European Development Fund (EDF)... De-
spite considerable pressure on our governments from the European Union 
to sign new EPAs, Paciﬁ c civil society well understands that there is... no 
political obligation for Paciﬁ c leaders to agree to an EU-imposed model of 
development (PANG, 2008).
Of course, the European Union rejected all of these claims, stating that the Pa-
cific countries had had plenty of time to prepare for the EPAs. Moreover, it was 
argued that ‘through the EPA, Europe will help the Pacific improve competitive-
ness, diversify its exports and build regional markets’ (European Commission, 
2007a: 3). But to do so, the Pacific could not rely solely on traditional approaches, 
and would need to improve conditions for investment, services and the competi-
tiveness of its exports, addressing longer-term strategic issues relating to trade, 
services, investment, governance, economic policy and deeper regional integra-
tion. The EU’s priority, the European Commission claimed, has been to help the 
Pacific boost its regional integration, gain new markets and opportunities, make 
it more attractive to investors and hence, foster its development (European Com-
mission, 2007a).
 Conclusion
The Cotonou Agreement marked a significant turn in the relationships between 
the EU and the ACP states. One of the most innovative areas, at least in theory, 
concerns the idea of participatory development. In the latest Lomé Conventions, 
several attempts had been made to make decentralized actors full partners in 
development cooperation, but their involvement had been limited to the imple-
mentation stage. While recognizing the right of ACP governments to determine 
the development strategy for their own countries, the Cotonou Agreement es-
tablished that non-state actors must be involved in the planning, implementation 
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and evaluation stages of the development cooperation strategies. Some analysts 
have seen this as a very positive element while others have raised doubts. Hurt 
(2003: 172), for example, argues that ‘it is possible that the increasing incorpo-
ration of democratically unaccountable non-state actors, especially the private 
sector, into the process may actually serve to weaken the process of democratiza-
tion... to weaken the dominance of ACP states, especially with regard to a state’s 
economic dimensions, by shifting the political landscape more in favour of neo-
liberal policies.’ By contrast, Bossuyt (2006: 125) maintains that ‘the opening of 
ACP-EU cooperation to non-state actors holds great potential in terms of fight-
ing poverty, promoting growth, delivering social services and fostering democracy 
and good governance.’
 While in theory the Cotonou Agreement can be considered an exemplary 
framework to promote participatory development, the practice has been differ-
ent. The participation of NSAs in the first generation of CSPs and NIPs (2002-
2007), according to the European Commission’s own assessment, was considered 
satisfactory; the NSAs had been consulted in most countries, and, in more than 
half of the cases, the final document took into account their inputs. This view 
needs to be complemented by less optimistic NSAs or independent scholarly 
research. The Pacific region, however, offered a more positive picture, in spite 
of the structural constraints faced by the NSA sector and the geographical dis-
tance between the EU’s delegations and the 15 PICs. Much more was expected 
from the second generations of CSPs and NIPs (2008-2013). But, in contrast to 
expectations, little progress has been achieved between the two programming 
exercises. True, the involvement of the NSAs in the consultation process has 
certainly increased, but there are still a number of cases in which the partici-
pation process has been unsatisfactory, with consultation often equated with 
information sessions.
 Notes
 The EDF is the main instrument for development cooperation within the ACP group. 
It is not part of the general EU budget, but is funded by voluntary contributions from 
Member States, regulated by its own financial rules and managed by a specific committee.
 It should be noted that this article does not discuss Timor-Leste, which joined the EU-
ACP Partnership agreement after the Cotonou Agreement had been signed.
 For a comprehensive review of the politics of the South Pacific Islands, see Crocombe 
().
 Cooperation under Lomé I concentrated on telecommunications and human resources 
development; under Lomé II, on developing regional transport, energy, telecommunica-
tions, training and tourism; under Lomé III, on transport and infrastructures, energy, 
telecommunications, tourism, agricultures and fisheries; under. Lomé IV-a, on alleviat-
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ing constraints of natural resources and tourism; under Lomé IV-b, on human resources 
development and sustainable development of natural resources (European Commission, 
b). 
 The European Union has two delegations in the Pacific, one in Suva, Fiji, and another in 
Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea. 
 All of the discussions stressed the need to agree on a more political ACP-EU agreement, 
with a particular emphasis on good governance and the protection of human rights; to 
preserve the transitional period for trade preferences; to improve investment instruments; 
to increase the role of civil society; to mainstream gender and environment. It should also 
be remembered that the PCRC was chosen as the Pacific focal point for the ACP Civil 
Society Forum (Vassort-Rousset, ).
 The importance of civil society was already emphasised in Article , which defines the 
objectives of the Partnership: ‘building the capacity of the actors in development and im-
proving the institutional framework necessary for social cohesion, for the functioning of a 
democratic society and market economy, and for the emergence of an active and organized 
civil society shall be integral to the approach’. 
 Laryea () has summarised various factors prevented an effective participation such 
as: a) lack of institutional mechanisms; b) short time set aside for consultation; c) poor 
quality of information; d) limited range of NSAs involved in the process, which were 
mostly well-connected and urban CSOs; few attempts were made to involve grassroots or 
rural NGOs; d) insufficient information supplied to NSAs on the results of the consulta-
tions.
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An Overview of European Programs to Support 
Energy Projects in Africa and Strategies to 
Involve the Private Sector*
 Lars Holstenkamp
 Energy and Development in Africa
Energy services have not been included in the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) as a separate target. Nevertheless, energy delivery is part of the essential 
infrastructure needed for a productive life and to reach the goals and targets set 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN) in 2000. Despite its abun-
dant energy resources, consumption of modern energy in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) is the lowest in the world. In rural areas, in particular, the vast majority of 
the people have no access to electricity. Moreover, in some countries, more than 
90 of the energy consumed is produced from biomass, i.e., fuel-wood, charcoal, 
and dung. Open fires and unprocessed fuel contribute to emissions and indoor air 
pollution that are responsible for respiratory illnesses.2
 The way energy is produced and access to energy are important issues in many 
areas of life, such as healthcare, education, communication and lighting. Energy 
services have a high marginal value for economic growth and development and 
are economically costly in many parts of the developing world. Moreover, there 
are important links between energy services and environmental issues.3 Modern 
forms of energy can improve productivity, especially in rural areas, and facili-
tate income generation at local level. Additional opportunities for employment 
may be created, thereby diversifying the available income sources.4 Renewable 
energy technologies (RETs) can also spur the creation of micro-enterprises. On 
the other hand, one must guard against excessive expectations. The economic 
benefits that can be generated also depend on other conditions. Therefore, im-
provements in energy delivery must be accompanied by complementary actions 
and integrated into a poverty alleviation strategy encompassing more than (rural) 
electrification alone.5
 Though insufficient, improving access to energy is an essential and necessary 
input if the MDGs are to be fulfilled in African countries. SSA is still a long way 
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off from meeting the MDGs.6 Energy crises in countries such as Tanzania show 
that energy shortages are a bottleneck to economic growth and development. The 
challenge here is to increase funding for energy access, which has to be at least 
doubled in a climate in which private funding has declined and is at a low level in 
African RET markets.7
 Switching from traditional biomass to kerosene or gas as suggested by the UN 
Millennium Project (2004) may be a first step but it also increases dependency 
on fossil fuels. Rising oil prices also have a negative effect on the economies of 
oil importers and force the poor back down the energy ladder.8 This is why the 
main focus of this paper is on renewable energy sources. Moreover, grid exten-
sion is not a feasible solution in many rural areas where RETs are sometimes the 
only economically viable way to facilitate electrification or other energy services. 
There are lots of different RET project types ranging from large-scale projects 
like the Inga dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo to transboundary grid 
routes through Africa, medium-scale hydro-electrical facilities, wind parks, geo-
thermal power, biomass and concentrating solar power, all integrated into the 
national grid, to rural off-grid centres, household scale appliances, or sustainable 
household biomass (e.g., improved stoves).9
 Funding and technical assistance is available from public and private actors 
at the global, continental, regional and national levels. The following section 
deals with different private actors and their investment decisions. The problems 
of RET projects in Africa are described and possible public actions to solve 
these problems are briefly discussed. These theoretical considerations serve as 
a background for the overview of European financing initiatives for (renew-
able) energy on the African continent in the third section of this contribution. 
Since it is often stressed that investment needs can never be met without private 
sector participation, this article also examines the potentials and limitations 
of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or other forms of cooperation between 
public and private actors. It also focuses on the need for (more) coordination 
and harmonisation among donors, not only within the European Union (EU) 
and its various institutions, but also between EU and multilateral donors and 
networks. The article ends with a brief summary of results and conclusions. The 
work presented here is based mainly on a review of the literature, complemented 
by several interviews and personal communications with some of the actors in 
this field.
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 Private Sector Involvement
 Private Sector Contributions
A variety of different public and private entities are active in the field of energy 
supply in Africa. Figure 1 is an overview of the most important ones. This contri-
bution deals specifically with European initiatives, networks in which the Euro-
pean Community (EC) or EU Member States participate, and the private sector.
Figure 1 Overview of Public and Private Actors
Private sector agents are active in two fields. The first is the renewable energy 
industry (and related businesses), i.e., the more technical part, and the second is 
the financial sector which provides capital and risk management instruments for 
RET projects. Private sector agents may provide training, facilitate the transfer 
of knowledge and innovative technical solutions, or help build capacity in the re-
cipient country. On the technical side we find the energy companies and business 
associations. Important actors in the financial sector in addition to the banks are 
the microfinance institutions, venture capital funds, carbon funds, and insurance 
companies.
 Projects are mainly evaluated on the basis of costs and benefits. These finan-
cial motives are not the only considerations, however. Others include sustain-
ability or corporate social responsibility (CSR) in relation to ‘green funds’.10 A 
not-for-profit sector also exists in which these kinds of motives play a significant 
role. Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is on the private, ‘commercial’ sector 
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and the possible collaboration between the public and private sectors. Investment 
planning data always includes a degree of uncertainty,11 which has to be taken 
into consideration in one of three general ways:
1. Cash flows are adapted to incorporate these uncertainties (e.g., via simulation 
and, to a certain extent, via sensitivity or scenario analysis).
2. A risk premium is added to the discount rate taken to calculate the net present 
value (NPV) with capital market models perhaps being used.
3. The amortisation period is shortened, i.e., the period of time after which up-
front costs have to have been paid back by revenues.
When choosing between different projects, private investors not only take the 
risks and returns of a single investment into account, but also the correlation be-
tween the risks of different projects. In general, the higher the uncertainties are, 
the higher the expected returns from an investment have to be. Besides, assets 
that are not or maybe even negatively correlated with other assets are of special 
interest due to the possibility of portfolio diversification.12
 As is shown in the next section, the low level of private investment in RET 
projects in Africa is due to the fact that they offer ‘a low return with an extra por-
tion of risk’.13 High initial costs and a corresponding long amortisation period, 
low returns and uncertain cash flows, which lead to high risk premiums, result 
in a low NPV. This is the reason why most of the projects are ‘CSR driven’ or 
take the form of donations rather than commercially viable businesses.14 Conse-
quently, there is a need to reduce uncertainties and enhance returns in order to 
encourage private sector agents in addition to the non-governmental organisation 
(NGO) and philanthropic / CSR sectors.
 Problems of RET Projects in Africa
The obstacles and uncertainties facing RET projects can be lumped together 
into four groups:15 (1) supply side, (2) demand side, (3) framework conditions, 
and (4) financial sector. Most of these are common to all RET projects, wher-
ever they are conducted. However, the problems are a lot more severe in the 
African context.
 supply-side obstacles
The problems on the supply side, which tend to be more serious in the African 
context because of the more difficult business and financial environment, are:
– Higher operating uncertainties because of the newer technologies and insuf-
ficient data for analysis;
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– Projects being too small for some financiers. This is especially the case as re-
gards rural electrification with the result being much higher transaction costs 
per unit produced;
– Longer lead times and high initial costs which result in a higher ratio of capital 
costs to operating costs, the need for longer-term financing, project exposure 
to uncertainties over a very long period of time, vulnerability to capital struc-
ture and, in particular, political uncertainties.
Moreover, present technologies are not yet fully competitive. Commercialisation 
and marketing are complicated by the competition between relative new technol-
ogies and older ones. Although this also applies in developed countries, especially 
due to the state of the demand side and regulatory obstacles described below, the 
problem is more severe in many parts of Africa.
 Developers in African countries are mostly less experienced. Completion and 
operating uncertainties therefore tend to be higher. The track record of develop-
ers is, in most cases, limited. Moreover, most developers have a low level of own 
funds, i.e., little equity and none of the collateral required by banks for corporate 
finance. There is also a lack of commercial business models and of local capacities 
to adapt technology.
 Low accessibility due to difficult locations aggravates the problems as regards 
the infrastructure required to deliver services. Huge funds and/or smart decen-
tralised solutions are needed to overcome these physical barriers.
 Other uncertainties include those commonly found in foreign projects such 
as currency uncertainties or credit, economic, and political uncertainties. Once 
again these are generally more acute in the African context, although a couple of 
standard risk management solutions have been developed to mitigate such risks.
 The last point to be mentioned on the supply side, namely fuel supply uncer-
tainty, is mainly caused by difficulties in assessment (e.g., wind, geothermal) or 
delivery (e.g., biomass). The lack of reliable data in many African countries may 
exacerbate this problem. Nevertheless, it has to be stressed that this type of un-
certainty is usually understated in the case of conventional power plants. Since 
there is no correlation between renewable energy and fossil fuel supply, RETs 
could be used as a natural barrier.16
 demand-side obstacles
Supply-side factors play a role in almost every region of the world, although most 
of these are more problematic in the African context. Meanwhile, demand-side 
obstacles are present to a much lesser extent in developed countries compared to 
developing ones. These include:
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– a lack of familiarity with RETs and reduced awareness and willingness due to 
a limited cultural acceptance of RETs;
– problems relating to adequacy and costs that lead to low rates of return and 
therefore impede investments in RET projects;
– excessively low consumption levels in some areas, which means insufficient 
productive use in remote rural regions, for instance;
– low ability-to-pay and willingness-to-pay in rural areas in particular, aggra-
vated by high unit costs per consumer;
– low demand for excess supply which can be fed into the grid.
Consequently, there is a need for businesses to be developed and upgraded before 
or in conjunction with RET projects.
 framework conditions
Transmission access, interconnection, permitting, and liability requirements, lo-
cation restrictions or prohibitions to sell into the grid are all problems created by 
inadequate policies and legal frameworks. Moreover, pricing rules play a signifi-
cant role in the context of energy investments. Tariffs are often too low for RETs 
to recapture costs. Price distortions such as subsidies or unequal tax burdens also 
favour conventional sources. Insufficient market performance also hampers RET 
projects and leads to positive externalities of renewables not being valued and the 
negative externalities not being internalised into fossil fuel prices. This adversely 
affects the commercial viability of RETs. Inadequate information may lead to 
market failures as well as natural monopolies of infrastructures and thus lead to 
the need for governmental regulation.
 While energy policy is a highly competitive field in developed countries, politi-
cal uncertainties tend to be much greater in African countries. Moreover, weak 
institutions may deter foreign investors. The structural transition of energy mar-
kets in African countries creates further uncertainty. An additional problem con-
cerns excessive or ineffective regulations.
 financial sector
The fourth group of obstacles concerns the financial sector, which is weak or 
even absent in many parts of Africa. Financial sector obstacles include problems 
relating to the acceptance of RETs by financiers. Banks or other intermediaries 
are usually unfamiliar with these types of projects and may be averse to them 
because they are perceived as new and high-risk. Moreover, financiers have lost 
faith in energy projects in general due to incidents like the California energy cri-
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sis, the Enron debacle or blackouts in the US and Europe. While familiarity with 
RETs is also increasing in the developing country context, the previous obstacle, 
however, shows that it remains a general problem. By contrast, excessively small 
projects and high transaction costs per deal, as well as a risk-return profile (which 
is considered to be unattractive compared to other types of projects) hampers the 
willingness to finance RET projects, especially in Africa.
 All this leads to a lack of funds and/or financial instruments. Different RETs 
require different types of financing. Consumer finance and microfinance that are 
necessary for off-grid and small-scale solutions are often absent in rural areas. It 
is difficult to secure corporate finance for medium-sized projects due to a lack 
of collateral and high interest rates. Project finance could be used as a financial 
tool for large-scale projects, but this is difficult to implement due to the risks for 
which no party takes responsibility, or there is simply a lack of funds.
 The solutions are of a more traditional short-term nature than creatively 
structured products. If policies are available at all, the insurance premiums are 
(too) high and the level of local investments tends to be low.
 All in all, these problems may create a vicious circle with the reluctance of fin-
anciers and manufacturers to invest leading to low levels of production. Higher 
production levels are necessary to increase the economies of scale. High costs 
resulting from this further lower demand and therewith deteriorate investment 
conditions.
 Public Interventions and the Possible Role for ODA
There are at least four starting points from which public intervention helps to 
reduce risks and enhance returns through the improvement of the framework 
conditions and the provision of various types of subsidies:
– Policy environment and pricing
 Improvements in the policy environment have been taking place in the form of 
liberalisation in many energy markets. Nevertheless, most energy markets are 
still in a state of transition. Energy market regulation is a complex task. For 
instance, it is possible to make revenues more predictable and stable through 
adequate pricing (price-support schemes, ﬁ xed-price schemes, feed-in-tariﬀ s) as 
shown by experiences in developed countries. Policy advice is, therefore, one of 
the major roles that oﬃ  cial development assistance (ODA) can play in this ﬁ eld.
– Financial (sector) assistance
 Donors could help close the infrastructure funding gaps, provide equity espe-
cially for financing during the seed stage, participate in venture capital funds 
to raise funding for Africa as well as provide loans or grants to large or me-
dium-sized projects, or support the development of risk management tools. 
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In addition to this, training and awareness raising is necessary in the microfi-
nance sector, although this should be limited to initial stages in order to avoid 
the crowding out of private initiatives by public funds.17
– Additional revenue flows
 Additional revenue flows could be generated for renewable energy projects 
through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, 
or through Tradable Renewable Certificates (TRCs), which are dealt with in 
section 3.1.2. Technical support is also needed.
– Business development
 Besides pricing schemes, support for the productive sector might be one way 
of overcoming demand side problems.
These four types of policies may each help to break the vicious circle described in 
the previous section in conjunction with technical support for energy companies.
 An Overview of European Energy Policy and Initiatives vis-à-
vis Africa: Th e General Framework
Having described the uncertainties associated with RET projects and obstacles to 
private investments in this sector in Africa, this section provides an overview of 
a variety of European initiatives. It analyses how far these initiatives address the 
problems referred to above. Th e initiatives are imbedded in a general policy frame-
work, which is described ﬁ rst. Th is is followed by a clariﬁ cation of the character-
istics of some of the funds. Besides these funds, there are a variety of diﬀ erent ini-
tiatives and forums in which European actors are involved and this brings up the 
question of policy coordination, which is the focus of the last part of this section.
 When looking at the overall energy policy framework and EU-Africa rela-
tions, one has to take three major issues into account. First, the general EU Africa 
policy and development issues, second, climate change policies and the global cli-
mate change regime and third, the issue of energy security. With regard to the ﬁ rst 
issue, at least two attempts are being made to create a coherent policy framework 
in the form of the Africa Strategy of 200518 and the 2007 Joint Africa-EU Strat-
egy19, 20 Energy is a key development issue of these strategies and is also referred to 
as part of the infrastructure challenge and climate change policy. Both strategies 
address the whole continent, with the African Union (AU) as the partner.
 Nevertheless, diﬀ erent institutional arrangements continue to exist for North 
Africa, the SSA, and South Africa. Th e Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was cre-
ated as part of the Barcelona Process, followed by the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) with the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) as 
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source of funding.21 Th e SSA is part of the Africa, Caribbean, and the Paciﬁ c (ACP) 
group with the European Development Fund (EDF) as its main ﬁ nancial instru-
ment. South Africa has its own Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement 
(TDCA) with the European Communities and is speciﬁ cally addressed as a geo-
graphical area within the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI).
 Different institutional arrangements based on parts of the continent as well 
as energy-related topics are mirrored by competencies within the Commission, 
which are spread over various departments (Department General, DG):
– DG Development for ACP countries and DCI plus EuropeAid as agency;
– DG External Relations for ENP;
– DG Environment for climate change policy;
– DG Energy and Transport for energy policy in general and research in this 
field.
The second issue, which has, or could have, an influence on energy access and 
development in Africa is climate change policy. As noted in section 2.3, carbon 
finance and TRCs could generate additional revenue streams for RET projects. 
From an investor perspective more or less certain revenues would help to make 
projects attractive. Since both instruments – carbon finance and TRCs – are still 
relatively new instruments and their future development highly dependent upon 
international political decisions, this is a difficult condition to fulfil.
 Nevertheless, carbon finance is used as an instrument for RET projects in 
most regions of the developing world with Africa having only a very small share 
of the carbon market.22 Emission-reducing projects can be used to generate Certi-
fied Emissions Reduction (CER) certificates, which can then be traded. Projects 
must be approved by the CDM Executive Board.
 Problems associated with CDM projects are the high transaction costs and 
uncertainties relating to approval. Some of the problems with CDM rules for 
small projects might be overcome by combining projects and the so-called ‘pro-
grammatic CDM’.23 This is one way in which climate change policy affects energy 
markets.
 Promotion of CDM in Africa is included in the EUEI. Nevertheless, Africa has 
played only a minor role in the Conference of Parties in Bali in December 2007.24 
Besides capacity building in African countries and the initiation of pilot projects 
as a means of producing successful examples, there is a need to lower transaction 
costs and uncertainties with regard to regulation, and further improve possibili-
ties for combining smaller projects. These regulatory issues are daily business in 
the field of climate change policy with impacts on development and energy policy. 
The use of the CDM in RET projects in Africa can be increased not only through 
capacity and awareness building but also by reducing uncertainties.
European Development Cooperation.indd   103 29-6-2010   21:04:31
 Lars Holstenkamp
 TRCs, also called green tags, green certiﬁ cates or renewable energy credits are 
being discussed as a tool by which to integrate the private sector, for example, in 
the Mediterranean Renewable Energy Partnership (MEDREP) launched by Italy 
and established as a Johannesburg Plan of Implementation ( JPoI) type 2 partner-
ship.25 TRCs use an unbundling strategy to sell non-energy attributes of electricity 
produced from renewable sources. Th ese certiﬁ cates can be bought by residential 
or non-residential customers who value ‘green’ electricity more than conventional 
production. Th e revenues generated by selling the certiﬁ cates can be used to ﬁ -
nance the RETs projects.26 Using TRCs will require standardisation and veriﬁ ca-
tion procedures. Moreover, it would make sense to test this instrument for North 
African markets if these are integrated into the EU energy internal market.
 In addition to development and access to energy, the third topic on the agenda 
is energy security, which influences the (public) investment flows to different 
African regions. Rising prices for fossil fuels and increasing demand, especially 
in Asia, have, in the eyes of many observers, led to a resurgence of geopolitics 
based on ‘regions and empires’ and ’market and institutions’,27 with a focus on 
market-based solutions, good governance, and multilateralism.28 Both strands of 
the energy security discourse lead to questions relating to the links between de-
velopment, energy security, and democracy. Resource-related conflicts may arise 
because of energy poverty.29 Another discussion focuses on whether a ‘resource 
curse’ exists, i.e., a decline in economic activity and level of democracy because of 
a wealth of resources.30
 While acknowledging Europe’s dependency on energy imports, which will be-
come even greater in the future, an attempt is being made to build up a coherent 
common external energy policy for the EU. Concrete actions, as laid down in the 
Commission’s Green Paper on Energy Security31 and subsequent documents and 
communications, are the integration of Maghreb countries into the EU electric-
ity internal market and the negotiation of a Euro-Maghreb Energy Community 
Treaty. Transport from the SSA is included as a later phase. The SSA is mainly 
seen as an increasingly important market for fuels, which is clearly affected by 
China’s growing influence.32 Development issues are no more than a minor point, 
reflecting the fact that the integration of development and energy policies is at 
least at an initial stage.33
 European funds to support energy access in Africa
The institutional fragmentation discussed in the previous section, as well as the 
differing emphasis put on energy policies vis-à-vis different parts of Africa, are 
also reflected in the various European funds available to support energy projects 
on the African continent. Table 1 shows an overview of the characteristics of 
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three different programmes: The Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), the ACP-EC 
Energy Facility, and the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Fund 
(GEEREF).
The Commission, member states, and the European Investment Bank (EIB) have 
set up the Africa-Europe Partnership on Infrastructure together with the In-
frastructure Trust Fund (ITF).34 The ITF supports cross-border infrastructure 
projects, including energy, with public or private partners. It can be used as source 
of co-finance and provides funding for interest rate subsidies, technical assist-
Table 1 Overview of European funds
Program Infrastructure Trust 
Fund (ITF)
ACP-EC Energy Facility Global Energy 
Effi  ciency and 
Renewable Energy 
Fund (GEEREF)
Organisation under EU-Africa 
Infrastructure 
Partnership; managed 
by EIB
under EDF managed by EIB and 
EIF
Funds € 146m(€ 10m from 
ACP-EC Energy Facility)
€ 220m (2005-2007)
(€ 198m for Call for 
Proposals)
€ 80m by ECtarget: € 
100m
Target cross-border 
infrastructure; energy 
as 1 of 4 sectors; large-
scale projects
energy projects in 
ACP countries: access, 
management and 
governance, cross-
border cooperation
broad spectrum of 
renewables and energy 
effi  ciency, regional 
funds; smaller projects 
< € 10m
Private sector 
involvement
co-investment application for 
projects, not for 
profi t; call for tenders, 
subcontracts, 
participation in PPPs
private sub-funds, 
private sector 
involvement on project 
level
Type of 
intervention
Co-fi nance, interest 
rate subsidies, 
technical assistance, 
environmental or social 
project components, 
early-stage fi nance, 
insurance
Co-fi nance fund-of-funds: equity 
for sub-funds, or: 
co-investment with 
regional fund in 
projects; technical 
assistance component
Source: Funds’ websites as indicated in the endnotes
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ance/feasibility studies, environmental or social project components, early-stage 
finance and risk mitigation insurance premiums. The fund is managed by the 
EIB and   146 million has been committed so far. Although rural areas might 
also profit from better connections between different countries, energy projects 
financed under the ITF are mostly very large-scale ones not specifically targeted 
at rural populations.
 The second fund is the ACP-EC Energy Facility financed from intra-ACP 
funds under the 9th EDF.35   198 million was distributed to be used for the co-
financing of projects. Meanwhile,  10 million of the  -220 million facility was 
used to refinance part of the ITF. Eligibility criteria for projects under the facility 
make it difficult for private actors to participate if profit is involved and, for some, 
it certainly constitutes a hindrance in taking part. Moreover, the first facility is 
being phased out. The 10th EDF (2008-2013) is currently under discussion.36 If 
countries have included energy in their programming documents, RET projects 
can also be co-financed. Depending on how much is allocated to the energy sector 
by national governments in ACP countries, a second facility may be launched. In 
total  2.2 billion has been allocated to ACP countries. North African countries 
have no access to these funds. Instead the ENPI can be used for support.
 Third, the GEEREF was founded in 2008 as an innovative financing tool to 
provide equity for regional funds and/or co-financing projects together with (pri-
vate) funds.37 This fund-of-funds is managed by the EIB together with the Eu-
ropean Investment Funds (EIF).  80 million has been pledged by the EC with 
initial target funding being  100 million. It is estimated that up to  1 billion of 
additional risk capital can be generated. Ten percent of the total fund will be used 
for technical assistance in order to reduce transaction costs by improving project 
proposals and business plans. This will lead to higher fund performance.
 Although, under GEEREF, a smaller amount is provided compared to the 
other two funds, the initiators expect a much higher financial impact. Moreo-
ver, public money given to the regional funds may be repaid with higher yields 
if projects work out well. This article focuses on this type of funding in greater 
detail because it is complementary to other public funding sources.
 The basic idea was to construct a private equity fund with the public holding 
the subordinated shares and granting private investors a preferential profit in the 
range of 4 to 10. GEEREF can serve as a lead investor with investments between 
10-15. There is no specified target for profits on the public side, hence the title 
‘patient risk capital’.
 This fund offers a wide range of PPP possibilities at different levels. Private 
investors might join the fund-of-funds, which diversifies risks geographically and 
across more projects than the single sub-funds. If the first stages of the businesses 
are funded to a larger extent by public sources, other private investors might join 
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at later stages with a shorter period of exposure to risk, lower/less uncertain-
ties, and therefore a shorter amortisation period. The technical assistance facility 
lowers transaction costs, thereby helping to make projects commercially viable. 
The equity provided helps to secure other sources of finance such as bank loans, 
especially at later stages.
 Th ere are, however, a number of questions that should be raised and the answers 
to these will determine whether GEEREF will become a success story or not:
– Considering the wide scope of regions and project types to be addressed,  80 
million seems like a small amount. GEEREF is a fund-of-funds with regional 
sub-funds to be found in ACP, North Africa, Latin America, Asia and non-EU 
East European countries. If target funds have capital amounting to approxi-
mately  100 million and GEEREF refinances between 10-15, there is enough 
money for one fund per region.
– Target investments are a wide range of projects each worth less than  10 mil-
lion and with a proven technical track record. Examples are utility-based proj-
ects, manufacturing and assembly businesses, consumers, small and medium-
sized enterprises and microfinance intermediaries.
– Consequently, there is the need for more donors and/or private investors to 
join the initiative. Other interested donors have made a number of pledges. 
Moreover, the hope is that if this fund works well, it might lead to other simi-
lar initiatives.
– Besides the technical assistance component, there is no further support at 
the project level that would make single businesses more attractive to private 
investors. As a result, the success of GEEREF depends on the selection of 
successful target funds, as is the case with all private equity fund-of-funds. 
Bearing the many obstacles and problems in mind, one might surmise that the 
possibilities for investing in the SSA after due diligence are few.
– If a lack of equity is not the most prevalent problem and the economic vi-
ability of single projects is, then neither a fund nor a fund-of-funds will work. 
GEEREF could then function as an additional component of a larger package 
or all those regions where appropriate policies have yet to be installed and 
markets developed could be left out.
GEEREF and the ITF are managed by the EIB, which contributes its technical 
and financial expertise to energy projects. In the case of GEEREF, this is com-
plemented by the private equity know-how of the EIF. The EIB also has its own 
resources for renewable energy projects.38 Loans and guarantees are provided for 
economically viable projects with mature technologies. The EIB works together 
with other donors in consortia with a number of new flexible financing mecha-
nisms, such as the Risk Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF), and are used to provide 
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loans for research, development, and innovative projects relating, for example, to 
energy. The RSFF is not a program that specifically targets developing countries. 
Since it is partly refinanced through the 7th framework program, projects in Af-
rica can nevertheless be funded as well under the general eligibility criteria.
 In principle, projects supported by the EIB are only co-funded to a maximum 
of 50. Moreover, the EIB only considers projects worth more than  25 million. 
Smaller projects do not receive loans directly from the EIB, but only via other 
banks.39 This is reflected by the relatively small share of RET projects, especially 
smaller-scale hydropower projects that the EIB has awarded to African countries 
(table 2). The non-hydro electric project in 2005 was a large geothermal plant in 
Kenya. The 2004 loans were awarded to two projects in Morocco, one of which 
was a wind farm near Tangiers.
Table 2 EIB energy investments in Africa 2004-2007 
Moreover, the numbers mirror the geographical preferences for North Africa.
 Policy coordination issues
Different policies – Africa and development, climate change, energy security – 
and various funds with different programs available for energy projects in Africa 
– such as the ITF, ACP-EC Energy Facility, and GEEREF described above, plus 
own EIB resources – create the need for coordination. One such platform for 
2004 2005 2006 2007
EUR EUR EUR EUR
North 
Africa
468,423,300 93.5% 284,420,140 75.2% 464,000,000 64.7% 465,000,000 71.4%
SSA 32,500,000 6.5% 93,600,000 24.8% 173,000,000 24.1% 98,500,000 15.1%
South 
Africa
0 0.0% 0 0.0% 80,000,000 11.2% 88,000,000 13.5%
renewa-
bles
120,000,000 24.0% 40,100,000 10.6% 98,000,000 13.7% 248,500,000 38.1%
without 
hydro
120,000,000 24.0% 32,500,000 8.6% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
grid 0 0.0% 53,500,000 14.2% 250,000,000 34.9% 88,000,000 13.5%
Sum 500,923,300 100.0% 378,020,140 100.0% 717,000,000 100.0% 651,500,000 100.0%
Source: Own calculations; based on information provided by EIB, Financed Projects, retrieved 
13 September 2008 from <http://www.eib.org/projects/loans/index.htm>
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achieving this is the European Union Energy Initiative for poverty eradication 
and sustainable development (EUEI).40 There are also a number of other forums, 
in which various EU Member States and the EC actively participate. Thirdly, 
there are a number of multilateral agents and initiatives. Although it is beyond 
the scope of this article to describe these in detail, the third part of this section 
does discuss some of the coordination problems.
 The EUEI was an EU response to the World Summit on Sustainable Devel-
opment (WSSD) process and was launched during this event in Johannesburg in 
2002, along with a number of other so-called JPoI type 2 partnerships of which a 
selection are briefly described in section 3.3.2. The Africa-EU Energy Partnership 
launched at the Lisbon summit in December 2007 can be seen as a reinforcement 
of the EUEI focus on the African continent.41
 Under the umbrella of the EUEI, facilitation workshops and policy dialogues 
were organised in Ouagadougou in 2004 and Maputo in 2005 as a follow-up to the 
‘Energy for Africa’ conference with ﬁ nancing provided by the Danish government 
and the EC.42 Th e work was continued by the Partnership Dialogue Facility (PDF) 
and managed by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ).43 Th e PDF aims to integrate energy access into national and regional poli-
cy, capacity building, and dialogue with all relevant stakeholders, including regional 
organisations as well as NGOs, private sector companies and trade associations.
 Th e EUEI was launched during the WSSD together with the ACP-EC Energy 
Facility through which the ‘Intelligent Energy – COOPENER’ was funded as part 
of the DG Energy and Transport’s ‘Intelligent Energy-Europe’ program. Th is pro-
gram has now been replaced by the DCI’s ‘Th ematic Program for Environment and 
Sustainable Management of Natural Resources, including Energy’ (ENTRP).44
 Lastly, GEEREF, which was created by DG Development under the ENTRP, 
is a branch of the EUEI. The EUEI Finance Working Group discussed ways of 
closing the funding gap for smaller projects, resulting in a feasibility study for a 
fund-of-funds. Expertise has been contributed by the EIB, KfW, UN Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP) and the International Finance Corporation as well as 
private partners such as Triodos Fund Management b.v. and E+Co.
 The EUEI works together with other JPoI type 2 partnerships. Besides the Fo-
rum of Energy Ministers of Africa (FEMA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s 
Development (NePAD), the dialogue partners include:
– the Johannesburg Renewable Energy Coalition ( JREC),45 which was initiated 
by the German government based on participation by all EU Member States 
and which has, for example, led to the creation of the Patient Capital Initiative 
under which the EUEI Finance Working Group met;
– Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) International,46 which is a follow-
up to the Village Power Conference series and is based on less prominent par-
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ticipation by EU Member States, but more prominent participation by the 
World Bank, United States (US) partners, and some European corporations;
– The Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development (GNESD),47 
which was facilitated by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and a 
network of 20 ‘centres of excellence’;
– the Renewable Energy & Energy Efficiency Partnership (REEEP),48 with the 
United Kingdom (UK) as the largest donor, providing support for a range of 
activities from funding over policy dialogue to research projects;
– the Global Forum on Sustainable Energy (GFSE),49 led by Austria, which fos-
ters partnerships and facilitates energy initiatives.
Th e above can be regarded as an attempt to prevent double work and link the dif-
ferent initiatives. On the other hand, it seems to be almost impossible to coordinate 
the activities of the various JPoI type 2 partnerships, which serve similar interests 
but are created by diﬀ erent public and private actors.50 Although these initiatives 
might be the ﬂ agships of the various key member states in the partnership, they also 
serve diﬀ erent interests as can be seen in the case of MEDREP, which was initiated 
by Italy and was supposed to strengthen cooperation in the Mediterranean.
 In addition, every member state with its implementing agencies has its own 
bilateral program. According to the volume of ODA, the EC and Germany are 
the leading donors as regards energy projects. The only donor that provided eq-
uity for RET projects has been the UK.51 Parallel activities apply in the case of 
Germany and the Netherlands with JREC, on the one hand, and the Johannes-
burg Energy & Poverty Platform ( JEPP), on the other. Then there is the Inter-
national Conference for Renewable Energies Bonn 2004 and in the same year a 
conference on ‘Energy for Development’ in Noordwijk. Since then, there have 
been some signs of improved adjustment, as shown by the cooperation agreement 
between the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and 
the Dutch Directorate General for Development Cooperation in the case of the 
‘Energising Development’ program.
 Another problem associated with bilateral and multilateral aid in the energy 
sector is visible at country level. Some countries like Senegal have a partnership 
of donors responsible for certain rural areas,52 while other countries like Tanzania 
have a highly fragmented market and donors have attached only small financing 
components to their technical assistance. This does not make it any easier to fund 
RET projects in rural areas where the microfinance sector is at best weak.53
 In order to overcome this problem, i.e., to pool funds and create a coordinating 
platform, the World Bank has developed a syndication approach with the African 
government as syndication sponsor and a donor as lead syndicator. The form of 
participation and the amount of financial commitment can vary according to do-
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nor interests. Nevertheless, this approach enables the donor community to move 
away from ad hoc donor-by-donor and project-by-project decision-making. Pro-
spectuses will be developed for Senegal and Zambia first.54
 With regard to the World Bank’s ‘Clean Energy and Development: Towards 
an Investment Framework’ and ‘Energy Access Action Plan for Africa’, it has been 
acknowledged that more coordination is needed with the EUEI and other EU 
activities55 with other multilateral agents such as various UN funds and other 
involved programs.
 Problems with rural energy projects are widely acknowledged, and thus fur-
ther coordination at international level is needed and with regard to emerging 
rural electriﬁ cation programs. In Tanzania, for instance, the World Bank is sup-
porting the Rural Energy Fund and priority projects under the Energising Rural 
Transformation program.56 Th e support comprises co-ﬁ nancing grants to RET 
entrepreneurs in the form of smart subsidy,57 technical assistance, the negotiation 
of power purchase agreements with the grid possessing company, and seed ﬁ nance 
for micro, small, and medium RET enterprises. Th ese problems are only partly 
addressed by EC and/or bilateral donors, mostly on a project-by-project basis.
 Conclusions and Recommendations
As has been shown in the second section of this article there are four groups of 
obstacles which may prevent private companies from investing in RET projects 
in Africa, namely supply-side obstacles, demand-side obstacles, framework con-
ditions and financial sector development or funding gaps. The ITF, ACP-EC En-
ergy Facility and the EIB with its ‘standard’ programs mainly address the financial 
obstacles facing RETs projects, resulting mostly from co-financing for large-scale 
and trans-boundary projects (see table 3) involving private partners which of-
Table 3 Obstacles addressed by the European initiatives
Fund/Program Supply Side Demand Side Framework 
Conditions
Financial 
Sector/ Funding
ITF L
ACP-EC Energy 
Facility
? x L/S
GEEREF S (S) S
EIB L (x) L
EUEI (L/S) x L/S
L: large-sized projects, S: smaller-sized projects, x: addressed
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ten play a minor role. Technological development is supported financially by the 
EIB. Best practices are also exchanged at conferences organised within the EUEI. 
The political and regulatory framework is also addressed via the conferences. 
Although some of the obstacles are reduced thanks to the funds and programs 
described in section 3, some problems still remain, namely that only a few initia-
tives actually address the obstacles to small projects or demand-side problems.58 
Although GEEREF complements the other tools and may help to overcome some 
of the demand-side problems if microfinance is part of a target fund, the prob-
lems in this group of obstacles remain widely unsolved. With regard to large-scale 
projects and overall investment needs, the amounts provided are still not suffi-
cient to reach the targets that have been set.
Some further observations can be made:
– There is a highly complex institutional structure with different relevant policy 
areas, which includes a joint Africa strategy, with different programs to ad-
dress North Africa, the SSA, and South Africa. Various DGs are responsible 
for different programs and initiatives and there are a multitude of forums in-
cluding the many JPoI type 2 partnerships and different interacting levels with 
bilateral programs. There are also various EU initiatives, as well as multilateral 
development, energy, and environmental organisations. Institutional diversity 
makes policy coherence difficult, despite the various attempts to integrate dif-
ferent policies into a common framework such as the Africa strategies or the 
Green Paper relating to energy policy.
– CDM and TRCs may lower some of the demand side obstacles, but will cer-
tainly not play a major role as regards smaller-sized projects unless regulations 
are improved.
With regard to the institutional structure, the following recommendations can 
be made:
– The relationship between climate change policy, development policy and en-
ergy security should be made clear and policies and programs structured in a 
way that allows the specified goals to be realised.
– Participation in the syndication approach is a step that moves further away 
from project-by-project approaches. Nevertheless, it must be implemented in 
a way that is compatible with the other approaches taken.
– There is a need to clarify the status and relationships among networks. The 
EUEI should be developed in more detail in order to provide a forum in which 
to coordinate European policies in this field. A task that still needs to be ful-
filled is the integration into a coherent European energy policy vis-à-vis Africa 
and its different regions.
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In the field of climate change policy there is a need for further development of 
project-based mechanisms post-2012. Nevertheless, attention must be paid to 
interactions between incentives or disincentives set in this area and the overall 
energy policy of the different countries.
 GEEREF is certainly an interesting tool when it comes to financial instru-
ments since the more risky parts are taken care of by public investors, while pri-
vate investors add to the funds needed for more substantial progress. The results 
of this and similar financial arrangements should be evaluated and the logical 
conclusions drawn, for example, that giving more equity might be a more effective 
way to provide aid.
 Lastly, progress in the direction of a more coherent policy away from dona-
tions could be improved if other fields such as microfinance and private sector 
development are integrated. Paying more attention to cross-sector linkages could 
facilitate the move ‘from donor aid to [the development of ] sustainable markets’.59
 These initiatives will be the most effective if different measures work hand in 
hand. Examples are improvements in the policy and regulatory framework, which 
can be regarded as preconditions for private initiatives to take place, business 
model development as well as funding research and development performed by 
the EIB and EC; improvements in the infrastructure coordinated on an interna-
tional level and, last but not least, a clear recognition of demand-side obstacles. 
Otherwise, private participation in rural energy projects will remain unlikely de-
spite improvements in the policy environment, which may well be helpful.
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 Energy Sector Management Assistance Program (ESMAP), Outreach on Africa Energy 
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 German presidency of the EU and European Commission, Joint Background Paper on En-
ergy Cooperation Between Africa and Europe, , retrieved  March  from <http://
www.energypartnership.eu/download/EU_PRES-COM_Background_Paper_AFRI-
CA-ENERGY-COOPERATION.pdf>, p. .
 MIRREIA, Initial Assessment, .
 A smart subsidy means a grant that is output-based; see E. Martinot et al., Renewable 
Energy Markets, .
 There seems to be a more or less general lack of attention paid to demand-side issues in 
many bilateral and multilateral projects and initiatives as confirmed in an expert interview 
with Daniel Magallón, Basel Agency for Sustainable Energy, on  May .
 E. Martinot et al., Renewable Energy Markets, .
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Is Th ere an Advantage to Being Small?
 Security-related Development Cooperation of Four Smaller 
European States
Jan Pospisil and Stefan Khittel
This paper examines the strategies, methods and practices of small states in the 
field of security-related development cooperation. The findings are then used as 
a basis for evaluating the potential influence and comparative advantages small 
states might have in the specific context of civil intervention in violent conflict by 
means of development cooperation in the future.
 With that objective in mind, the paper first presents a literature-based hy-
pothesis on potential comparative advantages of small states in development and 
security policy, two sectors, which overlap in a field referred to as security-related 
development cooperation. Based on this, we present and compare four case stud-
ies that, in turn, serve as an empirical basis for our conclusions and our attempt 
to assess the actual potential of small states in that particular sector.
 First of all, we have to define ‘smallness’ based on the way it was used during 
the research, primarily because the concept of ‘small states’, especially regarding 
its characteristics, is highly contested. Since the study focuses on a specific policy 
area in a limited number of European states, it deliberately makes use of a broad 
concept of smallness and focuses on qualitative criteria and on the role a par-
ticular state plays in the international context. Given that smallness in terms of 
foreign policy capacities is not, or at least not decisively, related to the size of the 
state territory or the number of inhabitants, it does not make much sense to rely 
on quantitative approaches.
 In the context of the foreign and development policy of European countries, it 
seems sensible to use a negative approach when identifying ‘smallness’ as relating 
to all those countries that do not belong to the group of ‘big players’. Of course, 
by such standards, the concept of smallness can be applied to most ‘medium-sized 
countries’, particularly in the context of foreign policy in which there are only a 
couple of major players.
 Within the European Union, those major players can be identified by the rela-
tionships between all of the Member States and the influences on decision-mak-
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ing processes. According to Hänggi,1 there is a clear trend in present perceptions 
and analyses towards identifying Germany, the UK, France, Italy and Spain as the 
key players (Poland may also be regarded as a key player after the most recent EU 
expansion). We agree with this tendency and, as a consequence, define all other 
EU member countries as ‘small states’. Furthermore, we expand this concept to in-
clude all non-EU member countries in Western Europe (particularly Switzerland 
and Norway) in that category.
 Based on this definition, four different European small states were selected as 
case studies for the purpose of describing and comparing various approaches and 
to assess what does or could work and what does not. The four selected coun-
tries – Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland – cover a wide range 
in terms of their foreign policy orientation (neutral countries vs. NATO member 
states, EU vs. non-EU members, small donors vs. big donors, former colonial 
powers vs. countries without colonial backgrounds) as well as in terms of their 
respective ‘smallness’.
 The scope of this study is restricted to the bilateral level, which means that 
all of the activities and practices included have to be (at least partly) financed by 
ODA funds. Multilateral activities are, in particular, not included although the 
level of multilateral involvement is high. Furthermore, the funding activities of 
NGDOs are not covered by the scope of this study. Although it is possible for 
bilateral actors to share a task in terms of funding activities perceived as politi-
cally sensitive, the case studies showed that the vast majority of the interventions 
set by NGDOs in the context of ‘working on conflict’ were at least co-funded by 
bilateral actors.
 The second restriction is the concentration on ongoing violent conflict and/
or post-conflict settings. Conflict prevention activities in regions without a his-
tory or the presence of violent conflict are not included since it would not have 
been possible to identify such practices in a way that would enable comparability, 
due to the very different approaches of the donors under investigation. In order 
to investigate the activities on the ground, four recipient countries were chosen 
as exemplary case studies: Colombia, Nicaragua (as a post-conflict setting), Sri 
Lanka and Uganda.
 To assess the current strategies, practices and, based on that, the abilities of 
the four selected small states in the field of security-related development coop-
eration, the study focused on four research questions: (1) How important is the 
security and conflict prevention aspect in program development and strategic 
planning of the respective small state donors? What are the preferred methods 
of intervention? (2) Are there indeed any comparative advantages of small states 
as donors in the field of security-related development cooperation and, if so, to 
what extent is it possible to employ them in the course of intervention? (3) What 
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are the main differences between the donors under investigation and how far 
do these differences correlate with the particular security policy orientations of 
those countries? (4) Are there any specific characteristics in terms of cooperation 
and coordination with major players in international ODA as well as with the in-
stitutions of the recipient state and the private and civil society sector? Do small 
states deliberately try to exploit their ‘smallness’ in that respect?
 Comparative advantages of small states?
In order to discuss those questions it is necessary to generate an assumption on 
what potential comparative advantages of small states in development and secu-
rity policy might be. While there are several studies available concerning security 
and foreign policy issues of small states,2 comparable studies relating to develop-
ment policy issues are rare.
 The relevant, large-scale empirical studies that deal with the development 
policy of small states date back to the 1980s,3 when the international behaviour of 
Western small and middle-sized states were particularly interesting in the con-
text of the Cold War. Hoadley’s study draws the conclusion that there are indeed 
particular patterns that distinguish the actions of small states from those of the 
six biggest OECD members countries: small states would tend to give more aid 
(in relative terms), and would channel this aid more via the multilateral sector. 
Generally, small states were more strongly committed to internationally agreed 
principles and targets. The research group led by Stokke identified a similar pat-
tern, and also discovered a particular interest in dealing with matters of peace and 
international stability.4 Therefore, as Hoadley emphatically concludes, the size of 
a particular donor could be used as a better indicator of donor performance than 
the financial resources.
 These results correspond with other, more normatively oriented analyses,5 
some of which also include security-related tasks like peace building and conflict 
prevention.6 Drawing on those studies, it is possible to classify the perceived ad-
vantages of small states in the field of security-related development cooperation 
into three specific types: the advantage of trust, the advantage of structure, and 
the advantage of perception. These three advantages, which are briefly illustrated 
below, serve as the hypothesis that will be tested against the concrete experiences 
of the four donors selected as case studies.
 (1) Advantage of trust: The argument of a specific advantage of trust, which 
distinguishes small state donors from the ‘big players’ in the OECD-context, is 
based mainly on two assumptions. Firstly, most small states have no, or only a 
very limited history as colonial powers (with the Netherlands and Belgium as 
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two important exceptions). Austrian development cooperation, for instance, re-
fers to this fact when explaining its particular trustworthiness.7 Secondly, small 
states have limited resources or power (economically, politically, and military) 
compared to the global players in the international system. The reasoning is that, 
given these restrictions, small states are perceived as having a comparatively lim-
ited strategic interest in the respective recipient country. This assumption is par-
ticularly strong if the small state has positioned itself as neutral, as have three of 
the four selected case studies (Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland).
 (2) Advantage of structure: Zapotoczky8 argues that the smallness of states is 
most likely accompanied by lean structures and institutions. Compared to the of-
ten huge apparatuses of the big donors, this should, or at least could, result in 
better coordination and, furthermore, in a useful geographic and thematic con-
centration. Given the frequent experience of the qualitative success of projects and 
programmes with comparably small funding and limited resources within develop-
ment cooperation, such concentration could serve as a signiﬁ cant advantage. Fur-
thermore, a geographic concentration should result in synergies with the advantage 
of trust of the respective small state donor, since it should favour long-term com-
mitment and deepened partnerships with the selected partner countries. However, 
on the other hand, small structures also suﬀ er the disadvantage of quickly becom-
ing overstretched when new funds and tasks are allocated – a considerable risk in 
a booming sector like the developmental work in the area of violent conﬂ ict.
 (3) Advantage of perception: This potential advantage draws on the assumption 
that, due to their ‘smallness’ and the above-mentioned presumable lack of strate-
gic interest, small states as such have a different perception of the conditions and 
needs of a particular recipient country or region. Building on the advantages of 
trust and structure, small states could have a specific sensitivity in terms of analy-
sis. Consequently, intervention which, given the assumed long-term commitment 
to a limited number of partners, should be accompanied by salient regional and 
local knowledge. Therefore, especially in the context of peace building and con-
flict-related measures, small states are described as having unique competences.9
 Comparison of selected donors
These three assumed advantages serve as a background for a discussion of the 
following analyses of four small states as donors in the field of security-related 
development cooperation. First, the analyses critically describe the history and 
strategic approaches of the respective donors, and then assess these approaches 
on the basis of concrete interventions undertaken by the donors in the four re-
cipient countries Colombia, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka and Uganda.
European Development Cooperation.indd   128 29-6-2010   21:04:32
Is There an Advantage to Being Small?
 Before examining the case studies in more detail, the profiles and specific roles 
played by the four small states within the international donor community are 
highlighted using quantitative data. The first remarkable finding concerns the 
ODA commitment of the respective donors in absolute terms. Here it becomes 
obvious that two of the countries under investigation, the Netherlands and Swe-
den, undoubtedly have to be characterised as big donors in both relative and ab-
solute terms (cf. table 1, column 1), although there is a significant gap separating 
them from the top five.
Table 1 2006 ODA Commitments (Total, %GDP, DAC Code 150) of Selected DAC 
members10
(In millions of US$) Total %GDP Code 150
United States 22,738.75 0.17 2705.74
United Kingdom 12,606.91 0.52 799.51
Japan 11,607.91 0.25 377.86
France 10,448.19 0.47 138.59
Germany 10,350.89 0.36 676.94
Netherlands 5,451.50 0.81 634.63
Sweden 3,967.33 1.03 412.18
Canada 3,713.14 0.3 461.36
Norway 2,946.31 0.89 435.14
Denmark 2,236.12 0.8 121.45
Australia 2,127.50 0.3 443.61
Switzerland 1,647.49 0.39 143.15
Austria 1,498.43 0.47 56.99
DAC Countries, Total 103,996.07 0.3 8072.24
However, this gap is not noticeable if ODA commitments are compared in rela-
tive terms (in relation to the GDP, cf. table 1, column 2). Here, small states are 
far ahead of the big states, which are also the major donors in absolute terms. 
Sweden is actually the leading DAC member in that it is the only one with an 
ODA volume of more than 1 of its GDP. Furthermore, even Switzerland and 
Austria, rather small donors given their absolute contributions, score above the 
DAC average of 0.3  of their GDP.
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 In judging the particular involvement in the field of security-related develop-
ment cooperation in quantitative terms, a comparison of the respective commit-
ments for DAC code 150 – ‘Government and Civil Society’ – and therein code 152 
(‘Conflict, Peace and Security’), helps to give at least some idea (cf. table 1, column 
3). Despite acknowledged limitations, since by far not all development measures 
that fit under the umbrella security-related are included in code 150, this data 
conveys a good sense of comparison, based on shared definitions.
 The data shows that Sweden and the Netherlands are major players in the 
field. Even in absolute terms, both are among the top spenders in that category 
(apart from the US and the UK, which are by far the two main players in the 
field). On the other hand, the contributions of Switzerland and Austria are rath-
er limited, even if we take their role as small donors into account. In 2006, Austria 
remains one of the smallest actors concerning measures that fit under code 150.
 Summing up, we have to conclude that, judging from quantitative data, the 
only common pattern among the four donors is a relatively high ODA volume 
(measured against the respective GDP). However, the other categories sug-
gest fairly huge disparities in absolute terms between big donors, which are 
also among the leading actors regarding measures within DAC code 150 (the 
Netherlands and Sweden) and those that are not (Switzerland and Austria). 
The following qualitative analysis builds on these results and aims to find out if 
such contradictions are reflected in the ongoing practices of the respective small 
states.
 Austria
Traditionally, development policy in general and development cooperation in 
particular has been a rather weak sector in Austria in terms of competence – 
where Austria usually follows the big players, especially Germany – and in terms 
of funds.11 These weaknesses are also present in the concept of civil crisis preven-
tion and conflict management by developmental means.12
 Nevertheless, since 2004, Austria has taken several steps to improve its ca-
pacity of development cooperation in the security segment. At first, a specific 
budget for conflict prevention and peace building was introduced, which followed 
the newly introduced DAC Subcode 152. Furthermore, ‘conflict prevention and 
peace building’ became one of the three main targets and, as a consequence, focal 
points of Austria’s development activities, alongside poverty reduction and envi-
ronment. Furthermore, the establishment of the Austrian Development Agency 
ADA in 2004 led to the creation of two desks, which were specifically dedicated 
to the topics of human rights and peace building, with one position at the foreign 
ministry also being responsible for these tasks.
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 In 2006, three guidelines for the topics of good governance, human rights, 
and conflict prevention and peace building were published in order to clarify the 
content of the sector and to consolidate the available expertise.13 The approach 
used in these guidelines shows two characteristics: it is governance-focused – hu-
man rights and conflict prevention are both defined explicitly as subfields of good 
governance – and rights-based. Consequently, good governance is defined in an 
obviously political way, focusing not only on stringent economic processes and 
administrative efficiency, but also on democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
participation.14
 Along with this programmatic focusing, the volume of funds for this sector 
has gone up. As a result, there has been an increase in the number of projects 
to the extent that presently one-third of all projects funded or co-funded with 
Austrian ODA money deal with topics of governance, human rights and peace 
building. Unsurprisingly, the main emphasis is on governance issues and on meas-
ures in the justice and human rights sectors. In addition to the concrete interven-
tions in those particular sectors, Austria is also quite active at international level: 
Austrian Development Cooperation is part of the DAC working group on fragile 
states, and Austria is one of the driving forces in the Human Security Network 
(HSN), a group of 13 like-minded countries promoting the concept of Human 
Security.
 Nevertheless, these efforts designed to concentrate the interventions along pri-
orities set in the guidelines are contrasted by a wide and, in most cases, only very 
loosely connected range of activities that often exist mainly because of historical 
reasons. Furthermore, this demonstrates two severe weaknesses in the guidelines 
and the process of strategic orientation within Austria’s development cooperation 
as a whole.
 Firstly, there is no tradition of interconnection with research as, for instance, 
in Sweden, or increasingly in the Netherlands and Switzerland as well. As a con-
sequence, the guidelines offer little in terms of innovative thought and strategic 
decision-making, but mainly mirror the results of international debates (main-
ly in the UN and the DAC) and approaches from other development agencies 
(mainly from Germany). Instead of representing a genuine and consistent ap-
proach, the guidelines appear to be a patchwork of phrases and concepts used by 
other actors in barely comparable contexts.
 This highlights a second major weakness: a trend toward presenting simplistic 
mind games as potential avenues of intervention instead of building on existing 
experiences and shaping them into a strategy. One such example is the proposed 
emphasis on security sector reform (SSR), where – apart from very limited ac-
tivities in South East Europe – no long-standing expertise exists. The problem is 
aggravated even further by the traditionally strong role of civil society organisa-
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tions in the process of implementation, which often leads to inconsistencies in 
designing programs and country strategies from bottom-up.
 The experiences in the recipient countries underline this trend. Especially in 
Nicaragua, the determining role of Austrian NGOs – not only in the imple-
mentation, but also in the design of interventions – effectively undermines every 
attempt at programmatic steering. In Sri Lanka, on the other hand, a potential-
ly promising project by an Austrian NGO, which is working on specific peace 
building via a dialogue group involving several important actors in the Sri Lankan 
conflict, has to deal with official disengagement. While this is, of course, a legiti-
mate position, given the fact that Sri Lanka is not a partner country of Austria’s 
development cooperation, it is apparently inconsistent to fund a project based in 
the political sphere in one case and to remain diplomatically and politically aloof 
in the other.
 A striking case is Austria’s engagement in Uganda, which is relatively large 
and therefore demonstrates the above-mentioned weaknesses in a very clear 
way. Since 1986, Uganda has been one of the main partner countries of Austria’s 
development cooperation (mostly due to the good connections the National 
Resistance Movement, which took over power at that time, had with Austria). 
For the next 16 years, Austria was very actively involved in the development 
in the South and West of the country and accumulated not only exceptional 
expertise but also a trustworthy relationship with the Ugandan political lead-
ership. However, Austria resisted an engagement in the war-torn North of the 
country, where the government fought a bloody war against several guerrilla 
groups such as the Holy Spirit Movement or, subsequently, the Lord’s Resist-
ance Army.
 This changed in 2002/03, when the development section in Austria’s foreign 
ministry decided to get involved, motivated by the international discussions on 
using developmental means for peace building and the outcry of multilateral 
agencies over the devastating situation in Northern Uganda. A specific ‘North-
ern Uganda Strategy’ was elaborated (by an external consultant15) and funds of 
 400,000 allocated for the period of 2004 to 2006. These funds were used to 
finance a wide range of activities aimed at ‘Empowerment, Encouragement and 
Strengthening of Social Infrastructure’, particularly in connection with the target 
groups of women, youth and traditional and religious leaders.
 Given that the projects were identified via a call for proposals from Austrian 
developmental NGOs and project partners in the lively market of peace build-
ing NGOs in Northern Uganda, it is hardly surprising that the interventions 
undertaken not only lacked any strategic orientation, but were mostly redundant 
(overlapping with some other initiatives in the vastly increasing project market of 
Northern Uganda) and were more suited to the quite abstract call that reflected 
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Austrian’s rights-based focus than the on-the-ground realities. Here, the mind 
games visible in the guidelines could also be seen in the various donor-driven 
activities that mainly serve as an end in themselves.
 Switzerland
It was only after the end of the Cold War that a re-orientation development pol-
icy began to emerge in Switzerland. A new central document was written and 
implemented for foreign policy, which includes development policy. The ongoing 
North-South division was viewed as a problem and Swiss policy had to be coor-
dinated accordingly. Interestingly, from that 1993 document, peace and security 
have been central issues of Swiss foreign policy.
 Swiss development cooperation is organised into two main branches, the 
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs and the Secretariat for Economic Af-
fairs (SECO). Within the Federal Department, two major branches deal with 
development cooperation. One is the SDC (Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation) and the other is Political Division Four (PA IV). The SDC also ad-
ministers humanitarian aid whereas the PA IV deals with overlapping and cross-
cutting sectors of foreign policy and development policy and their application in 
the field. A major problem, perceived as such by the Geschäftsprüfungskommission 
des Ständerates (Auditing Commission of the Council of States),16 is that the vari-
ous institutions write their own strategic papers for their respective field of activ-
ity without much consulting or coordination.
 This is why the fairly early efforts relating to policy and coherence issues 
and the fact that Switzerland has a long tradition in offering ‘good services’ 
made the following implementation into the practices of development coop-
eration relatively difficult. In 2001, sections of Good Governance and Conflict 
Prevention and Transformation (COPRET), the latter with a specialised staff 
of four, have been established within the SDC. This was directly due to the 
implementation process of a new strategy, which included conflict prevention 
and transformation as well as good governance among the five main priorities 
of Swiss development cooperation. The latter included an emphasis on human 
rights, too.
 In 2003, a guideline for peace and development offered 10 commandments for 
how development cooperation should deal with conflicts. This list owes most 
of its content to the principle of ‘do no harm’ publicised by Mary Anderson and 
other handbooks in the market about dealing with armed conflict in development 
cooperation. As a result, the emphasis on conflict and gender sensitivity is clear, 
and the grouping into working around, in and on conflict is repeated. A Swiss 
exception may be the principle that even humanitarian and emergency aid should 
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have a longer perspective so that humanitarian aid and classic development coop-
eration overlap extensively.
 In the case of conflict transformation within the Federal Department of For-
eign Affairs, the PA IV and the SDC cooperate in the sense that country-specific 
activities on Track 1 are usually executed by the PA IV, whereas COPRET carries 
out Track 3 and sometimes Track 2 activities as well. Usually, these efforts are 
closely coordinated within Switzerland, but also with the staff on the ground in 
the respective target regions as precise knowledge of local conditions has proved 
to be an indispensable prerequisite for positive results.
 In order to achieve this local competence, the Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs not only has 70 staff members but also commands an expert pool and 
finances substantial parts of Swisspeace with FAST – an early warning system 
which is also used for Swedish, Austrian and Canadian development agencies – 
and KOFF (Center for Peace Building) as centrepieces. Of course, staff at the 
embassies and SDC are also involved in local peace building activities.
 Sri Lanka and Colombia (along with Nepal, which is beyond the scope of 
this research) represent typical cases of Swiss operations. In the case of Colom-
bia, the PA IV has a special ambassador for peace negotiations and is involved 
at many peace-building levels. At the foreign policy level, continuous efforts 
are being made to highlight issues of peace and the Swiss government is one of 
the few remaining channels open for communication between the Colombian 
government and the FARC. It is also one of the few countries that support the 
peace initiative casa de paz (House of Peace) as a platform for initiating peace 
negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian Government. At the same 
time, the PA IV supports civil society efforts to promote peace via SUIPPCOL 
in coordination with Swiss civil society organisations. Simultaneously, the SDC 
is providing humanitarian aid, which has a long-term perspective and, as such, 
is almost indiscernible from more traditional approaches of development coop-
eration.
 An initiating peace process has been supported since 2001 in Sri Lanka as 
well, based on an interesting and, to a certain extent, successful experience in 
Nepal. The Berghof Foundation has been vigorously supported in its efforts 
to build peace, but the aforementioned expert pool also provided valuable 
staff to perform the work there. The rather limited Swiss resources in the 
beginning were considerably increased by Tsunami Aid funds from 2005 on, 
which consequently created new issues and problems of coordination among 
the Swiss players. This coordination effort resulted in a new program based 
on the concept of Human Security, which aims to unify the diverse visions 
and themes of Swiss efforts in Sri Lanka. The Swiss vantage point is that 
they are not bound by EU declarations of condemning the LTTE as a terror-
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ist group and have more options when negotiating with such groups and its 
members. The fact that Switzerland also has a large Tamil immigrant popu-
lation (and Sri Lankans in general) may have increased interest on the Swiss 
side.
 The conclusion is that smallness is in itself not as important an asset for the 
Swiss as its neutrality and the diplomatic tradition of offering ‘good services’. Not 
being one of the major players in the EU or NATO gives Swiss development 
cooperation more leeway to operate in the field of peace building and conflict 
transformation. This margin is actively sought by both Swiss diplomats and de-
velopment staff. Despite these rather positive trends, the efforts are sometimes 
hampered by the rather low level of resources, which are also split into many 
priority countries and regions and the sometimes complex structures that are rel-
evant for activities in the field, all with their respective institutional sensibilities 
and strategies. At least there is a certain intention of wanting to play an important 
role in peace building efforts, which, in some cases, leads to a prominent role for 
Swiss development policy in this area.
 Sweden
The work that focuses on international peace and the resolution of violent con-
flicts is a salient and long-standing tradition of Swedish foreign policy.17 It is 
also used as an argumentative background for designing its development policy 
accordingly.18 Since a reform of its general orientation in 1995, the expansion of 
non-military activities in the sector of crisis prevention have taken centre stage 
in particular,19 whereas Sweden’s setting as a neutral small state is used explicitly 
as an explanation.20
 Back in 1999, the Swedish development agency Sida developed a strategy for 
dealing with violent conflict and shifted its multilateral activities as well as its 
bilateral program and project portfolio. Human Security became the main point 
of reference in a ‘holistic approach’, which focuses on the security of both the state 
and the individual’.21 As a neutral country, Sweden is therefore using a similar ap-
proach to that of the other neutral actors, Austria and Switzerland.
 This is also reflected in the main sectors of activity where, like in Austria and 
Switzerland, the rights sector, human rights on a multilateral and bilateral level 
and rights-based approach in the sense of ‘rule of law’ takes centre stage. Rule of 
law in the Swedish approach is conceptualised as one of the key ingredients of de-
mocracy promotion.22 The respective priorities in concrete intervention lie in the 
security sector, in the governance-related work within administrations in general, 
in DDR, and in the justice sector, in which ‘transitional justice’ in post-conflict 
situations is one of the focal points.23
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 A striking feature of Swedish development policy in general is the close in-
terconnectedness with, and the heavy use of, scientific research. While it is very 
active in the international debates, Sweden refrains from simply adopting blue-
prints from multilateral actors like the UN and DAC. It prefers to promote (for 
example, via a research fund financed by Sida) or produce its own research. In 
particular, this can be seen in the division that works on peace building and con-
flict resolution, where some remarkable studies were produced at the beginning 
of the decade.24 However, at that point, the structural limitations of Sida as a 
bureaucratic agency became obvious: their studies failed to be acknowledged ac-
cordingly within the agency since officers working in the office and in the field 
lacked the time, the specific competence, or both to connect the scholarly work 
with their daily chores. It remains to be seen whether the decision taken by the 
peace building division of Sida, to refrain from these kinds of studies in the fu-
ture, is the right answer to that problem.
 At the level of concrete interventions, Sweden suffers from similar problems 
as Austria, albeit at a qualitatively higher level given the much higher ODA com-
mitments. The high proportion of NGOs involved in project design and realisa-
tion tends to work against the implementation of the strategic guidelines. For 
example, this is visible in Colombia, where a large number of sometimes very suc-
cessful projects have been implemented. However, these projects remain largely 
unconnected from the program point of view. The same is true in the context of 
Northern Uganda. Whereas Sweden is one of the most active countries in terms 
of donor coordination and joint strategic planning, its intervention in Northern 
Uganda, which started in 2004/05, suffers from the same shortcomings as the 
Austrian intervention there does. Involvement for involvement’s sake, without 
available local expertise and with a heavy dependence on third actors as partners, 
tends to replicate already existing avenues and therefore has led to redundancy 
and potentially more harm than good.
 In Nicaragua, Sida took the opposite path and continued projects that initially 
built on the consequences of the violent conflict, shifting them in their priorities 
to pro-poor development. This, along with projects in the governance sector and 
particularly police training, results in a coherent and productive presence in the 
partner country. To some extent, the same holds true for the Swedish engagement 
in Sri Lanka, where some long-standing project partners, mainly in the political 
field of conflict resolution, are supported.
 Nevertheless, the activities suffer from severe limitations that represent dif-
ficulties, which can be found at many of the Swedish interventions in the context 
of security-related development cooperation. Given the scope of its involvement, 
the number and the qualification of the staff remained limited, which led to the 
self-perception that Sweden was indeed a small player, unable to take a leading 
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role within the international community in Sri Lanka. This, in turn, resulted in 
actions against accepting coordinative functions (such as periodic leadership in 
the Sri Lankan ‘Donor Peace Support Group’) or leadership roles in diplomatic 
initiatives.
 Keeping such a disproportionally low profile is, however, not specific to the 
Sri Lankan case. We have to agree with Wenger et al. that, despite its numerous 
efforts, Sweden continues to be quite reluctant to act in the field of civil peace 
building; it shies away from taking a leading position and the realisation of for-
eign policy visions.25 Such reasoning contrasts with Sweden’s position as one of 
the largest donors in the international arena – even in absolute terms – and hav-
ing one of the best reputations as an international mediator at a diplomatic and 
political level.
 It is interesting that it seems to be exactly Sweden’s position as a small state in 
the international arena that is used to sustain the argument of ‘we are too small’ in 
respect of pronounced foreign policy interventions, where security-related devel-
opment cooperation could take a leading role, given Sweden’s profile as a donor 
and its openness to innovative and unconventional approaches.
 Th e Netherlands
The beginning of the Dutch interest in peace building, conflict prevention and 
post-conflict reconstruction is clearly demarcated by the end of the Cold War.26 
Despite the growing interest under the long-time ministership of Jan Pronk, 
there was no systematic framework for conflict prevention and peace building, 
despite repeated warnings about the threat of internal conflicts and new wars. As 
Paul Hoebink showed,27 there had been shifts in discourse in Dutch development 
policy, albeit, the changes were barely noticed in the concrete practices of devel-
opment cooperation. Subsequent changes of government led to shifts in the focus 
of development policies. In the field of human rights and, directly concerning the 
topic of this paper, a directorate for human rights, peace building and human de-
velopment was implemented under Minister Agnes van Ardenne. In 2007, Minis-
ter Bert Koenders commissioned the formation of a special unit for fragile states.
 The Rehabilitation, Sustainable Peace and Development project can be seen 
as the starting point for a systematic approach in the field of peace and devel-
opment. The Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute deals with 
a wide range of possible strategies and best practices and this paper already 
contains a focus on post-conflict reconstruction, which should be one of the 
constants of Dutch policy. Furthermore, the integration and concentration of 
all areas of foreign and development policy is part and parcel of Dutch policy. 
Unsurprisingly then, the document urges the development of a coherent stra-
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tegic framework in this area.28 As a consequence, memoranda on conflict pre-
vention, on reconstruction (both in 2001) and also regionally on Sub-Saharan 
Africa (in 2003) were issued.
 However, the major new introduction has been the stability fund, established 
in 2003. This fund has been implemented in order to focus on Dutch efforts for 
peace in the world, mainly using development cooperation methods although 
the military provide some of the resources. The fund is intended to enable the 
Netherlands to act fast and react flexibly whenever and wherever the Foreign 
Ministry perceives the necessity to intervene in countries and regions suffering 
from violent conflicts or where such conflicts are threatening to erupt.29 The 
bulk of the money from the first two years went to the East African Greater 
Lakes Region, but the fund was also used to support Dutch activities world-
wide.30 Most of the DAC code activities 150 and especially 152 received their 
resources from this fund.
 The support of the demobilisation process of the paramilitary forces in Co-
lombia is also financed through this fund. There the Dutch and Swedish govern-
ments played a crucial role in leading the OAS-backed process of demobilisation 
and reintegration of paramilitary combatants because of the unwillingness and 
pessimism of other European states in this particular DDR process. Together 
with Sweden, they not only sustained the OAS mission in the beginning, but 
also set an example for other countries. In this case, the Netherlands may have 
been even more crucial because the Swedish tended and still tend to exclude the 
Colombian government from cooperation programs, which meant that the diplo-
matic side was largely a Dutch responsibility.
 In their evaluation of the first two years, Klem and Frerks concluded that the 
stability fund is definitely an overall improvement for Dutch development and 
foreign policy initiatives in the overlapping areas of peace, security and develop-
ment.31 They made some critical points about the regional distribution resources 
of the fund as well as the results in the main project in the Greater Lakes Region. 
Finally, they perceived a certain inconsistency between the priority countries of 
the fund and the priority countries for development.
 In general, Dutch development cooperation in the field of peace building, 
conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction is quite well integrated into 
foreign and development policy administratively. Country desks are responsible 
for all aspects of Dutch relations with a target country. For especially ‘fuzzy’ 
cases, the stability fund provides a promising instrument to bridge gaps between 
countries, policy areas, and the sometimes-delicate civil-military relations. Fur-
thermore, the Dutch embassies have a very high degree of responsibility and lots 
of room to manoeuvre in, which, in theory at least, can bring local competence 
to the fore. There are many other tools for analysis and action in the field, which 
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help determine the staff both at the ministry and the embassies or representa-
tions in the target countries. However, there is still no clear overall strategic 
framework.
 Conclusion
The comparison shows that the four donors behave quite dissimilarly, despite 
the fact that three of them are members of the European Union. These differ-
ences reflect varying traditions of development policy, which have consequences 
on both strategic issues and interventions in the field. This shows that the proc-
ess of unifying European foreign policy at the level of development cooperation 
is still only incipient. This is not necessarily a disadvantage if the various donors 
act in a coordinated and – especially in foreign policy issues – coherent way. We 
have demonstrated empirically that this is not the case.
 Nevertheless, it is possible to draw some general conclusions concerning the 
three potential advantages of small states in the field of security-related develop-
ment policy as we framed at the beginning.
1 Regarding the advantage of trust it must be stated that political influence and 
trust from the partner countries does not automatically go hand in hand with 
smallness of scale. It mostly depends on the commitment of the donors, with 
the respective ODA volume as a crucial factor. For that matter, committed 
small states can make a difference in a specific target country. A second crucial 
aspect of trustworthiness, especially in political terms, is the general political 
environment, where the factor of EU membership plays a particular role (e.g., 
Switzerland in Sri Lanka).
2 There is no noticeable advantage of structure for small states. The challenges 
of – and shortcomings in – institutional and inter-agency cooperation are the 
same as with the big players. Although the lack of specialised personal is a 
relevant problem within the development structures of small states, at least 
it can be stated that there is no particular overstretching compared with the 
large-scale donors, where the development and engagement of qualified staff 
is also a well-known problem.
3 Finally, an advantage of perception is also not an identiﬁ able general trend. How-
ever, in speciﬁ c situations and contexts, there is usually some noticeable advan-
tage compared with the larger players. Th is is demonstrated particularly in the 
activities of Switzerland in Sri Lanka or the (eventually failed) eﬀ orts undertaken 
by Sweden to elaborate a more complex background for its interventions in the 
security-related sector. In any case, however, such highlights are always a conse-
quence of a particular commitment to a certain problem or a certain situation.
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Generally, the results indicate that smallness in itself does not automatically 
guarantee advantages in the field of security-related development cooperation. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to use this factor productively under delicate political 
circumstances, but only if the material (in terms of ODA volume) and political 
(in the sense of a unified, coherent strategy) commitments of the respective do-
nor are steadfast.
 There are three key recommendations that can be deduced from the results of 
our research that appear relevant for small state donors:
1 Being a small state is – in itself – not a factor on which a strategy that con-
nects development and security issues can be built. Nevertheless, it is feasible 
to include the distinction of being a small state. In order to be able to use this 
factor effectively a long-term commitment for a relevant engagement in the 
target regions is crucial. To put it more blatantly: Small states can only play a 
productive role, if they are comparably big donors.
2 A formidable obstacle to a strategic policy development in the area of security 
relevant development cooperation is the interaction of the various institution-
al levels of foreign and development policies. This problem affects all of the 
donors that we analysed. Development policy in particular suffers from a lack 
of integration into the general outline of foreign policy. The solution to this 
problem requires focused efforts without which the efficacy of security-rele-
vant development cooperation will remain quite limited, with it being impera-
tive to avoid ‘doing security’ because it is trendy and only to become engaged 
if there are significant competences and capacities as well as long-standing 
partnerships to build on.
3 The detailed knowledge of local contexts and situations is the decisive factor 
at the stage of intervention in the field. Furthermore, it seems inappropri-
ate to devise measures based on blueprints, which are, in turn, based on 
politically negotiated policy papers or general papers of multilateral organi-
sations. There is no universal silver bullet for intervention in this particular 
area of development cooperation. This neglect of local conditions amounts 
to a disregard of a crucial component of the ‘do no harm’ principle, which 
should not only stand for an adaptation of a universal blueprint but also 
for the development of a new design for each concrete intervention from 
scratch. Without this admittedly complex and onerous procedure, develop-
ment cooperation in areas in which there is an overlap with security policy 
will be beset with the errors that have characterised the last four decades of 
development policy.
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Evaluating the Best Delivery Mode of Food Aid
 Some Th eoretical and Empirical Insights from Northeast 
Africa1
Francesco Burchi and Sara Turchetti
In the Rome Declaration of the 1996 World Food Summit (WFS) the inter-
national community committed itself to fighting world food insecurity, which 
hits developing countries the hardest. The Declaration was followed by a ‘Plan 
of Action’, which identified strategies and means to reduce food insecurity in the 
world. The Plan of Action covers several matters since there are many possible 
instruments that can be useful to alleviate hunger. The paper intends to inves-
tigate the use of one of them, food aid. Commitment 5 of the Plan stresses the 
need to reduce food insecurity through natural and man-made disaster preven-
tion, thus ensuring access to food in situations of both long-term and transitory 
emergencies. Within this Commitment, the Objective 5.3, paragraph d, states 
that governments should ‘promote triangular food aid operations’. This work only 
briefly explains the general utility of food aid; it mainly aims at understanding 
the rationale behind this objective and describing and interpreting the progress 
in its realisation.
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of food 
aid, and briefly discusses the role of food aid in promoting food security. Section 
3 examines the different categories of food aid. Section 4 conceptualises the ‘best 
food aid’ on the basis of specific criteria. This analysis aims at addressing the rel-
evance of the triangular purchase as a means to deliver food aid in order to verify 
the theoretical foundations of the Objective 5.3d. It also concerns the analysis of 
food aid trends for the purpose of assessing whether there has been progress dur-
ing the period 1996-2006. Thus, after providing information regarding data, vari-
ables and choice of recipient countries, the trend of the three delivery modalities 
of food aid – triangular purchase, local purchase and direct transfer – are shown 
and commented upon. In section 5 an analysis disaggregated by main donor coun-
tries is proposed in order to verify whether there are significant differences in 
their behaviour with respect to food aid practices. Section 6 is the conclusion 
where we draw some policy recommendations.
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 Food as Aid for Food Security?
 Food aid: deﬁ nition and objectives
Barrett and Maxwell’s definition of food aid is more in line with the academic 
literature; basically, it states that food aid is the ‘international sourcing of conces-
sional resources in the form of, or for the provision of food’.2 In other words, food 
aid is generally a form of commodity aid, but it can also be granted as a cash flow 
to be exchanged for food. It must be provided by a foreign country freely or on a 
concessional basis, which means that the donor sells food at below market price 
or finances the purchase of food applying interest rates lower than commercial 
ones.3
 A distinction must be made between food aid and food assistance; the latter 
‘describes any intervention designed to address hunger in response to chronic 
problems or short-term crises’.4 Food assistance differs from food aid in that it 
can be financed either at the national or international levels and does not neces-
sarily require that the donor purchases food commodities.
 Food aid was first introduced as a cooperation tool in 1954, with the specific 
objective of alleviating food insecurity in the world. After a period of many years, 
its role had been partly re-addressed: food aid is currently considered as only one 
of the tools available to enhance food security. This is the result of the evolution of 
the theory on food security.
 In the past, food security was only considered an issue of availability, which 
is the supply of food physically existent in a region due to production, imports 
and food aid. Nowadays, following the enlightening work of Amartya Sen, we see 
that more dimensions have been included in the definition of food security.5 In 
addition to availability – which is a necessary but not sufficient condition for food 
security – people must have access to food through their own production, market 
purchases or public transfers in kind or cash. Another essential dimension is uti-
lisation, which is the physiological ability of the body to absorb the nutrients in 
food.6 Finally, and more recently, stability became a fourth dimension: the supply 
of food in developing countries as well as the household and individual incomes 
and employment are often unstable, thus putting people at risk of food insecu-
rity and starvation. The longer people are food insecure, the more their bodies 
lose the capacity to properly absorb calories. All of these elements have been 
incorporated into the commonly accepted definition of food security, which was 
introduced at the 1996 World Food Summit.
 Following the shift in food security discourses, the role played by food aid has 
also changed. Supporters of this instrument share the idea that food aid in emer-
gency situations is simply indispensable.7 Food aid allows one to meet the food 
needs of hungry people thus preventing mortality without creating market dis-
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tortions. This is because emergency food aid (when effectively targeted to needy 
people) creates extra-consumption, since it reaches people who do not have the 
purchasing power to buy it. In the literature it is referred to as the principle of ‘ad-
ditionality’.8 Moreover, some authors suggest that, in cases of food shortfalls, food 
aid may work as a ‘clearing mechanism’, bringing the supply back to an equilibrium 
level.9
 Meanwhile, those who dispute the ‘goodness’ of this tool claim that a relevant 
part of food aid has much to do with the disposal of surplus output rather than 
taking care of food deficits in recipient countries. Harris shows that food aid 
has often been used by donors as a form of export assistance to relieve domestic 
pricing pressures in periods of oversupply.10 This creates distortions in the global 
commodities supply, especially of cereals, and, as export subsidies, it provides 
incentives for extra-production, thus further depressing prices. Most of the lit-
erature agrees that food aid creates distortions in the global and local markets, 
even if the effects depend on the types of commodities distributed as aid, the 
duration of the interventions and the targeting mechanisms.11 It must be taken 
into account that the main recipients of food aid are agricultural-based countries 
whose income and employment levels are highly dependent on the production 
and sales of primary products. Therefore, displacement effects of local goods and 
a downward pressure on prices, due to an increased supply, may seriously affect 
the main sources of livelihoods of these fragile economies and, consequently, food 
security.
 Even avoiding these unintended outcomes – but as the FAO points out ‘it 
is effectively impossible to avoid one or both effects’12 – there are some authors 
who simply believe that cash transfers are better than food aid.13 This is because 
it tends to increase consumption and investments without causing distortions 
on the supply side of the agricultural sector. Furthermore, food aid is simply less 
fungible thus further limiting the ‘agency’ of the recipient country.14
 The debate regarding the validity of food aid continues unabated. In this sec-
tion we have briefly presented some aspects of this debate; however, this paper 
does not intend to engage in this controversy and challenge the relevance of food 
aid as a cooperation tool compared to other possible instruments.15 Starting from 
the recognition that donor countries make a wide use of food aid, we intend to ex-
amine the characteristics that food aid should have in order to effectively enhance 
food security. For such purposes, it is necessary to present the different categories 
of food aid.
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 Grouping food aid
First of all, food aid can either be sold on the market or freely distributed. It can 
also be ‘monetised’, which means that part or all of the commodities provided as a 
grant are sold, and the funds generated are used to finance development projects 
or activities directly connected to the intervention.
 When it is freely distributed, it is always directed toward targeted beneficiar-
ies: targeting helps to restrict ‘the coverage of an intervention to those who are 
perceived to be most at risk’.16 There are diverse methods of targeting but, gener-
ally, variables such as income, consumption, health and nutrition are recognised 
as the main indicators of a state of vulnerability.17 Moreover, the consideration of 
religious, cultural, and political factors helps to minimise the errors of inclusion 
and exclusion, although this complicates the picture and increases the costs of 
information.18
 Moreover, food aid can be tied to ‘loans, grants, or associated financing pack-
ages with a grant element greater than 25 and defined as aid which is in effect (in 
law or in fact) tied to the procurement of goods and/or services from the donor 
country and/or a restricted number of countries’.19 An example of a tie is the use 
of a donor’s boats for the shipment of commodities. It is estimated that nearly 
90 of world food aid is tied.20
 The fourth distinction is made on the basis of the aim of the intervention. Fol-
lowing the classification made by the World Food Programme (WFP), there are 
three main typologies of food aid:
– Emergency food aid: destined for victims of natural or man-made disasters. It 
is freely distributed to targeted beneficiary groups, and is usually provided on 
a grant basis;
– Project food aid: it aims at supporting specific poverty-reduction and disaster-
prevention activities. It is usually freely distributed to targeted beneficiary 
groups; nonetheless, it is often monetised by selling it on the open market. It 
is generally provided on a grant basis; and
– Programme food aid: it is usually provided on a government-to-government 
basis; it very often aims to improve the recipient’s balance of payments or bud-
getary support. It is sold on the open market and therefore it is not targeted. It 
can be delivered either as a grant, or as a loan.
Program food aid accounts for only 13 of the total food aid, while projects and 
emergencies respectively account for 24 and 62.21
 It is necessary for the purpose of this research to distinguish food aid based on 
its delivery mode.22 The three typologies are the following:
– Direct transfer (DT) includes all food aid originating from the donor country;
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– Triangular purchase (TP) includes all transactions by which a donor provides 
commodities that have been purchased or exchanged in a third country as food 
aid to a recipient country; and
– Local purchase (LP) includes food aid procured in a country and used as food 
aid in the same country.
In 2007, 62 of the total food aid delivered was procured through DT, 19 
through TP and 19 through LP.23
 Th e Best Food Aid
Besides the limits of food aid as a cooperation tool, which was discussed in pre-
vious sections, in this chapter we will investigate the optimal timing to use food 
aid. For this purpose we identify three core characteristics of the ‘best food aid’:
– Effectiveness. Since the main goal is to reduce the number of people suffering 
from hunger and the intensity of hunger within a geographical area, for the 
food aid to be effective it is necessary that it ultimately reaches the highest 
possible number of beneficiaries for the food aid to be effective. Furthermore, 
especially in emergency situations, the timing of food aid delivery plays an es-
sential role because it can only contribute to the reduction of food insecurity 
only if it occurs at the right moment.
– Efficiency: The goal of food insecurity reduction should be achieved at the low-
est possible cost. Costs here mainly include purchasing costs, distribution and 
transportation costs of agricultural commodities and other operational costs. 
Moreover, ‘political’ and ‘moral’ costs also fall into this category.
– Transparency: Food aid is supposed to be a means to promote international 
cooperation and not commercial interests; therefore, it is important not to use 
it for purposes other than what they were originally intended for. Although it is 
impossible to know the real intentions of donor countries, there are some ele-
ments that reveal the ‘genuineness’ of food aid practices. First of all, it should be 
analyzed at the point when food aid produces lower distortions in international 
and local markets and better fulﬁ ls the ‘additionality’ principle, which justiﬁ es 
its use within the current World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. It follows 
that the more distorted food aid is, the more likely it will hide vested interests. 
Second, the transparency of food aid interventions is directly related to the 
degree of involvement of the recipient country in the transaction process. For 
example, the commodities delivered can reﬂ ect the real needs of the beneﬁ cia-
ries or, conversely, the needs of the donor countries. In the second case we have 
a donor-driven approach, probably inﬂ uenced by commercial concerns.
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Now that we have identified the features of ‘best food aid’, we can refer to the 
food aid categories outlined in section 2.2 to see which one best meets the cri-
teria. First of all, a targeted food aid effort ensures that food will be sent to the 
actual beneficiaries, thus it is considered effective. Furthermore, the definition of 
targeting should go beyond what was discussed in the previous section. The tar-
geting should be realised by looking simultaneously at the end beneficiaries and 
the food that is actually being delivered to them. The targeted people should be 
poor recipients who actually need the specific food being provided by the donor. 
This comprehensive definition ensures that hungry people receive food that is 
socially acceptable and that meets their needs. This ensures that the effectiveness 
level rises because food insecurity can be better fought. However, targeting may 
increase the operational costs and timing since good targeting methods generally 
require sufficient information.
 A second important element to analyze is whether food aid is tied or not. 
The main world donors spend nearly half of their food aid budget on product 
preparation and delivery via national transporters. This means that some one-
third of the overall food aid budget is wasted.24 Furthermore, it is unlikely that 
food provided with additional ties will be able to adequately meet the preferences 
and nutritional needs of the end beneficiaries. Moreover, imposing ties ultimately 
ensures high levels of market distortion. This means that when food aid is tied it 
is less effective, efficient and transparent.
 As we previously noted, most food aid is emergency food aid. This is a fairly 
recent development caused by the sudden increase in the number of emergencies, 
particularly in Africa. The increased urgency of emergency food aid improves 
transparency since, by definition, food aid provided to people affected by natural 
or man-made disasters produces extra-consumption. Thus, it is more in line with 
the additionality principle. However, to infer that emergency food aid is ‘addi-
tional’ to commercial food imports, we need to have a clear and restricted defini-
tion of emergency. During the Doha Round of the WTO, there has been a lively 
debate on the WFP’s 2005 definition of ‘emergencies’ – the most common one 
– as ‘urgent situations in which there is clear evidence that an event or series of 
events has occurred which causes human suffering or imminently threatens hu-
man lives or livelihoods and which the government concerned has not the means 
to remedy; and it is a demonstrably abnormal event or series of events which 
produces dislocation in the life of a community on an exceptional scale’.25 As Clay 
observed, such definition ‘includes actions ranging from immediate post-crisis 
responses to protracted relief and rehabilitation operations up to five years after 
an event’.26 This broad definition provides donors with the opportunity to ignore 
rules on export subsidies. This point is crucial because any provision of ex-ante 
assessment or approval may compromise the flow of emergency food aid.27
European Development Cooperation.indd   150 29-6-2010   21:04:32
Evaluating the Best Delivery Mode of Food Aid
 Programme food aid cannot be considered eﬀ ective, eﬃ  cient, or transparent. By 
deﬁ nition, it is not targeted since it is sold on the open market, which, in turn, re-
duces the eﬀ ectiveness of the intervention and creates distortions at both the global 
and local levels. Moreover, it can be a potential source of proﬁ t for donor ﬁ rms, 
which raises serious doubts about the needs-based nature of such a transaction.28
 Project food aid is probably more effective than programme food aid since the 
former is usually freely distributed on the market and targets specific groups; 
theoretically, this should increase its effectiveness because timing is not necessar-
ily a key component as during an emergency. Nothing, instead, can be declared a 
priori about the level of efficiency and transparency. Operational costs, as we shall 
see later, depend more on the chosen modality of procurement. With respect to 
transparency, in the long run, project food aid may reduce people’s incentives to 
improve their own situation with their own means, thus causing dependency. At 
the same time, however, the creation of job opportunities, due to projects like 
food-for-work, may be the best way to ensure poverty alleviation.29
 Some authors30 do not believe that monetisation is a good practice because 
it is food aid sold on the open market, which decreases the effectiveness and 
transparency of the intervention. Murphy and McAfee (2005) point out that the 
proliferation of this practice among American NGOs is mainly due to the high 
operational costs of food aid; since the 1990s, monetisation has emerged as one 
of their main sources of revenue and the ability to monitor funds externally has 
become increasingly difficult.31
 The most important issue for this chapter is how food is procured. As we not-
ed earlier, most food aid is transferred directly. DT is by definition a form of tied 
aid since at least food has to be purchased within the donor country and further 
aid is often tied to additional requirements. This means the emergence of strong 
incentives for donor firms and contractors to join the food aid business, which 
are likely to consider the needs of the poor as a minor sideline. For example, 
Tschirley estimated that during the period 2001-2005, the costs of in-kind US 
food aid were so high that if it was provided through local (or regional) purchas-
ing strategies would have increased the actual food received by beneficiaries by 
75.32 Furthermore, the overall procurement process is controlled by the donor 
thus reducing accountability to its lowest level. This means that DT is not the 
best aid modality in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and transparency.
 TP and LP are generally considered better procurement modalities compared 
to DT; globally, however, they still only account for a small share of total food aid. 
Buying food locally implies a redistribution of commodities within the recipient 
country; efficiency should rise since operational costs tend to decline. Moreover, 
food is more likely to meet the preferences of the final beneficiaries, making the 
intervention more effective. Finally, LP does not create displacement effects, al-
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lows a reallocation of resources by stimulating local supplies, which may cause an 
improvement in agricultural infrastructures such as storage facilities.
 Before choosing local purchases as the best delivery mode, however, it is neces-
sary to consider key issues as the sufficient availability of food, especially in a case 
involving an economic, climatic, or political crisis. The re-distribution of food at 
national level causes a reduction of the food supplied by local traders; whether 
the food surplus is insignificant, this process increases the scarcity of food com-
modities, thus raising their prices. This may end up exacerbating rather than al-
leviating the food crisis in a particular country.33
 Another critical aspect concerns the political and moral domains. Start-
ing from the widely recognised principle according to which ‘National govern-
ments are primarily responsible for food security in their countries’,34 when there 
is enough food, its reallocation through international food aid cannot be easily 
justified. For instance, India often stockpiles large amounts of food despite the 
fact that a large part of its population is food insecure. The Indian government 
initially chose to not directly intervene through domestic food assistance, but 
then sells food to international donors in order to reach both objectives of raising 
revenue and providing food to its hungry people.
 The third delivery mode, triangular purchase, is less likely to hide vested in-
terests since food aid is not directly transferred and is instead provided by a third 
country. Therefore, without having information on other possible ties attached 
to it, it is clearly more transparent than DT. Moreover, when the donor chooses 
a third country that is located in the same region as the recipient country this 
generally has the effect of lowering purchasing and transaction costs, thus making 
the intervention more efficient. This is confirmed by the fact that more than 85 
of food provided for triangular operations originates in developing countries,35 
where the food is certainly cheaper. Finally, TP does not have displacement ef-
fects at the local level but, instead, may help to alleviate poverty in both the re-
cipient and the third country. The increasing demand, as was the case for the LP, 
can cause price spikes, which creates the risk of spreading the food crisis into the 
greater region; unlikely in LP operations, in TP transactions the sufficient avail-
ability should not be a problem since it is assumed that the third country will be 
chosen on the basis of sufficient food supply.
 In terms of food adequacy, LP is certainly better than TP and, consequently, it 
is likely to be more eﬀ ective. Purchasing costs are likely to be lower in TP, while 
LP operational costs are generally lower except when poor infrastructures increase 
transport and delivery costs: in this case, it is usually more convenient to buy food 
from a neighbouring region. Th e lack of adequate infrastructures and storage fa-
cilities, and the search for surplus at a local level also aﬀ ect the timing of a project. 
Finally, TP is ultimately more transparent from a moral and political perspective.
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 In summary, the WFS Objective is justiﬁ ed from a theoretical perspective, but 
other aspects should be more carefully considered. First of all, TP is more likely to 
be tied and not targeted than LP; on the other hand, LP is less transparent from 
a political and moral perspective because governments are assumed to be respon-
sible for national food security. Both are certainly more eﬀ ective, more eﬃ  cient 
and more transparent than DT. In any case, the evaluation of the best modality of 
procurement has to be made case-by-case; in order to respond to a wide spectrum 
of functions a versatile ‘toolbox’ is needed, as Josette Sheeran has argued.36
 Finally, the reﬂ ections made in this section are valid on a purely theoretical basis. 
All the times it is necessary to monitor the procedures followed for the procure-
ment of food aid through LP and TP. Th ere are only few studies that have evaluated 
speciﬁ c food aid delivery cases. Among those, Coulter et al. examined these proce-
dures in two countries, Uganda and Ethiopia.37 Th is will be the focus of the follow-
ing section. Coulter et al. concluded that, within the region, LP and TP were better 
from all perspectives, but there were two major weaknesses in the process. Th e 
ﬁ rst one was that there was a high concentration of food aid procurement limited 
to a few major suppliers due to the restrictive WFP food standards and to largely 
bureaucratic and costly tenders, which excluded small producers. On the one hand, 
this caused price manipulations, while, on the other hand, especially in Uganda, it 
oﬀ ers incentives to some of these big suppliers to divert grain production away from 
exports, thus reducing regional trade.38 Th e second problem occurred in Uganda 
and concerns logistics. Food was procured in Northern production areas, it was 
then transported to Kampala in the South to be cleaned and dried by local ﬁ rms, 
supported by the WFP through large incentives. Finally, the food was transported 
to the north again, where the refugee camps were actually located.39 Th is level of 
ineﬃ  ciency resulted in less food ending up being delivered to those in need.
 To conclude, an adequate study of the local market environment as well as 
good logistical choices are essential parts of a well-run food aid intervention pro-
gram; otherwise, there is a serious risk that these factors will have a negative ef-
fect on the advantage of using LP and TP over DT.
 An Empirical Investigation of Food Aid Practices
This section deals with a descriptive analysis of some food aid trends between 
1996 and 2006. Building on the conclusions drawn in the previous section re-
garding the rationale behind the definition of the Objective 5.3d, we intend to 
monitor the progresses towards the achievement of this Objective. In particular, 
we interpret this objective as calling for an increase in the percentage of food 
aid delivered through triangular operations (more than its absolute value). The 
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analysis goes beyond this minimal scope since it also examines the levels and the 
trends of the other two delivery modalities – local purchase and direct transfer. 
This is because a positive combined LP-TP trend should be generally interpreted 
as an improvement in food aid practices.
 The empirical study was carried out in four recipient countries located in 
Northeast Africa: Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. These countries are all 
characterised by large food deprivations and very low levels of progress (some-
times even experiencing a regress) towards the first Millennium Development 
Goal, which is to halve the proportion of people who suffer from hunger.40 The 
second reason for this choice is that the Northeastern area of Africa represents a 
wide heterogeneity of development conditions.
 In Eritrea and Ethiopia the international community has been mainly con-
cerned with emergency operations. These two countries have experienced several 
natural and man-made disasters over the period 1996-2006. In particular, the 
floods caused by the El Niño in 1997-1998 in Eritrea, the war between the two 
states in the three years from 1998 to 2000, and the famines in Ethiopia in 2000 
and 2002-2003 led the international community to allocate many resources dur-
ing the emergency and relief operations. As shown in table 1, 39.77 and 28.66 
of official development assistance (ODA) was directed respectively to Eritrea and 
Ethiopia for emergency and reconstruction. The amounts committed to Uganda 
and Kenya were much lower, where the relatively smaller magnitude of the hu-
manitarian crises made it possible for the international donors to intervene with 
more long-term development projects and programs. We can make the same dis-
tinction with respect to food aid among the four African countries. Eritrea and 
Ethiopia received a fairly higher proportion of food aid for emergency and relief 
operations than Kenya and Uganda (see last columns of table 1).41
Table 1 ODA and food aid 1996-2005 by country and type of intervention
Recipient country Development Assistance* Food Aid**
Emergency Development Emergency Development
Kenya 9.38% 91.62% 72.53% 27.47%
Uganda 11.04% 88.96% 74.88% 25.12%
Ethiopia 28.66% 71.34% 82.14% 17.86%
Eritrea 39.77% 60.23% 91.04% 8.96%
* Source: OECD\DAC, Creditor Reporting System
** Source: Interfais, WFP
N.B. The amount of food aid delivered as ‘program food aid’ was not considered in the 
calculations of food aid used for emergencies and development situations.
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The source of our data is the INTERFAIS/WFP, which collects the statistics 
for the monitoring of food aid transactions. The dataset covers information re-
garding donors and recipient countries, delivery modes, the quantity of food 
aid measured in tons and the period when it actually arrived in the recipient 
country. More detailed data on issues such as purchasing and transportation 
costs as well as data on ‘third’ countries involved in the triangular purchases are 
lacking. The latter is a problem that international organisations, such as OECD 
and WFP, are also encountering since donors do not report this kind of infor-
mation. Without these data, the empirical analysis cannot be used to validate 
the assumptions made regarding the criteria used to select the ‘third country’. 
Thus, we are totally dependent on the conceptual framework explained in the 
previous section.
 The graphs presented in this section (figures 1-4) show both absolute and rela-
tive trends of food aid delivery modes in the four recipient countries. Although a 
ten-year period is not enough to track a reliable trend, it offers a general view of 
changes across time.
 The overall amount of food aid has increased in all four countries. A clear 
downward trend was experienced by Eritrea from 2005 to 2006 and will prob-
ably continue for the coming years. The reason for this exception is that Eritrea 
was hit by a drought while in May 2006, the government decided to reduce its 
dependency on external food aid and came up with a massive national food se-
curity campaign.
 Some changes in the choice of delivery mode have occurred. First, the propor-
tion of food aid delivered through DT was very high in the entire region with a 
range from a low of 31 (Uganda 1996) to a high of 100 (Eritrea 1998). Although 
it began at a very high level, the trend for DT has usually shown an increase, 
which comes at the expense of other procurement methods; however, the inten-
sity and timing of changes vary across recipient countries. In the countries with 
greater food shortages – Ethiopia and Eritrea – the use of DT was even more 
pronounced, especially during the crises such as the 1998 conflict in Eritrea and 
the famines in Ethiopia in 2000 and 2003.
 The trend of food aid deliveries through TP shows a decline in Kenya, Uganda 
and Ethiopia, while showing a rise in Eritrea. If we focus only on Objective 5.3d 
that came out of the 1996 World Food Summit, it suggests that progress was only 
made in Eritrea.42 However, besides the temporal variations, the use of this deliv-
ery mode has always been very low in these countries, with a maximum of some 
33 in Eritrea in 1999.
 Since 2000, donors have generally increased food aid procurement through 
LP in all of these countries, except in Eritrea, where almost no food was procured 
locally.
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 The overall picture emerging from the examination of these graphs is that 
the choice of procurement does not follow the guidelines identified in the WFS, 
and, even worse, it reveals that food aid intervention is rarely done in the ‘best’ 
way, since both local and triangular purchases play only marginal roles. There are 
some observable changes in Kenya and Uganda, however, where local purchases – 
a good delivery mode especially under the conditions of large food availability in 
short periods of time – over the past few years has registered figures that match 
direct transfer modalities. On the contrary, it seems as if emergency situations, 
mainly in Ethiopia and Eritrea, have been used by major donor countries to jus-
tify a far larger use of direct transfer.
 This analysis was based on the aggregation of donor countries in one single 
group. In the next chapter, we try to outline differences in donors’ behaviour with 
respect to food aid practices.
Figure 1 Kenya: food aid by delivery mode
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
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Figure 2 Uganda: food aid by delivery mode
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
Figure 3 Ethiopia: food aid by delivery mode
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
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Figure 4 Eritrea: food aid by delivery mode
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
 An Analysis by Donor
This chapter draws attention to the behaviour of the major donor countries with 
respect to the food aid delivery modalities. Three donor countries were selected: 
United States, Germany and Denmark. The first one is the largest donor of food 
aid overall as well as in the region examined (see table 2); at the same time, it is 
one of the smallest donors of ODA as a percentage of Gross National Income 
(see Figure 5). Germany, instead, has been chosen as a representative of the Euro-
pean Union, which is the other large food aid donor. Germany is the largest actor 
in food aid transactions in Europe and its overall ODA has been stable since 1990 
and in line with the average for the European Union (see Figure 5). Germany, in 
fact, is situated somewhere between the small donors such as Spain, Italy and 
Greece and large donors such as Belgium, Austria and France as percentage of 
GNI destined to ODA. Furthermore, the US and the EU have been selected 
because they take opposite positions regarding the role of food aid in the WTO. 
Finally, Denmark is certainly not a major player in food aid transactions within 
the European Union. It was chosen because it is a Scandinavian country, where 
many of the examples of best practices in development cooperation are located. 
As shown in Figure 6, Danish development aid is clearly closer to the average 
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Scandinavian aid figures, with ODA shares of GNI that are much larger than the 
overall EU. Finally, among Scandinavian countries, Denmark is the only food aid 
donor that has been consistently active in Northeast Africa since the mid-1990s.
Table 2 Total food aid 1996-2005 by recipient country and donor
Figure 5 ODA\GNI ratio (%)
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD\DAC, Creditor Reporting System. ODA data refer to net 
disbursements in current USD.
Because the behaviour of the donors is similar in the four recipient countries, 
only the graphs for Kenya are shown. And since this analysis focuses on the food 
aid distribution across procurement modalities, only relative trends (in percent-
Recipient 
Donor
Kenya Uganda Ethiopia Eritrea
United states 54.45% 61.03% 51.48% 59.30%
Germany 8.66% 5.63% 2.52% 1.10%
Denmark 2.17% 1.08% 0.31% 0.31%
Total 65.28% 67.73% 54.31% 60.71%
Source: Interfais, WFP
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age) are shown. The graphs are based on data from the period 1996-2005; the 
figures for 2006 were not available.
 United States
The US is the only donor that has specific legislation that authorises food aid ac-
tivities. This legislation, based on Public Law (PL) 480, is very complex since the 
US Department for Agriculture (USDA) and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) share in the administration of food aid activities. PL 480 
has three major dimensions.43 Title II – food donations for emergency situations 
and non-emergency situations – accounts for approximately 74 of total food 
aid; Title I – sales of food commodities to developing countries on a government-
to-government basis – only accounts for 3, while Title III – food donations to 
support economic development on a government-to-government basis – is cur-
rently inactive.44
 There are also two other programs worth to be mentioned since they each ac-
count for about 10 of US food aid: a) Section 416(b), which includes donations 
of surplus commodities; and b) Food for Progress, which consists of donations or 
credit sales to countries that support democracy or are committed to the expan-
sion of private enterprise.
 The majority of US food aid is considered highly distortional and is neither 
effective nor efficient. It is closely related to specific forms of market support 
policies, especially, in the cases of wheat and skim milk powder, where US gov-
ernment practices of either purchasing goods for food aid or directly supporting 
farmers through export credits and prices support schemes that have increased 
production and stockpiles.45 In particular, 75 of US wheat aid has been author-
ised under the Section 416(b) program. This food aid legislation together with 
a complex system of marketing, logistic and distribution involving a restricted 
number of agribusiness firms, maritime companies and large NGOs, create the 
so-called ‘iron triangle’, which advocates for keeping US food aid practices un-
changed .46
 Moreover, the geopolitical use of food aid cannot be underestimated. As ex-
plicitly noted in the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget Request, ‘Foreign assistance and the 
development it supports are therefore more important than ever, now not just in 
terms of our moral responsibility to alleviate suffering, but as foundational pillars 
of our new national security architecture and the Global War on Terror’.47
 Some key logistical issues further undermine the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the interventions: among them, the lengthy trajectories of the funding and 
planning processes, the high costs of transportation and contracting practices, 
the legal requirements of contractors, the lack of coordination among agencies 
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and the lack of reliable targeting methods and assessments due to budget con-
straints.48
 Figure 6 clearly confirms the case of Kenya as recipient country. In the pe-
riod 1997-2005 there was no relevant change in delivery modes so that DT was 
definitely the primary mode of food procurement, with a share of at least 92.5 
(2003). On the contrary, the TP and LP levels are quite stable and, even when 
considered together, account for less than 10 of the total food aid delivered. 
There is only a slight increase in LP utilisation during the period 2001-2003, with 
a decline shown in 2004. The spread between TP and LP, on the one side, and 
DT on the other, are also greater in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea.
Figure 6 US food aid in Kenya, by delivery mode (%)
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
The fact that the US is the major food aid donor makes its failure to address the 
WFS Objective 5.3d result in overall failure. Food aid has recently become an 
issue for debate within the WTO, with the US opposing the EU’s position. The 
US, in fact, denies to cut the practices of monetisation and sales of food aid,49 
making its practices not consistent with the 1994 Marrakech Decision of provid-
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ing as much food aid as needed on a fully grant form. Furthermore, the US has 
demanded that food aid be excluded from the export subsidy disciplines because 
it insists that the WTO should only be concerned with the displacement effects 
of food aid, while totally untied food aid, as proposed by the EU, may further 
lower its actual amount.50
 Germany
Germany, as we mentioned earlier, represents the EU. In 1996, the EU approved 
a new Council Regulation on food aid policy, explicitly consistent with the Food 
Aid Convention.51 Food aid operations have been integrated into the overall 
framework of humanitarian assistance and untied from the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (CAP). This allows the main aim of food security support and pov-
erty alleviation to be brought to the centre of interventions, so that food surplus 
disposal is no longer considered a priority. Moreover, that the EU has vowed to 
avoid the adverse effects of food aid on local production, distribution, transport 
and marketing capacities, which includes the last goal of food aid operations, 
which is to make food aid redundant.52
 The EU has progressively increased its share of food aid procured through 
both triangular operations and local purchases; in 2004, 90 of EU food aid was 
procured in developing countries. This is only an aggregate figure since individual 
state members have maintained a larger share of traditional direct transfer of 
food aid; indeed, most of this increase is due mainly to a general decline of Euro-
pean stock levels, which results in a decrease of in-kind food aid.53
 Despite these limits, it is important to stress that the new regulation clearly 
states that the commodities can be procured in the Community Market, ei-
ther in the recipient nation or in another one of the developing countries listed 
in the document, ‘if possible one belonging to the same geographical region 
as the recipient country’.54 The criteria for choosing where to buy food prod-
ucts include availability and the economic efficiency; effectiveness is, however, 
not directly mentioned even if it obvious that the food purchased must reflect 
the dietary and nutritional needs of the beneficiaries as much as possible. The 
general aim of untying food aid from surplus disposal intrinsically increases 
transparency and it is consistent with the position taken by the EU within 
the WTO; in fact, the EU advocates a gradual inclusion of distorting food aid 
within the category of export subsidies. This is why Germany was expected to 
use food aid in a different manner. Figure 7 shows the composition of German 
food aid in Kenya.
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Figure 7 German food aid in Kenya, by delivery mode (%)
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
The use of TP as a delivery mode shows an unstable trend; its use increases un-
til 1998, then decreases sharply in 1999 and, has risen gradually since 2003. But, 
meanwhile, the other preferred form of procurement, LP, has increased drastical-
ly since 1999, and, since 2000, has become by far Germany’s most utilised delivery 
mode. In 2005, Germany did directly transfer food aid to Kenya. Furthermore, 
the results for Kenya generally overestimate the importance of DT for the entire 
Northeastern region.55 We can thus argue that Germany is an example of good 
practice in the area of food aid.
 Denmark
As shown in table 2, the role of Denmark as a food aid donor in the region is 
much less significant than that of the US and Germany. However, Denmark does 
play an important role in the field. During the 1990s, the Danish government re-
viewed its food aid policy and changed the composition of its food basket to bet-
ter respond to recipients’ needs and shifted the responsibility for food aid from 
the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, they 
declared that national commercial interests should only be considered if the pri-
ority goals of growth and poverty eradication are not compromised.56
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 Figure 8 shows that the trend of Danish food aid procured through DT was 
quite stable until 2002, when a dramatic decrease occurred along with a dramatic 
increase in LP. In 2003, in fact, LP accounted for 70 of total food aid delivered 
by Denmark to Kenya, thereafter it again shrinks but remains stable at higher 
levels than before 2003; meanwhile DT began to increase again. The use of TP, 
meanwhile, has been much more limited than either DT or LP for the period and 
ranges from 0 to 9 of the total.
 Meanwhile, regarding Danish food aid delivered to Uganda, both TP and LP 
have remained stable at almost nothing during this period; DT is by far the main 
delivery mode used. In Ethiopia and Eritrea, the TP trends since 1996 have de-
creased, except during the period 1996-1998 in Ethiopia where there was a slight 
increase in TP, which was in line with WFS prescriptions. However, in 1998 TP 
utilisation suddenly collapsed.
Figure 8 Danish food aid in Kenya, by delivery mode (%)
Source: authors’ elaboration on Interfais, WFP
To conclude, Denmark has not moved toward a better system of food aid utilisa-
tion; the significant use of DT as a delivery method in Northeast Africa does not 
make Denmark one of the ‘success stories’. Furthermore, two-thirds of Danish 
food aid deliveries are still tied to the procurement of commodities in Denmark 
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and more than one-third of its cash contributions to WFP are used for opera-
tional costs.57
 Section 5.3 allows us to conclude that there is a clear difference in the evalua-
tion of Denmark as donor depending on whether we use quantitative parameters 
related to total ODA or qualitative ones.58 However, it should be noted that WFP 
data for 2006 showed a possible change in Danish food aid practices, with LP, TP 
and DT usages at respectively 58.6, 27.7, and 13.5 of overall food aid. This is 
also confirmed by government documents, where it is stated that Denmark was 
planning to eliminate tied aid by 2009.59
 Concluding Remarks
Food aid is a cooperation tool with the specific goal of alleviating food insecurity 
in low-income countries. For this reason, the international community commit-
ted itself also to ‘promote triangular food aid operations’ at the 1996 WFS. How-
ever, by combining three core criteria – effectiveness, efficiency and transparency 
– in section 3, it was argued that local purchase can also be a good delivery mode 
for food aid because it is sensitive to specific situations and contexts and makes 
better use of triangular or local purchasing modes. In all of the above-mentioned 
cases, the direct transfer of food aid appears to be a bad practice since it is tied, 
distorts trade and is donor-driven.
 Building on this theoretical framework, in section 4 we analyzed food aid 
trends in four recipient countries – Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea – all 
of which had large food shortages. Although small differences exist across the 
four countries, it is evident that, since 1996, there has been no significant progress 
toward the modes suggested by the theory. Direct transfer remains the largest 
supply mode of food aid, while donors have gradually shifted from a triangular 
purchase mode to a local purchase method.
 Analysing the figures by donor, as presented in section 5, we tried to exam-
ine whether there were differences in donor behaviour with respect to food 
aid practices. US food aid is an example of ‘bad practice’, with almost all of the 
food delivered via direct transfer. This was not an unexpected outcome since 
US legislation on food aid clearly promotes national interests over those of 
the recipients. Germany, on the contrary, reflects the position held by the EU 
in the WTO, which is that food aid should gradually be untied and delivered 
in cash. The trends show Germany’s limited use of the direct transfer mode in 
the four recipient countries. Meanwhile, in Denmark, which was chosen as a 
representative of Scandinavia, DT is considered a good model for cooperation 
intervention. The results concerning Danish food aid were disappointing, how-
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ever, in 2005, most of Denmark’s food aid in Northeast Africa was transferred 
directly.
 Denmark was a good case study for the analysis of general development as-
sistance because it has good practices in the broad field of development coopera-
tion, as especially confirmed by quantitative parameters such as the proportion 
of GNI earmarked for ODA; on the contrary, it has ‘bad practices’ in the specific 
field of food aid policies, visible on the basis of more quality parameters such as 
the proportion of food aid delivered through more effective and efficient delivery 
modes. This raises an important question of whether quality should be consid-
ered in order to come up with better indicators for development assistance.
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Th e Emergence of International 
Development Policies in Central and 
Eastern European States1
Simon Lightfoot and Irene Lindenhovius Zubizarreta
Th is paper examines the emergence of international development policies in the ten 
European Union2 (EU) Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
Th ese states have had to re-orientate themselves within a short time span from 
being recipients of aid to becoming donors. Th is chapter reviews the state of devel-
opment cooperation in CEE states after accession to the EU3 with a speciﬁ c focus 
on the legal framework and institutions of development cooperation policy in CEE 
states; the aim, targets and focus of bilateral, multilateral and trilateral cooperation 
policies; and perceptions and attitudes towards development cooperation in the 
CEE states. It argues that in some areas the prospects had been good, with clearly 
identiﬁ ed comparative advantages4 in certain sectors and geographical areas with 
many states on the road to meeting Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) tar-
gets. However, it identiﬁ es many challenges including issues related to construct-
ing comprehensive development strategies, the creation of sustainable institutional 
frameworks and meeting ODA targets during the current recession without using 
tied aid. It shows that much of the progress that has occurred since these states have 
joined the EU is at risk of being reversed in the current diﬃ  cult economic climate.
 Th is research is based on a number of semi-structured interviews with oﬃ  cials 
responsible for Development Cooperation in the Permanent Representations of 
New Member States in Brussels. Interviews were also carried out with oﬃ  cials 
from the UK’s Department of International Development, the Development Co-
operation Section at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Trade and Develop-
ment Co-operation, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, DG Development 
and DG Enlargement. Additional interviews were undertaken with representatives 
from a variety of Development NGOs and NGO Platforms in both the UK and 
CEE states. Th ese interviewees were chosen to ensure that the primary research 
data (Strategy Papers etc) was still up to date, to provide context for governmen-
tal actions and critical reﬂ ection on the challenge of development policy for CEE 
states.
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 Development Policy in the Pre-accession Period: ‘Re’-emerging 
Donors?
Many CEE states have a long history of engagement with the developing world. 
During the period of communist rule, the former Soviet Bloc provided aid char-
acterised by a ‘strong and strategic orientation, concentrating on political allies 
and friendly countries, which were pursuing socialist goals’.5 As a result of this 
history, many CEE states see themselves as re-emerging donors.6 However, CEE 
states never really had the same intensity of relations with developing countries as 
many Western European countries. It is also clear that the situation since transi-
tion is vastly different from twenty years ago.7 Personnel have left ministries and, 
perhaps most importantly, the values and practices of development cooperation 
have changed.8 In particular, the policies previously adopted by the NMS were 
never oriented toward international ‘best practice’, with their focus being mainly 
on technical aid and goods. In 2002, for example, DG Development argued that 
the NMS might not be so familiar with concepts such as donor practices’ har-
monisation, selectivity and performance-based allocations, the PRSP (Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers) approach and the shift away from projects to sector/
budget support.9
 How then should we categorise the responses of CEE states to the challeng-
es of development policy?10 From the discussion above it is clear that a distinc-
tion between re-emerging, such as the Czech Republic, and totally new donors, 
such as the Baltic States, is historically true but of little use when comparing the 
situation today. Some authors have divided new Member States in Central and 
Eastern Europe into Visegrad 4+1, the Baltic States and the 2007 enlargement 
states.11 Others argue that, with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, who are 
still in the early stages of establishing a development and humanitarian assistance 
policy, the NMS can be grouped according to how they responded to the chal-
lenge of creating a development policy: some countries were slow starters while 
others appeared to respond to the challenge quickly.12 These groupings have been 
criticised as inaccurate and fitting into a limited time frame. Finally, it is argued 
that each country should be examined individually.13 However, this paper argues 
that it makes sense to see all of the CEE states as new donors,14 despite their dif-
ferent histories. We thus concur with Bucar and Mrak15 who observed that there 
is not enough evidence to divide them up amongst these other groupings. As a 
result we follow Bucar and Mrak in examining the experiences of each of the ten 
states. This macro-comparison provides the best overview of the ever-changing 
situation in the states as well as providing interesting contrasts between experi-
ences in policy sectors across different states.
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 From the Transition Period to EU Membership
Before we can outline the contemporary challenges, it is worth briefly examin-
ing the situation between the transition begun in 1989 and, ultimately, obtaining 
EU membership. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1989, the political and 
economic transformation of the former Soviet Bloc in Europe occurred quickly. 
Regime change and revolutions, transformations of states and secessions from 
larger entities took place throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Political sys-
tems and economies were fundamentally and rapidly changed; so was the posi-
tion of an entire region within the international system.16 By the time the Soviet 
Bloc collapsed, the ideological and political motives behind the development 
policies toward developing countries had disappeared. During the first half of 
the 1990s, the focus of the CEE countries was on domestic system transforma-
tion, which absorbed most of the domestic resources.17 Poverty rates in the CEE 
states soared. As a result of this transition period, all of the CEE states saw 
their engagement with the developing world and any aid programs dramatically 
reduced.18
 One of the factors that forced these countries to start creating an outward 
looking approach again, with development cooperation as part of that, was ac-
cession of the CEE countries to major international donor organisations such as 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the 1990s. 
The other major factor was of course the possibility of future membership to the 
EU. The Copenhagen European Council in 1993 identified the key criteria, which 
were considered essential for obtaining membership, including the ability to take 
on the acquis communautaire.19 The candidate countries were expected to adopt 
and fully implement this body of law.
 The way development cooperation policy has been incorporated into the ac-
cession agendas has often been heavily criticised. It is argued that some new 
Member States’ governments were not clear about the Union’s expectations re-
garding development policy due to the low priority given to this sector during 
the accession process.20 Indeed, some NGOs alleged that development was being 
treated as the 32nd chapter of the negotiations.21 One comment focused on the 
Commission’s lack of political will.22 DG Development responded by saying that 
the Commission did have development on the accession agenda, but that, con-
sidering the many essential political topics and policies to be discussed during 
accession negotiations, one could not expect development cooperation to receive 
a disproportionate amount of attention. This is very effectively summed up in the 
2002 Trialog policy paper in which it is clearly stated that ‘development coopera-
tion constituted neither a priority for the EU nor for the accession countries in 
the pre-accession strategies’. The result of this was that many NMSs felt ill-in-
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formed about the implementation capacities and financial contributions expected 
of them.23 Indeed, the fact that development cooperation was not on the agenda 
for accession was seen as a ‘big mistake’.24
 Development Cooperation since Accession: Challenges Faced 
by the New Donors
This section outlines the main challenges faced by the new donors with regard to 
the creation of robust institutional and legal structures for development policy 
with staffing expertise. It also outlines how low public awareness of development 
issues and a small development NGO sector has limited the political pressure for 
improvements in this area.
 The experiences of traditional donors clearly indicates that a well-designed 
policy framework is a necessary precondition for successful implementation of 
a country’s development assistance.25 However, prior to accession, the Commis-
sion demanded only minimal administrative structures and human resources for 
development cooperation in new Member States.26 This meant that whilst some 
states, such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia, put together devel-
opment cooperation strategies, the rest either had no strategy or merely short 
concepts papers of only a few pages.27 For example, Slovenia only produced its de-
velopment strategy in 2006 and they acknowledged that they still had ‘some work 
ahead of them’.28 Lithuania’s policy included recognition that there was a need 
to improve Lithuania’s legal basis for development co-operation. Interestingly, 
Poland has recently incorporated the objectives and framework of the European 
Development Co-operation policy into its foreign assistance document for 2007-
2015.29 The situation in Bulgaria and Romania is seen as a particular problem due 
to slow progress, although they have only been members of the EU since 2007.
 Th e majority of the countries thus have an oﬃ  cial document, which spells out 
the development cooperation principles and a development cooperation strategy. 
Meanwhile, those who do not have these documents in place have indicated that 
work on drafts have started or are in the process of being ratiﬁ ed. However, what 
we do see is that the NMSs that have already adopted a special law governing 
ODA are more the exception than the rule and that this generally means that de-
velopment assistance is being regulated within the framework of existing legisla-
tion.30 Th e lack of a formal law makes it hard to take part in multi-annual programs 
because budgets need to be approved on an annual basis. Th e existence of annual 
budgetary systems is not uncommon in ‘old’ Member States so we should not judge 
the NMS too harshly, but given that they are developing their policies from scratch 
it is perhaps a missed opportunity not to start from the position of best practice. 
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Annual budgets are more susceptible to political pressure in times of recessions 
and easier to amend, thus resulting in a number of states that have cut their devel-
opment budgets over the past year, such as Hungary, Estonia and Latvia.31 Another 
issue is the fact that only four NMSs produce annual reports on development. Th e 
ﬁ nal issue is that in the EU-15, 11 states have a minister for development in their 
cabinet; none of the NMSs have followed suit, although it must be said that the 
current levels of cooperation do not necessarily warrant such a position.
 While establishing a sound legislative framework and ensuring policy coher-
ence through coherent legislative arrangements is absolutely crucial, the main is-
sue brought up during interviews was another, more practical one. It referred 
to the institutional and administrative structures of development cooperation in 
CEE states. The institutions are vital to the maintaining of political will, as well 
as to meeting the obligations of EU membership. Most Member States appear to 
be headed toward the creation of a unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA), with the MFA in charge of the aid coordination efforts. The problem is 
that the MFA in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic only oversees a small 
part of the development budget, with the rest remaining under the control of line 
ministries, who are in charge of project and program implementation.32 As Burac 
and Mrak argue, this fragmentation hampers efforts to raise public awareness.33 
The recent EP report recommended that the CEE states strengthen coordination 
within their own ministries to ensure that strategy planning will have greater in-
ternal coordination. It highlighted the good example set by Lithuania, where the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the chief ministry for ODA planning and manage-
ment.34
 While the highly decentralised implementation of development policy in most 
CEE state ministries was recognised as an issue, lack of personnel with relevant 
experience and loss of institutional memory caused by high staff turnover were 
identified as major issues that prevented CEE countries’ development coopera-
tion policies from showing improvements. Locating development assistance in 
the MFA means that staff members are usually chosen from the diplomatic serv-
ice and, therefore, may lack the necessary expertise in development policy.35 An 
additional problem is the insufficient staff. The 2006 EU Donor Atlas highlights 
the fact that active staff numbers range from 5 in Latvia to 30 in the Czech Re-
public; this is compared to Austria with 140 and Luxembourg 103. However, since 
its publication in 2006, Lithuania has increased its total staff numbers from 3 to 
14. To put that into context, bearing in mind that comparing data on civil serv-
ants is often hard due to differing definitions of who actually is a civil servant, 
Lithuania now has a staff of 14 out of a total 24,000 public service employees, 
whereas Luxembourg’s figures are 103 out of 5018.36 The Slovakian permanent 
representation indicated that ‘it is difficult to keep continuity as the government 
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changes and staff changes frequently’, whilst the Slovenian representation said 
that ‘staff turnover is a problem. There are 10 people working on development and 
only two-thirds of them have more than 3 years experience. There is a serious lack 
of institutional memory and capacity’.37
 The pressures on resources in many countries meant that there was a general 
acceptance that this situation was unacceptable but there was little that could 
be done to resolve it. However, representatives from Lithuania and Latvia indi-
cated a clear willingness to act: ‘Lithuania is trying to deal with this by putting in 
place half staff diplomats and half civil servants, so that some sort of institutional 
memory can be established through the civil servants and the problem can be 
overcome’, whilst it was noted that ‘the loss of institutional memory is a serious 
issue in Latvia and that is why we would be very interested in having a national 
development agency that would not have these issues of rotating diplomats’. The 
institutional framework for development cooperation in new Member States is 
still very fragile, but one must remember that it has been less than five years since 
these states started implementing development cooperation policies.
 Civil society has a critical role to play in development policy.38 The state of 
post-communist civil society varies, with some states having a more developed 
civil society than others. In addition to the general issues faced by civil society 
organisations, development NGOs in the NMS are confronted with specific 
problems, such as a limited awareness of development issues in the South and 
a major focus on activities in neighbouring East European countries.39 The ma-
jority of these NGOs in the post-transition period were mainly Western Euro-
pean-based, so a big challenge has been to build capacity and financial stability 
in organisations based in the CEE states.40 NGOs play a major role in build-
ing a constituency amongst civil society. The most common and overarching 
problem that TRIALOG, an organisation set up to indentify and strengthen 
development NGOs in new European Member States, faces in its work is that 
development is understood very differently in the various CEE states and that 
there are often great divisions between civil society and government within these 
countries. TRIALOG also identified the weakness of campaigning amongst civil 
society groups in the NMS.41 This, of course, has to do with the political history 
of the CEE states, where NGO activity was banned or severely curtailed until 
recently.
 Many NGOs encounter organisational problems as well. The NGO platforms 
in Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia and Lithuania are still not members of CON-
CORD, the EU-level umbrella group for NGOs, whilst the Hungarian plat-
form is largely Canadian funded.42 The stronger CEE national platforms are the 
Czech and Slovak platforms. These two platforms are both mainly funded by 
their MFAs and, unlike other platforms, have secure finances and memberships.43 
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The Slovenian platform, SLOGA, is very young and was the last platform to be 
established in the new Member States. However, it has been very successful in 
recent years and, despite its late start, it is now further developed and stronger 
than many of the other platforms. This also has to do with the extra help it re-
ceived in light of Slovenia’s EU presidency. However, the main problem for all the 
new Member States’ national platforms is funding, especially as external funding 
sources are coming to an end.
 Development policy encounters a number of specific issues that hinder its 
establishment within the NMS. One major issue is the low levels of public aware-
ness around development issues which has a negative effect on support for de-
velopment cooperation. In many CEE states, this situation is compounded by a 
view that poverty within each state should be resolved first and that EU funds 
should be used for this purpose. As Vari argues, ‘the public thinks of EU acces-
sion as an opportunity through which the drawing of EU funds can lead to the 
growth of the country’s welfare and does not consider the external aspects of the 
EU’s double principle of solidarity’.44 This conclusion was borne out in a special 
‘Eurobarometer’ on EU development aid. It found a noticeable disparity between 
the views of the EU-15 group and those of the NMS. It found that respondents 
in Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia were more reluc-
tant to take a strong stance on the question regarding the importance of helping 
people in poor countries, although the overall proportion believing that this is 
important remained high.45 The ‘Eurobarometer’ concluded that there appears 
to be a lack of knowledge in many NMSs concerning development issues. The 
EP report found that one of the biggest challenges will be to overcome a general 
lack of political will and expertise. The NMSs have a limited development his-
tory, resulting in low public awareness and a small NGO development sector. To 
a large extent, the biggest spur to the creation of development policies was the 
EU’s development acquis. To what extent the NMS share these policy priorities 
is a question to which this paper now turns.
 Th e New Member States and the EU Acquis46
The need to meet the EU acquis on development cooperation has shaped the way 
the majority of the NMSs have responded to the challenge. This section exam-
ines these responses by focusing on the prospects for the new states meeting their 
ODA goals, the geographical focus of their aid and the types of projects favoured 
by CEE states.
 The question of how much aid the CEE states will give is clearly linked to the 
factors outlined in the section above. If development aid has a low priority then 
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one can hardly expect huge amounts of money to be dedicated to it from state 
coffers. However, we must also consider the fact that the CEE states have under-
gone a major economic transition to a market economy. This transition resulted 
in widespread unemployment and social inequality. We need to consider the fact 
that, as late as 1999, Poland was the third largest recipient of EU aid and that 
many of the CEE states are still eligible for World Bank loans.47 Of course, since 
joining the EU, the NMSs have ODA commitments under their acquis, whilst, at 
the same time, they remain recipients of EU aid via the Structural Funds.
 Between 2002 and 2006, the NMS increased their ODA equivalent from ap-
proximately 0.03 of their collective Gross National Income (GNI) to approxi-
mately 0.1.48 For individual states, this was a doubling or even tripling of their 
ODAs. However, within that period, the EU in 2005 re-committed itself to its 
Monterry ODA target of 0.7 of GNI by 2015 with its ‘Finance for Development’ 
paper. In this paper, the EU accepted the reality of the situation in the NMSs by 
giving them their own target, which means increasing their ODA to 0.17 GNI 
by 2010 and 0.33 of GNI by 2015. To ensure they meet these targets, the Com-
mission has called upon the new states to establish multiannual calendars for 
ODA increases. However, only four of the ten countries have thus far done so.
 It is important to note that there are a few issues that make reaching aid tar-
gets not as straightforward as it may seem. For example, Hungary’s development 
cooperation appropriation has been substantially affected by the government’s 
recent budget rationalisation, depleting its potential total from approximately 
4 million in 2003-04 to 1 million in 2007.49 Another issue, as we have already 
noted, , was that it was especially difficult for CEE states to meet their aid targets 
because, although the rapid growth of their economies meant that total amounts 
of ODA kept increasing annually, their percentages did not. The Estonians also 
pointed out that the issue which causes major problems for them was the fact 
that the large overall CEE contribution to the EU budget (often more than 2/3 
of their total ODA budget) was not calculated into the figures of the individual 
country’s economic growth, but was included in the general EU budget.50
 Most of the current ODA figures for many CEE states are comprised of con-
tributions to multilateral agencies or to the EU’s budget.51 Membership in these 
organisations includes subscription obligations. Therefore, the reason for the 
relatively high percentage of total ODA that goes to the multilaterals is the low 
overall level of ODA provided by the NMS. If they provide higher levels of total 
ODA over the coming years, then the percentage given to the multilaterals will 
decline and bilateral budgets will increase.52
 There is also concern that the CEE states, with the exception of Slovakia, still 
tie their aid to varying degrees, a practice whereby governments make giving aid 
conditional on the receiving countries buying goods and services from the do-
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nor country.53 For example, the Polish government only ties investment projects, 
whereas the Czech Republic ties investment, technical and NGO support aid.54 
This remains the case despite the fact that the EU has made commitments to 
honour Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rec-
ommendations and shift away from aid ties. One of the CEE’s counter-arguments 
is that tying aid stimulates economic development in the donor country. There-
fore, the Hungarian government rated its tied aid initiatives very positively in 
2005, particularly from the perspective of Hungarian economic interests.55 A sim-
ilar response involves the argument that tied aid helps build capacity and public 
understanding in the donor country. The Latvian government, for example, justi-
fies the fact that most Latvian aid is highly tied based on the fact that ‘Latvia is a 
newcomer in the field of development co-operation, and needs to build its own 
capacity and public understanding and support for development co-operation 
before proceeding to an open aid market’.56
 Official Commission statistics shows that half the 2004 accession states are 
on track for their 2010 target, as are Bulgaria and Romania. Of all the new states, 
only Estonia and Latvia remain off course and will likely fall dramatically short of 
the 2010 target of 0.17. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia 
all achieved a level of 0.12 by the end of 2006.57 This situation has changed with 
the economic downturn of 2008, however, with aid levels in Bulgaria, Estonia and 
Hungary all identified by the European Commission as being on a worrisome 
downward trend.58
 According to NGO projections, only Lithuania was ‘likely’ to meet its target 
without inflating its aid budget. Some of the other states have started to imple-
ment the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Recommendation on un-
tying their aid from LDCs, with the Commission’s threat to pursue any breaches 
of EC internal market rules on ODA seen as a major incentive.59 The incorpora-
tion of contemporary good practice measures is therefore likely to have an impact 
on ODA targets. Hungary and Slovakia, for example, have in recent years both 
seen a decline in their ODA levels as a share of GNI due to end of debt relief 
funds to some countries.
 The goal of eradicating poverty has been deemed as paramount, as the Euro-
pean Consensus on Development has clearly declared.60 Of all the NMSs, only 
Hungary had an unequivocal commitment to poverty reduction.61 The original 
Polish ODA document did not prioritise poverty reduction, however, the revised 
Strategy for 2007-2015 does.62 In contrast, despite the fundamental principles 
of development cooperation policy being in line with the MDGs in Latvia, the 
concept of poverty reduction is slowly withering away as a policy priority in gov-
ernment documents. However, many old and new Member States argue that 
poverty reduction requires a multidimensional approach, which must include 
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other elements such as environmental sustainability. The recent commitment to 
poverty reduction as part of the Lisbon Treaty does suggest that all 27 Member 
States share a common goal of poverty reduction. However, there is evidence that 
enlargement has exaggerated a trend that has seen the share of the EU’s ODA to 
LDCs decline over the past 40 years, despite absolute funding increases.63
 When looking at bilateral aid, the thematic and geographical priorities that 
have been proposed by CEE states are quite clear. It is argued that, in light of 
the need for policy coherence and complementarity, it makes more sense for the 
NMS states to be active in those countries and sectors where they have a com-
parative advantage. These sectors include democratisation, market liberalisation, 
and managing transition to EU membership, especially the transition from aid 
recipients to donors. The main targets are neighbours that share their historical 
experience such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Georgia. 
Of the six newly independent states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine) the most targeted Member State countries are Moldo-
va and Ukraine.64 The United Nations (UN) has described the majority of the 
priority states of having medium levels of human development, placing them in 
the same category as many African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states.65 Many 
NMSs would therefore like the EU to re-focus elements of its aid to Eastern Eu-
rope, Central Asia and the Caucasus and acknowledge their numerous develop-
ment challenges. This is one area where the NMSs could play a complementary 
role, providing aid to these ‘orphans’ or ‘marginalised countries’, because states 
like Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are experiencing issues similar to those of the 
NMS.66
 To date, the bilateral development co-operation activities of the NMS towards 
ACP countries have been very limited. As a recent EP report states: ‘the Euro-
pean Consensus on Development provides an impetus, but does not oblige new 
Member States to target their development cooperation towards Africa’.67 The 
issues of coherence and complementarity associated with development policy 
certainly play a role here. It makes little sense for Lithuania, for example, to try 
and play a significant role in Africa, a continent where it has little expertise.68 It 
makes more sense for them to be more active in those countries where they have a 
comparative advantage such as Belarus. Moreover, of the new states only Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic have any foreign policy influence outside of 
Europe. Indeed, recent revisions to ODA policies in the Czech Republic and Po-
land have seen them prioritise Zambia and Tanzania respectively. Both have also 
prioritised Angola.69 The NMS can certainly play a larger role in co-financings. 
This is where two or more Member States finance a project together, sharing 
and reducing the administrative load. Examples include Slovakia and Austria 
co-financing infrastructure projects in Kenya; another exists between the Czech 
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Republic and  Luxembourg in the field of water quality. These program-based 
approaches (PBAs) enable small donors to increase their impact as the PBA al-
lows them to combine their resources, thereby enabling to reach beyond their 
individual sphere of influence. According to Slay, this is the ‘Paris Declaration 
at work’.70 Many of these PBAs have been developed via the UNDP Regional 
Emerging Donors Initiative, which aims to facilitate cooperation between new 
donors, traditional donors and recipient countries. Probably the major forum for 
sharing expertise is the OECD DAC, but only four of the NMSs have become 
members of the OECD (although talks have begun with Estonia and Slovenia). 
None of the NMSs are currently represented on the DAC, however.
 The EU’s Code of Conduct on the Division of Labour on aid71 lays down rules 
on best practice. It is noted that ‘everyone has their darlings therefore the need is 
to focus on the big issues.’72 On the issue of priority countries, the Code of Con-
duct encourages EU donors to focus on a few donors each, especially so-called aid 
orphans. Integrating these EU principles into national strategies is a big challenge 
for the NMSs, especially because some countries like the Czech Republic were 
initially focusing their limited resources on eight countries. However, the Czech 
government has subsequently decided to narrow down its territorial focus of de-
velopment cooperation considerably.73 States like Latvia, with its three priority 
countries, comply with the code of conduct, although problems remain elsewhere. 
For example, in Slovakia, $ 28 million was spent in seven priority countries, whilst 
Slovenia spent $ 31 million in six states.74 Substantial, aid activities usually mean 
the allocation of at least $ 5 million annually, with the amounts discussed here 
being either below or right on target.
 The country principles are further complemented by sector rules, with a code 
of conduct establishing the maximum number of sectors an EU donor can be 
involved in per country at three. Slovakia responded by adopting is policies that 
limit the number of sectors they are active in to three per partner country, whilst 
Bulgaria has committed itself to no more than two sectors per partner country.75 
The Commission’s idea is that each donor focuses on sectors where they have a 
comparative advantage, such as transition experience, so they can offer first-hand 
experience involving regulatory and institutional transition processes, shifting 
from a centralised planned economy to a market economy.76 The Estonian ODA 
framework document explicitly states that Estonia’s development cooperation 
focus remains directed at regions and countries that need similar reforms and 
transition strategies, which Estonia has undertaken,77 while Slovakia’s ODA is 
based on a goal of the ‘transfer of Slovakia’s experience and know-how’.78
 Critics argue that the notion of comparative advantage often amounts to no 
more than a list of sectors in official documents with little evidence of practice 
reflected in aid flows.79 The problems in part stem from a lack of knowledge or 
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expertise in situ. Other commentators have a more fundamental problem with 
this comparative advantage. It is argued that many countries mismanaged their 
transitions in a spectacular way. Poland’s transition followed an authoritarian 
blueprint for the establishment of its new government, choosing the most ex-
treme economic reforms and then telling society that this was the only option 
and the best one at that. This has led to the current Polish government with its 
career politicians and its elitist style of governing, its weak commitment to citizen 
representation and accountability. The general conclusion is that the reforms and 
their implementation only further alienated society and created the highest levels 
of inequality and unemployment ‘East of the Elbe’.80
 What we have attempted to show here with regard to NMS policies and prac-
tices, is that many issues associated with meeting the acquis requirements remain. 
The differentiated ODA targets have proven challenging, with some Member 
States not being able to meet their goals without inflating or tying their aid. As 
a result, the ability of the NMS to meet the demands of the acquis remains a 
considerable concern both within the EU81 and amongst NGOs. There is also 
the question of priority. Aid from CEE states is distributed overwhelmingly in 
Europe, despite an EU commitment to poverty reduction in Africa. This divi-
sion between the EU-15 focus on the ACP and a strong NMS focus on Eastern 
Europe may ‘cause difficulties and frictions between the two’.82 It seems to be too 
early to ask NMS donors to begin focussing on Africa, given their lack of ex-
pertise and relatively low ODA budgets (also considering the costs of African 
relations’83), but there is a need for the NMS to re-orientate their development 
policies towards good practices and further focus their aid on areas where poverty 
is greatest, thus shifting their focus from the East to the South over time.
 Conclusion
This paper set out to examine the emergence of development policy in CEE states. 
It has shown that these states have had to re-orientate themselves from being re-
cipients of aid to becoming donors and that this transition has been ‘quicker than 
expected’.84 Despite the speed of transition, all states have, or are close to having, 
the legal and institutional structures in place, which are crucial for the matura-
tion of a development policy. Some states– largely those donors that have fully 
embraced the challenge of development cooperation before accession to the EU 
– have accepted the goal of meeting their ODA commitments and have developed 
healthy civil society organisations. They have identified clear priority countries, 
in particular the former Yugoslavian and CIS states, as well as sectors, especially 
transition sectors, where they have a comparative advantage. The Czech Republic 
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is thus far the leading donor, becoming the first non-DAC member from the 
region to undergo peer review. There have also been positive signs in some of the 
Baltic States, with both Lithuania and Estonia having seen vast improvements in 
recent years, although both states have been hit hard by the recession.
 The future challenge is to ‘combine well-focused priorities, based on their dis-
tinct expertise, with meeting their responsibilities to support development in 
less-developed countries’.85 There is a clear understanding that the NMSs are ‘not 
able or expected to do the same thing as the old Member States did in a time span 
of 50 years’.86 However, there is the need to ensure that all new donors maintain 
their commitments to development cooperation despite the current economic 
situation. The recession also means that a number of states are backtracking on 
their ODA commitments, reluctantly setting up legal and institutional structures 
and doing little to encourage civil society participation, which is related to general 
need for more education on all levels. Many NMSs have focussed on humanita-
rian aid. This aid is considered an important policy instrument in maintaining 
regional stability, including containing migration from the East and reducing the 
impact of conflict.87 In light of the recession, however, it is has grown more dif-
ficult to convince the populace of the need for aid to the South. Indeed, even 
before the current crisis, an EP report highlighted how far there is yet to travel 
on this journey. It called for a concerted public awareness campaign to stimulate 
political and public support for increased ODA, improving civil society and the 
expert capacity within the NMS, strengthening the co-ordination agencies in 
the NMS and between the NMS and other EU Member States. These calls echo 
similar calls made in 2002, when this subject was first discussed. The concern is 
that, given the overall fragility of development policy in the NMS, the current 
economic slowdown88 could force many of the involved states to water down their 
commitment to development aid, which may mean that the successes of recent 
years could be reversed.
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Hungarian Development Policy
Beata Paragi1
Hungary belongs to the Central European ‘wing’ of emerging donor countries. 
This categorisation refers to a group of countries sharing certain similar or com-
mon historical and political experiences. Contrary to the political dialogue in the 
region, these countries do not engage in formal or informal cooperation on their 
participation in international development assistance, regardless of whether they 
are members of the Visegrad Cooperation or not. Common experiences shared 
by these countries include changing perceptions of personal security, a decreas-
ing standard of living, and a lack of a broad public interest and support for any 
meaningful role played by the country on the international scene mainly due to 
public attention being devoted to domestic affairs. These are the main difficulties 
that must be tackled by all those involved in shaping, implementing and evaluat-
ing foreign and development policies.
 Hungary and its neighbouring countries had a foreign aid policy well before 
the political changes of 1989/1990. The scope of the policy, as well as its imple-
mentation, was influenced by the overall political environment, the Cold War 
context and various Soviet commitments and interests. The contemporary eco-
nomic and business needs of state-owned companies also influenced Hungarian 
foreign aid policy (HUN-IDA).
 The political transformation brought various other priorities to the surface 
in the field of foreign policy. The three goals of Hungarian foreign policy in 1990 
were a transatlantic orientation, regional stability and support for Hungarians in 
neighbouring countries. This was reflected in their geographical commitments, 
which had little to do with developing countries entitled to official development 
assistance.
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 Th e OECD and EU Membership
Hungary’s aspirations to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (1996) and the European Union (2004), resulted in significant 
changes in both policy and practice. These changes were evident in the formula-
tion of Hungarian international development policy and in Hungary’s participa-
tion in international development cooperation.2
 Between 1990 and 1996, there was neither an integrated approach nor a 
formalised policy aimed at addressing the contribution to the development of 
countries in the former third world. Hungarian embassies maintained ordi-
nary diplomatic relations without having an overarching, specific goal as re-
gards foreign assistance or aid policy. In many cases, the embassies performed 
the same activities that developed countries were engaged in as part of their 
official development assistance programs. Nevertheless, neither their adminis-
tration nor statistical record keeping were treated as a priority. At the regional 
level, the support for the Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of the neighbouring 
countries (such as on the borders of former Yugoslavia, Romania, Ukraine and 
Slovakia) was its primary goal. This objective was subject to considerable par-
liamentary debate in the 1990s and was financed by various public foundations, 
offices and programs established and financed or supported by the Hungarian 
government.
 Adjusting or ‘(re)joining the West’ required Hungary to reconsider and re-
evaluate not only the content of its relationship with the developing world, but 
also its priorities as regards the potential beneficiaries supported by official Hun-
garian resources.
 In relation to the framework of Hungarian development cooperation, the pe-
riod between joining the OECD (1996) and EU accession (2004) proved to be 
crucial. The country – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the embryonic 
NGDO sector – received solid technical assistance from countries such as Cana-
da (ODACE program), the United States (for example, the Hungarian American 
Partnership Initiative), and from certain members of the EU (MFA – CIDA 
2002, DEMNET 2000). Budapest and neighbouring capitals were conscious of 
the fact that the European Commission did not pay that much attention to the 
preparedness of the international development policy of the CEE countries dur-
ing the accession talks (KUM 2007b).
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 Motivations, Goals and Limits of their Assessment
The methodological context: In the general evaluation of development policy, cer-
tain methodological difficulties are encountered when analysing and assessing its 
framework, that is, the relationship between Hungary’s foreign policy and its de-
velopment policy. During the years when the concept of Hungarian development 
cooperation policy (DCP) was formulated (in 2002-2003), the country lacked 
a coherent, integrated and detailed foreign policy which could be read in one 
document as a reference point for defining its relations with developing countries. 
Hungary has become a member of various Western international organisations 
(OECD, NATO, and EU) along with almost all of its neighbouring countries. 
This means that the main political goals declared in the early 1990s (and listed 
in the first paragraphs of this paper) have been achieved. However, over the past 
decade, the major political parties have failed to agree on how to redefine and 
reformulate Hungary’s intentions, objectives and measures in the field of foreign 
policy.
 According to the government, foreign policy has been ‘under construction’ for 
years. The key elements, which have been formulated thus far are summarised 
by the term ‘Foreign Relations Strategy’ (külkapcsolati stratégia).3 The use of this 
term is an attempt by the government to bridge the gap between ‘foreign policy’ 
(which has been interpreted as a political concept formulated at a strategic level) 
and ‘foreign relations’ (as supposedly practised and evaluated at an operational 
level). Although this paper does not deal with Hungarian foreign policy, a brief 
inclusion and reference to the prevailing professionally obscure background is 
vital for an understanding of the methodological difficulties.
 On the one hand, it is almost impossible to interpret the motives and justifi-
cations on which development policy is based without a written or oral foreign 
policy, or, at the very least, a commonly agreed-upon and well-articulated foreign 
policy. On the other hand, without any written reference point, it is difficult to 
analyse, evaluate, contradict or modify existing development policy.4 The Foreign 
Relations Strategy mentioned above refers to Hungary’s participation in inter-
national development cooperation (on pages 3, 16, 18 in the English translation) 
but fails to specify the values, motivations, goals, objectives or assigned meas-
ures related to the Hungarian IDC within the framework of the ‘foreign relations 
strategy’.
 Further methodological problems arise in respect to the formulation and con-
tent of the Hungarian development policy itself. The tendency to use divergent 
terminologies by the primary players, such as the foreign ministry (MFA), the 
implementing agency (HUN-IDA), NGDOs (non-governmental development 
organisations) and academic circles, inevitably leads to certain amount of con-
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fusion. Misunderstandings may arise not only with regard to the quality and 
essence of public debate, but also the preferred ends and means. Although ex-
pressions such as goals, objectives, project, program, partner country, sector and 
the misinterpreted ‘comparative advantage’ are simple terms, they hold different 
connotations both in official communications and during informal discussions 
(see later). For example, in 2003, Hungary defined 16 recipient countries in a 
resolution, which was slightly modified later in 2006 and then again in 2008. 
During the amendment processes there was no relevant procedure to clarify to 
the public what a given country group stood for and, as a result, there was a risk 
of confusion. Of the original countries, four were deemed to be ‘strategic partner 
countries’ and six were considered to be ‘other partner countries’. The develop-
ment agency, HUN-IDA, was responsible for implementation and also refers to 
‘our partner countries’ although its country list differs slightly from the official 
categories of countries (see below).
 Bearing in mind these methodological ambiguities, the only option is to sum-
marise ‘opinions’ and make assumptions if needed. Unfortunately, however, past 
conclusions were drawn all too often without adequate, scholarly and academi-
cally supported hard facts and without credible methods of justification.
 Foreign policy, foreign relations and development policy: As has been proven 
since the beginning (2002/2003), Hungarian DCP can be approached from a 
(neo)realistic as well as a liberal viewpoint. While the former argument takes the 
state’s interests, as determined by the existing international structure, into con-
sideration, the latter interpretation emphasises state responsibility when it comes 
to tackling common global problems.
 DCP has been established on such realistic terms as ‘joining the OECD (1996) 
and the EU (2004), [and carrying out] efforts to make a fresh start in inter-
national development policy, in accordance with the norms of these organisa-
tions’ (MFA 200Y). There is little doubt that membership in these organisations 
played an important role in formulating Hungarian DCP, without which the need 
to allocate Hungarian resources for countries in need would be significantly less 
urgent. Civil society and the general public have been neither strong nor knowl-
edgeable enough to force the political stakeholders, parties and the government 
to formulate a more sophisticated position or play a more spectacular role in 
international development cooperation.
 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a department (see later) that has 
been in charge of coordinating the IDC’s policies and processes. The Hungarian 
DCP represents a more liberal way of thinking inasmuch as the justifications for 
the DCP are concerned (KUM 2007b; Paragi 2007). According to the MFA’s var-
ious statements, Hungarian development policy is parallel, or horizontal, rather 
than subordinated to foreign policy. There are official voices, which tend to em-
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phasise that ‘IDC policy has nothing to do with foreign policy’. When analysing 
and scrutinising the countries ‘targeted by Hungarian development activities’ one 
has to admit that Hungary follows a fairly realistic path (see later).
 The first milestone for the realisation of a Hungarian development policy was 
governmental approval of the ‘Concept Paper of the Hungarian Development 
Cooperation Policy’ in July 2001. The concept, jointly prepared by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Finance and that of Economic Affairs on the basis 
of Government Decision 2319/1999, took into account Hungary’s economic and 
social background and previous experience, as well as the importance of commit-
ting Hungary to the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
It formulated the general principle and operational framework of the Hungarian 
development policy aimed at helping countries that are less well developed than 
Hungary.
 Motivations behind development cooperation: In the case of Hungary, there are 
several more or less explicit reasons for supporting certain developing countries. 
These include the following: (i) adjustment to the international environment, (ii) 
moral obligations, (iii) broader foreign and national security policy concerns, and 
(iv) economic considerations. The international environment represents a source 
of considerable pressure since there is no democratic, developed state, which 
could afford to ignore the responsibility of helping poorer ones (Tomaj 2007). 
In this sense, the Hungarian method of the formulation and implementation of 
development policy are equally motivated by ‘rational choice’.
 The moral obligations underpinning the necessity of participating in inter-
national development cooperation, as opposed to political reasons (iii), tend to 
be stressed and supported by local and international civil organisations. These 
organisations emphasise the necessity of helping people in need, although not for 
political reasons. They attempt to assert solidarity or advocate global responsibil-
ity in order to increase support for aid to those less fortunate. As far as the third 
motivation is concerned, there are several challenges (poverty, migration, terror-
ism, etc.) that even Hungary has to face in the long run. There are also other 
reasons for using development policy as an instrument to enhance economic or 
business interests and there is a very simple and mainly historical and economic 
explanation for this. Hungary is a small Central European country without any 
significant experience in colonisation and decolonisation, which also lacks mean-
ingful ‘exportable’ political ideas or social beliefs in the international perspective. 
In the absence of a solid political commitment, which is widely supported by 
society, the most obvious reason for participating in international assistance is 
based on realisable economic benefits and meeting international obligations.
 Declared goals of DCP: As expressed above, the goals (and/or objectives or 
preferences – the distinction is not clear in Hungarian documents) of the Hun-
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garian development policy were to be formulated in accordance with the norms of 
the relevant international organisations and institutions, based first and foremost 
on compliance with the MDGs. The primary goal of Hungarian DCP is reduc-
tion in (global) poverty or, at the very least, poverty in partner countries.
 The analysis of the more or less well-defined objectives which have been sub-
ordinated to the above-mentioned overall international goal(s), includes the iden-
tification of various priorities (KUM 2002; MFA 2003b: 1-2). According to of-
ficial documents translated into English ‘[t]he main preferences of the Hungarian 
international development policy are: to preserve and support international peace 
and security, and to create and sustain regional, political and economic stability; 
to reduce poverty, and contribute to sustainable economic and social develop-
ment; to protect human rights and equal opportunities, to strengthen democracy 
and civil society structures, as well as to support local community autonomies; to 
support efforts aimed at creating economic and social development (basic neces-
sities, healthcare, primary education); to promote good governance; to protect 
and improve environmental resources’ (MFA 200Y).
 The objectives listed in Hungarian or English documents are easy to misun-
derstand. It is important to realise that all of the measures, tools and procedures 
that have to be fulfilled are covered in Hungarian documents by the word ‘objec-
tives’ which have neither been listed, nor embodied in one logical framework or 
structure. The absence of the required legal background means it has been quite 
difficult to underpin and understand DCP policy and practice.
 Legal and Institutional Background
Since its creation, the primary source of the Hungarian DCP has been the above-
mentioned Concept Paper (approved by the government in 2001). Since it was 
published by the MFA, a ‘Government Decree’ (82/2003) modified the responsi-
bilities and competence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to include DCP activi-
ties. As far as the organisational structure is concerned, Government Decisions 
established various administrative units (see below) that are domestically respon-
sible for various elements of DCP activity (MFA 2003b: 2).
 The law, which is supposed to eventually regulate Hungary’s international de-
velopment cooperation policy, has been under construction for some time. Un-
like the first concept, this document is open to certain amount of public debate 
within the framework of the Civil Advisory Board. In the absence of a DCP law, 
considerable efforts are required to cope with the otherwise non-harmonised ex-
isting bureaucratic and legislative structures involving, among others, the budget-
ary law and public procedures law. As a member of European Union, the country 
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has also been ‘obliged to apply all the legal provisions of the EU, including parts 
of acquis communautaire on development cooperation’ (MFA 2003b: 1). Apart 
from this, the DCP is almost totally absent from Hungarian society’s ‘priority 
list’. This fact is underpinned by another issue, namely that no budget lines, no 
country selection, and no organisational questions have ever been debated at the 
plenary sessions of the legislative council. Details of the Hungarian IDC activity 
are regularly presented to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Parliament by 
MFA (KUM 2008b). However, this practice is more reminiscent of a compulsory 
procedural matter than a reflection of a substantially innovative and initiative 
decision-making process.
 Hungary’s development assistance programs are financed by the central state 
budget. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for planning the interna-
tional development cooperation activities as well as coordinating ongoing activi-
ties among various governmental units involved. The MFA administers approxi-
mately 20 of Hungary’s total contribution to international development, mainly 
in the forms of projects and technical assistance (see table 1, column E). The 
remaining part of Hungary’s official development assistance is provided by other 
government units, predominantly ministries like the Ministry of Finance,5 Min-
istry of Health, Interior Ministry, etc. The detailed content of their IDC activity 
as well as the exact percentage of their contributions is unknown, not only to the 
wider public, but also to the MFA (KUM 2008b). It has also not been commu-
nicated via the MFA’s website on a voluntary basis nor obtained by researchers 
(Kiss 2007a; Kiss 2007b; Kiss 2008).
 The MFA department responsible for coordination and management of 
Hungary’s development policy was established in late 2002 (Department for 
International Development Cooperation – DfIDC – Nemzetközi Fejlesztési 
Együttműködési Főosztály). Since then, neither the government itself nor any po-
litical parties have treated international development cooperation as a priority. 
Typical organisational problems relating both to human capacities and financial-
budgetary constraints reflect the fact that DCP has been a policy ignored by main 
political decision makers.
 The IDC Interdepartmental Committee (IDC IC, NEFE Tárcaközi Bizottság) 
was established by a Government Decree (2121/2003). At the end of 2007, a new 
administration unit (IDC Government Committee, IDC GC; NEFE Kormány-
bizottság) was created to replace the Interdepartmental Committee (by Gov-
ernment Decree 2191/2007). The IDC Government Committee chaired by the 
foreign minister is responsible for (re)defining geographical and sectoral priori-
ties. The details of this procedure are still under construction (KUM 2008a: 14). 
However, the initial IDC IC was also presided over by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and was primarily responsible for determining the recipient countries and 
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target areas of the IDC. The main task of the IDC IC was ‘to harmonise IDC 
programs with the foreign, security and foreign economic policy objectives’ (MFA 
2003b: 2). These objectives, as mentioned above, have not been compiled as a 
written framework nor communicated publicly. Neither the minutes of IDC IC 
meetings, nor its resolutions and methods for evaluating the IDC IC activity 
have been made available to the wider public by 2007 (2008).6 Only a few general 
comments are made in official government annual reports on Hungarian develop-
ment assistance (see below). The work of the IDC IC, as well as that of its suc-
cessor, the IDC GC, has been supported by an Interdepartmental Expert Group 
(NEFE Tárcaközi Szakértői Munkacsoport) comprising delegated representatives 
(experts) from the ministries.
 The development policy, which is coordinated by the MFA has not replaced 
the international aid-support activity and funding program currently pursued 
by various ministries and institutions. However, in 2003, the MFA became re-
sponsible for the harmonisation, with the active participation of the line min-
istries, of all of the Hungarian development activities and for assistance in the 
management of the efficient use of central IDC resources. Due to capacity prob-
lems, the coordination has not covered the task of precise statistical recording 
(so far).
 In addition to the above-mentioned governmental structure, there are two ad-
ditional institutes – an advisory board and the implementing agency – which 
should also be mentioned. The Civil Advisory Board (CAB, ‘Társadalmi Tanác-
sadó Testület’) was established almost immediately following the commencement 
of the governmental development activities. The role assigned to CAB is to en-
courage the participation of social and professional organisations and various 
representatives of the public. The CAB, which convenes once or twice annually, 
consists of representatives of the MFA, political parties, trade unions, employers’ 
associations, academic communities, NGDOs and individual experts. The op-
portunity is given to the participants to review the Hungarian DCP activities and 
to influence the efficiency of these activities by sharing their points of view. The 
CAB also helps to raising public awareness by enhancing IDC’s social and public 
acceptance (MFA 2003c).
 However, an evaluation of the CAB reveals that the Board is quite rhetori-
cal. According to academic and civil sources the CAB is a formal establishment 
rather than a body able to articulate and convey essential messages. It is also 
quite revealing that none of the Hungarian parties represented in the Parliament 
have formulated any independent policy that would reflect their own position to-
wards international development cooperation. Even though there has been some 
improvement over the years, the activities of the CAB have not been well docu-
mented, at least not in any academic sense.
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 HUN-IDA, a non-profit private company, is the agency responsible for the 
implementation of Hungarian IDC programs, while Hungarian missions abroad, 
NGDOs, the private sector and various organs of public administration are in-
volved in carrying out development projects in partner countries. The implement-
ing agency is managed by a general manager, supervised by a three-member board 
and audited annually by an independent company. HUN-IDA is not a major 
implementing agency, does not have offices abroad and employs about 10-15 peo-
ple in its Budapest office to run its own ‘programmes and activities.’ The average 
project budget is tellingly small and only between HUF 5 and 8 million (approx. 
US$ 26,000-35,0000) have on average been spent by each program in recent years 
(HUN-IDA 2008b).
 According to its mandate, ‘HUN-IDA has been an official executive institu-
tion of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, specialised in international bilateral co-
operation since 2004, with a commission lasting until 2009. HUN-IDA’s task 
is to implement the relevant contract. The organisation was granted the com-
mission twice in the framework of public procurement procedures’ (HUN-IDA 
2008A). The clarity of the public procurement procedures within the organisa-
tion has been informally questioned by ‘external’ players – mainly NGDOs – in 
Hungary (Miklósi 2007). Tensions between the implementing agency and the 
civil sector players can be explained by the size of the market: the available official 
resources for implementing IDC projects are so small that signing a multi-annual 
contract with the MFA is a pretty big step which many want to take.
 According to official sources, the MFA has been satisfied with its activities, 
which embrace three major pillars. First of all, the HUN-IDA ensures or ar-
ranges the training of foreign diplomats who come to Hungary within the frame-
work of bilateral governmental agreements. It also monitors the financial and 
professional realisation of projects that have been financed by MFA sources and 
implemented by non-state actors. Nevertheless, it is interesting to ascertain that 
the projected budget at the disposal of the MFA/DfIDC in 2007 of HUF275 mil-
lion or US$ 1.496 million (that is, without resources devoted to the reconstruc-
tion activities in Afghanistan, see table 1, column E) was smaller than the amount 
paid to the HUN-IDA for monitoring various Hungarian IDC projects abroad 
(HUF309 million or US$  1.683 million)7 (KUM 2008a: 2; KUM 2008a: 23). 
These amounts and their comparison are a pretty good reflection of IDC activity. 
Last but not least, the scope of HUN-IDA’s activities covers professional consul-
tations and advice relating to DCP activities. The most popular field of interest is 
sharing the experiences (know-how) of the Hungarian political and institutional 
transformation, which was followed by the demand for learning more about how 
local government systems operate and how small and medium-sized enterprises 
in the country have been developed and supported (HUN-IDA 2008b).
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 Th e Major Features of International Development Assistance
Between 2003 and 2005, Hungary’s ODA rose from 0.03 to slightly over 0.1 
GNI. Data registered by the OECD shows spectacular improvements. For ex-
ample, the initial total ODA (US$ 21.21 million; 0.03 ODA/GNI rate in 2003) 
rapidly rose to US$ 100 million (0.11 ODA/GNI, 2005). Approximate estima-
tions for 2006 are US$ 120 million or  96 million (0.13). Such rapid increases 
can be explained mainly by debt cancellation.
Table 1 Total Hungarian bilateral and multilateral ODA (2003-2007) as reported in 
various currencies15 to various sources by MFA
Unfortunately, the chart is complicated due to the otherwise obscure nature of 
the situation. An analysis of the data that reflects tangible bilateral development 
activity in partner countries (column E) shows that Hungary provided assistance 
valued at US$ 15.7 million (HUF 3,283 billion) in the form of 301 projects in 27 
different countries between 2003-2006 (Tomaj 2007).
A B C1 C2 D1 D2 E
Referred 
year
Year of 
report
ODA 
reported 
to EU/EC
% of GNI ODA 
reported 
to OECD
ODA 
reported 
to Kiss 
(2008)
Amount assigned 
to MFA/DfIDC. 
Activities 
implemented in 
form of projects.
(OA and ODA)
Million 
euro
US$ in 
millions
HUF in 
billions 
HUF in billions 
2003 2004 n.a. n.a. 21 6.981 ..
2004 2005 56 0.07 70 20.478 1.050
2005 2006 80 0.10 100 21.873 0.945
2006 2007 96 0.12 140 29.003 0.437
2007 2008 - 0.08 103 - 0.275
(with Afghanistan: 
0.673)
Total - - 434 - 3.283 (with 
Afghanistan)
Sources: KUM 2002b; KUM 2003b; KUM 2004b
OECD 2007; KUM 2007b; Kiss 2007a: 11; EU/EC 2007 ; OECD 2008: 235
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 Differences between the data calculated in different currencies (euro, US$, 
HUF) as shown in columns C1, D1, D2 can be explained by the variation in ex-
change rates as well as by the date and method of calculating this data as reported 
to EU/EC and OECD DAC and Hungarian researchers (Kiss 2007a: 8) respec-
tively. There was approximately a six-month gap between submitting data to the 
EU/EC and to the OECD and this may explain the changes in their accuracy or 
content. Information provided by the MFA reiterated this explanation just as it 
revealed that there is no professional statistician in charge of reporting IDC data 
within the MFA (KUM 2008b).
 There are various explanations for the differences between column D2 (ODA 
reported to Kiss 2007, calculated in billion HUF) and column E (amount assigned 
to MFA/DfIDC calculated in billion HUF). The most important of these is the 
impact of debt cancellation in relation to Nicaragua (US$ 22.12 million in 2004), 
Yemen (US$  19.6 million in 2005), Tanzania (US$  18.8 million in 2005), and 
Ethiopia (US$ 6.438 million in 2006) (Kiss 2007: 20-21). It is not known how the 
debt cancellation (60 of US$ 229,324 million, which includes capital and inter-
est) activities with Iraq have been represented in statistics (Kiss 2007a: 21). It is 
also not known whether any of the aforementioned debt cancellation acts have 
been used for intentional export promotion. However, the answer is definitely 
‘officially not’ since the MFA would otherwise have known about it, which is not 
the case (KUM 2008b). A substantially more relevant explanatory factor may be 
the number of activities that are counted and reported as ODA and realised by 
the various ministries and governmental units. An overall lack of transparency 
Table 2 Bilateral and Multilateral ODA (2003-2007) as reported in various currencies to 
various sources by MFA. Figures given in HUF may provide OA as well.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
HUF
in
bill.
US$
in
mill.
HUF
in 
bill.
US$
in 
mill.
HUF
in
bill.
US$
in
mill.
HUF
in
bill.
US$
in
mill.
HUF
in
bill.
US$
in
mill.
Bilateral 
ODA
1.4723 14 6.7439 35 13.2904 40 13.3219 84 - 33
Multilateral 
ODA
5.50087 7 13.7376 35 8.5831 60 15.6818 56 - 70
Total 6.9811 21 20.4785 70 21.8735 100 29.0037 140 - 103
Bilateral 
ODA,%
21.10 66.66 32.9 50.00 60.80 40.00 45.90 60.00 - 32.03
Sources: Kiss 2007a: 7 (table 3); Kiss 2007a (table 4): 8; OECD 2008: 235 (table 33)
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significantly increases this possibility. So far, the MFA, responsible for coordinat-
ing Hungarian IDC activities, has neither recently posted their contribution to 
total Hungarian ODA on its website,8 nor has it shared them with researchers 
applying for this data (Kiss 2007a: 9; Kiss 2008; also, see later).
 Approximately 50 of the Hungarian ODA (and OA) (on average) is chan-
nelled through multilateral institutions. Trends not only reflect changing budget-
ary priorities but also an improvement in the way data is collected and summa-
rised, and in how the activities of various ministries are coordinated.
It is difficult to explain the differences between the figures provided to the OECD 
DAC and those provided to Kiss (2007: 8). Explanatory factors may include the 
(unknown) exchange rate, as well as the exact content of ‘development assistance.’ 
As far as the latter is concerned, the figures given in HUF very likely include OA 
(official assistance) in addition to ODA. The absence of definitions of the ter-
minology used in various Hungarian sources makes information retrieval almost 
impossible.
 Geographical distribution: In 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defined 16 
recipient countries ‘targeted by Hungarian development policy’ (MFA 2003a: 1). 
Apart from the practice of debt cancellation and meeting international require-
ments, such as rebuilding Afghanistan or Iraq, Hungary has been maintaining 
long-lasting relations with countries in close geographic proximity such as Ser-
bia, Montenegro, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Although Viet-
nam is not a neighbouring country, Vietnam had already cultivated close political 
relations with Hungary prior to 1989/1990. The list has been updated twice since 
2003, in 2006 and in 2008, without any additional information being provided (to 
the public) as to specific of the country groups.9
 The initial selection resulted in the creation of four categories, namely ‘stra-
tegic or preferred partner countries’ (kiemelt partnerek), ‘partner countries’ (part-
ner államok), ‘least developed countries’ (legkevésbé fejlett államok) and recipients 
representing ‘international commitment’ (nemzetközi kötelezettség alapján vállalt 
együttműködés). Between 2006 and 2008, the category of strategic partner was 
not applied. In 2008, the former strategic partners were qualified as ‘priority part-
ner countries’ and cooperation with them has since been based on ‘medium-term 
country strategies’ (középtávú országstratégia alapján kiemelten kezelt parterek). 
Country strategies (CSP) completed more recently or which are still being pre-
pared presume a more coherent and consistent way of cooperating with Serbia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam as well as Moldova and the Palestinian Na-
tional Authority (PNA). In these cases, the cooperation is based on medium-
term planning. So far, three country strategies (Vietnam, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia) have been prepared for a three-year periods based on summarising the 
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needs defined by the governments of the countries concerned (KUM 2008a: 2). 
The lack of country strategies means that the content of the medium-term co-
operation with both the PNA and Moldova remains quite obscure. In all of the 
other cases, the cooperation is project-based (KUM 2008b), i.e., conducted in an 
ad hoc way depending on budgetary opportunities.
 Although certain substantial differences can be observed purely through an 
analysis of the titles of each category, no specific explanations of substantial dif-
ferences between the given categories has been provided (MFA 2003b; KUM 
2003; MFA 2006). Early documentation prepared by the MFA refers to ‘strict and 
Table 3 Various ‘Partner Relations’ according to the MFA and its implementing agency
Categories MFA16 (as of 2003) MFA
(as of February 2006
*: added or reaffi  rmed 
in 2008)
HUN-IDA: 
our partner countries
(2008)17
(Strategic) Partner 
Countries
Cooperation based 
on medium-term 
strategy (since 2008)
Serbia and 
Montenegro
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Vietnam
Palestinian National 
Authority
Serbia
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Socialist Rep. of 
Vietnam
*Palestinian N. 
Authority
*Moldova
Albania
Kyrgyzstan
Republic of Moldavia 
(ie. Moldova)
Mongolia
Montenegro
Nigeria
Palestine
Republic of Serbia
Socialist Rep. of 
Vietnam
(Other) Partner 
Countries
‘Project-based’ 
cooperation
(since 2008)
Macedonia
Republic of Moldavia
China (dropped)
Mongolia
Kyrgyzstan
Ukraine (OA)
Ethiopia  *countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
Yemen
Cambodia
*Kosovo
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Macedonia
Mongolia
*Montenegro
*Ukraine (OA)
Least Developed 
Countries
Ethiopia
Yemen
Cambodia
Laos
-
Partners under 
International 
Commitment
Iraq
Afghanistan
Iraq
Afghanistan
Sources: KUM 2002; KUM 2007a; KUM 2008a; HUNIDA 2008a
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consistent’ selection criteria but none of these have been listed explicitly and pub-
licly. As the MFA states, ‘... [t]he selection of these countries will ensure coherence 
between our political, security and economic objectives, on the one hand, and the 
practice of development cooperation, on the other. The programs are intended 
to contribute to the sustainable social and economic development of the partner 
countries and to the reinforcement of bilateral relations equally’ (MFA 2003b: 
3). According to the latest publication by the MFA ‘the selection of the partner 
countries is the result of a multi-round coordination among the various minis-
tries which took into consideration (i) Hungary’s international environment, its 
interest system and its political, economic, trade and security capacities, (ii) the 
development and poverty level of the recipient countries and (iii) the history of 
the relationship between Hungary and the potential partner countries’ (KUM 
2008b).
 According to recent research, 301 projects supported by the MFA were real-
ised in 27 countries (eligible for both ODA and OA) between 2003 and 2006. 
The most favoured partner countries were Serbia and Montenegro (68 projects 
or 18.41 of the total with a value of HUF604.4 million), followed by Iraq (16 
projects, 12.66; HUF415.8 million); Afghanistan (11 projects, 10.81; HUF355 
million); Ukraine (44 projects, 8.39; HUF275.6 million) and Vietnam (26 
projects, 8.22; HUF269.9 million) (Kiss 2007: 11-12).
 Sectoral distribution: Officially declared ‘comparative advantages’, they range 
from sharing experiences of democratic transition to professional contributions 
to various water and agricultural projects (various documents, MFA 2003a; 
MFA 2003b; MFA 2006).10 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the 
following sectoral focuses can be identified, based on Hungary’s ‘comparative 
advantages’:
– transfer of knowledge and experience in political system changes;
– education;
– technical training;
– information technology;
– agriculture;
– health;
– infrastructural planning; and
– environmental protection (source: MFA 2003a: 1; Cf.: MFA 2003b: 2; MFA 
2006: 2).
Figures on sectoral spending are not available from official governmental sources 
(KUM 2008b) for the period 2003-2007. Judit Kiss tried categorising data by 
sectors, but only resources devoted to project implementation could be counted 
due to the fact that the MFA have only recorded the sectoral categorisation of 
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the projects that (a) have been financed by the budget at its disposal (Table 1, 
Column E) and (b) have been implemented by its implementing agency, NGOs 
or private companies. It means that activities in the field of education, health, 
agriculture, public order, etc. which have been performed by other ministries are 
counted (reflected) in international (OECD DAC) statistics (ODA data) but, by 
2008, had not been recorded in a statistically credible and publicly accessible way 
by the MFA.
 As far as the sectoral distribution of the implemented projects is concerned 
(with a total value of HUF3,282 billion), the most popular sectors were the fol-
lowing: government and civil society (134 projects), emergency aid (49), agricul-
ture (forestry, fishery) (32), health (24) and education (34).
Table 4 Sectoral distribution of project aid recorded by MFA
So-called sectoral priorities (or preferences) have been repeated and extended in 
various MFA communications over time. The ‘sectors’ have not been assigned to 
the declared goals and objectives (or so-called preferences). The projects which 
have been recorded by the MFA have also not been arranged according to the ini-
tially defined sectors (cf. Kiss 2007: 21-22 and the KUM 2003a). A comparison of 
the official documents prepared in Hungarian and English over the past few years 
shows that it is unclear what the difference is between categories such as ‘objec-
tives’ (preferences), ‘comparative advantages’ and ‘sectors’ (sometimes also referred 
to as branches or areas).
2003-2006 Sectors Number of 
projects
Value of the projects
Billion HUF  %
Government and civil sector  134 1.099 33.49
Emergency aid  49 0.598 18.23
Agriculture, forestry, fi shery  32 0.454 13.84
Health  24 0.414 12.6
Education  34 0.313 9.55
all other  28 0.405 12.29
Total  301 3.283 100
Source: Kiss 2007a: 15-16
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It is almost impossible to formulate proper definitions of the above-mentioned 
categories based on the elements of the given sets. The listed ‘sectors’ are rather 
obscure approximations. This is the result of a lack of proper definition, which 
reflects the meaning of this category. ‘Sharing Hungary’s experience in political-
economic transition’ and ‘knowledge transfer’ has been allocated to the group of 
sectors along with ‘agriculture’ and even ‘environmental protection’. This associa-
tion with completely unrelated sectors, which adds to the confusion, highlights 
the above-mentioned methodological problems. In addition, sectoral priorities 
have not been explained by concrete, explanatory facts, which would help clarify 
why the given priorities have been selected and grouped together. In the absence 
of proper indicators and of data reflecting aggregated demands of the partner 
Table 5 Overlapping categories applied in offi  cial documents published in Hungarian 
(KUM) and in English (MFA)
Categories Initial objectives ~ 
principal and practical 
priorities (2002)
Sectors and bran-
ches (2003):
‘Preferences’
Content 
listed in offi  -
cial sources 
•  international peace, 
security and regional 
stability
•  implementing 
sustainable develop-
ment in developing 
countries
•  protecting human 
rights, democracy 
and minority rights
•  (Hungarian minorities 
in the region)
•  economic and social 
development
•  good governance
•  protecting the envi-
ronment
•  active participation 
in the work of IDC 
organisations
•  OECD DAC member-
ship 
a.  transfer of 
knowledge, 
experience in 
political system 
changes;
b.  ducation,
c.  technical trai-
ning,
d.  information 
technology,
e.  agriculture,
f. health,
f.  infrastructure 
planning
g.  environment 
protection
•  to preserve and support inter-
national peace and security,
•  to create and sustain regio-
nal, political and economic 
stability;
•  to reduce poverty,
•  to contribute to sustainable 
economic and social develop-
ment;
•  to protect human rights and 
equal opportunities,
•  to strengthen democracy and 
civil society structures,
•  to support local community 
autonomies;
•  to support eff orts aimed at 
creating economic and social 
development (basic neces-
sities, healthcare, primary 
education);
•  to promote good governance;
•  to protect and improve environ-
mental resources
Sources: KUM 2002 KUM 2002
MFA 2003a
MFA 200Y
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‘Sectors and areas where Hungary has comparative advantages’
a. Sharing Hungarian experiences associated with the political-economic transition (esta-
blishment and operation of democratic structures, creating conditions for the transition 
to a free-market economy, privatisation, providing assistance to small and medium-sized 
enterprises, the application of the criteria of good governance).
b. Knowledge transfer, knowledge-based assistance (methodological procedures, know-how, 
software, transfer of organisational and planning methods, etc.)
c. Promoting education (university and post-graduate), training of experts and technicians, 
developing curriculum, organising long-distance learning.
d. Developing health services (planning, equipping, and running hospitals and polyclinics, 
birth control, combating epidemics, etc.).
e. Agriculture (dissemination of state-of-the-art plant and animal breeding methods, seed 
improvement, plant hygiene – plant protection, freshwater fi sh breeding, forestation pro-
grams, farm development plans, biotechnology, agro-meteorology, training of specialists 
and engineers in farming-related areas), food industry (planning of slaughterhouses).
f. Contributing to water management and water resources development, planning and 
providing technical advice (reservoirs and barrages, water purifi cation plants, planning of 
dikes, inland drainage, exploration and assessment of water stocks, etc.).
g. Developing general infrastructure.
h. Helping general and transport engineering activity, cartography.
i. Providing technical advice on environmental protection.
KUM 2002; KUM 2003a
MFA 2006, cf. MFA 2003b
countries or Hungary’s sectoral economic performance, it is possible to assume 
that the sectors have been selected by (foreign) political concerns or in any other 
ad hoc way.
 An Alternative Monitoring Method to ‘Evaluating Evaluation’
Public awareness: Generally speaking, taxpayers are neither very well informed 
about the role of development assistance nor about its necessity, when compared 
to Western Europe, despite the increased focus on public awareness. Compre-
hensive public opinion polls have never been prepared by any Hungarian polling 
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institution with to the goal of measuring how Hungarians think about global 
problems, development assistance and private aid contributions. In 2000, a Ph.D. 
dissertation sought to map the attitudes people have towards global challenges 
within the framework of a broader topic (Nature and History 2000). A thou-
sand people responded to the questionnaires. According to the results, the three 
most important global problems were environmental problems, poverty, and war. 
Moreover, 55 of the respondents knew that international organisations were 
involved in tackling global problems, while only 16 were unaware of these insti-
tutions and 29 thought that no such institutions existed. Approximately one-
third of the sample was convinced that they [the people] could not do anything 
to solve global problems (Székely 2003).
 The ‘Eurobarometer’ poll, which focussed on Attitudes towards Development 
Aid, indicated that only 73 of the Hungarian respondents said that it was either 
very important or fairly important to help people in developing countries (the 
average for the EU-25 was 91) (Eurobarometer 2005: 26). It is thus not surpris-
ing that 44 of Hungarians did not know how much money the government was 
spending on development assistance. Since the amount in question is very similar 
to the amount spent in the new Member States (Eurobarometer 2005: 36), one 
might assume that there is no real correlation between the quality of data pub-
lished by official actors and public awareness.
 An examination of the latest ‘Eurobarometer’ survey reveals a slightly differ-
ent situation. According to Hungarian respondents, ‘development aid is selfish’, 
inasmuch as the two main motivations for richer countries to provide develop-
ment aid to poor countries are: (1) ‘to prevent citizens from these countries [from] 
emigrating to rich countries,’ (2) direct ‘self-interest, for example, helping poor 
countries to trade will enable them to buy more products from rich countries’ 
(Eurobarometer 2007: 5). This approach can be explained by the fact that people 
in Central Europe have not experienced any significant political altruism on the 
part of key European countries in the past. In fact, 73 of the population (or at 
least the respondents) have never heard of the Millennium Development Goals. 
This is slightly higher than the average of the EU-27 (80). Of the EU members, 
the Hungarians trust the method of untying aid the most with 34 of them an-
swering that this is the best way to improve aid efficiency (Eurobarometer 2007: 
28). Hungarians also have faith in the European Parliament as well as in the 
governments of the recipients. 38 said that the EP has the most significant influ-
ence on the development aid priorities (compared to the EU-27 average, 27) and 
26 said that governments in the recipient (ACP) countries possess this influ-
ence (the EU average was just 15).
 Governmental communication; monitoring and evaluation: Neither recipient 
countries nor Hungarian taxpayers know how to readily access certain details 
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of Hungary’s development policy. Relevant information provided publicly by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs tends to be inconsistent (Kiss 2007a, 2007b; Paragi 
2007; Kékesy 2008). Various pieces of information are shared with the public un-
der the heading of ‘events’ (események) posted on the MFA’s website. However, the 
extent to which the listed events mirror the real activity behind the development 
policy is unknown as there is a general lack of transparency.11 It is possible that, in 
reality, the MFA may provide between 90 and 100 coverage, but may only make 
between 50 and 70 of this information available to the public. Monitoring and 
evaluation documents prepared either by the implementing agency (HUN-IDA) 
or by the MFA are not accessible and contain data on ‘projects’ that are not ag-
gregated at either the national or sectoral levels.
 Annual summaries reported in Hungarian have been posted on the MFA’s 
website (KUM 2004, KUM 2005, KUM 2006, KUM 2007, KUM 2008A) as 
well. The reports, each consisting of approximately 15-20 pages, are intended to 
be summaries of the activities of the previous year as well as indicating the ‘prior-
ity tasks’ (kiemelt teendők) for the coming year. These ‘essays’ reflect the ‘history’ of 
the Hungarian IDC in the relevant years. They also address the question of what 
has occurred during any given year in Hungary’s public administration, as well as 
within the framework of cooperation with recipient countries. Nonetheless, the 
annual reports fail to elaborate on the degree of effectiveness or efficiency. Thus 
far, all of them have lacked charts and tables, any systematic approach involving 
hindsight evaluation, and a logical and structured assessment of development 
activities by sectors and by partner countries as well as on the basis of one cur-
rency.12 With respect to indicating future goals, the reports have failed to contain 
clearly worded goals and objectives derived from the IDC concept. They also lack 
policy tools or measures directly or indirectly aimed at addressing these (other-
wise non-existing) annual goals and objectives.
 It must be emphasised that ‘previous activities’ have been listed by countries 
and by sectors in annual reports since the beginning. Future activities have also 
been proposed and projected. Nevertheless, neither past nor future (planned) 
activities have been structured in a methodologically legitimate way, which would 
also serve as a basis for credible arguments whether formulated by the Ministry 
or by outside parties such as NGOs or academic actors.
 Th e ‘outsiders’ or the role of civil society in Hungarian development policy: Anyone 
who is familiar with Hungarian IDC policy and practice cannot deny that the 
formulating, implementing and evaluating of such policies is a very tense process. 
Serious communication mistakes have been made by all players since the begin-
ning of the process, which has led to mutual mistrust among the concerned parties.
 The HAND Association was created in 2002 thanks to local initiatives and 
Canadian generosity. Since the very beginning, the CIDA-ODACE has support-
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ed and assisted the consolidation of the Hungarian NGDO platform (HAND, 
Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development of Humanitarian Aid) which 
has become a representative body of the Hungarian NGOs being interested in 
development and humanitarian activities. The HAND has 13 permanent mem-
bers and 13 observers, with the majority of them possessing only a very small 
annual budget and staff. It runs a small office of 2-3 staff members who mainly 
organise fundraising activities. As a result of their struggle to cope in financial 
terms, HAND has been more active in the past two years than any time previous-
ly. Nevertheless, it was scarcely able to meet the demands it faced. Over the years, 
HAND became a member of the CONCORD and benefited from international 
best practices. As far as their local presence is concerned, their activities are based 
on three main pillars: representing civil society organisations while communicat-
ing or working with the MFA as well as international official and civil society or-
ganisations; raising public awareness and advocacy; and providing services to its 
member organisations. HAND has also established working groups, which are 
intended to contribute constructively to the articulation of the official Hungar-
ian development policy. Even if the NGDO sector is only able to assert its voice, 
values and interests to a limited extent, the role they play in implementation is 
crucial and invaluable. It proved to be such a highly constructive step that an in-
depth inquiry was initiated by civil society (under the umbrella of the HAND 
NGDO platform). The findings enabled them to list a lot of the weaknesses and 
tasks that need to be tackled (Kiss 2007a, Kiss 2007b).13
 Another great achievement of civil society is that, within the framework of 
the above-mentioned Civil Advisory Board (CAB), HAND’s members have also 
had an opportunity to form an opinion on DCP law (which is being drawn up) 
and on country strategies. The latest developments aside, CAB has been a repre-
sentative body in a formal way, but not in an essential sense. Even if its members 
are able to articulate their positions on various questions, their work remains 
essentially invisible to the wider public inasmuch as CAB does not have a mail-
ing list, a website or a phone number to contact. The CAB was created by the 
MFA and currently still responds to the initiatives of the MFA instead of being 
a creative and pro-active body formulating proposals without any explicit invita-
tion. Although the CAB proposals, remarks and feedback must have been used 
in the process of year-to-year ‘policy’ formulation and implementation, the MFA 
has failed to evaluate its level of satisfaction with the CAB. Since public life in 
Hungary is rather small in scale, it has been easier for many people involved in 
CAB to distance themselves from essential matters in order to avoid confronta-
tions, which might backfire in the longer term. Proposals formulated by the CAB 
and/or its members have never been discussed in the parliament, but ‘are debated 
within the framework of the Government Committee and used to embellish the 
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final reports and documents prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA 
2008b). Nevertheless, there is a lack of clarity regarding the details and the added 
value of the CAB.
 Summary
The main trends in the short history of the Hungarian DCP can be summarised 
as follows. Although an entire DCP institution system has been created, com-
pared with European experiences, only some relatively insignificant progress has 
been made. The government is not really interested in gaining international rec-
ognition and self-esteem by taking part effectively in international development 
cooperation. This observation is underpinned by the amounts spent on interna-
tional development cooperation and by the size of the individual projects. Even 
if the public were to be more interested in the global problems of the developing 
world, the government has neither the means nor the channels to achieve more 
spectacular results at a national level.
 From an academic perspective, the most important lessons that can be learned 
are related to the quality of input needed in any research in order to draw cred-
ible conclusions. As stated by Judit Kiss, ‘[researchers in Hungary] had enormous 
difficulties with data collection due to uneasy governmental data service, lack of 
data and inconsistency (Kiss 2007b: 1). Without making a considerable extra ef-
fort it is not possible to access certain data relating to Hungary’s international de-
velopment cooperation activity. Although the practice of phone calls and e-mail 
communications do work, it may take an outsider weeks or even months to gain 
access to the information he or she needs. The accuracy of hard facts (published 
official figures), whether they are communicated publicly or provided on an ad 
hoc basis, is often questionable and the figures are difficult to compare.14 Last 
but not least, the professional terminology used by Hungarian stakeholders is 
inconsistent and there is no transparency as regards the evaluation methodology 
applied by officials. These two factors definitely do not make the situation any 
clearer.
 Despite the above-mentioned difficulties, the improvement can be regarded as 
quite spectacular during the reference period (2002-2003). Since the beginning, 
a whole administrative structure has been created consisting of more than 300 
projects of varying sizes. This structure has been coordinated by the MFA and 
implemented by either its implementing agency or various civil organisations.
 As far as recommendations are concerned, it is worth repeating the main find-
ings of a recent critical survey (Kiss 2007b: 2). A mechanism needs to be devel-
oped or adapted by which to measure aid effectiveness, which embraces all of 
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the elements of Hungarian DCP. In addition, ex ante and ex post project evalua-
tion, impact assessment must take place regularly, based on proper measurement 
mechanisms and adequate indicators. As for accountability, free access to ODA 
statistics, reports and project evaluations should be provided by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. Regarding the transparency of implementation of the Hungarian 
DCP activities, the MFA should facilitate an independent evaluation method in 
order to guarantee impartiality and objectivity.
 As long as the major elements and basic mechanisms of the Hungarian DCP are 
not (re)arranged in a transparent and professionally legitimate way, there can be no 
realistic expectations regarding raising the quality of development assistance.
 Notes
 While an attempt was made to write this paper objectively, the author is aware of the fact 
that she may have stressed a comfortable outsider academic point of view in her approach 
throughout the text. I am indebted to Judit Kiss, senior researcher at the Institute for 
World Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences for reviewing the manuscript 
and sharing her thoughts with me. I am also indebted to the colleagues with responsibil-
ity for international development cooperation within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to 
the director of HUN-IDA (the implementing agency) as well as to Annamária Kékessy 
(former head of the NGDO Association) for their written and verbal communications. 
Nevertheless, all of the conclusions drawn are my own.
 Emphasising ‘international’ when speaking about Hungarian development policy is cru-
cial (fejlesztéspolitika, in Hungarian) since it is widely understood by the Hungarian 
public to be a policy aimed at developing Hungary mainly on the basis of funding from 
various foreign sources within the EU budget. In this paper, development (cooperation) 
policy (DCP), development assistance and international development cooperation (IDC) 
are interchangeable. All of them refer to Hungary’s international development policy and 
existing relations and attitudes with the eligible developing countries. For more accurate 
definitions see Stokke : . 
 A comparison of the Hungarian and English versions of the MFA’s websites reveals dif-
ferences not only as regards detail but also the content of the message they intend to 
convey. Cf. ‘Foreign Policy’ in English (http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/en/
bal/) and Külpolitikánk (Our Foreign Policy) in Hungarian. The Hungarian „Külkapcso-
lati Stratégia” (Hungary’s External Relations’ Strategy) can be downloaded from: http://
www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/kulkapcsolati_strategia/hu_
kulkapcs_strat.htm. Hungary’s External Relations’ Strategy (in English) can be accessed 
at: http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/NR/rdonlyres/EFA-B--AC-
ACBBA//_kulkapcs_strat_en.pdf. 
 ‘The justifications given for a policy by the political authorities (government and Parlia-
ment) represent a primary source where the motives are to be found. There will always 
be hidden agendas and ideal (altruistic) arguments may camouflage selfish interests. The 
stated motives therefore have to be modified and contradicted by the policy implemented’ 
(Stokke : ).
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 The Ministry of Finance is responsible for financial contributions (such as membership 
fees) to be paid to multilateral organisations, matters related to debt cancellations and 
for coordinating statistical issues (how to record and report data) with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 The first IDC IC resolution (/) marks an exception (MFA a).
 Yearly average exchange rate (): , HUF/USD, source: Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
(MNB), Central Bank of Hungary (http://www.mnb.hu/engine.aspx?page=mnbhu_ar-
folyamok).
 The official annual report summarising Hungarian IDC activities in  pays some at-
tention to the relevant activities of the ministries in question, but not in a systematic way 
(KUM a: -). The latest annual report covering Hungarian IDC activities in  
had not been published by June , although it is said to contain some improvements in 
this regard. 
 Th e original list was deﬁ ned by the IDC Interdepartmental Committee (IDC IC) Resolu-
tion /. According to the annual report of  prepared by the MFA on behalf of 
the IDC IC, the position adopted by the IDC IC resulted in little change in the set of ‘part-
ner relations’ in February . In Hungarian, this was expressed as, ‘A NEFE TB . 
februári állásfoglalása szerint a magyar NEFE-hez az alábbi partnerrelációk tartoznak: ...’ 
(source: KÜM : -; Report on Hungarian Development Cooperation in  and pro-
posed activities to , in Hungarian. Title and quoted sentence were translated to English 
by the author – PB). In contrast to this, another document drawn up by the same MFA 
at the end of December  contains the original  list with three exceptions (China, 
Montenegro, PNA). More importance was attached to the four ‘strategic partner countries’ 
of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vietnam. Given that the Palestinian 
National Authority was temporarily re-categorised and China was dropped, the six ‘other 
partner countries’ are as follows: Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, 
Palestinian National Authority. Th e categories of ‘Least developed countries’ as well as that 
of the ‘international commitments’ remained the same (see: MFA : ) by . 
 It should be noted that comparative advantage is a technical term used in economics, which 
is often misused in official communications.
 Any Hungarian citizen can submit a request to the MFA on any topic and the questions 
raised have to be answered by the MFA. However, neither the general public nor research-
ers can ‘control’ the quality and content of the answers and the validity of data. So far, the 
Ministry has not made public any information on the kind of internal procedures with 
regard to internal checks on the effectiveness of the Ministry or any of its departments. 
 In the annual reports, figures that reflect DCP activities are provided in various cur-
rencies (HUF, US, euro) without indicating the exchange rates, which makes it almost 
impossible to summarise and/or analyse the figures. 
 Papers and documents prepared by HAND can be accessed via its website: http://www.
hand.org.hu/documents.shtml. 
 Th e author is grateful for the valuable comments of the anonymous reviewers. One of them 
emphasised that ’it is normal that such ﬁ gures are incomplete and somewhat unreliable at 
the early stages of development of a DCP.’ Since this general rule was accepted at the begin-
ning of st Century, it has also been ‘normal’ to make charts and tables to summarise data 
in a mathematically and ﬁ nancially correct way in annual DCP activity publications.
 Table  and table : the exchange rates during the years in question varied as follows:  
USD: - HUF,  euro: -. No information is available on the exact exchanges 
rates used by MFA.
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 Source: http://www.kulugyminiszterium.hu/kum/hu/bal/Kulpolitikank/Nemzetkozi_
fejlesztes/nemz_fejl/NEFE_TB.htm
 Source: http://en.hunida.hu/tematikus_oldalaink).
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Policy Coherence for Development of the Czech 
Republic
 Case Studies on Migration and Trade1
Ondřej Horký
The changes in the European population landscape that occurred when Bulgaria 
and Romania joined the European Union (EU) in 2007 has meant that one-fifth 
of all European citizens now live in a new member state (NMS).2 However, their 
contribution to the EU’s official development assistance (ODA) is approximately 
only 1.3 None of the new member states are members of the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC), and only four Central European countries 
are OECD members. Moreover, the NMS provide the major part of their ODA 
through the EU budget and other compulsory contributions to multilateral or-
ganisations. According to the 2010 target set by the European Council, the NMS 
must ‘strive to increase’ their ODA/GNI ratio to 0.17, but most of them are 
already off-track, and the latest arrivals only recently started to set up institutions 
to provide bilateral aid.
 However, these ‘re-emerging’ or just ‘emerging’ donor countries – depending 
on the amount of ideologically motivated aid they delivered during the Cold 
War – are not significantly less integrated into the global economy, politics and 
environment than the experienced donors. They are all trading partners of the 
developing countries and influence the EU trade and agricultural policies. Their 
populations are declining, and some of them have already opened their labour 
markets to qualified migrants from developing and transition countries. Con-
sciously or unconsciously, their external and internal policies are having an im-
pact on the developing world, which may not be coherent with the goals of their 
development policies. Indeed, the relative insignificance of their development 
programs should highlight the importance of the other policies which focus on 
the developing world and, hence, the problem of policy coherence for develop-
ment (PCD).
 In contrast to this assumption, PCD is the most institutionalised and im-
plemented concept by the most experienced donors, especially the Scandinavian 
countries (ECPDM/ICEI 2006). It seems that, in reality, the institution in charge 
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of development cooperation programs must obtain signiﬁ cant support and insti-
tutional recognition before a widely deﬁ ned development policy gains enough au-
thority to inﬂ uence the decisions made by other government bodies. Th e diﬀ erent 
levels of attention paid to PCD across the EU contrasts with the roughly similar 
impact of its members on the developing world and emphasises that policy coher-
ence is a social construct. In the area of development cooperation, the distinction 
between discourses and practices was shown to be particularly fruitful.4 In the case 
of PCD, the gap between oﬃ  cial discourses and policy implementation is prob-
ably even wider. Analysing the (mis)use of the concept by diverse political actors, 
their (mis)perceptions of it, and whether the concept is present or absent in their 
discourse can help us to understand its rationale and prospects.
 The Czech Republic, among the NMS, has a development policy that is clos-
est to the least active of the fifteen ‘old’ member states (OMS), located primarily 
in southern Europe. Its recent accession to the EU and the principles of PCD 
which originate mostly at European and multilateral levels make it a good case 
for a study of the effect of Europeanisation on national policies. The country 
recently started transforming its development cooperation processes and it is 
aligning them with the centralised institutional model common in most of the 
OMS, which includes a development agency. The Act on Development Coop-
eration has not yet been adopted. Even though the principle of policy coherence 
has already been included in the documents that define the current institutional 
framework and in the government’s program since 2006, it has not yet been im-
plemented. This leaves room for an examination of the positions in the policy 
area.
 The chapter starts by making a distinction between different types and levels 
of policy coherence in a section dedicated to the genealogy, definition, analysis 
and critique of the concept, which is used more as an operative tool than as a 
scientific concept. The second part of the paper introduces PCD in the context 
of the enlargement of the European Union. The third part presents the general 
institutional framework of the Czech development policy and the positions of the 
main actors. The last two parts are case studies on migration and trade. While it 
is extremely difficult to quantify the exact development impacts of external and 
internal Czech policies on the developing world, the interviews and question-
naires with their actors have shown that while there was a pragmatic motivation 
for the actors to get involved in the coherence process in the migration area, in 
the trade area, misunderstandings about the concept of development make PCD 
inoperative. The chapter concludes with a reflection on the potential of the con-
cept to politicise or depoliticise development issues in donor countries and on the 
nexus between strong development cooperation and coherence policies.
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 Th e Concept of Policy Coherence of Development: Deﬁ nition, 
Analysis and Criticism
The concept of PCD appeared in the early 1990s as one of the triple Cs in the 
Maastricht Treaty, the principles of aid coordination and complementarity being 
the other two. At the same time, it was also referred to in OECD DAC publica-
tions (1992). The fall of the Berlin Wall partly helped to de-ideologise develop-
ment cooperation, which led to its almost complete abandonment in the East 
and to its significant reduction in the West. On the one hand, the ideological 
motivations to support ruling governments in developing countries weakened 
and the focus on poverty reduction strengthened. On the other hand, lower 
budgets led the development agencies to concentrate more on the problem of 
aid efficiency.
 At the same time, global markets underwent the ongoing process of liberalisa-
tion and the apparent homogeneity of the former Third Word disappeared in fa-
vour of a multiplication of actors, especially those in the ‘emerging markets’. This 
constituted a serious challenge to governments in the North and to international 
organisations. Since then, the role of the private sector in financial relations be-
tween the North and the South has steadily increased and this has limited the 
relative impact of development cooperation. In spite of regional differences, the 
volume of foreign direct investments and remittances is growing much faster than 
aid (OECD 2005), and donors are confronted with the problem of complementa-
rity between aid and other financial flows (Cogneau and Lambert 2006). Moreo-
ver, the growing interconnectedness of the world in non-economic areas makes 
development cooperation relatively less important than in the past. Policy coher-
ence for development can be seen as a response to the weakening public governance 
of the global economy, whose growth did not lead to a substantive reduction of 
poverty and inequalities.5
 The concept of PCD is an invention of development policymakers rather than 
scholars, an operational rather than an analytical tool. Coherence as such is a 
relatively new concept in the social sciences as well (Hoebink 2004: 184). Pa-
blo Aguiar Molina observes that ‘[d]espite the [EU’s] numerous commitments to 
coherence, the concept, and its use in policy analysis, has rarely been examined’ 
(Aguiar Molina 2003: 235). The concept was mentioned for the first time (though 
indirectly) in Article 130 V of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and was only made 
explicit in primary official documents more than a decade later in a communica-
tion from the Commission (European Commission 2005a) and, later on, in the 
joint declaration ‘European Consensus on Development’ (European Commission 
2005b). Coherence and effectiveness are currently both regarded as objectives of 
the development policy of the European Union. Coherence would be monitored 
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biannually as of 2007, but its implementation has been very slow and has en-
countered numerous obstacles, especially from the Commission itself (Hoebink 
2004).6
 In theory, coherence should be respected at all levels: the national, regional 
and global. Developing countries ‘have the primary responsibility for conducting 
coherent and effective policies’ as well (European Commission 2005b: 9). The an-
nounced priority of PCD contrasts with the problem of translation: while Czech 
government documents use the word ‘koherence’, the official Czech translation 
is ‘soudržnost’, a word that is generally used to mean ‘cohesion’, thereby making 
PCD into a ‘cohesion of policies in the interest of development’ (Evropská komise 
2005) or even a ‘cohesion of policies beneficial to development’. The word would 
be translated as ‘consistency’ in some other languages, which only increases the 
confusion (Aguiar Molina 2003: 248).
 Moving from the translation problems to the deﬁ nition, Jacques Foster and 
Olav Stokke (1999) deﬁ ne coherence negatively as an absence of incoherencies (i.e., 
when ‘other policies deliberately or accidentally impair the eﬀ ects of development 
policy or run counter to its intentions’) in perhaps the most complete scholarly 
book on the subject. Th ey interpret incoherencies as inherent to any public policy 
and as a natural state of aﬀ airs. Th e growing global interdependence is causing 
the divergences between interests of private actors and the incoherencies to be-
come ampliﬁ ed. Politics reﬂ ects this diversity and tends to compartmentalise and 
create individual institutional cultures: diﬀ erent interests translate into diﬀ erent 
departments, which would then deal narrowly with separate aspects of a problem. 
Misunderstandings are therefore inevitable at the lowest hierarchical level.
 If divergent interests are the cause of incoherence, attaining coherence is possi-
ble only in the presence of a common objective. However, the condition of a com-
mon interest is insufficient. Coherence must trickle down to lower levels of policy 
implementation: from strategies to mechanisms and finally to the outcomes (For-
ster and Stokke 1999). Intentions at the top level are insufficient and specific 
capacities are required at the lower administrative levels. Guido Aschoff (2005) 
divides the levels of coherence differently into the levels of societal and political 
norms, political decision making, policy formulation and coordination, and the 
conceptual level. In both approaches, discursive and practical elements are mixed 
up, and the ideal state is clearly expressed as having a harmony between all of its 
levels. The OECD (2005) does not provide a more enlightening definition, but 
it does offer a classification of the tools needed to put coherence into practice: 
hard law, soft law, capacity building, surveillance, analysis (in order of hierar-
chy). Fieldwork in the Czech Republic suggests that awareness should be added 
as the least important element. However, awareness overlaps with intentional-
ity, which is another possible classification criterion, according to Paul Hoebink 
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(2004: 193). Incoherence may be intended when the government decides to prefer 
domestic interests in spite of being aware of the adverse effects. Unintended inco-
herence occurs when the results of different policies go unstudied. The advantage 
of awareness when it is interpreted as an additional level of coherence is its direct 
connection to a specific actor.
 An analysis by actors also seems to be handiest when multiple levels of govern-
ance are considered. Foster and Stokke (1999) proposed identifying coherence at 
four levels: coherence of aid policy, coherence of policies towards the South, coher-
ence of donor’s policies (and of aid policy in particular) towards the South, and 
coherence between donor and recipient policies. While this classiﬁ cation is the 
one most frequently cited, it seems a little confusing since the third point is just a 
special version of the second point. A classiﬁ cation by actors eases the analysis and 
enables the inclusion of the European dimension: internal coherence of the aid 
policy, intra-governmental coherence, inter-governmental coherence, multilateral-
bilateral coherence and donor-recipient coherence (ECPDM/ICEI 2006: 19). It 
allows a consideration of the actors as unitary or fragmented according to the level 
of analysis. Th is does not embrace all of the conﬁ gurations derived from Hoe-
bink’s (2004) ﬁ ve alternative classiﬁ cations, which focus mostly on the European 
level. However, the purpose of this paper is not to provide a better conceptual 
framework: both case studies at the national level concentrate chieﬂ y on the intra-
governmental policy and partly touch on the internal coherence of the aid policy.
 Even as an analytical tool, the focus of PCD makes it a normative concept. It 
is difficult to attain completely because one objective must be agreed upon by 
all of the concerned actors at all levels of policy implementation and all levels of 
governance simultaneously. However, the question is whether such a situation is 
desirable. Achieving policy coherence is feasible neither in theory nor in practice, 
except in a totalitarian regime. Therefore, ‘one-sided demands for coherence by 
development policy would not be devoid of moral and political arrogance’ (Ashoff 
2005: 26). Indeed, this is the general state of affairs. Assuming that the interests 
of the South are seldom identical to the interests of the North, a call for coherence 
of policies for development can be interpreted as a call for a shift toward objectives 
favourable to the developing world. Incoherence is a result of different interests 
within a government, which are legitimate in a democratic society by definition. 
It can also not be eliminated without limiting the other interests. Therefore, how-
ever technical its denomination may seem, policy coherence for something is based 
on the very idea of the greater legitimacy of the South’s interests and assumes 
ethical principles of altruism or justice, even if they can be masked.7
 Thus, the call for PCD seems to struggle against the depoliticisation of de-
velopment and the North’s concentration on aid transformed into a technical is-
sue instead of struggling with the structure of relations between the North and 
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the South. That is why, in practice, coherence is often reduced to the strategy of 
‘naming and shaming’ (Winters 2001: 22). The authors who base their coherence 
approach on the Rational Choice Theory, such as Winters, are necessarily critical 
of the concept:
Policymaking is about trade-oﬀ s, and except in terms of some particular 
trade-oﬀ , coherence is non-operational: it begs the critical question of 
what point to cohere about, i.e., where is ‘here’ in coherence. In practice, 
the only role for ‘coherence’ as an abstract term is rhetorical – as a means 
of signalling concern and persuading partners to pursue some course of 
action. I think we would be better oﬀ  without it (Winters 2001: 1).
Otherwise, coherence would be rational as long as the costs of its implementa-
tion are not greater than the savings. Foster and Stokke (1999) base the coherence 
framework on the Rational Choice Theory as well, without being as critical of 
the concept.
 Another critical approach to PCD may have been inspired by recent scrutiny 
of the development security nexus by David Chandler (2007).8 He starts by ob-
serving that the causal links between security and development are far from being 
clear. Over the last few years, the scope of both concepts has been enlarged so 
much that the nexus is reduced to wishful contradictory political recommenda-
tions. The unclear political framework between different agendas makes policy-
making difficult. The focus on coherence may signify a shift of interest from the 
incapacity of a single development or security agenda to solving the problems of 
development or security. As a result, the call for coherence is reduced to the focus 
on Northern policymaking processes instead of on the partners in the South, the 
targets of the development policy:
... the call for ‘coherence’, central to the security-development nexus, is a 
bureaucratic substitute for politically coherent policymaking, when the 
clarity of goals enables instrumental policymaking. Rather than justifying 
a policy in terms of goals, the desire for ‘coherence’ symbolises the lack of 
belief that any policy or project can be defended on the basis of policy out-
comes (Chandler 2007).
Again, coherence would serve as a patch on the widening gap between the goal of 
poverty reduction and reality in the South. But there is a difference between the 
coherence of development and the coherence between development and security. 
While the first type simply recommends a shift of interests to the South, the lat-
ter presents the risk of diluting them and retaining the attention in the North. 
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Moreover, the outcomes of higher coherence, translated into a shift in ‘structural’ 
policies such as trade and migration, are less visible than aid. Nonetheless, Chan-
dler’s analysis remains valuable in the sense that an exaggerated focus on the co-
herence implementation in the North may contribute to masking the real goal of 
the development policies. Contrary to their declared objective, ‘new partnerships’ 
and ‘policy coherence’ may lead to diluting responsibility between actors.9
 Coherence outcomes are extremely difficult to evaluate, and the preferences 
of the actors change over time. However, the approach of the Rational Choice 
Theory with the notion of transaction costs can only include ‘soft’ aspects with 
difficulty, despite appearing to be the most operational analysis tool of PCD. For 
the purpose of examining Czech policy coherence, the main asset of the current 
theories is that [1] PCD is always based on an implicit shift of interest to the 
advantage of the South; that [2] coherence can only be implemented if there is a 
common interest and understanding of the key concepts at the top level; and [3] 
it can be implemented only if there are capacities of analysis and policymaking at 
lower levels of administrative hierarchy.
 Coherence before and after EU Enlargement
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the post-communist countries almost imme-
diately lost their ideological reasons to continue their development coopera-
tion programs. The Central European and Baltic countries, formerly part of the 
USSR, still had some pragmatic reasons to remain active in the South, especially 
commercial ones but, in the general turmoil, their political representations fo-
cused on a ‘return to the West’. The NMSs had no colonial past, and their en-
gagement in Africa, East Asia or Latin America was seen as an imposition by 
the Soviet Union that was incompatible with the new line of democratic foreign 
policy. The OECD accession since 1995 was a strong stimulus for Central Euro-
pean countries to restart their development cooperation programs and therefore 
to mark their belonging to the West. At the same time, the carrot of EU accession 
as a means of weak conditionality was pushing them to restart the programs of 
development cooperation. From the beginning, development policy and, hence, 
policy coherence for development were driven by a mix of the logic of incentives 
and the logic of appropriateness, and the lack of domestic support let them be 
filled in by private interests, some of them dating from the communist era.10
 However, the first concerns regarding policy coherence for development in the 
region were shared by the OMS of the EU. In the atmosphere of uncertainty pre-
ceding each EU enlargement, especially the largest enlargement that took place 
in 2004, they saw EU accession as a potential obstacle to the development of the 
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South (Doucet 2001; Michaux 2002; Granell 2005). Most of the authors feared 
the redirecting of European trade, investment and aid flows away from the Medi-
terranean and Africa and toward the East. Millions of Africans in the West would 
be replaced by Eastern migrants.11
 Their reservations still seemed to be exaggerated in as late as 2008. Aguiar 
Molina (2003) gave a more balanced view of the problem. He forecast that the 
Eastern enlargement would be beneficial to the developing world economically 
for the simple reason that Central and Eastern Europe are not genuine competi-
tors of Sub-Saharan and North Africa. In fact, while the latter export mostly raw 
materials, the NMS are exporters of manufactured products. The EU accession 
facilitated access of African products to the enlarged common market. However, 
he admits that enlargement could have been politically harmful to the countries 
of the South. Since then, development has been moving up on the international 
political agenda, and it seems difficult to answer the question of to what extent 
it could be more beneficial to the South if the European Union was not occupied 
with the institutional and financial arrangement of the Eastern enlargement.
 In the period preceding the accession, Aguiar Molina offered two scenarios 
for the future development policies of the NMS. If nothing changed, they would 
be unable to increase their international development budgets and their territo-
rial preferences would be limited to their Eastern and Southeastern neighbours. 
The alternative forecast was an alignment to the ‘standard’ European develop-
ment policies with a substantive increase in quantity and quality of aid and a turn 
in the territorial priorities to Africa, Latin America and Asia from the ex-USSR 
and the Balkans. Four years after the accession, the Europeanisation processes 
seemed to have started, but the Eastern orientation is already deeply rooted in the 
foreign policies of the NMS. Unlike the British or French preference for Africa, 
the NMS’s development policies are divided between an orientation toward the 
least developed countries, foreign policy priorities and the know-how from the 
transition period.
 Whatever the territorial priorities may be, according to the European Council’s 
(2005) decision, the gap between the OMS and NMS will remain until at least 
2015. While the OMS must reach an ODA/GNI percentage of 0.51, the NMS 
only needs to ‘strive to increase’ their ODA/GNI percentage to 0.17 in 2010. In 
2015, the commitments will still diﬀ er: 0.7 compared to 0.33. Even though the 
portion of the NMS’s ODA of the EU’s total and of their GNI doubled from 0.5 
and 0.04 respectively between 2003 and 2006 (European Commission 2005c), 
the diﬀ erences remain wide and concern, to a lesser extent, their contributions to 
the European Development Fund (EDF). For example, while the Czech Republic’s 
share in the total population of the EU is approximately 2, the Czech contribu-
tion to the 10th EDF will only be 0.51 (Vláda České republiky 2007b). In any 
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case, from an institutional point of view, the EU decision mechanisms do not seem 
to suﬀ er from the burden of 12 NMSs participating in the process of deﬁ ning 
European development policy. Th eir overall role is limited and there are no major 
points of discontentment that need to be managed by the European institutions. 
Th e development policy is a living example of a ‘double speed’ Europe.
 However, in terms of policy coherence, drawing a line between the new and 
‘old’ member states along the former Iron Curtain would be too simplistic. A 
study carried out by ECPDM/ICEI (2006) divides EU member countries into 
three groups according to the extent to which they incorporated concerns for co-
herence into their development policies: the first group does not mention coher-
ence in their policy guidelines at all; the second group refers to coherence without 
putting it into action according to procedures; the third group uses institutional 
mechanisms to enact coherence. The countries are divided as follows:
Table 1 Institutional mechanisms and implementation of policy coherence for the 
development of the EU member states
Reference Implementation NMS OMS
NO NO
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Hungary
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta
Romania
Slovenia
YES NO
Czech Republic
Estonia
Poland
Slovakia
Austria
Belgium
France
Italy
Greece
Portugal
Spain
YES YES
Denmark
Finland
Germany
Ireland
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Sweden
United Kingdom
Source: After ECPDM/ICEI 2006: 27-28
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On the one hand, the NMS belong to the group of countries that lacks both ref-
erences to coherence in official documents and its implementation. On the other 
hand, all EU countries with an ODA/GNI ratio larger than 0.7 make up a part 
of the most advanced group. Nevertheless, there is some overlapping between the 
NMS and OMS in the middle group, where PCD is institutionalised but unim-
plemented. This confirms the assumption expressed in the introduction, which 
suggests that the attention paid to policy coherence goes hand in hand with the 
importance of the development cooperation agenda. The study comments on this 
situation by stating that ‘[p]aradoxically, achieving policy coherence for develop-
ment requires a carefully defined, consolidated and specific aid policy’ (ECPDM/
ICEI 2006: 20).
 European countries do not all follow the exact same linear process, and the 
PCD agenda is relatively advanced in the NMS compared to aid delivery be-
cause they have to follow current trends in development policy, which are pro-
moted at international and European levels. The external pressure on the NMS 
remains the main stimulus for the promotion of their development policy. How-
ever, according to the European Council’s (2005) decision, which weakened a 
more binding proposition of the Commission to the NMS, the European Union 
does not consider development policy to be an agenda in which the same crite-
ria as those of other EU policies should apply and suggests that, in spite of the 
large gap between the NMS and most of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the 
EU still perceives the newcomers as ‘developing’ countries. As a result, the weak 
conditionality on development aid budgets is reflected in the low attention paid 
to PCD.12
 Th e Czech Institutional Framework and the Positions of the 
Main Actors
This section provides a general picture of the institutional framework for pro-
moting PCD at national level in the Czech Republic. After 1990, Czech develop-
ment cooperation was institutionally regulated by two principal documents. The 
1995 decision by the Czech government meant that the country ‘recognises the 
principle of solidarity between people and accepts its share of the responsibility 
for resolving global problems’. An ‘adequate part in providing development aid’ is 
‘one expression of this attitude’, and it is ‘provided in accordance with the interests 
and needs of the Czech Republic and in conformity with the attitudes of the 
international community anchored in the resolutions of the United Nations and 
of the OECD’ (Vláda České republiky 1995). A principle of positive conditional-
ity is stated in favour of the countries, which undertake democratic reforms and 
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protect human rights. There is no reference to policy coherence in the 1995 docu-
ment, which understands aid (but still not cooperation) very narrowly.
 In the context of EU accession, a new decision was adopted in March 2004 
(Vláda České republiky 2004). ‘International development cooperation (IDC)’ 
became ‘an integral part’ of Czech foreign policy. IDC represents a ‘self-contained 
development policy’, but poverty reduction is only one of its objectives. Its list 
of objectives includes ‘economic and industrial development, gradual integration 
of partner countries into the world economy, development of agriculture, devel-
opment and reinforcement of democracy, human rights and good governance, 
rule of law, migration management, sustainable development with emphasis on 
its environmental component and post-conflict resolution.’ They are defined so 
widely that any policy evaluation becomes almost impossible. Links between any 
of these goals are not direct, and they may be incompatible in some cases. Accord-
ing to the last available legal proposal, poverty reduction will be highlighted in 
forthcoming legislation as the principal goal of Czech development cooperation.
 The government decision makes three explicit references to PCD. First, it 
claims that ‘[i]n accordance with the international principle of policy coherence 
for development, the Czech Republic takes into account objectives and standards 
of IDC when implementing other policies, which can influence partner coun-
tries.’ Second, the ‘MFA, in cooperation with other ministries concerned, takes 
part in the definition of the EU policies in relation to developing countries while 
respecting the key principles of coherence, coordination and complementarity 
and their harmonisation in relations to the developing world.’ And finally, ‘secto-
ral priorities of IDC are defined on the basis of the comparative advantages of the 
Czech Republic and in accordance with principles of coherence, complementarity 
and coordination with other donor countries’. PCD is mentioned explicitly as a 
concept in regard to the OECD and the EU. Moreover, the second 2006 coalition 
agreement and government program declaration includes a request that the for-
eign trade liberalisation and Common Agriculture Policy do not harm developing 
countries.
 These findings contrast with the ECPDM/ICEI research report’s conclusion:
Promoting coherence for development is not clearly spelled out as one of 
the Czech Republic’s objectives; rather, policy coherence seems to be un-
derstood as consistency of development activities with foreign policy objec-
tives and with other trade-related interests (ECPDM/ICEI 2006: 29).
This conclusion is too hasty since it does not take into account by whom policy co-
herence is understood. The government decisions are acknowledged by the pro-
posal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), whose objective has always been 
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to align the Czech Republic with the development policies of the experienced 
donors in a situation where the implementation of the development cooperation 
programs would be dispersed between other ministries with different visions of 
reality.13
 The MFA could promote PCD within the Inter-ministerial Commission, but 
even if it were among its priorities, its negotiating power would be too limited. 
The Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid was fi-
nally founded in August 2003, and the Commission almost never met at Deputy 
Ministerial level because of the low priority of the development agenda. In the 
end, only practical matters related to aid were put on the Commission’s agenda. 
Thus far, the mechanisms of commenting on proposals within the inter-ministe-
rial proceedings have not been used to promote PCD either. We conclude that, 
while there is a soft law and sufficient institutional arrangements for the MFA to 
promote PCD, they are not used.14
 The department sees PCD at an inter-ministerial level as a natural issue, which 
should be, however, put on the agenda once the transformation of the bilateral aid 
system is achieved. This view is shared by its Director, who ‘would not start’ with 
the question of coherence but would put it ‘at the end for a [more] complete pic-
ture’. Her colleague is the only interviewee to raise the issue spontaneously. PCD 
is considered ‘too little perceived and discussed’ and as a ‘very difficult’ topic even 
among experienced donors. Promoting PCD will be easier in the future because 
Czech development policy is subject to a slow positive process of emancipation 
from the foreign policy. This liberation is not seen as an easy task among the ad-
vanced donors either.
 Other European donor countries remain points of reference, but that does not 
mean that everything ‘comes from Brussels’. Actually, the Czech Republic resisted 
EU preferences by putting a strong accent on Eastern and Southeastern Europe 
and expressing its scepticism about general budget support.15 The department 
underlines two dimensions of the PCD concept: it is trying to ‘educate’ other min-
istries as well as a wider public, and it acknowledges the idea of an implicit shift 
towards the interests of the South. Actually, there is a ‘level where the interest of 
one’s own country must retreat before the interest of the developing world’, which 
is ‘very, very difficult’. It does not readily agree with the ‘name and shame’ method 
because it wants to ‘attract, not discourage’ the other actors.
 In 2008, along with the transformation of the development system and the 
creation of the Czech Development Agency, a new Council on International De-
velopment Cooperation was also created to replace the Inter-ministerial Com-
mission, seven years after the provision of the Council in the 2001 development 
strategy (Vláda České republiky 2002). The department expects the new inter-
ministerial advisory body to ‘crystallise’ the issue. Indeed, promoting PCD is one 
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of the statute’s features, which was acknowledged by government decree. In fact, 
with the expected reduction of priority sectors, some of the ministries involved 
risk to lose budgets on development projects within a few years. Counting on 
PCD, which they are aware of from the European or multilateral level within 
their own field of expertise, may become the only way to mark their position in 
the development arena. Of course, the risk of them eventually losing attention to 
PCD is quite likely as well, but the better institutionalisation of development co-
operation and the progressive transfer of the bilateral cooperation agenda to the 
Czech Development Agency make the Council on International Development 
Cooperation a better potential forum for discussion of conceptual problems, in-
cluding policy coherence, when compared to the Inter-ministerial Commission.
 The Department for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid is part 
of the MFA and it is interesting to compare its perception of PCD to that of the 
Development Centre, which was transformed into the Czech Development Agen-
cy in the beginning of 2008. The Development Centre, an external expert body 
to the MFA and the result of a UNDP project, had a priority to reduce poverty, 
which was not limited by other departments within the MFA and by other in-
stitutional constraints that a ministry usually faces. Its Director considers policy 
coherence something that ‘comes from the Committees in Brussels’. However, he 
was unaware of any substantial activity in the field. He thought that ‘power rela-
tions are somewhere else’, and that the idea of the MFA influencing the decisions 
of another ministry is ‘disconnected from reality’. According to him, this makes 
the problem of coherence between the foreign and development policy unimpor-
tant. The ministry’s perception of PCD is more sceptical compared to that of the 
MFA.16
 The role of Czech civil society is substantial but insufficient, as in the case of 
general public awareness of development issues. The MFA lacks the proper ca-
pacities to carry out analysis and organise conferences and seminars. Therefore, 
many events are literally outsourced to non-governmental development organisa-
tions (NGDOs) because universities and research institutes are not adequately 
equipped to offer consultancy services. However, the civil society players lack 
political legitimacy and this undermines their criticism of the government. Par-
liament, or at least the Chamber of Deputies, a common agent of change in policy 
coherence issues in experienced donor countries, has never tackled the issue. In-
stitutionally, mainstreaming the development agenda in parliament through the 
envisaged creation of a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs may 
present an opportunity to raise policy coherence issues.17
 In October 2006, the topic of PCD was tackled by the globalisation and de-
velopment think tank Glopolis in a conference organised at, and in cooperation 
with, the Senate. In the end, no MPs participated in the conference except during 
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the opening speeches. A policy brief was issued to mark the occasion. It focuses on 
the ‘aid and trade’ issue and testiﬁ es to the diverging approaches of the MFA and 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT). Policy coherence is interpreted both 
negatively and positively, using ‘not undermining’ and ‘synergy’ expressions (Glop-
olis 2006: 2). Th e complaint is that there are no capacities for promoting coherence 
and that intergovernmental mechanisms are unused. Special attention is paid to 
the forthcoming Act on IDC and the need for further analysis at the government 
and academic levels. It proposes the inclusion of non-trade NGOs in the Sector 
Group for International Trade at the MIT, which deﬁ nes the position that will 
be defended by the European Commission. Th e conference did not produce any 
noticeable results and, two years later, Glopolis organised a seminar on the topic 
of coherence between development and agricultural policy in December 2007. Th e 
President of the NGDO platform FoRS – the Czech Forum for Development 
Cooperation – believes that the NGDOs as a whole have to ‘grow up’ and consider 
the issue. At the same time, he believes that his own NGDO People in Need, the 
most important development, humanitarian and human rights organisation in the 
Czech Republic lacks capacities and is already ‘losing its breath’ in this protracted 
process of advocating reforms to a narrowly deﬁ ned development policy.
 Coherence problems are indirectly part of the claims made by ‘Czechia against 
Poverty’, the Czech campaign of the Global Call against Poverty (Česko proti 
chudobě 2007)18. This campaign refers to ten points that the campaign hopes 
will increase the volume of aid, its poverty reduction impact and gender-sensi-
tivity; will equalise donor-recipient relations, encourage liberalisation of trade 
and services, cut agricultural subsidies and debt relief, increase corporate social 
responsibility and stop global warming. Even though other coherence issues such 
as human rights, immigration and arms exports are not addressed, the campaign 
focuses on all three types of incoherencies in Czech foreign policies as distin-
guished by Forster and Stokke (1999). Unfortunately, its impact on public aware-
ness seems to have been very limited.
 In fact, Czech public opinion seems to be unaware of the incoherencies at play. 
Only 15 of the respondents were able to actually name the campaign ‘Czechia 
against Poverty’ in the second public opinion survey on the subject of Czech de-
velopment cooperation in November 2006. Given that two of the other answers 
(‘Help for needy people’ and ‘Any of us can help’) were chosen by 12 and 11 of 
the respondents respectively, the number of people who were actually aware of 
the campaign and a forteriori its claims was fairly negligible (SC&C 2006: 27). 
The problem is discussed in much greater depth in Switzerland, an experienced 
donor country, despite severe incoherencies, and their survey is not blind to co-
herence (GFS Bern 2004). While 87 of voters completely agree or tend to agree 
with restricting arms exports to developing countries, 76 support fair trade and 
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72 support importations from the South as such (GFS Bern 2004: 7). In a sur-
vey conducted in Sweden, 63 of respondents also agreed that trade conditions 
would reduce world poverty, followed by 62 who agreed that this could be done 
through increased peace and security, while 50 thought that it could be done 
through debt reduction (OECD 2005: 68). No comparable data was collected for 
the Czech Republic.
 While globalisation is seen as an important factor in advanced donor coun-
tries, this aspect is almost totally absent from the Czech survey with 49 of the 
Czech respondents thinking that aid can reduce the risk of terrorist attacks, and 
67 thinking that it can reduce immigration, but trade issues were not included 
(SC&C 2006: 20-21). Perhaps this can be linked to an overall awareness of de-
velopment issues: only 36 of the Swiss claim that they are not appropriately in-
formed about the problems of developing countries. This figure is very much the 
opposite of the Czech survey results, where 79 of the respondents said they do 
not have enough information about Czech assistance to poor countries (SC&C 
2006: 21). The most positive message on the survey regarding Czech public opin-
ion is that 82 of the respondents think that aid should go where it is needed and 
not to countries that have good relations with the Czech Republic (SC&C 2006: 
17). The respondents also do not think that immediate benefits for the Czech Re-
public are necessary prerequisite to aid. An altruistic perception of development 
cooperation suggests that, if the public was more aware of the policy incoheren-
cies, it might more readily support the efforts in promoting PCD.
 There has been no specific research in academic circle on Czech policy coher-
ence. Several articles refer to EU coherence, and a conference paper by Němečková 
(2006) deals with the issue as a whole from the European perspective. Other rel-
evant actors and their positions or non-positions are analysed in the following 
case studies on migration and trade in relation to development.
 Migration and Development: Towards Policy Coherence 
through Pragmatism?
The narrowing of differences in economic output and living standards between 
NMS and OMS has consequently led to the disappearance of the differences be-
tween their labour markets. The demographic structure of the post-communist 
countries has not changed all that much since 1989. Their populations are ageing 
and they no longer engage in unqualified jobs. Some qualified workers, especially 
the Poles, often emigrate to the OMS, but the trend that the NMSs are becoming 
immigration countries is clear. In the Czech Republic, the 4 share of foreigners 
is still lower than in the average for the OMS but there is a clear trend towards 
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harmonisation of immigration patterns in numbers, types and policies between 
the Czech Republic and the OMS. The difference lies mainly in the geographi-
cal distribution of the countries of origin. Immigrants to the OMS arrive mostly 
from the former European countries in the South, while the immigrants who end 
up in the NMS come mostly from the East.19 The majority of the 400,000 immi-
grants in the Czech Republic are mainly Ukrainian, Slovak, Vietnamese, Polish 
and Russian. When illegal migrants are included, the total estimated number 
varies from an additional 30,000 to 300,000 (Drbohlav et al. 2005). Therefore, 
the impact of Czech policies related to migration may have a serious impact on 
the development of the countries of origin.
 Despite the growing research studies on the links between migration and 
development, an overall assessment has not yet been established (OECD De-
velopment Centre 2007). On the one hand, developing countries invest in the 
expensive and special education of migrants, who have left their homelands and 
cannot contribute to the improvement of the livelihoods of the local population, 
especially in the field of health and education. On the other hand, the migrant 
workers from developing countries send part of their earnings back home in the 
form of remittances, which contribute to the development of their regions of 
origin. They may also end up returning to their lands of origin or periodically cir-
culate between both countries and use the newly acquired capital and skills from 
the destination countries back in their homeland. The final effect is a combina-
tion of both phenomena, but there seems to be a consensus that the immigration 
of non-skilled workers is beneficial to both developing countries and destination 
countries, but the immigration of skilled workers is detrimental to both of them 
(see Portes 2006).
 The European Commission started to focus special attention on coherence 
between development and migration in 2005. It identified remittances, diasporas, 
brain drains and knowledge circulation as the main areas that needed to be ad-
dressed (European Commission 2005d). The topic has been explored in more 
detail recently along with climate change and research. The paper concentrates 
on brain drain and brain waste and still considers circular migration as a solution 
to the problem (European Commission 2008).20 Unfortunately, it is incompatible 
with the growing number of migrants in the Czech Republic and contradictory to 
the declared interests of bridging the population gap.
 It is almost impossible to estimate the total value of remittances and, hence, 
what the final effect of migration will be because of a general lack of reliable 
data. According to World Bank estimates, the amount of official outward remit-
tances from the Czech Republic in 2006 is quite important: US$ 2.8 billion. Of 
this amount, US$ 186 million are in the form of worker’s remittances, and US$ 3 
million are in the form of migrants’ transfers (Ratha et al. 2007). The bilateral 
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estimates record a total of US$ 460 million and, among developing nations, only 
Vietnam with 2.6 and Serbia with 1.6 exceed the one percent threshold (Ratha 
and Shaw 2007, own calculations). Ukraine’s remittances represent only 0.8 or 
US$ 3.7 million annually, which seems like a sizeable underestimation compared 
to the high number of Ukrainian long-term and seasonal workers in the Czech 
Republic.
 The ‘brain drain’ effect can be judged by the number of migrants with higher 
education. Their share may serve as an approximate criterion of the costs and 
benefits for the developing world. Of the 127,000 foreigners who were registered 
in 2006 as employed in the Czech Republic, only 9 had a university degree or 
a Ph.D., and only 15 had attained education levels above what was required for 
their particular job descriptions (Horáková 2007: 44-45). Of course, if illegal 
and self-employed migrants were included, the education gap and ‘brain waste’ 
would be even greater, but the Czech Republic has yet to become a desired desti-
nation for highly qualified migrants.21 The government is seeking to change this 
situation. Demographic forecasts for the Czech population has led to a political 
consensus on the necessity to attract migrants to fill the population gap and to 
keep the ratio of contributors to and benefactors of social security as high as 
possible. Without new migrants, the Czech population will decrease from 10 to 
8 million by 2065. Migrants to the Czech Republic need to have their integration 
into Czech society facilitated, and thus, the Czech Republic is currently seeking 
to attract young, highly educated people from the general region.
 In 2003, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs directed the Pilot Project 
of Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers, a project of ‘directed migration’, 
which allows qualified foreign workers and their families to obtain permission 
for permanent residence in 2.5 instead of 5 years. By the end of March 2007, only 
153 foreigners had obtained this ‘green card’ (Ministerstvo práce a sociálních věcí 
České republiky 2007) but, by the end of April 2007, 602 new applicants were 
taking part in the program (Stejskalová 2007) and another 888 by the end of the 
2007, or 1882 applicant, if their family members are included (Schroth 2007). The 
three priority countries of Czech development cooperation in Europe were part 
of this project: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, and Serbia and Montenegro.22 
However, the most successful countries of origin are Ukraine, Bulgaria, Belarus 
and Russia. India and Canada have been successful only to a limited degree. The 
professional status of the various migrant workers varies, but more than two-
thirds of them have university educations. Moreover, the private sector has been 
lobbying for a simplification of the rules and regulations.23
 The ministry does not seem to have taken coherence problems all that seri-
ously. For instance, the ‘brain drain’ is never mentioned except in reference to the 
foreign graduates of Czech universities who were awarded scholarships in the 
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Czech Republic within the development cooperation programs. Comments by 
other ministries ‘from the security and foreign policy point of view’ (and hence 
not from a development point of view) should have already been included in the 
final document, a government decree. The ministry manages to avoid the ‘brain 
drain’ issue emphasising the positive aspects of migration. It only reports ‘gener-
ally’ positive feedback that comes in from the countries of origin and it continues 
to insist that their policies have been a success and have prevented potentially 
illegal migrants from becoming the victims of criminal syndicates.
 An information prospectus, co-edited with the International Organization 
for Migration, presents migration principally as beneficial to development, while 
‘brain drain’ is considered a minor problem, which affects small countries or is 
outweighed by the circulation of knowledge, i.e., the temporal or periodic mi-
gration of skilled workers (Stojanov and Novosák 2007). Given that the entire 
existence of the program is legitimised by the need for new citizens to settle in 
the Czech Republic and fill the population gap, the focus on ‘brain circulation’, 
not uncommon in the discourse of the European Commission since it began is-
suing the ‘blue cards’ during the last few years, is not convincing. For example, the 
majority of second-generation Vietnamese migrants are unwilling to return to 
Vietnam, preferring to remain in the West.
 Furthermore, the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs must face the serious 
problem of intra-ministerial coherence. In an earlier questionnaire, the Depart-
ment of International Relations, which is responsible for the development coop-
eration programs in the social sector, defined PCD in precise terms and acknowl-
edged that the Czech Republic was not coherent in terms of the developing world 
‘for obvious reasons’. While specific sectors, crosscutting issues and European 
Commission initiatives have been cited, potential incoherence within the Home 
Ministry has not.
 Other incoherencies are related to education. In 2007, the Ministry of Educa-
tion, Youth and Sports was in charge of a development project at the University 
of Kishinev, Moldova. The purpose of the project was to improve the teaching 
conditions and align the study programs to EU standards. At the same time, the 
ministry was responsible for scholarships awarded to students from developing 
countries, including Moldova. While the scholarships are an important part of 
the aid package, costing 140 million CZK (5.6 million euros) a year (18 of all 
bilateral projects in 2008), the development outcomes have been very modest.
 According to an internal document from the MFA, only 29 of 426 students 
from developing countries finished their studies in the period from 2003 to 2006. 
(Bartošová 2007) While almost half the students from Sub-Saharan Africa or 
Northern Africa and the Middle East graduated, Latin American and Asian stu-
dents were less successful, and only 5 of students from Eastern and Southeast-
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ern Europe finished their studies. All of the nine Moldovan and 13 Ukrainian stu-
dents, for whom the Czech language should not have posed too many problems, 
failed and did not continue their studies at their own expense after their scholar-
ships ended. According to the Headquarters of Foreigners and Border Police at 
the Ministry of the Interior, 15 of those who were supposed to graduate in 2005 
ended up paying their own tuition (Bartošová 2006). Half of them had already 
left before 2005 but, most probably, some of the group left the Czech Republic for 
another developed country.
 A study of the scholarships for foreign students commissioned by the MFA, 
Jelínek, Desseiová and Náprstek (2004: 22), former students estimated the re-
turn rate at between 50 and 80. This percentage is even lower for the African 
students. Given the fact that not all of the students found employment in their 
country of origin, some of the students could not apply their educations and 
some chose subjects not relevant to a developing country, which meant that the 
development impact of the scholarships was very low.24 The special OECD DAC 
(2007a) review recommended that the Czech Embassies abroad unlink the schol-
arships from development objectives and highlighted ‘questionable’ development 
objectives and ‘potential negative effects of brain drain’ as a way of improving the 
follow-up. The figures above match those of the pre-reform period.
 Since 2008, the number of scholarships has been reduced from 250 to 130, 
countries where the return rate was higher were kept on the list, the option of 
studying in English was introduced and shorter stays were also permitted (Vláda 
České republiky 2007a). The reform, funded by the ODA, still failed to advance 
far enough to actually reverse the ‘brain drain’. The universities were unable to 
set up new academic English-language programs and students were not legally 
bound to return to their countries of origin.
 The principal governmental body in charge of migration, the Ministry of the In-
terior, has been involved in Czech development cooperation since the mid-1990s. 
During the war in the former Yugoslavia, it acquired expertise in offering assist-
ance to refugees – as did many humanitarian or ad hoc NGOs, which changed 
their focus on development to meet the urgent needs of the affected population. 
Consequently, the reference to the prevention of migration as a goal of Czech 
development cooperation, introduced in a 1995 government decision, would have 
been considered progressive even in an experienced donor country.
 The Ministry’s Department of Asylum and Migration Policy is responsible 
for assistance to refugees and for development cooperation projects, which is all 
considered part of the ODA’s functions. The department took the initiative itself 
of implementing the international migration and development agenda, produced 
a paper and organised a round table on migration and development in early 2007, 
which was participated in by the ministries and NGOs involved. An interviewee 
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from the department considered the fact that ‘people know about coherence’ as a 
success in its own right. However, the rationale behind this action was not purely 
idealistic, but a way for the ministry to affirm its position in the development 
constituency and remain an important actor after the planned reduction of the 
number of priority sectors. The Ministry was quite disappointed when the MFA 
showed reluctance to follow the migration and development agenda because of 
the energy it had spent on the centralisation of the system of bilateral aid and on 
the draft of the Act on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid.
 The Department of Asylum and Migration Policy does not regard the projects 
of migration prevention, run specifically by People in Need and the International 
Organization for Migration, as being truly capable of stopping or limiting mi-
gration. Migration appeared to be a natural phenomenon that was going to be 
extremely difficult to regulate. The geographical priorities of the Ministry are 
clearly situated in the East, which is considered to be the biggest security threat. 
Its chief representative is sceptical about the effects that it may have on poverty 
and points to various Spanish projects in Africa. She declared: ‘Let us be realistic. 
Nobody is altruistic in this matter’. She went on to argue that ‘Migration does 
not resolve development, and development does not resolve migration either’. The 
Ministry considers the Pilot Project of Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers 
to be a form of ‘brain drain’, and noted that it was going to lodge a protest with the 
Inter-ministerial Commission.25 At the same time, the MFA was not happy with 
the emphasis placed on illegal migration and, thus, security aspects are regarded 
as being more important than poverty reduction efforts.
 The ministry motivations are openly pragmatic: the projects should limit il-
legal migration because extraditions are costly and illegal migrants are vulnerable 
to criminal behaviour. The department also uses its development cooperation 
projects as a tool to collect information on migration pressures in the countries of 
origin. Even though its approach to Czech development cooperation is pragmatic 
in the sense that it understands international development as a tool for preserv-
ing the security of the country, it advocates policy coherence because implement-
ing the agenda from European and multinational fora may help it to defend its 
threatened position within Czech development cooperation.
 The Ministry of Finance occupies a special position within the development 
cooperation system. Systematically, it reduces the ODA budget proposal made by 
the MFA to reach the 0.17 ODA/GNI target for 2010, based on the argument 
that Czech public financing is currently undergoing reform. There is neither the 
political will at the government level nor sufficient pressure on the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Deputies to change it. Along with some 
technical assistance, the Ministry of Finance should be responsible for easing 
and monitoring the remittances of foreign workers who are employed or self-
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employed in the Czech Republic. Most of these workers come from European and 
Central Asian developing countries, where remittances have increased rapidly. 
For example, remittances represent one-third of Moldova’s GDP and are essential 
for the development of this poorest of European countries (Ratha et al. 2007).26
 Until now, the ministry has not undertaken any action in the field, but it did 
submit a project proposal to the World Bank on the remittances issue. It im-
plemented a World Bank project on the evaluations of the Czech development 
cooperation in 2008 and its attention shifted from the narrow topic of develop-
ment aid to a wider development policy.27 However, the change still seems fresh 
and induced by external actors. A questionnaire sent to the same civil servant 
two months earlier included a question on the ministry’s perception of policy co-
herence. Environment, trade, agriculture and security were spontaneously men-
tioned but, as in the preceding case, neither the ministry’s own agenda nor migra-
tion issues featured.
 Only a few NGDOs are active in the field of migration. Much like the domi-
nant People in Need organisation in the area of human rights, the role of the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) is quite ambiguous. This ‘hybrid’ 
non-UN intergovernmental organisation implements development projects on 
illegal migration prevention for the Ministry of the Interior and, at the same time, 
collaborates with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs on the Pilot Project 
of Active Selection of Qualified Foreign Workers. It therefore participates in the 
‘brain drain’ to the Czech Republic as well. The Czech NGOs are generally more 
dependent on public finance and, consequently, less critical than their Western 
neighbours, which, in this specific case, weakens the IOM’s position regarding 
the promotion of PCD.
 To conclude this case on migration and development, it needs to be pointed 
out that Czech policies are not coherent since they support ‘brain drain’ through 
the program of selective migration and scholarships for students from developing 
countries. In this latter case, financial support comes from the ODA. No reliable 
data is available but, at least in the case of the scholarships, the negative ‘brain 
drain’ effect seems to outweigh the positive results of remittances, and it also 
promises to increase in the near future. Awareness of the coherence problems is 
not that high since criteria other than development make the assessment of the 
respective programs appear positive. However, the centralisation of Czech co-
operation and the risk of losing its influence caused the Ministry of the Interior 
to table the agenda, as it did during the first meeting of the newly established 
Council on Development Cooperation. The pressure from external actors is im-
portant, but the case of migration and development shows that the PCD can be 
promoted by the Ministry for pragmatic reasons, which are not necessarily based 
on development objectives.
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 Trade and Development: Mixing Apples and Oranges?
While there seems to be at least some consensus on what development means in 
the migration issue area, this is not the case for trade. The Ministry of Industry 
and Trade (MIT) is responsible for the formulation of the trade policies that will 
be promoted at the European level and controls the most important aspect of the 
bilateral development cooperation, about 150m CZK (6 million euros) (Rozvo-
jové středisko 2007). In this case study, I concentrate less on the impact of the 
Czech/EU trade policies on the developing world than on the perceptions of the 
actors involved and on trade-related policies, whose development impact is not 
generally overlooked.
 An interview with a Czech representative at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in Geneva, who was appointed by the MIT and not by the MFA, re-
vealed a serious conceptual incompatibility with the approach used by interna-
tional development organisations and agencies. The semi-structured interview 
cannot pretend to be representative, but it offers a strong internal consistency. 
Furthermore, the incompatibility of opinions has been underlined by other state-
ments by the MIT representatives and by the Director of the Department of 
Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid at the MFA, with the latter 
claiming that the difficulty of promoting PCD is also due to the fact that the 
parties involved ‘do not think of the same thing when they hear the term “co-
herence”.’28 Although I admit that the trouble is rooted more deeply in the term 
‘development’, she pointed out that this incoherence should not be interpreted as 
a problem of ‘communication’ but of ‘understanding’, which prevents PCD from 
being implemented.
 Th e MIT representative to the WTO interprets coherence on two levels – with-
in the development policy and between diﬀ erent government policies – and this is 
perfectly compatible with PCD as promoted by the OECD or EU. He considers 
Czech policies to be implicitly coherent because they are a result of a government’s 
decision, which takes into account comments made by other ministries. He rec-
ognises, however, that an explicit PCD implementation is non-existent. Opinions 
start to diverge when development cooperation is deﬁ ned. He seems to consider all 
‘soft’ projects, for example in the social, health and education sectors, as being part 
of humanitarian aid and ineﬀ ective, especially in Africa29. Th e MIT representative 
believes the motivations of the actors are necessarily pragmatic, so the Czech Re-
public should not be naïve and use aid to strengthen bilateral relations:
I think that the point of bilateral aid should be to open the way to trade or 
perhaps to help exporters to take hold [in developing countries] or to con-
vince them of our good services.
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It is quite natural then that he considers Czech aid to be ‘disconnected’ from trade 
policy. He never used the word ‘poverty’ and development is simply identified 
with trade. When asked specifically about the subject, he noted that the incoher-
ence between the EU agricultural subventions and the Czech projects in the Af-
rican agricultural sector would be like ‘mixing apples and oranges’ because, when 
seen from the point of view of the WTO, the subventions are perfectly legal and 
legitimate within the WTO system.30 The problem is Africa, which lacks ‘basic 
business instincts’ when compared to China, for example. The problem of African 
cotton would have to do with its low quality, not in subventions to US farmers. 
When eventually he was asked for his definition of development, his immedi-
ate reaction was ‘development of what?’ He then went on to define development 
in a mercantilist way as the ability of a national economy to export and reduce 
its dependence on imports. Aid for trade is thus a ‘serious attempt at coherence 
between policies, which will contribute to the development of the countries in 
the trade area’. If development is identified with trade, then PCD becomes ‘policy 
coherence for trade’.31
 A softer perception of pro-trade coherence appeared in an interview with a 
representative from the Confederation of Industry and Trade, who contributed to 
the foundation of the Platform of the Business Sector for International Develop-
ment Cooperation, which has been active since January 2008. She understood 
PCD in its developmental meaning: the Czech Republic, she observed, has not 
advanced very far in this agenda, and it was still ‘too soon’ to implement it. How-
ever, the conversation quickly turned to the coherence of trade and a foreign pol-
icy, pointing to the example of Cuba under the US embargo and ‘our economic 
interests’, meaning the Czech Republic’s interests. In a political framework, the 
fact has to be respected that the Confederation is situated on the ‘more pragmatic 
side’. The interview ultimately shifted to China, particularly to the incoherence 
between Czech human rights policy and economic diplomacy.
 In spite of the primary orientation around profits, the business sector seems 
to have understood that development cooperation can be beneficial to companies 
without de-legitimising development objectives if it is considered an MFA part-
ner and not its enemy. The approach of the Platform of the Business Sector for In-
ternational Development Cooperation, established in late 2007, remains pragmatic 
because it continued requesting guarantees of public funding. However, it is not 
as incoherent as the MIT, which also appoints officials to the WTO.
 The unique organisational culture of the MIT has a long tradition. The former 
head of the MIT once told the private sector that ‘development aid is one of the 
tools used by Czech companies to penetrate developing markets’, and in the proc-
ess, emphasising the overall budget for reconstruction in Iraq (Svaz průmyslu 
a dopravy ČR 2006). There are no Czech ministries that officially use the term 
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‘aid’ anymore, which confirms the ministry’s vision of development cooperation 
as another kind of export subsidy. It is not surprising that no Least Developed 
Country clause [stipulation?] appears in the priority group’s export strategy: 
Serbia and Vietnam are included because the strategy concentrates on emerging 
markets such as Russia, India, China and Brazil. More generally, the Ministry 
supports ‘an active and rapacious trade policy’ (Ministerstvo průmyslu a obchodu 
České republiky 2005), but the level of incoherencies initiated by the Ministry in 
the various development projects are infamous. For example, it funded a project 
whose purpose was to train Vietnamese workers to operate Czech shoemaking 
machinery. In other words, the Ministry turned development cooperation into 
subjectively coherent export subsidies.
 The result of an openly pro-export development cooperation is a good exam-
ple of almost total tied aid. The Ministry of Finance remains very prudent about 
the way public resources are spent abroad, and it is particularly suspicious of 
direct budget support. All Czech development projects are implemented solely by 
Czech NGDOs, companies and public institutions, except for some small-scale 
projects that are chosen by the embassies.. The Czech Development Agency does 
not employ any Czechs or local citizen in partner countries. Theoretically, the 
tenders are open to other EU organisations and companies. However, in reality, 
most of the expenses disbursed at home and in Czech development assistance 
projects are de facto tied, whatever sector they fall into. In this general environ-
ment, MIT practices are an example of incoherence within the development pol-
icy and are denounced but ultimately tolerated.
 As far as the inter-ministerial coherence is concerned, the MIT, which defines 
the Czech position on the common trade policy, is clear about the country’s in-
terests: the liberalisation of world trade should not ‘go beyond the threshold of 
the EU Common Agricultural Policy reforms’. The domestic interests of Czech 
farmers are explicitly prioritised over those of other EU countries. The country 
displays a ‘rather liberal, not protectionist stance’ in regard to the Nordic coun-
tries, and within TRIPS talks, it supports the right of the developing and least 
developed countries to ‘make use of patented drugs for serious illnesses’ (Min-
isterstvo průmyslu a obchodu České republiky 2005). However, this position is 
not contradictory to its own interests because the Czech pharmaceutical industry 
– with its largest manufacturer, Zentiva, leading the way – specialises in generic 
drugs for the Central and Eastern European market. Free access to the market of 
the North by the Least Developed Countries is considered a priority (Minister-
stvo průmyslu a obchodu České republiky 2006), but no mention has been made 
about agricultural subsidies.
 The Ministry of Agriculture defines its own position as ‘liberal-pragmatic’, 
which means that it is liberal when national interests are not questioned.32 It posi-
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tions itself between France and Sweden, with whom it shared the EU presidency 
in 2008 and 2009. In the following discussions, the development appeared once 
– in the context of the development of Czech rural areas. Developing countries, 
namely China and India, appeared only as possible markets for European prod-
ucts. Afterwards, the discussion again turned to the position of Czech peasants.33 
In contrast to these preoccupations, the awareness of the effects of a common 
agricultural policy is almost non-existent. When the foreign company Eastern 
Sugar released a 100thousand-ton quota on sugar production and closed a sugar 
refinery, it was the minister who deplored it as a disaster for the Czech sugar 
industry. If this quantity of sugar had been produced by developing countries 
from cane, their additional profits would an additional 30 million euros, which 
would be roughly equal to the Czech bilateral ODA.34 In this particular case, 
the pragmatic argument of self-sufficiency overrode any other effects on the 
European and global market. In practice, while both ministries claim to take 
the interests of developing countries into account, they never go beyond exist-
ing international commitments. They consider the Doha Development Round 
to be the most advantageous proposal ever offered to developing countries and, 
with regard to EPAs, the Czech Republic is ‘on the side of developing countries’. 
In a spontaneous discussion, however, they wrap it up by shifting to domestic 
interests.
 The Czech Presidency of the EU, in the first half of 2009, promoted ‘competi-
tiveness, the four freedoms and the liberal trade policy’ under the slogan ‘Europe 
without barriers’ (Úřad vlády ČR 2008). The Budget Review and reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy rank among the six most important themes, but 
the President’s priorities were absent from the joint French, Czech and Swedish 
position document and must be considered a centre-right political program of its 
current government. The Czech liberal position is promoted for its own sake, and 
any positive effects it may have on developing countries would only be an unin-
tended effect of domestic EU reforms. The President’s detailed program makes 
no reference to global markets, while budget reduction is stated as the main goal 
(Útvar místopředsedy vlády pro evropské záležitosti 2008). The Czech Republic’s 
agricultural sector is relatively unimportant and competitive, and so its liberal 
position is not contradicted by the interests of the domestic constituency.
 While there is some awareness about the link between migration, trade and 
agricultural policies, nothing has yet been said about the link between state guar-
antees and Czech firms that export to developing countries.35 Very few NGOs are 
currently interested in state guarantees for the construction of a nuclear plant in 
Bulgaria, an EU member, and no case has ever generated so much public and po-
litical interest as the approval of the guarantees for the construction of the Three 
Gorges dam by the Swiss government in the mid-1990s.
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 According to the 2005 Annual Report of the Czech Export Guarantees and In-
surance Corporation (EGAP), the state-owned company monitors and evaluates 
the impact that the guaranteed exports have on the environment of the destina-
tion countries in compliance with the OECD agreement. In 2005, no project was 
classiﬁ ed under category A (having a considerably negative impact on the environ-
ment) or under category B (the environmental impact is less signiﬁ cant and locally 
restricted, and the negative impact can be eliminated). (EGAP 2006: 12). In 2006, 
one construction project in Kazakhstan received a category B classiﬁ cation. Th e 
EGAP’s commitment to the implementation of anti-bribery measures is, however, 
less clear. ECA Watch (2005a) states that the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom required a ‘practice to inform investigative au-
thorities of suspicion or suﬃ  cient evidence of bribery before support [was] given’. 
But, at the same time, it seems that the Czech Republic, along with Germany and 
Belgium, blocked the anti-bribery Action Statement of the OECD’s Export Credit 
Group. Th e group considers a simple declaration by the exporter claiming that no 
corruption was encountered as suﬃ  cient proof (ECA Watch 2005b).
 The role of state guarantees should not be underestimated. In 2005, 12 of 
Czech exports were insured by EGAP, and more than half of them were backed 
by the state. As EU importers are not generally involved, EGAP covers a con-
siderable portion of Czech exports to developing countries, with few exceptions: 
some ten countries are not insurable at all, including Angola, a priority country in 
the Czech scheme of development cooperation. Within this framework, synergies 
between aid and trade are very difficult to establish.
 Incoherencies between development, trade and agriculture policies are among 
the most cited examples of PCD. The latter are common EU policies and are 
often presented by domestic actors as a uniquely European problem. Unilateral 
concessions by the Member States in favour of developing countries are difficult, 
and therefore, the collective action has thus far failed. The analysis of Czech ac-
tors and their positions shows that, although the interests of developing countries 
are seldom considered, if they are sometimes considered for any length of time, 
then the topic is usually misunderstood. PCD implementation at national level, 
and indirectly at European level, is almost impossible in situations of this kind.
 Conclusion
Policy coherence for development is a very normative concept. One cannot say 
whether coherence is a good thing or not for development since it depends on 
how it is used. The concept assumes a shift of interests in favour of the develop-
ing world, but it can also dilute one’s responsibilities in a situation where different 
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policies are unsuccessful in attaining their respective goals. The actors account-
able for development policies may have two basic strategies: coherence can be 
used to ‘name and shame’ the adverse impact that policies other than development 
policies have on the developing world or they can emphasise ‘win-win’ situations 
and new synergies. The latter strategy is more suitable when the pragmatic inter-
ests of other actors can be evoked and the former will necessarily involve idealistic 
arguments and emotions.
 In the Czech Republic’s case, PCD is embedded in government decisions, 
and institutional inter-ministerial mechanisms for its promotion are also now in 
place. However, the recent transformation of bilateral cooperation has exhausted 
the MFA’s capacities. The MFA is responsible for Czech development policy and 
incoherencies have not been addressed. The Department of Development Co-
operation and Humanitarian Aid believes that the more development policy be-
comes emancipated and independent, the more it can introduce development ob-
jectives into other policy areas. Its recent compromises with other foreign policy 
concerns show, however, that it must become free of its own ministry’s constraints 
before PCD can be promoted at the government level.
 Policy coherence at any of the intra-ministerial and inter-ministerial levels 
cannot be implemented without recognising common interests. This is only pos-
sible, however, if the involved are aware of the contradictory practices of different 
governmental bodies. If policy recommendations are to be effective, they must be 
based on evidence. A precise analysis of incoherencies is also needed.
 In spite of its idiosyncrasies, the Czech Republic is a re-emerging donor on 
its way to an alignment of its development policy with those of the more experi-
enced donors. The non-implementation of policy coherence is paradoxically due 
to the Europeanisation of the Czech foreign policy: Europe and the OCED’s 
unenforceable ‘soft law’ has been adopted to indicate that a country belongs to the 
EU, but public awareness, political will and analytical capacities continue to lag 
behind because they need more time to develop.
 “The case of migration and development coherence in the Czech Republic 
presents an atypical example of the policy coherence agenda because it was pro-
moted by another ministry, which was afraid of losing its influence on the Czech 
Republic’s development policy after the centralisation of development coopera-
tion. In order for the European Consensus on Development (European Commis-
sion 2005b) to be enacted by all of the EU’s Member States and subsequently lead 
to the reduction of priority sectors, involving the affected ministries in the debate 
on coherence could be an alternative strategy for the promotion of PCD in the 
name of aid effectiveness.
 In the case of trade, despite ongoing awareness activities, the potential imple-
mentation of PCD is much more difficult. The MIT and the Ministry of Agricul-
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ture are more connected to the profit-oriented private sector than the Ministry 
of the Interior or the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, which put a greater 
accent on public interest, even though it risks being influenced more intensely 
by the private sector, which demands more and more qualified workers. How-
ever, most importantly, there is a severe incompatibility at conceptual level, which 
prevents further steps towards the implementation of PCD in trade from being 
taken because some of the involved actors consider the development cooperation 
budget to be an export subvention. There is no consensus on the meaning of ‘de-
velopment’, which can be identified with trade as such.
 In the Czech Republic and other NMSs, the development cooperation pro-
grams are considered a very technical issue, and there are almost no high-level 
political debates on their priorities. They also serve as proof of the ‘Europeanness’ 
of the post-communist countries. The promotion of PCD may thus serve as an 
agent of the re-politicisation of development issues, which starts with the identi-
fication of incoherencies and then makes them visible in the public space. Actions 
at the EU level are not enough. The Czech Republic intends to promote PCD 
during its EU presidency in the first six months of 2009 because other donors 
have also done this, but this does not guarantee sufficient internal pressure on the 
promotion of incoherencies at national level.36
 What are the most important lessons of the Czech case? At a theoretical level, 
the trade and development case shows that understanding PCD is very much re-
lated to an understanding of development in general. Development studies have 
offered a wide range of development theories, ranging from modernisation and 
dependence to post-development theories, which means that the concept and the 
policies implemented in the name of policy coherence deserve a thorough analysis 
from a variety of standpoints. At the practical level, in a situation in which PCD 
is promoted at European and OECD levels, and where national institutional ar-
rangements are set up without being used, awareness-raising and analyses appear 
to be the most important elements for discovering conceptual and policy contra-
dictions in public administration.
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the Working Group Aid Policy and Performance at the th General Conference of EADI 
in Geneva, June , two anonymous referees, and to all the interviewees and respondents 
from the following institutions: Permanent Mission of the Czech Republic to the UN 
Oﬃ  ce in Geneva; FoRS – Czech Forum for Development Co-operation; Development 
Centre; Department of Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid, Ministry of 
Foreign Aﬀ airs ( x); Committee on Foreign Aﬀ airs, Chamber of Deputies; Department 
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of Development Aid and Project Co-operation, Ministry of Environment; Confederation 
of Industry of the Czech Republic, Asylum and Migration Policy Department, Ministry 
of Interior; Department of the European Union and International Relations, Ministry of 
Finance; Department of International Relations, Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀ airs; 
Department of the European Union and International Relations, Ministry of Finance; and 
Department for Migration and Integration of Foreigners, Ministry of Labour and Social 
Aﬀ airs. Th e ﬁ eld research was carried out between  July  and  March .
 The new EU Member States of the include five Central European countries (Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland), three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania), and two Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta) since  May , and 
two Southeast European countries (Bulgaria and Romania) since  January .
 Based on rough calculations of reported data and estimates from OECD DAC (b) 
and PASOS ().
 See, for example, Ferguson () for a meso-level view or Rist () for a macro-level 
view.
 For an analysis of PCD at global level, based on the Monterrey Consensus on Finance and 
Development, and from a gender perspective, see Floro and Hoppe ().
 There are striking similarities between the promotion of PCD at both European and 
Czech levels: it is a time- consuming process, political commitment and the pressure from 
external actors are essential, and the gap between discourses and practices remains wide.
 Policy makers often stress that a ‘win-win’ situation where greater coherence for develop-
ment could be achieved without harming the interests of the North is imaginable: ‘In 
particularly sensitive areas, such as migration or security, the promotion of European 
interests and the identification of partner countries’ own concerns must be balanced, with 
a view to finding win-win solutions.’ (European Commission : , author’s emphasis). 
This would be possible only if policy making was simply inefficient and transaction costs 
to overcome inefficiency were zero. In this case, success could be achieved by separate 
policies. Another strategy used by policymakers is to identify the South’s interest with 
that of the North’s and call for ‘increased awareness of the fact that development and 
poverty reduction are eventually in Europe’s own interest.’ (European Commission : 
). Here, the coherence problem is reduced to long-term vs. short- term priorities, which, 
however, remain the object of divergent political interests as well. 
 ‘Security and development’ was the main topic of the preceding EADI General Confer-
ence, which was held in Bonn in .
 It might seem surprising that development policy, which could be considered to be a re-
gional policy, is a matter of serious incoherencies. An empirical assessment of internal US 
policies shows that regional policies rank among the most coherent ones and are charac-
terised by a concentration of issues and interests (May et al. ). Drawing on the theory 
of public policy could help to clarify the concept in the context of development as well.
 For a complete review of the development policies of the NMS from a historical, institu-
tionalist approach, see Vencato ().
 These preoccupations do not make full sense if they are not seen as an expression of 
French and Spanish foreign policy priorities in Africa and their concern with the realign-
ment of the European Union towards the East.
 During the accession process, the topic of development cooperation, a part of the soft 
acquis, was hardly raised. It is true that development cooperation needs sufficient con-
stituency, political and public support, but still, the ease with which the ‘double speed’ EU 
development policy was institutionalised has yet to be questioned.
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 Historically, the development cooperation programs were born out of activities that re-
sumed in the s, or they were transformations of humanitarian interventions in the 
former Yugoslavia. The  decision acknowledged the dispersion of development coop-
eration between nine line ministries with the multiplicity of the objectives.
 To compare the situation of an experienced donor outside the EU, Switzerland had al-
ready institutionalised coherency as early as  in the separate message Guiding lines 
North-South (Conseil fédéral de la Conféderation Suisse ). There has been neither a 
follow-up nor a reference to the document since then.
 The negative stance to the general budget support is based on a general mistrust of the 
state as a stimulus of development, higher risks of corruption and, last but not least, the 
exclusion of the Czech subjects from the implementation of development projects on the 
ground. Projects are seen as essential to capacity building and reinforcing the contacts of 
the Czech Republic with the developing world.
 As of August , the MFA has not undertaken any steps to promote PCD. On the 
contrary, the centralisation of decision-making in Czech development cooperation policy 
has increased, the use of bilateral aid for the sake of security and transatlantic interests 
has been reinforced.
 Three working groups were established by the Council in February  by the Council, 
but none involving PCD.
 The campaign is another example of the MFA using the NGDOs to promote develop-
ment issues. It was subsidised by the state as a ‘development education and public aware-
ness’ project and, it was highly critical of the Czech trade and agricultural policies and of 
the Ministry of Finance, which basically has control of particular aspects of the coopera-
tion budget.
 According to the Czech migration expert Dušan Drbohlav, the pattern of migration be-
tween Ukraine and the Czech Republic is very similar to that of the migration patterns 
between Mexico and the United States. 
 While ‘brain drain’ designates the use of education acquired in the South by the migrants 
in the North, ‘brain waste’ concerns the unused skills of the highly educated migrants 
from the South who are employed in unskilled positions in the North.
 For the sake of comparison, according to an Interfax news report from  July , the 
large majority of Polish migrants to the United Kingdom and Ireland are overqualified, 
and as many as  of Polish manual workers have a university degree.
 The other priority countries are Angola, Mongolia, Vietnam, Yemen and Zambia, and, 
in the short term, Afghanistan and Iraq. Recently, the MFA has sought to enlarge its list 
rather than to reduce it.
 The recent simplification of the ‘green card’ system, approved by the government, which 
now includes less-qualified migrants, was criticised by non-governmental organisations 
because it denies civil rights to migrants. Human rights and development policies conflict 
with one another. The civil rights of migrants have been limited precisely because the 
government wanted to preserve circular migration.
 Students could choose their academic majors without any limitations. One Senegalese 
student studied nuclear physics, while one Belarusian student studied Russian. However, 
in the long term, the foreign graduates of the Czechoslovak universities during the com-
munist era were members of various elites, especially in Vietnam and Mongolia, where 
Czech lecturers occupy important political and administrative functions and facilitate 
development cooperation.
 This information was not confirmed by the other parties.
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 Moldova is one of eight (plus Iraq and Afghanistan) priority countries of Czech develop-
ment cooperation.
 The seminar eventually took place in the spring of , in cooperation with the Multi-
cultural Centre Prague.
 On the policy level, she refused to evaluate whether the policies of the Ministry of Ag-
riculture and the MIT were coherent with development, pretending that it was not her 
role.
 He does not seem to have enough information about Czech development cooperation.
 In the NMS, I identified other comparisons related to policy coherence, namely hypocrisy 
and indifference. In Poland, a UNDP representative stated that ‘on the one hand, we give 
money and that’s why we feel morally better, but, on the other hand, we pose conditions 
which de facto prevent these countries from developing in the long term.’ (Szczyciński et 
al. ). In the Czech Republic, the former Head of the Development Centre voiced his 
criticism that one hand does not know what the other is doing or even that one hand is 
destroying what the other has done (approximate quotation). This saying implies that the 
existence of a coherent government body, and more generally, the tropes aim to connect or 
disconnect two different areas of human activity.
 This definition of trade development is actually mercantilist rather than liberal.
 One official assessed the Czech position during the seminar ‘Preparing the Czech EU 
Presidency’ by wondering: Why Should Subventions and Cutting Barriers Harm the 
Poor?’ The seminar, was organised by the Glopolis think-tank Glopolis on  December 
.
 The MIT official also kept changing the focus of the debate. This was also the case with 
the MIT official: the discussion turned to the BRICs and, finally, to the competitiveness 
of the Czech economy.
 More research is needed on the estimates of the Czech Republic’s impact on developing 
countries via the Common Agricultural Policy.
 The topics for which ‘more research is needed’ include debt relief, investments and arms 
exports. The debt relief aspect of the Czech bilateral ODA is a substantial  (Stálá 
mise České republiky při OECD ), but there seems to be no link between debt relief 
and Czech development strategy. Most of the loans, of which the Ministry of Finance is 
in charge, were contracted during the communist era and remain secret (Stojanov ). 
To summarise, the Czech Republic’s entire debt relief strategy is anything but transpar-
ent, and its coherence cannot be accurately evaluated. Compared to trade, Czech invest-
ments in developing countries are still modest: almost zero in Africa and Latin America 
and US   million in Asia and US   million in the Middle East. (Česká národní 
banka ). While these numbers are insignificant compared to Swiss investments, for 
example, which are worth US . billion in Africa alone (Banque Nationale Suisse : 
), they may have become more important in recent years. Too little information has 
been released on arms exports. In theory, the Czech Republic should respect international 
commitments, but arms are probably being delivered to Nigeria and Ethiopia, whose gov-
ernments may use them against their political opponents.
 France chose Migration and Development as one of its priorities. The EU Presidencies 
are an important stimulus of change in EU policies, including the promotion of PCD 
(Egenhofer ).
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From the Global to the Local
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Th e Role of European Local Governments in 
Development Cooperation
 Examples from the Netherlands and Germany
Mariken Bontenbal
The analysis and review in the academic discourse on European development 
cooperation has been largely geared towards bilateral and multinational donor 
assistance, on the one hand, and the role of NGOs and CBOs, on the other. 
The former category is mainly concerned with development cooperation at the 
macro level by national governments and international donor institutions, often 
focusing on public sector reform and good governance in relation to SWAPs and 
budgetary support. The latter type of cooperation is usually directed toward local 
level development and poverty reduction dealing with civic society, with NGOs 
in the North working in direct partnership with locally based organisations in the 
South. In the dichotomy of bilateral macro-donor assistance versus local, NGO-
based cooperation with civic society, there has been limited amount of academic 
attention paid to development cooperation initiated by and aimed at government 
at the local level.
 Local governments have stepped into the international development coopera-
tion arena all over the world. Through city-to-city cooperation (C2C), such as 
city twinning and organised city networks in transnational North-South settings, 
cities cooperate to improve local governance and enhance local development in 
young democracies and areas struck by poverty. In the South, ongoing decen-
tralisation processes explain much of the current needs for institutional capacity 
building for local governments. City partnerships can be used as an instrument 
to address such needs, channelling knowledge and expertise from the North to 
partner municipalities in the South.
 In the discourse on development cooperation, a focus on development assist-
ance geared towards municipalities and performed by partner municipalities has 
thus far been lacking to a large extent. A need for further research has been in-
dicated to understand the content, objectives and implications of such interven-
tions.1 This paper seeks to contribute to filling this knowledge gap, by exploring 
the way European local governments participate in international development 
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cooperation. There is a need for understanding the conditions which affect the 
role of local governments in the North as development agents, e.g., regarding 
policies, capacities and political will. The aim of this article is therefore to explain 
the factors that shape the position and potential impact of local governments in 
the North as partners in international development cooperation through C2C 
partnerships.
 The paper starts with a review of city-to-city cooperation and urban develop-
ment policies, and the linkages to improving local governance and institutional 
performance of local authorities in the South. Then, specific reference is made 
to the C2C policy context in the Netherlands and Germany. Subsequently, five 
critical conditions for local government participation in development coopera-
tion are discussed. Findings are presented of comparative empirical research of 
four North-South city partnerships between Dutch and German municipalities 
and their partner cities in Latin America and Africa.
 City-to-City Cooperation and Urban Development Policies
It has been estimated that 70 of the world’s cities currently participate in so-
called city-to-city cooperation partnerships, projects and programs.2 Looked at 
from an historical perspective, city twinning has been practiced to serve a range 
of goals and interests. Th ese have included building peace and mutual under-
standing ‘from below’ in post-war Europe,3 expressing solidarity with suppressed 
population groups (e.g., the Soviet regime, Apartheid in South Africa) and with 
ideological movements (the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua).4 Some twin-
nings obtained a more economic-oriented character, fostering entrepreneurship 
and trade. Another type of interaction between cities is ‘city-to-city cooperation’, 
which has evolved in pursuit of development and poverty alleviation in the South. 
Th e idea of ‘cooperation twinnings’ was launched in the 1960s after the independ-
ence of several African countries, and was practiced essentially between French 
and West African municipalities, in particular Senegal. Th is type of decentralised 
North-South cooperation developed further in the 1970s and 1980s, becoming 
more project-based and technically oriented.5 City-to-city cooperation has been 
considered a promising mechanism for building and developing capacity in local 
administrations and contributes to improving the living conditions in urban com-
munities,6 which has become a pressing need in many developing countries after 
decentralisation reforms.
 The rise of city-to-city cooperation as a mechanism for development assist-
ance can be explained by a number of trends. The first trend concerns the fact 
that local governments are increasingly recognised as actors in development. 
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This is reflected in a more general tendency in which the international donor 
community has become more receptive to incorporating non-conventional do-
nors including NGOs, civic society, local authorities and communities. Agendas 
of various international development institutions point out that local govern-
ments play a major role in attaining sustainable development. Chapter 28 of 
Agenda 21, the outcome of the 1992 Rio Conference (Earth Summit), is a very 
clear example in this respect. As a result of this international agreement, lo-
cal governments world-wide have taken the lead in devising their own Local 
Agendas 21 (LA21), and enacting them. In a similar vein, the Habitat Agenda 
(outcome of the Habitat II conference in Istanbul, 1996) emphasises the crucial 
role of local governments as the ‘closest partner’ in the Habitat process, and 
encourages national governments to strengthen municipalities. This paradigm 
shift away from the former central state orientation towards a new emphasis 
on strengthening the capacities of local governments, including their ability to 
become efficient and effective agents for local development, can be observed in 
the latest World Bank policies. In the Cities Alliance program, for instance, Lo-
cal Government Associations fully participate in the Consultative Group, and 
negotiations are taking place directly with the local authorities of the cities in-
volved. More recently, at the UN World Summit on the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals in 2005, the vital importance of cities and communities in achieving 
them was stressed.
 The understanding that nation-states no longer represent the sole milieu for 
solving current problems7 has strengthened the role of non-state actors and mi-
cro-order players in development aid. Decentralised international cooperation, 
including C2C, implies that the venture of development assistance is no longer 
limited to multilateral donors and national governments. In the framework of 
the French presidency of the European Union during the second half of 2008, 
France proposed an initiative to value the importance of the local dimension of 
development and to recognise the role of local governments, community-based 
organisations, and other local actors in international cooperation.8 Indeed, one 
of the thematic programs of the European Union for development cooperation 
for 2008-20139 is aimed at ‘non-state actors and local authorities in development’. 
These grassroots actors purportedly have a thorough knowledge of local commu-
nities and access to reach them through their extensive networks. Putting local-
level governance and development high on the EU agenda is just one example of 
the accumulation and consolidation of attention and recognition that has devel-
oped over the past few years from donors, governments and practitioners alike to 
decentralised cooperation, in which cities assume a key role.
 A second trend has occurred in the theories involving urban development, 
which have increasingly embraced the importance of institutions and good gov-
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ernance at the local level. In other words, urban development requires strong 
local governments. 2007 was the first year in which the majority of the human 
population lived in urban areas. While this milestone is the result of rapid ur-
banization over the last decades, growth is expected to continue at an unprec-
edented rate in the coming decades. Urbanization is most rapid in developing 
countries,10 which implies that poverty is becoming increasingly urbanized. It 
also means, as donors argue, that the challenges in the future are strongly cor-
related with global urbanization, and that both the cause of these challenges 
and their solutions can be found in cities. The management of urban areas and 
their populations will become more multifaceted, and cities are under increased 
pressure to find solutions and improve their planning strategies to accommodate 
the poor, enhance urban living conditions, infrastructure, services and employ-
ment opportunities, and strengthen governance in increasingly complex urban 
systems.
 In the early days of development planning, the growth of cities and their popu-
lations were generally considered an undesirable and negative development, as 
overpopulated and congested urban areas were seen as unhealthy, prone to crime 
and lacking sufficient opportunities to accommodate rural newcomers. Planners 
stressed that growth had to be controlled, rural-urban migration mitigated and 
urban slums eliminated. Since the 1970s, however, the traditional rural-oriented 
development model was challenged by a new paradigm, which revolved around 
urban development.11 It was based on a ‘new realism’, which recognised that ur-
ban growth could not be prevented and should instead be accommodated.12 The 
first UN Habitat conference held in Vancouver in 1976 and the establishment 
of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (UNCHS-Habitat) in 
1977 effectively served as the foundation of donor commitments to urban pov-
erty issues. In the evolution of urban development thinking from the early days 
in the 1970s until the present day, various phases can be distinguished.13 In the 
1970s, urban development was rather narrowly defined and focused essentially 
on meeting housing needs, in particular, through settlement upgrading and self-
help housing. In the following decade, the urban development approach became 
more multidimensional. With the start of the Urban Management Programme 
(UMP) in 1986 – a joint effort of UN-Habitat, UNDP and the World Bank 
– a more integrated perspective towards urban development began to include 
a range of urban sectors such as markets and the financial sector, infrastruc-
ture management, and land and environmental management. Capacity building 
and institutional strengthening of local authorities became major strategies to 
increase urban productivity, raise local revenues and improve urban socio-eco-
nomic conditions. In the 1990s, the concept of ‘good governance’ gained ground, 
also in urban development thinking. Urban governance has been increasingly 
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considered an imperative for the sustainable management of urban areas.14 The 
1990s moreover can be marked as the heyday of decentralisation policies. Dem-
ocratic and decentralised governance was increasingly considered an essential 
component of urban development initiatives. Strategies aimed to both contrib-
ute to the decentralisation process itself and strengthen local institutions and 
the capacities of local governments. This capacity building of local authorities 
and technicians has been indispensable to the ability to respond adequately to 
the new responsibilities that decentralisation has brought. Thus, some programs 
have provided support to central governments in designing and implementing 
decentralisation plans (reforming legal, political, and fiscal systems), while oth-
ers have addressed local government capacity building and strengthening, e.g., 
resource management, social services delivery, and civic participation.15 The 
concept of ‘good urban governance’ has, in particular, been employed by UN-
Habitat’s Global Campaign on Urban Governance launched in 1999, which aims 
to contribute to poverty alleviation through improved urban governance. Ca-
pacity building for local governments is a key strategy to realising ‘the inclusive 
city’, i.e., ‘a place where everyone (...) is enabled to participate productively and 
positively in the opportunities cities have to offer’.16 The key principles to reach-
ing inclusive decision-making and good urban governance include sustainability, 
subsidiarity, equity, efficiency, transparency and accountability, civic engagement 
and citizenship, and security.
 A final trend that is discussed here to explain the contemporary position of 
C2C is the rise of city networks and the growing importance of ‘partnerships’ in 
international cooperation. The introduction of the concept of ‘partnership’ in the 
international cooperation debate has indicated a move away from the traditional 
hierarchical patron-client relationship between donor and recipient partners to-
wards a more balanced North-South power relationship in which partners co-
operate on a peer basis.17 In an urban context, an opportunity for partners (i.e., 
cities) to achieve such relationships and learn from peers is through the network-
ing of cities, to exchange knowledge and seek best practices elsewhere that will 
find solutions to urban problems. It was found18 that between 1982 and 2004, the 
number of such international city networks grew from eight to 49. Agenda 21’s 
call to cities to participate in international sustainability city networking was a 
key driving force in this trend. A major impetus with regard to city-to-city co-
operation, also seen as the “most basic building block of city networking”,19 was 
provided by UN-Habitat, which chose city-to-city cooperation as the theme of 
World Habitat Day in 2002.20
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 City-to-city cooperation
City-to-city cooperation can be considered a decentralised form of development 
cooperation, in which local authorities have become development agents and 
partners. The objectives are generally two-fold. Firstly, C2C is relevant from the 
viewpoint of fostering decentralised ‘good governance’ as a precondition to lo-
cal development. Due to the changing nature of local administration as guided 
by decentralisation processes, local governments in the South have increasingly 
been given new mandates and responsibilities, dealing with basic service delivery, 
urban infrastructure and financial resource bases to manage. Moreover, many are 
now expected to assume a role that actively fosters local development and tackles 
urban poverty. Changes in the legal and administrative environment however pose 
difficulties to organisational capacity and basic service delivery. For the majority 
of local governments in developing countries, institutional reinforcement is one 
of the most pressing challenges of the near future. In this light, C2C is considered 
an instrument to enhance the capacities of local institutions for improved lo-
cal governance. In the public sector, capacity building is mainly directed towards 
the institutional strengthening of public institutions and administrations, aim-
ing at ‘getting good government’21 through increased institutional performance. In 
this respect, C2C initiatives can be potentially employed with regard to service 
delivery, creating an enabling legal and institutional environment, and fostering 
partnerships with key local public, private and community actors. Cities set up 
and support projects, and provide knowledge and expertise through the delivery 
of technical assistance to their partner cities, often organised in a peer-to-peer 
setting for local government officials and technicians. The ‘colleague-to-colleague’ 
approach is considered a vehicle for knowledge and skills transfer that is unique 
to C2C partnerships and scarcely found among other modalities of development 
cooperation.22
 A second C2C objective regards the contribution to community development 
and (basic) urban services. C2C is not confined to the participation of local ad-
ministrations alone. Indeed, it has been observed,23 while the concept of a rela-
tionship between local authorities is at the core of the partnership, the participa-
tion of civil society is a feature of equal importance. A characteristic of C2C is 
that it is usually founded on two pillars; the local state apparatus and its constitu-
ency, the citizens themselves.24 While the former relates to the above-mentioned 
objective of institutional strengthening, the latter relates the participation and 
contributions of civil society, the non-profit and the private sector. Activities 
include a wide range of small-scale community development initiatives such as 
fundraising for education and health care projects, and stimulating business en-
trepreneurship through micro-credit support. While the development effects in 
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the partner city are often modest, such activities are crucial to the sustaining of 
public support for the partnership. Raising awareness on global issues (poverty, 
inequality) and development cooperation is an important goal. These activities in 
the civic society sphere have a substantial symbolic meaning, reinforcing the link 
between the cities and further stimulating public support.25
 If local governments in the North seek to act as development agents, they 
need to comply with some necessary preconditions for successful North-South 
cooperation. Development cooperation is not a core task of municipalities and 
lack of expertise may undermine good intentions. Partnerships fail when North-
ern partners wrongly assume they have all the necessary professional expertise 
and knowledge needed to engage in development cooperation: ‘Many [North-
ern municipal partners] see themselves walking into the aid business with none 
of the knowledge which has built up in NGO circles over the years, so there is 
a danger if guidance is not sought, of their taking part in very amateurish aid 
efforts’.26 Examples of the lack of development expertise among municipal staff 
in the North include the lack of knowledge of local contextual conditions, not 
taking into account adequate evaluation and monitoring criteria, or lacking the 
required advisory skills.27 The dilemma of well-intentioned aid ambitions versus 
the lack of professional expertise was accurately expressed in the title of a recent 
Dutch Government evaluation of national C2C support programmes: ‘On Soli-
darity and Professionalisation’.28
 City-to-city Cooperation in the Netherlands and Germany
In the Netherlands, 72 of the municipalities are involved in international coop-
eration.29 It is estimated that 10 of these efforts are with developing countries.30 
National development policy in the Netherlands has traditionally supported 
C2C cooperation, albeit with different motives. During the 1990s, municipal 
C2C efforts were primarily considered relevant for awareness raising and creating 
public support for international development cooperation. A second task was the 
provision of technical assistance and the transfer of knowledge and expertise to 
Southern partner cities. Strengthening local government in developing countries 
was seen as a precondition that would allow marginalised communities access to 
political decision-making.31 Capacity building to strengthen municipalities and 
good governance became a more central objective some years later, in which the 
principles of reciprocity and mutual learning were emphasised. Throughout the 
1990s, policies in favour of C2C received strong parliamentary backing, partly 
because it was considered helpful for the maintenance of public and political sup-
port for development cooperation in general. Between 1998 and 2002, national 
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support experienced a temporary decline when the effectiveness of C2C in re-
ducing poverty was questioned. There were doubts whether Dutch municipali-
ties, despite their knowledge of governance and urban policies, also possessed the 
relevant expertise necessary to act in the domain of development cooperation.32 
C2C has over the past few years regained its prominence on the agenda. Current 
development cooperation policy stresses the importance of partnerships, which 
certainly applies to C2C. The C2C budget for 2005-2008 was expanded to  12.4 
million, an average of  3.1 million per year.33 In previous years, this average had 
been  2.2 million.34 The main objective has shifted from awareness raising to lo-
cal governance capacity building in the South. The national C2C budget is trans-
ferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the International Co-operation 
Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities, VNG International 
(VNG-I). VNG-I, in turn, is responsible for support programs to which Dutch 
municipalities can turn to for financial and technical assistance. The objective of 
this funding program35 is to ‘strengthen good local government as a condition for 
poverty reduction’ by means of capacity building to develop human capital in lo-
cal government organisations. Twelve countries have been targeted.36 The contri-
bution from the Ministry accounts for an estimated 60 to 70 of the funding for 
the C2C projects, while the remainder comes from the participating Dutch mu-
nicipalities, provinces, municipal water boards, and waterworks.37 As of January 
2008, some 40 Dutch local governments were participating in some 46 projects.
 German development cooperation policy and practice at the community level 
takes a holistic and multifaceted approach compared to the more narrowly de-
fined Municipal International Cooperation (the Dutch terminology for C2C) in 
the Netherlands, which place particular emphasis on the partnership element. 
German communal development cooperation incorporates fair trade projects and 
events, fair procurement policies in local authorities, development education and 
‘global learning’.38 It has been estimated that German cities together maintain be-
tween 5,000 and 7,000 international partnerships.39 However, the bulk of the 
relations are within Europe and only 3 of partnerships are with the develop-
ing world.40 Communal development cooperation is characterised as civic society 
driven (mainly by churches and community organisations), operating with small 
budgets and mainly financed by donations.41 Many North-South initiatives are 
framed in Local Agenda 21 processes. The LA21 movement has been successful in 
Germany, where it has been adopted by 20 of the municipalities (SKEW, 2007). 
In the Netherlands, on the contrary, LA21 is not an issue in urban (environmen-
tal) planning.
 Local political support in Germany is ubiquitous, but it is not accompanied 
by the necessary financial and administrative support. This is in contrast to the 
Netherlands, where local political support is generally expressed in providing fi-
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nancial resources (from the municipal budget or by attracting external funding) 
to C2C initiatives. The lack of a clear mandate among German local governments 
makes it difficult to actively engage in development cooperation, especially in 
communities that are facing budget deficits and are struggling to adapt to legisla-
tive changes after German reunification.
 The main organisation in Germany supporting communal development co-
operation is the ‘Service Agency Communities in One World’ (SKEW), which 
is a subdivision of the non-profit organisation Capacity Building International 
(InWent). This is similar to the VNG-I in the Netherlands, which also concerns 
its role in motivating and informing communities. However, the situation in Ger-
many differs from the Netherlands in that SKEW does not fund community 
projects. Cities generally work much more independently on development initia-
tives. Moreover, while the Dutch central government provides funding for C2C 
projects, these resources are not available to German municipalities. It has also 
been observed42 that the legal conditions for the use of municipal resources for 
North-South city partnerships remain unclear, due to an unresolved constitu-
tional debate on the limitations of municipal self-government and the monopoly 
that the federal government officially maintains on engaging in foreign relations. 
As a result, German municipalities operate in a rather different financial, juridi-
cal and political reality than Dutch cities. This has implications for the role of 
local governments as partners in development, the objectives set in North-South 
twinnings, and the capacities, resources and political backing available to support 
these initiatives.
 Local Government Participation in Development Cooperation: 
Five Critical Conditions
Drawing on empirical evidence from four North-South city partnership case 
studies, and taking the perspective from the North – i.e., local governments as 
development agents, this section discusses five critical conditions that have been 
found to impact on the role of local governments in development cooperation 
through the practice of C2C. Between 2005 and 2007, research was conducted 
on four partnerships involving cities in the Netherlands and Germany and their 
partner cities in South Africa, Nicaragua and Peru.43 The partnerships reviewed 
are briefly summarised in box 1. The factors discussed are:
1. The extent to which C2C partnerships are politically embedded in municipal 
international cooperation policies;
2. The availability and quality of human resources in the local administration for 
C2C;
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3. The availability of financial resources and the capacity to tap into external 
funding;
4. The level of political, administrative and public support for C2C;
5. The extent to which local governments cooperate with development partners 
to support their C2C efforts.
1 Municipal International Cooperation policy frameworks
Perhaps the greatest difference between local administrations and mainstream, 
traditional decentralised development organisations such as NGOs and charity 
organisations is that international cooperation (IC) is not a core task of local 
administrations. In both the Netherlands and Germany, municipal IC is not re-
quired by law. While it is heavily promoted by Local Government Associations 
and (inter)national support organisations, local governments are not formally 
mandated to invest in IC or establish IC policies. Hence, international munici-
pal efforts are voluntary. In this light, and due to the fact that municipalities 
are political institutions, the first critical factor is the political orientation of 
the municipal council and of the leading local political parties as an important 
determinant of city partnership organisation. In the absence of a guiding legal 
framework, political programs and supporting IC policies shape and outline the 
Box 1 The four C2C partnership case studies
– The municipalities of Amstelveen, the Netherlands and Villa El Salvador (VES), Peru 
became offi  cial partners in 1997. Recent cooperation projects (2004-2007) were aimed 
at strengthening the local administration of VES with a focus on municipal fi nance, and 
environment and waste management, e.g., setting up an Environmental Department 
and introducing separate waste management in VES.
– Since its inception in 1983, the partnership between Utrecht, the Netherlands and León, 
Nicaragua has experienced both municipal and civic society participation. Since 1998, 
the City of Utrecht has supported León in its urban expansion ambitions in the long-
term, multi-dimensional León South East project to build 15,000 dwellings by 2020.
– The partnership (1998) between the Berlin District Treptow-Köpenick and the 
Municipality of Cajamarca, Peru, is an example of C2C as North-South component in the 
framework of Local Agenda 21. Mainly driven by civic society, the municipal role is more 
limited. The partnership aims at fostering exchanges (e.g., schools), awareness raising 
and fundraising.
– Alphen aan den Rijn signed a twinning agreement with Oudtshoorn, South Africa, 
in 2002, focusing on strengthening institutional performance and community 
development in Oudtshoorn. Oudtshoorn municipality has been assisted with 
policymaking on HIV/Aids, gender and social housing, and the implementation of a 
Performance Management System.
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IC vision and strategy of municipalities. Formalised policies can be considered a 
political determinant for the emergence and fostering of IC, guaranteeing a stable 
flow of financial resources as IC becomes an item on the municipal budget. The 
political programs of the three Dutch cities that were studied all contain an item 
on international cooperation.
 C2C partnerships are often embedded in an IC policy framework that serves 
a range of objectives. They show great variety regarding geographical orienta-
tion (e.g., European vs. North-South), instruments (long-term partnerships, 
international city networks, projects) and activities (knowledge exchange, grant-
ing subsidies). North-South city partnerships may be just one aspect of a mu-
nicipality’s international cooperation strategy (e.g., Utrecht), or it may be the 
singular IC activity performed (Alphen aan den Rijn or Alphen for short). Di-
versity in policy objectives is evident: they may be economic and trade-oriented, 
which is the case for Amstelveen and Utrecht. EU affairs, such as subsidies and 
legislation have clearly been observed in both Utrecht and Treptow-Köpenick. 
There was mention of fostering international exchanges and city networking 
in Treptow-Köpenick, Utrecht and Amstelveen. All four North-South partner-
ships in this study contributed to a fourth objective, i.e., international solidarity 
and accepting a role in development cooperation. The Dutch cases show a dual 
strategy in this respect: on the one hand, contributing to the strengthening of 
local governance and local democracy in the South, on the other hand, engaging 
in awareness raising and the education of citizens on development issues. This 
duality is also expressed in the financial details and in the relations between the 
local administrations and civic society as city partnership actors, as will be dis-
cussed below.
 The case of Amstelveen will be used here to illustrate how C2C partnerships 
are embedded in a more general IC policy framework. The partnership agree-
ment with Villa El Salvador fits into the wider ‘international orientation’ pro-
gram, which forms the political mandate that gives guidance to all international 
activities. It is based on three main motives for engaging in international coopera-
tion: a) the exchange of knowledge, innovation and ‘best practices’ of municipal 
affairs; b) economic motives in attracting foreign investments; and c) ideological 
motives, i.e., to raise global awareness, and ‘contribute to local democracy and 
governance elsewhere through the provision of in-house municipal expertise’.44 
The latter provides the framework for cooperation with VES. In contrast to the 
three European city partnerships, which are predominantly directed at cultural 
and people-to-people exchanges (the so-called jumelages), the (knowledge) ex-
changes and projects with VES have a clear development objective, with the aim 
to strengthen local governance in the partner city. VES is considered the most 
relevant initiative for the involved international partner cities; an estimated 70 
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of the budget for international cooperation is allocated to VES.45 Moreover, po-
litical, administrative and community involvement are predominantly focussed 
on VES rather than on other international activities.46
 In contrast to the three Dutch examples, the Berlin District of Treptow-
Köpenick has no official political IC vision or policy. One of the reasons is re-
lated to the administrative status of Treptow-Köpenick as one of the 12 Districts 
of the City of Berlin. While the Senate of Greater Berlin has its own IC policies 
and city partnerships, the majority of the Districts also maintain their own inter-
national relations. At district level, however, IC is not an official administrative 
mandate. This means the districts, which are not autonomous, do not receive any 
IC financial or technical support from the Senate. Treptow-Köpenick thus has 
very limited resources for international cooperation and this has been a major 
limitation for the international relations of the district.47 Despite the absence of a 
formal IC policy, the local administration is engaged in international affairs. The 
focus is mainly on the European Union, e.g., attracting EU funding and projects, 
and engaging citizens to participate in European affairs and exchanges. Moreover, 
the district government is concerned with the significant number of 11 city part-
nerships, of which Cajamarca is the only partner in the South; although a large 
number of these partnerships are currently inactive.
 Some observations can be made from comparing the cases. Firstly, the lack 
of a political mandate in the German case makes the involvement of the local 
administration voluntary, which may undermine the stability and continuity of 
municipal engagement in the partnership. The role of political will and the per-
sonal involvement of the mayor becomes crucial in this respect. Secondly, it must 
be noted, however, that the Treptow-Köpenick-Cajamarca partnership is largely 
a civic society-driven effort, in which the local government only has a modest 
role in providing political support and some funding. There are, for example, no 
direct exchanges between municipality staff. The consequences of the absence of 
a municipal IC policy should in this respect not be exaggerated. Thirdly, instru-
ments other than IC policy can also provide guidelines for shaping the various 
international cooperation strategies and activities. In the German case, this is the 
partnership agreement signed by the two cities and the Local Agenda 21 process 
in Treptow-Köpenick.
 The cases show that North-South city partnerships are not isolated activities 
but are part of a broader municipal IC policy framework. For local administra-
tions, city partnerships are instruments that serve a range of objectives, including 
contributing to global awareness raising, facilitating civic society international 
cooperation initiatives and strengthening partner municipalities and local gov-
ernance conditions in the South.
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2 Local government human resources for C2C
A second factor that has an impact on the performance of municipalities in devel-
opment cooperation refers to the availability of human resources for IC activities. 
The existence of organisation-wide consultation structures and the definition of 
key roles within local governments determine whether a pool of experienced and 
skilled staff members is available for partnership projects. Individual capacities 
(both technical and partnership capacities to interact with the partner, such as 
language, cultural understanding and knowledge of the partner country) as well 
as the mechanisms to select staff for partnership projects are underlying deter-
minants. The availability of human resources is particularly relevant as local gov-
ernments are not core development experts and questions have been raised about 
the suitability and knowledgeability of local governments to act as partners in the 
international development arena.
 A first point of attention is the positioning of IC in the organisation, the sub-
sequent staff time available for IC, and how participation of staff and decision-
making are organised. In the municipality of Amstelveen, the administrative re-
sponsibility for IC lies with the Policy Department, with its budgeted schedule 
of twenty hours per week. The number of individuals involved can be regarded as 
limited and fixed. There is no formalised consultation structure such as a work-
ing group or task force that brings together partnership participants. In Treptow-
Köpenick, IC is administratively embedded in the mayor’s office. The full-time 
position is officially for EU affairs only, and due to the absence of a clear C2C 
mandate, partnership activities are not formally administered. No additional mu-
nicipal staff is involved in the partnership as there is no institutional capacity 
building relationship with Cajamarca. The lack of C2C policy instruments leaves 
decision making largely to the mayor, making the partnership vulnerable to po-
litical will and commitment. In the Alphen administration, the four to six hours 
per week dedicated to IC can be regarded as very limited. Similar to Amstelveen, 
while a relatively limited but permanent group of officials is involved in the part-
nership, there is no formalised consultation structure within the local adminis-
tration. Part of this is due to the unfortunate position of IC in the organisation. 
IC is embedded in the Department of Welfare and Education, which covers more 
than 30 policy topics and where IC is the odd one out.48 The local government 
has considered shifting IC to the Municipal Manager’s office. This shift would 
not only permit more integral project planning and corresponding participation 
from the various departments, it would also enhance the possibilities to make IC 
more visible and exert influence directly on the various departments.
 The administrative responsibility of the partnership in Utrecht lies with the 
Department of Governmental and International Affairs, concerned with a wide 
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range of international issues. Moreover, within the administration, a decentralised 
consultation structure is set up to manage the León South East (LSE) project, 
which has been the key focus of the municipal partnership between Utrecht and 
León since 1998. The structure brings together various line Departments, staff 
and external advisors and an external consultant, the project coordinator. Such 
a multi-disciplinary team, which includes urban planners, architects, and social 
policy advisors, contributes to the integral approach the LSE project seeks to 
have. It also facilitates and coordinates the division of labour in accordance to the 
needs expressed by León municipality. The project group meets every six weeks. 
Four to six work visits are paid to León by one or two members. The decentral-
ised structure allows for broad consultation within Utrecht’s administration. Not 
only do the involved officials deliver technical expertise, each line department 
also contributes financially to the LSE project. Such an integral project structure 
is a positive factor with regard to generating wide administrative support and 
additional funding for the partnership and facilitates matching existing expertise 
with the partner city’s needs.
 A second note that can be made is that, with regard to human resources, various 
mechanisms are in place for the selection of project participants. In Alphen and Am-
stelveen, participation was mainly based on invitation, according to expertise need-
ed. In Utrecht, the LSE project group has selected through conducting interviews 
and reviewing CVs. Not only technical expertise but also knowledge of the Spanish 
language and experience with working in developing countries are considered, as 
well as the ability to understand the way of working of the Southern partner. Such 
criteria are important to take into account if local governments seek a professional 
approach to development cooperation, not only to maximize project performance 
but also to prevent the involvement of staﬀ  members who are just looking for an 
opportunity to travel or who may be very eager to participate but lack the necessary 
technical or cultural skills to cooperate eﬀ ectively with the partner organisation.
3 Available ﬁ nancial resources and the capacity to tap from external 
funding
A third factor concerns the financial resources that municipalities make available 
for their North-South partnership. Municipal IC is voluntary, thus the availabil-
ity of capital may be a sensitive issue. In all four case studies, part of the mu-
nicipal budget is allocated on a structural basis to international cooperation and 
the partnerships in particular. Table 1 provides an overview of the main annual 
financial figures for the four Northern cities.
 Comparing the financial contribution for the C2C partnership with the total 
IC budget,49 the four cities spend an average of 31 of their IC budget (LA21 
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budget for Treptow-Köpenick) on the city partnership. The figure is relatively 
low for Amstelveen, where a large portion of the IC budget is absorbed by eco-
nomic development/trade activities. For international partnerships, 70 is dedi-
cated to VES. The figures for Alphen are rather surprising since the partnership 
with Oudtshoorn is considered the single activity of International Cooperation 
in Alphen. Apparently a large share is also allotted to civic society initiatives. The 
 35,000 amount is based on the calculation of dedicating one former Dutch guil-
der to IC for each Alphen inhabitant. Because the partnership with Cajamarca is 
an element of Treptow-Köpenick’s LA21 process, the figures show the IC share in 
the municipal contribution to LA21 activities. In 2006, the municipality for the 
first time allocated a structural budget to Local Agenda of  30,000 per annum. 
This helps overcome the vulnerable financial position of the partnership, as the 
municipality does not have a structural budget for IC.
Table 1 Annual municipal budgets for C2C and IC (Euro)
The figures only reflect structural contributions. Moreover, Municipal Councils 
may decide on occasional donations. Examples include a project by Amstelveen 
for disabled people and donations for reconstruction after a fire in 2003 in VES, 
and Alphen offering emergency relief in response to, for example, the Asian tsu-
nami in 2005, and the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The amount of these ad-hoc 
donations have ranged from  1,000 to  25,000.
 The budgets illustrate the financial resources available from the municipal-
ity as an institution. Moreover, there are various examples where, on an organ-
isational and even an individual level, financial contributions are made to the 
partnerships. A very clear example of the former is the decentralised financial 
contribution that the various line departments in Utrecht’s government make as 
member of the León South East Working Group. Six line departments contrib-
Municipal budget for 
C2C partnership
Municipal budget 
for international 
cooperation*
Share of C2C 
partnership in the IC 
budget (%)
Amstelveen (2007) 30,000 146,000 21%
Treptow-Köpenick 
(2006)
10,400 30,000 35%
Utrecht (2007) 128,700 565,876 23%
Alphen (2006) 15,000 35,000 43%
* For Treptow-Köpenick: Municipal budget for Local Agenda 21
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uted  13,000 each to the project annually. The aggregate amount of  78,000 is 
an addition to the central municipal LSE budget and accounts for over 50 of the 
project budget of  130,000 made available by the Municipality annually.50
 Within the local administration, various donations are raised for the North-
South partnerships. Examples include fundraising activities during Christmas 
or at social staff gatherings (Alphen, Utrecht), or charity events such as the col-
lection of second-hand toys to ship to the partner city (Alphen). At the indi-
vidual level or the staff member level, some financial contributions to partnership 
projects were observed. Examples include the donations of departing councillors 
(Amstelveen) and officials (Utrecht). The donation of Christmas bonuses was 
also mentioned. Although these contributions may be considered very modest 
and fairly insubstantial financial contributions for the partnership, they are more 
important for their added value in awareness raising and creating support for the 
partnership among local staff. It also reflects the often tremendous personal com-
mitment and dedication to the partnership and its projects.
 Municipalities in the North are often severely limited in their international 
aspirations due to restricted financial resources. Small and medium-sized munic-
ipalities, in particular, have modest budgets for international cooperation. Mu-
nicipalities thus turn to external funding sources that have increasingly become 
available via national and supranational organisations. In the case of Amstelveen, 
the main external funding source was provided by VNG. Moreover, the munici-
pality has also been able to receive funding from the Province of Noord Holland, 
where the city is located, as well as from a local housing association. The finan-
cial contributions from local administrative sources are very modest compared to 
various external sources. The contribution is mainly of an in-kind type, i.e., the 
hours invested by local officials who provide knowledge and expertise in city-
to-city exchanges. While it was estimated that in 2004 and 2005 a total of over 
 500,000 was invested in the partnership from external funding,51 the municipal-
ity’s contribution was approximately  60,000 for that same period.52 The large 
majority of financial contributions thus come from external sources.
 VNG has also been a major source of additional funding for Utrecht and Al-
phen. In Utrecht, VNG funding accounts for 40-50 of the annual budget for the 
LSE project, which was  124,262 in 2006. In Alphen, virtually all of the technical 
exchanges and work visits were financed by a VNG subsidy. In recent years, the 
City of Utrecht has further attracted external funding from a range of NGOs 
and CBOs. It was estimated that in 2007,  70,000 was allocated to León from 
the municipal budget against  502,000 from external sources.53 Moreover, both 
Amstelveen and Utrecht have been very successful in finding additional donors 
and other partner cities involved in VES and León for their partnership projects, 
which generated more financial assistance.
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 Hence, for three of the four involved partnerships, external funding was es-
sential for the Northern cities. This has a number of consequences.
– The cities in the North have created a multiplier effect of financial resources 
channelled to their partner cities in the South. By using C2C partnerships as a 
development cooperation strategy, various flows of Dutch national and subna-
tional funding sources are funnelled into the local level in the South, allowing 
Dutch financial development assistance to become decentralised.
– It should be noted that while additional funding is often crucial to the finan-
cial viability of C2C partnerships, there is also a danger that local administra-
tions will become overly dependent on external funds. The criteria to gain 
access to external funding may have a strong impact on partnership agendas 
and may impose limitations on the utilising of the full potential of municipal 
expertise. It can also undermine the continuity of partnerships when subsidies 
are withdrawn.
4 Political and administrative support for C2C
A fourth condition is political and administrative support that is needed to 
sustain C2C efforts. It has been considered54 an advantage that IC is not a core 
task for municipalities, as they are not dependent on this task for their exist-
ence. However, it also presents one of the main vulnerabilities of IC: it is highly 
dependent upon political will and administrative support to make it a successful 
municipal affair. Will power and commitment are relevant on both the political 
level (it produces a political mandate which justifies IC activities) and on the ad-
ministrative level. Meanwhile, for the large majority of local officials, IC is not a 
core responsibility and participants are involved on a voluntary basis.
 Local political leaders assume both the key political and representative roles in 
the partnerships. The political responsibility for IC usually lies with the mayor. 
Political leaders have the capacity to increase and sustain political support for 
the partnership within the Municipal council and to assist in attracting potential 
partners in partnership activities. Mayors play a significant role in partnerships 
and are often involved in work visits and other activities. It has been found that 
the representation and ceremonial aspects of international cooperation seem to 
be valued, especially by municipalities in the South. This is illustrated by the 
signing of various cooperation agreements by the mayors in all four case studies, 
or it involved official mayoral visits to the partner city.
 In Treptow-Köpenick, in the absence of any formal IC policy, the mayor’s 
role and the need for political commitment have been essential. In Alphen, 
although IC is politically mandated and the mayor is very much in favour of 
strengthening local governance in the partner city Oudtshoorn, broad politi-
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cal support and commitment from the council is virtually absent. The political 
engagement in IC is very limited.55 A general lack of political support makes the 
partnerships vulnerable. This became very clear in 2004, when, in the context 
of municipal expenditure cuts, the city council proposed to remove IC from the 
muncipal budget. There are some similarities in the case of Amstelveen. While 
there is council support for IC, the city partnerships are rarely an agenda item 
at city council meetings and cannot be considered a relevant political issue.56 In 
the case of Alphen and Amstelveen, we can therefore speak of ‘passive political 
support’, in which the Municpal Council approves and tolerates International 
Cooperation rather than their actually being pro-actively involved and politi-
cally interested.
 The presence or absence of political concern is also reflected in the appear-
ance of IC as an issue during the election campaigns of local political parties. In 
a review of election programs of the various local political parties in Alphen and 
Utrecht presented during the municipal elections of March 2006, there is mixed 
evidence regarding the importance of MIC to local political parties. While the 
election programs in Alphen reveal that local political parties barely acknowledge 
the potential responsibility local governments could have with regard to Inter-
national Cooperation, the political parties in Utrecht are generally much more 
aware of the city’s international position. With some exceptions, the frequent 
appearance of IC as an item in municipal election campaigns reflects that local 
political visions do have an international dimension in Utrecht.
 Support among administrative staff members for C2C activities has also prov-
en important. While the objectives of solidarity and development cooperation 
have been mentioned as important driving forces in the maintenance of interna-
tional partnerships for the various municipal institutions, additional advantages 
have been mentioned that may be related to the sphere of human resource man-
agement. The possibility of participating in partnership activities can be regarded 
as fringe benefits to local government officials, which fosters employee satisfac-
tion and motivation, while, at the same time, strengthens the capacity of the local 
government. Amstelveen’s mayor stressed that participation in the partnership 
enriched his staff, empowered and inspired them in their functions. A senior 
manager stressed the importance that the partnership provided his experienced 
staff with a “completely new point of view”.57 Partnership participation was seen 
as a relatively radical way to put one’s daily work routine into perspective. The 
international experience through partnership participation is thus regarded as an 
opportunity for human resource development. In Amstelveen, therefore, the cur-
rent discussion revolves around the various partnership activities and how they 
can become a more integral part of Human Resource Management policies as a 
fringe benefit.
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 Participants no doubt reap benefits from participating in these activities and 
are usually very committed, although, in most of the cases, overall administra-
tive support was fairly passive. The majority of staff were not really involved in 
any partnership activities, and participation was ‘limited and vulnerable’.58 In this 
light, the role of local champions acting as ambassadors for the partnership in 
their organisation and beyond appears crucial in all of our case studies. Moreover, 
the mayors have proven that they are a vital link in creating such support. Table 2 
provides an overview of mayoral activities that are illustrative of how they cham-
pion the initiatives.
Table 2 The champion role of political leaders
5 Local government cooperation with development partners in support 
of C2C eﬀ orts
A final condition for local governments as development agents is related to their 
potential to establish strategic alliances or relationships with other partners for 
their C2C efforts. As was already noted, C2C is not just confined to local govern-
ments alone. The participation of civic society and other urban actors has often 
been mentioned as a critical and distinguishing element of the C2C modality. 
Moreover, local governments in the North may seek external financial and capac-
Amstelveen –  Leadership for campaigning and fundraising after a 2003 fi re which 
damaged part of the partner city
–  Mayor lobbied within Municipal Council to create political support 
before the 2006 Municpal Elections
–  Mayor lobbied in Dutch Parliament and VNG for C2C and Peru 
Treptow-Köpenick –  Ceremonial openings of partnership exhibition by mayor
–  Mayoral work visits to Cajamarca
–  Mayor allocates municipality’s ‘representation budget’ to C2C
Utrecht –  Regular mayoral visits to León
–  Chairing of city-wide consultation meetings on C2C with León 
Alphen –  One technical exchange project started thanks to personal contact 
the mayor had with his counterpart in South Africa
–  Mayor has IC track record and has a key advisory position in VNG 
activities regarding international relations
–  Mayor argued succesfully to have an international paragraph 
included in the municipal programme and budget (2002-2006)
–  Mayor seeks public relations opportunities by doing interviews in 
staff  journal and local newspapers to promote C2C
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ity support from their national governments and official donors to sustain their 
C2C activities. The relationships of local governments discussed here are with a) 
international and national government partners, including local government as-
sociations, b) the decentralised public sector, c) NGOs and other external, non-
governmental development agents, d) civic society, and e) the private sector.
 National governments, local government associations and international do-
nors have set up a wide range of support programs for C2C, such as the United 
Cities and Local Governments (UCLG), UNDP, UN-Habitat, the European 
Union, Cities Alliance and the European Council of Municipalities and Regions 
(CEMR).59 The question is to what extent local governments make use of the 
support and assistance available from external funding and donors for their C2C 
activities. This not only refers to the extent to which municipalities attract exter-
nal funding, as was explained above, it also entails tapping into technical capacity 
building to increase their performance as development partners. VNG has of-
fered numerous training programs for Dutch municipal staff. Courses are provid-
ed on local governance in the South, the conditions of working in North-South 
partnerships and preparations for overseas missions. The Dutch cities have par-
ticipated in a number of these programs. Amstelveen has also been successful in 
getting moral support from the Dutch embassy and financial cooperation for an 
environmental project in Villa El Salvador from the European Commission Del-
egation in Lima.
 Various public institutions (both governmental and semi-governmental) at a 
decentralised level often participate in partnership activities. In both Alphen and 
Amstelveen, local housing associations have been actors in the partnership. In 
Amstelveen, the association provided external funding to set up a municipal tech-
nical support office in Villa El Salvador to give advice on housing construction 
and gaining access to government housing subsidies and construction licenses for 
VES citizens. In Alphen, the municipality discussed the possibilities of seeking 
financial and technical assistance from the local housing association for a social 
housing project in Oudtshoorn. Furthermore, Amstelveen has been able to in-
volve the Province of Noord-Holland, which has provided funding for the instal-
lation of a water and sewage system in one of the newer VES neighbourhoods. 
Utrecht’s municipal electricity company facilitated the installation of solar energy 
panels in a rural development project outside of León. In Treptow-Köpenick, 
there are no actors in this category of the partnership network.
 National NGOs and other external development agents are partners that 
bring in external financial- or knowledge-related resources to local governments 
for their C2C activities. These include various national subsidy schemes aimed 
at decentralised development cooperation and subcontracting project consult-
ants. In Utrecht, various Dutch NGOs (MFOs)60 have contributed to partner-
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ship activities and have financed awareness-raising projects. Moreover, these or-
ganisations have contributed to existing local projects through national funding 
schemes such as KPA, which double the investments.61 Treptow-Köpenick has 
been able to invite a number of officials and students from Cajamarca on three-
month professional internships in Germany, financed by the ASA program.62 
Utrecht and Alphen have used external consultants, bringing in development ex-
pertise to C2C projects that would have been unavailable within the local govern-
ment environment.
 The relationships of local governments to civic society were plentiful and di-
verse. In all of the cases except Amstelveen, a coordinating civic society entity has 
been a central source for the local C2C partnership architecture. These entities 
can be defined as non-governmental organisations that have been established to 
carry out activities within the framework of the C2C partnership. They have a 
unique position in the sense that their existence depends primarily on the fact 
that the city is engaged in the C2C partnership, while the partnership in most of 
the cases is not a core issue for other participating actors, including local govern-
ment. The coordinating entities are often funded by local government agencies, 
to enact awareness raising and educational activities. For other civic society actors 
involved in the C2C partnership, it has served as a coordinating and facilitat-
ing role in the various collaborations and projects executed in the partner city. 
For example, in Utrecht, the Foundation Utrecht-León serves as the coordinating 
entity. It channels initiatives from Utrecht’s civic society to support León, and 
thereby facilitating the linking of schools and child care centres in the two cities, 
initiating development educational, employment creation and cultural projects 
in León as well as projects that foster the organisational strengthening of Leo-
nese NGOs and micro-finance schemes. The foundation is funded by the City 
of Utrecht to cover administrative costs. In return, the foundation is engaged in 
awareness raising and education activities, which are essential to the municipal-
ity’s IC policy. Similar coordinating civic society entities exist in both Alphen 
and Treptow-Köpenick. They have an additional role in joining and subsequently 
facilitating various C2C activities for numerous civic society groups, including 
schools and youth, citizens (volunteers, neighbourhood committees), churches, 
libraries, private charity funds, etc.
 The practice of local governments cooperating with the private sector in C2C 
activities is still very limited. Moreover, business participation is often channelled 
through local charity wings of business associations such as the Rotary Clubs, 
which represent the business sector as a whole rather than individual local busi-
nesses. Rotary Clubs play a role in the three Dutch cities in partnership activities. 
They donate money or organise various charity projects. Some individual busi-
nesses donate directly on an ad hoc basis. In Alphen, the local Fair Trade shop 
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sells products made by a small-scale handicraft business in Oudtshoorn. Private 
sector contributions to C2C activities are, however, mostly facilitated by the co-
ordinating civic society entities and this means they usually do not directly take 
part in local government activities.
 Discussion and Conclusions
Due to ongoing urbanisation and the understanding that future poverty chal-
lenges need to increasingly be tackled in the cities of the developing world, and 
in the light of increased acknowledgment of the ‘urban’ in development thinking, 
it seems that the presence of cities and local governments in the development 
cooperation arena is here to stay. This is manifested by the ever-growing number 
of cities engaged in international activities and the number of city networks that 
bring together cities to work on various development issues. This chapter has dis-
cussed the role of local governments in development cooperation so that we can 
better comprehend the underlying factors that shape this role and that explain its 
successes and failures to a large extent.
 The Dutch and German examples have shown that, because of the voluntary 
character of municipal involvement in North-South cooperation, C2C efforts 
need to be institutionalised in local governments in order to be sustained. This 
includes having a formal international cooperation policy framework in place 
with the necessary financial and human capital available. Gaining political and 
administrative support for C2C activities is equally important. Because resources 
are often limited and development cooperation is not the raison d’être of munici-
pal organisations, the case studies reveal that seeking external support for fund-
ing and expertise amplifies the opportunities for C2C. Building multi-sectoral 
partnerships with local community actors strengthens the necessary public sup-
port and widens participation.
 From the national policy context analysis, we can conclude that local govern-
ments in the Netherlands and Germany operate in different political, financial 
and juridical realities. The empirical examples have demonstrated how the dif-
ferences in the institutional frameworks of the two countries are manifested at a 
community level. The German case of Treptow-Köpenick shows the struggle to 
guarantee and sustain the provision of human and financial resources for inter-
national partnerships and activities that have been very dependent upon the po-
litical initiative of the local mayor. The Dutch cities seem to benefit considerably 
from the funding and technical expertise from the national government available 
to the C2C partnerships. It should be noted, however, that while external funding 
is of great importance for local governments that engage in development coop-
European Development Cooperation.indd   282 29-6-2010   21:04:37
The Role of European Local Governments
eration, it also simultaneously poses some real risks of becoming too dependent. 
For example, Amstelveen found itself no longer being funded by VNG-I in 2008. 
This made the continuation of the projects uncertain and the municipality had to 
invest a great deal of time and energy into seeking new funding opportunities.
 An interesting point of discussion is the dual objectives of cities engaging in 
C2C partnerships, which aim to strengthen local institutions and foster local de-
velopment in the South, while at the same time, they aim to raise awareness and 
public support among their own citizens on development-related issues. Local 
level partnerships have traditionally been considered sites for development edu-
cation in the North. But because C2C is not confined solely to local government 
activities, it offers many opportunities for citizens to be exposed to development 
cooperation and issues related to global poverty and inequality, and the possibil-
ity to establish intercultural contacts and obtain greater global awareness. C2C is 
a form of decentralised development cooperation that directly involves communi-
ties, which has the potential to translate the abstract matter of far away places and 
large-scale donor development assistance into the world of the citizen. The dual 
objective, however, also poses some tensions regarding the scope and content of 
C2C activities and projects. For example, although donating school materials to 
various educational institutions in the partner city may offer a concrete illustra-
tion to donor citizens and may correspond to their notion of solidarity with the 
South, the developmental impact may, in practice, be rather limited. On the other 
hand, the technical exchanges between the partner municipalities do not gener-
ally appeal to the citizens, especially when they are not ‘visible’ due to the projects’ 
focus on institutional or organisational aspects, such as financial administration, 
implementing IT systems or the design of new policies and plans. When results 
are difficult to demonstrate it may also be complicated for local governments to 
justify their international aspirations and investments vis-à-vis their constituents 
who want their local taxes to be well spent. Local authorities thus need to find 
a balance between generating visible, media-attractive development results and 
employing their expertise in highly technical municipal cooperation efforts. The 
case of Utrecht is a good example in this respect, where the municipality has ‘del-
egated’ awareness-raising activities to the Friendship Foundation, while, at the 
same time, it also engages in technical cooperation with the partner municipality 
in León.
 It should be noted that in order to fully understand the impact of C2C on lo-
cal governance strengthening and community development in the South, more 
questions need to be answered. The position of local governments in the South 
that become involved in C2C is one area that needs more research. This includes 
many of the conditions discussed here, as well as the institutional framework mu-
nicipalities are operating under, such as the country’s decentralisation agenda and 
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the fact that development assistance flowing directly to local levels is not always 
appreciated by national governments in the South. It can be argued that in order 
to fully reap the benefits of C2C, local governments in the South need to have 
a locally created development strategy in place on which C2C interventions can 
build. This also allows for the coordination of projects from various C2C part-
nerships, because many municipalities have more than one partner city (León and 
Villa El Salvador are examples). A second area relates to the question how cities 
operate in a partnership context that connects the different realities of the North 
and South. C2C links similar institutions with relatively similar characteristics, 
activities and roles in their respective communities, which produces a relatively 
high level of mutual understanding. At the same time, structural inequalities are 
persistent in North-South partnerships with the North having financial, techno-
logical and institutional advantages over the South. For C2C to be most effective, 
there is a need to understand how North-South partnerships between local gov-
ernments can be shaped to respond to existing needs and a development strategy 
put forward by the partner in the South.
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 IOB, On Solidarity and Professionalisation. Evaluation of Municipal International Co-oper-
ation (-), Den Haag, Policy and Operations Evaluation Department.
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 VNG, Een wereld aan kansen, de stand van zaken op het beleidsterrein gemeentelijke inter-
nationale samenwerking in , Den Haag, VNG International, . 
 NCDO, Barometer Internationale Samenwerking , trends en ontwikkelingen, Amster-
dam, Nationale Commissie voor internationale samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkel-
ing, . 
 IOB, .
 Ibid.
 Apart from external funding, Dutch municipalities spend an estimated aggregated    
million per year on international cooperation. For the majority of municipalities involved 
in CC, CC is a separate budget item on the municipal budget. This is on average an 
amount of  , per municipality, or  , per inhabitant (SEOR, ‘ Evaluation of the 
Dutch Municipal International Co-operation Programme: Three Independent Projects’, 
SEOR BV/ Ecorys-NEI, September , in: IOB, On Solidarity and Professionalisation. 
Evaluation of Municipal International Co-operation (-), Policy and Operations 
Evaluation Department). 
 Interview with H. Buis, VNG-International, January , . In , the programme 
was extended until  and received an additional grant of   million, which reflects 
the Ministry’s continued acknowledgement and commitment to decentralised coopera-
tion in the Netherlands. 
 The design of the funding programme has been influenced by a study carried out by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For the first time in history, Dutch city-to-city cooperation 
policy was evaluated on a national scale. The report recommended to make policy formu-
lation more results-oriented and flexible while increasingly taking into account the local 
context. A stronger thematic and geographical focus should prevent scattered, isolated ac-
tivities. Moreover, it was suggested that CC as specific form of development cooperation 
be more aligned and harmonized with other aid modalities, to facilitate mutual synergies 
(see note ). 
 They include: Benin (local taxes), Egypt (local water supply and sanitation), Ghana 
(financial management), Indonesia (local water management), Namibia (HIV/AIDS), 
Nicaragua (local government), The Palestinian Territories (solid waste and waste water 
management), Sri Lanka (waste management), Sudan (water supply and waste manage-
ment), Surinam (capacity development of decentralised districts), Tanzania (financial 
management) and South Africa (social housing).
 Buis, H., ‘The role of local government associations in increasing the effectiveness of city-
to-city cooperation’, Habitat International, vol. , no. , , -. 
 Nitschke, U. and S. Wilhelmy, ‘Challenges of German citycity cooperation and the way 
forward to a quality debate’, Habitat International, vol. , no. , , -.
 On a total of some , German municipalities, this figures suggests that  to  of 
German communities are engaged in international partnerships. The figure however does 
not take into account the distribution of the number of partnerships among the munici-
palities. 
 Heinz et al.,  quoted in Nitschke and Wilhelmy, . 
 Nitschke and Wilhelmy, .
 Ibid. 
 The main criteria for the selection of these partnerships include: a) A formal coopera-
tion agreement exists between the local authorities of the partner cities, b) a range of 
urban actors is involved, representing and targeting both local institutions and civic 
society in both partner cities, and c) the objectives of the partnerships (e.g. expressed 
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in cooperation agreements) are linked to institutional strengthening, poverty allevia-
tion or local development in the South. Research methods included interviews with key 
stakeholders from municipal councils, local administrations and civic society; document 
analysis of e.g. municipal international cooperation policies, municipal budgetary re-
ports and project evaluations; and observations of e.g. partnership missions and visits to 
project sites.
 Amstelveen Municipality Beleidskader internationale betrekkingen -, . 
 Interview official  Amstelveen Municipality, January , .
 Interview official  Amstelveen Municipality, July , .
 Interview official  Treptow-Köpenick Municipality, January , .
 Interview official  Alphen Municipality, October , .
 The overall IC budget relates to all IC activities. The figures are derived from an analysis 
of municipal budgets and IC policy and work programmes and from personal communi-
cation. 
 Interview LSE working group member, May , .
 Amstelveen Municipality, .
 Interview official  Amstelveen Municipality
 Utrecht Municipality, Work plan International Affairs, .
 Hafteck, .
 Interview Mayor of Alphen aan den Rijn, March , 
 Interview official  Amstelveen Municipality.
 Interview official  Amstelveen municipality.
 Interview Mayor of Amstelveen, July , .
 Bontenbal, M. and P. van Lindert, ‘Bridging local institutions and civic society in Latin 
America: Can city-to-city cooperation make a difference?’, Environment & Urbanization, 
vol. , no. , , pp. -.
  of the national government budget for Dutch development cooperation is disbursed 
annually through medefinancieringsorganisaties (MFOs) or co-financing organisations. 
These NGOs cooperate with local partner organizations in the South and include, 
amongst others, Oxfam/Novib and Cordaid. 
 The KPA program for small-scale local activities increases fundraising aimed at develop-
ing countries with a maximum contribution of  of the total amount, provided that 
awareness-raising activities are included.
 The ASA programme is a network for ‘learning in the field of development policy’ and 
offers internships in Germany to young professionals and students from developing coun-
tries.
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Th e Role of Local and Regional Authorities in 
European Community Development Aid Policy
 Beyond Decentralised Aid
Jokin Alberdi Bidaguren1
 Clariﬁ cation of Concepts: About Decentralised Aid
To avoid possible confusion about the contents of this paper, it is necessary to 
start by clarifying a number of concepts related to international development aid. 
First, there is a difference between the development aid of the European Union 
(EU) and community development aid. The latter refers to development aid to 
third countries which originates from, is planned and managed by, and in large 
measure also carried out by institutions of the European Community (EC).2 This 
European aid, together with the aid from Member States is what is referred to 
as EU development aid. Community aid is complementary to that carried out by 
the EU Member States. In this sense, as long as there is no significant transfer of 
bilateral development efforts to the objectives of the political community, it can 
be said that EU aid is based on the model of the 15 Member States (or the 27 if we 
take into account the latest accessions to the EU). The aid efforts are bilateral and 
are complemented by aid coming from community institutions. In spite of this 
fragmentation of official aid, it should be borne in mind that, taken as a whole, the 
EU contributes more than half of the world’s Official Development Aid (ODA), 
much more than that of the World Bank or the United Nations (UN).
 Second, when looking at decentralised aid and community aid in greater de-
tail, it is useful to differentiate between bilateral and multilateral aid. Public and 
official financing comes from the budgets of central, regional and municipal gov-
ernments, and these funds can be directly channelled by the donor governments 
to the recipient governments (bilateral aid) or can be used to fund multilateral 
organisations (multilateral aid). In the latter case, control of the funds lies not 
with governments but with the international institutions.
 Traditionally, community aid has been classified as multilateral aid, given that 
the institutions of the EC controlled the funds, which came primarily from the 
Member States. However, this has been called into question since, with the ‘com-
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munitisation’ of development policy, although the EU itself has begun to be seen 
as a relevant actor on the aid stage, the role of Member States in designing and 
implementing Community aid has continued to increase.
 Third, it should be noted that there is no consensus on what to call aid pro-
vided by sub-state administrations. While some institutions, such as the OECD’s 
DAC, prefer to use the expression ‘extended aid’ to refer to ODA provided by mu-
nicipalities, provinces, regions and/or states of federations (OECD 2005), there 
is a tendency elsewhere to use the confusing expression ‘decentralised aid’. Decen-
tralised aid could have several different meanings. The phrase has been devised to 
mean aid that comes from sub-state level administrations, but it could also mean 
a new conception of aid with the participation of a new broad spectrum of actors 
from societies in both the North and the South, characterised by a decentralisa-
tion of initiatives, which has arisen as a reaction to the over-centralisation of 
ODA and of the donor countries (Dubois 2000).
 In the case of the EU, decentralised aid is mostly used in this second sense. 
There is a tendency to define it to include all of the development activities carried 
out by agents and institutions which are not part of central governments, includ-
ing official actors and civil society (AIETI 2000). Within this perspective it is 
common to place NGOs alongside local and regional authorities in the category 
of non-state actors, even though the latter undoubtedly have a governmental role 
and are thus part of the state.
 Decentralised aid is defined as including aid from local and regional authori-
ties and other sub-state institutions, or in other words from non-central govern-
ments (NCGs), a term which includes the aid provided by municipalities, prov-
inces, regions and/or states which are part of federations and is preferable to the 
term ‘non-state actors’. This type of aid is also known as Official Decentralised 
Aid (ODA) (Díaz Abraham 2008).
 Fourth, and lastly, it is worth clarifying whether cooperation by the NGOs 
and other non-governmental actors comprises decentralised cooperation or not. 
This confusion arises primarily because a large percentage of the decentralised 
initiatives undertaken by the NGOs are financed with funding from a number 
of public administrations. Bearing in mind that the definition that establishes 
decentralised aid as cooperation carried out by sub-state administrations, the aid 
provided by NGOs, would not be described as decentralised aid.
 On the contrary, starting from the second definition (Dubois 2000; AIETI 
2000), a distinction can be made between the aid provided by NGOs – that of 
non-governmental decentralised aid – and the decentralised aid provided by the 
NCGs – Official Decentralised Aid. That distinction will be the focus of this 
paper.
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 Decentralised Aid in EU Member States: A Diverse Picture
There are no detailed studies or reliable data on the aid provided by regional and 
local authorities in EU Member States. The main reference is the recent report of 
the OECD DAC (2005) on ‘extended aid’, which compiles statistical information 
and describes the nature of the institutional framework of the aid carried out by 
the local and regional governments of 12 DAC member countries, eight of which 
are EU members (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain).
 The report identifies major limitations in analysing decentralised official aid 
in the DAC/OECD countries: the problem of reaching a consensus on the ter-
minology related to decentralised aid, the lack of unified criteria and methods for 
the collection of information in different countries, the existence of numerous 
initiatives of non-central authorities which do not fit the description of ODA, 
and the absence of data about some states where local governments play a signifi-
cant role in aid (the Netherlands and the UK, for example).
 In spite of these problems, however, this DAC publication provides a very 
informative and perceptive introduction to the rising phenomenon of NCG aid 
in the main donor countries. The chart in appendix 1 reflects the increasing im-
portance of local governments in ODA.3 The more difficult question concerns 
the analysis of the EU’s official decentralised aid.
 The obstacles to analysing official decentralised aid in the EU arise from vari-
ous complexities. These include the diverse nature of states (federal states, re-
gional states with or without autonomy, centralised or non-centralised unitary 
states), the complication of intergovernmental relations, which is part of the 
process of European integration, and the lack of homogeneity between the insti-
tutional levels of different Member States.
 Using the DAC report as a basis,4 and with no claim to completeness, appen-
dix 2 provides some data about state systems, the capacity for external activities 
by sub-state entities and the legal–institutional framework of decentralised co-
operation in EU Member States, which are also DAC members.5
 With regard to the models of political-administrative organisation of states, 
and more specifically to the capacity of different sub-state administrations to 
carry out external activity and development aid, the following observations can 
be made.
 First, the form of the state (federal or unitary) is not the main determinant of 
whether EU countries have a highly active NCG sector in development aid ac-
tivities. While the sub-state administrations of federal states (Austria, Belgium, 
Germany) and of both regional states and unitary states with high levels of po-
litical and administrative decentralisation (Italy, Spain) tend to have especially 
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active NCG aid programs, we should recognise that the foreign aid activities of 
local institutions in the other more unitary states (especially France) are on the 
increase.
 In nearly all cases, central governments are responsible for international rela-
tions. In many of the states analysed, however, there is some kind of legal-consti-
tutional recognition that NCGs can also engage in international action (at least 
in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and the UK). There is no doubt that in recent decades local and regional govern-
ments, as well as the institutions of the Community, have been increasing their 
presence on the international political stage and this complicates the sharing of 
competencies between different levels of government on the question of develop-
ment aid.
 Second, it is clear that there is a great diversity between local and regional 
structures within each country. This means that every Member State has its own 
special model of official decentralised aid. The degree of transfer of powers from 
central governments to municipalities, regions and/or federated states is so het-
erogeneous that external action by sub-state administrations in the field of devel-
opment aid is almost impossible to classify coherently.
 What does emerge from the analysis is that not all EU Member States are 
active on every level of their respective sub-state administrations. In Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy and Spain regional governments and the municipali-
ties (and sometimes provincial governments) all have their own development aid 
policies. Th e rest of the Member States (Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and the UK) are only active at municipal level.
 Third, the level of institutionalisation of these policies is also very heteroge-
neous. In some countries, such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Italy and France, the 
NCGs (Länder, regions, autonomous communities, provinces, municipalities and 
groupings of municipalities) have their own funds and specialised public bodies 
which plan their development aid initiatives, and even coordinate them with their 
respective central governments. In other countries, there is a much greater degree 
of informality in the development-oriented activities carried out by local bodies 
and the level of institutionalisation of decentralised cooperation is much lower.6
 Fourth, provisional data suggests that Belgium, Germany, Spain and to a lesser 
degree Italy devote more ODA to official decentralised aid (or ‘extended aid’). On 
the other hand, partly in contrast to some of the conclusions of the DAC report, 
it can be said that the expansion of this kind of aid is no longer something pe-
culiar to those states. Although the different aid initiatives of the NCGs in the 
rest of the Members States largely depend on contributions from their respective 
state development agencies and they are rarely self-financed, a growing interest in 
this kind of aid can be detected in the majority of these countries.7
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 As will be seen in the next section, however, the activities of local and regional 
governments continue to play only a marginal role within the totality of Com-
munity policy. The inclusion of aid dispensed by non-central administrations in 
the Member States in the same category as aid by NGOs and other non-govern-
mental actors, as well as the lack of interest in achieving greater coherence and 
complementarity between local and regional policies and Community policy on 
this question, offer conclusive proof of the meagre importance which the Com-
munity authorities give to the area of decentralised official aid.
 Overview of the Legislation, Instruments and Institutions of 
Decentralised Aid in Europe
The end of the Cold War presented the world with new challenges, especially in 
relation to fighting poverty and attaining the Millennium Development Goals. At 
the same time, there has been a deepening of the process of European integration, 
marked by particular uncertainty about the evolution of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Both of these developments have accelerated reflection 
about and the implementation of a new model of development cooperation in the 
European Community.
 The present legal framework (Titles XX and XXI of the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Community) affirms the complementary character of Community develop-
ment policy and the bilateral aid policies of the Member States. The document 
which establishes new directions for European Community aid policy (European 
Consensus on Development 2005) continues to be committed to move towards 
a Community aid policy which is more internationally relevant and which im-
proves its complementarity with the aid policies of the Member States and cohe-
sion with all the other European Community policies which affect third countries 
(trade, security, migration, environment and so on).
 The 1999 reform of the Commission led to profound changes in the legal-
institutional model of Community aid. These included the formation of Euro-
peAid, reduced concentration of aid to the Commission Delegations in devel-
oping countries, accelerated the adoption of new aid rules, decision-making via 
recognised procedures and co-decision, and a resulting increase in the role of the 
European Parliament. In addition to these changes, the important formation of 
the EU General Affairs and External Relations Councils (GAERC) in the design 
of development policy and the new sharing of functions between the Directorates 
General of Development and External Relations (DG DEV and DG RELEX) in 
the Commission are facilitating deeper ‘communitisation’ of aid policy (Alberdi 
2007).
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 Some examples of the growing articulation between Community aid and the 
bilateral aid policies of the Member States are: the adoption of some joint aid 
strategies based on different international undertakings (the MDGs and the fight 
against poverty, the effectiveness of aid and the Paris Declaration); the coordi-
nated drafting of Strategic Country Documents, which help to determine the 
development policies of partner countries; and the improvement of the follow-up 
mechanisms and the annual European Community development policy reports 
(Maxwell et al. 2004).8
 In spite of these improvements in the organisation of joint action between 
the community institutions and the Member States, the EU’s aid policy is by no 
means perceived as a single entity. On the contrary, there are new sources of con-
fusion regarding the part aid recipients and other international actors play when 
attending a donors meeting. For example, it is normal to find one chair occupied 
by a representative of the European Commission and others occupied by differ-
ent representatives from the bilateral aid agencies of the Member States.
 The steps that have been taken towards the communitisation of aid and de-
velopment in the last few years are a good reflection of the dialectic between the 
inter-governmental and federalist visions in the process of constructing the EU. 
Without any doubt this tension leaves a number of legal-constitutional questions 
unresolved. These include the sharing of functions regarding development aid, 
the participation of the Community institutions and the Member States in the 
decision-making process, and the coordination and collaboration between bod-
ies, which administer different aid initiatives.
 Within the framework of this transformation of EU aid policy, the role played 
by local and regional bodies has been a residual, even irrelevant, one that neither 
corresponds to the level of interest nor to the surge in these local development aid 
initiatives in virtually all Member States mentioned in the previous section.
 As already indicated, the EU considers decentralised aid to be a new angle on 
aid in which the main protagonists are local authorities and civil society – an an-
gle which aims to reinforce the capacity for dialogue among the involved actors in 
the developing countries thus stimulating the rise and consolidation of democra-
cy. The European Community, in carrying out its mission to complement the aid 
activities of the Member States, has not shown much interest in aid provided by 
local authorities in Member States, and has limited itself to providing resources 
to various actors in civil society and in local institutions.
 For the EU, decentralised aid has thus been converted into an instrument of 
poverty reduction and the pursuit of sustainable development, especially in very 
difficult contexts in which traditional mechanisms (ODA, indicative national 
plans, diplomacy, sanctions, embargoes, political dialogue and so on) do not 
work. In such difficult circumstances, EC institutions can use the international 
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relations involved in the NCGs’ decentralised aid to try and influence weak or au-
thoritarian governments in developing countries. Nevertheless, the limitations of 
the EC’s financial programs in relation to decentralised aid and the scant amount 
of attention given to this means of cooperation make it difficult for these initia-
tives to become key instruments for the reduction of poverty. It does not seem 
likely that their results in situations where cooperation is difficult are going to 
contribute to the substantial improvement in contexts of fragility and a lack of 
democracy.
 As will be seen below, this perspective of the European Community on decen-
tralised aid has not changed much since the beginning. The 1989 Lomé Conven-
tion contained the first references to decentralised development aid. EC Council 
Regulation 443/92 regarding financial and technical assistance for economic aid 
to developing countries in Latin America and Asia underlined the convenience of 
adopting an approach to development that included decentralised aid.
 Within the framework of the 1992 budget, initial funding was therefore in-
cluded in order to encourage this approach and this was later consolidated with 
EC Regulation 1659/98 of the 17 July 1998 Council meeting on decentralised aid. 
This Regulation recognised the support of the EC for development initiatives 
carried out by the agents of decentralised aid (including local public authorities) 
and established a level of funding (18 million ECUs) for the period 1999-2001. EC 
Regulation 955/2002 continued the financing (by the same amount) until 2003.
 After an evaluation of the budgetary support, EC Regulation 625/2004 in-
troduced a number of modifications to EC Regulation 1659/98, insisting that 
this instrument of decentralised aid meant a specific bonus to support actions 
in specific situations and in difficult circumstance where traditional instruments 
could not be used.9 In addition, new institutions were added to the list of partici-
pants in decentralised aid, in particular, European Community institutions.10 The 
budget for this program for the period 2004-2006 remained at 18 million.
 As a result of the debates on the reform of the EC’s policy on aid, the Com-
mission for External Relations and Decentralised Cooperation of the Commit-
tee of the Regions was consulted in order to assess the role of the local and re-
gional authorities in the design of this new policy. In this Opinion, CoR (2005) 
RELEX-034,11 the Committee of the Regions positively valued having been con-
sulted by the communitarian institutions on this question. But, at the same time, 
it regrets the fact that European local authorities’ contribution to the European 
Development Policy, and to other external assistance policies, continues to go 
largely unrecognised, even by the EC.
 However, the Committee of the Regions lauded the tendency to include the 
local and regional authorities in the same dispositions and programs as non-state 
actors and the intention to highlight the cooperation of the NCGs, and suggested 
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extending initiatives like the Observatory on Decentralised Cooperation between 
the European Union and Latin America,12 created in 2004, to other regions of 
the world. It also suggested there was a need to carry out investigations of decen-
tralised cooperation, and the creation and strengthening of networks of local and 
regional governments which develop initiatives on decentralised cooperation.
 After 1 January 2007, this regulation on decentralised aid was replaced by EC 
Council Regulation 1905/2006, which establishes a financing instrument for de-
velopment cooperation.13 The instrument includes a thematic program (2007-
2010) for non-state actors and local development authorities (COM (2006) 19). 
However, it does not seem that these new changes imply substantial alterations 
in the decentralised aid that already promoted by the European Community.
 This new program is seen as part of the new ‘European Consensus’ develop-
ment policy and is a substitute for both NGO cofinancing programs and de-
centralised aid budgets. It is designed to complement other thematic programs 
(in particular those on democracy and human rights) and gives special priority 
to the recipient countries of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership In-
strument.14 In addition, the non-state actors and local authorities (especially the 
latter) will receive financial support from some of the EC’s geographically based 
development aid programs, which allocate funds to decentralisation processes.
 The launching of this program is helping to promote initiatives aimed at ad-
vancing local initiatives in the processes of development and participation in 
European and developing societies. Independence from the state, closeness to 
the civil society and a pragmatic approach provide advantages over other pro-
grams. But the aims of the new approach are not so very different from previous 
ones, since decentralised aid is still primarily directed towards those non-state 
actors and local governments that are marginalised by other geographical-based 
or country programs, or are in fragile, post-conflict or unstable situations.
 Besides initiatives on the ground, this thematic program also includes an in-
crease in initiatives in the field of development education and the coordination 
and communication between civil society networks and local authorities both in 
the EU and in candidate countries.
 Different evaluations of the EC’s various decentralised aid programs during 
the last decade suggest that the participation of local authorities in aid projects 
needs to be promoted and improved, and it seems as if this new thematic pro-
gram accepts that suggestion. The COM (2008) 626 and the Opinion of the CoR 
(2009/C 200/05) on “Local Authorities: actors for development” confirm this 
tendecy.
 However, Community institutions and the Member States still do not consid-
er the NCGs to be important actors in aid. As a result, several needs have still not 
been incorporated into the EU’s aid agenda: the participation of these sub-state 
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bodies in the decision-making process of Community aid policy, the recognition 
of the complementarity between Community, state and sub-state institutions in 
development policies for third countries, and policy coordination between gov-
ernments at different levels.
 Local and Regional Bodies in community Aid Policy and Inter-
Administrative Coordination
The second section of this article analyses the formulae for the participation of 
non-central governments (NCGs) in Community aid policy and the mechanisms, 
which exist for collaboration between the different public administrations (at 
Community, state and sub-state levels).
 In order to address that question it is necessary to make a number of legal-
constitutional points about the capacity for international action by Community 
institutions and sub-state bodies and to clarify the distribution of areas of re-
sponsibility or competence on questions of international development aid.
 External action by the European Community and aid as a 
‘complementary competence’ of the Union
In recent years, as noted earlier, both sub-state and supra-state entities have be-
come increasingly active in the international sphere and that, as a result, the com-
plexity of the subjects that are covered by the term ‘international relations’ and 
the distribution of competence in matters of development aid between different 
levels of government have become increasingly more complicated. The EU is ob-
viously very much part of this tendency.
 The problem of Member States in reaching consensus positions on any par-
ticular crisis has been stressed on numerous occasions. In the long term, however, 
despite the long list of the EU’s foreign policy failures (Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
Rwanda, Iraq and others), it would be fair to recognise that the EU has also be-
come one of the most significant international players in other areas such as hu-
man rights, democracy and good governance, the prevention of violent conflicts, 
the struggle against international crime and regional cooperation and integration 
(Smith 2003).
 The 1992 Treaty on the European Union made a distinction between, on the 
one hand, foreign relations which are a Community responsibility, based on the 
legal personality of the European Communities and which are given functions 
that are usually exercised by states, and, on the other hand, the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) which is concerned with the rest of foreign policy, 
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and which is subject to an inter-governmental logic and has no international legal 
personality. Development aid is a significant element of the external activity of 
the European Communities and therefore falls into the Community category.
 Article 177 of the Treaty of the European Community has declared that the 
Community’s policy in the field of development aid will be complementary to the 
policies undertaken by the Member States. In practice, this means that Commu-
nity institutions can produce legal provisions that affect the content of develop-
ment aid. However, according to the principle of subsidiarity, these provisions 
can only be directed towards support and coordination of the different aid poli-
cies of the various administrations which make up the European Union. The rest 
of the articles of Titles XX and XXI, which relate to Community policy, specify 
that this complementarity has to be translated into mutual support between the 
Community and the Member States.
 The deficiencies of coordination between the development aid policies of the 
Member States are, however, a matter of concern in that the states often do not 
accept the need to make their policies consistent with Community policy to such 
an extent that they seem to be denying the principle of Community loyalty (Man-
gas and Liñan 2006).
 As mentioned above, the EU has to be seen as a conglomerate of 28 entities: 
27 Member States (of which it should be remembered that only 15 are members 
of the DAC/OECD) and the European Community. As we have already pointed 
out, these entities do not necessarily act in either a joint or coordinated way in 
matters of foreign policy and development aid.
 This conglomerate of entities has a variety of ways of operating abroad (Tor-
rent, 2004), which are all in force simultaneously and which, depending on the par-
ticular case, can be eﬀ ective to varying degrees. Th e EU can act alone (though only 
in matters there are the exclusive ﬁ elds of operation of the Union). Member States 
can act in their own name outside of the EU framework since they have competence 
in questions of international relations. In those areas, they can act jointly within the 
framework of the EU. Th e Community and the Member States can each exercise 
their own powers, but can try to organise their actions in a joint way.
 Th is variety of EU options is carried over into the ﬁ eld of development aid. 
Being an area of ‘complementary competence’, the EU cannot simply act alone on 
questions of development aid. Furthermore, the Member States continue to initiate 
policies and activities on aid, which fall outside the EU’s ambit. For example, it is 
common for Member States to agree on development programs with their former 
colonies completely outside the policy or ﬁ nancial framework of the EU.15 Th is, 
however, is not an obstacle to the Member States and the Community institutions 
that prevents them from reaching greater coherence and coordination in their aid 
policies; they have also increased collaboration and joint action in this ﬁ eld.
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 Indeed, there have been some outstanding steps forward in efforts towards 
planning a Community development policy, in which the aid organisations of 
each Member State participate more and more, and in the adoption of joint aid 
policies relating to various international goals.16
 The successive reforms of the constitutive treaties (Amsterdam 1999, Nice 
2001, and Lisbon 2009) have succeeded in alleviating some of the defects of the 
CFSP system and of the EU’s foreign policy, and have also facilitated the crea-
tion of a legal-constitutional foundation for Community development aid poli-
cy. The adoption of the procedure of co-decisions, the framework of community 
rules on development aid questions and the adoption of Council documents 
which establish an overall EU strategy in this field (particularly the Develop-
ment Policy Declaration of 2000 and the policy declaration ‘Consensus Europe’ 
of 2005) are strengthening the trend towards the communitisation of develop-
ment aid.
 Although Community aid broadly continues to be complementary to the bilat-
eral policies of the Member States, the various reforms of the constitutive treaties 
and later changes in the institutional framework have, in fact, meant that some 
improvement in joint action by the Community institutions and the Member 
States has occurred. Nevertheless, there is still a long way to go.
 It can certainly be said that the main debate about development aid in the EU 
today is less about defining the role and competence of the European Community 
in the field and more about how the Member States can advance from an attitude 
to aid based on their respective national interests towards a higher level of coher-
ence in their initiatives and a Community policy for development aid.
 External activity of the sub-state bodies and the development aid of 
the Member States
The small steps forward in the complementarity between Community aid policy 
and that of the Member States are also affected by the heterogeneity of formulae 
which different Member States use to distribute the responsibility for develop-
ment aid policy within their own countries. This question is particularly relevant 
in territorially complex states where there is an especially complicated division of 
responsibility for external policies between state and sub-state institutions (Pé-
rez González 1998).
 Although, formally speaking, development aid is usually regarded as being in-
tegrated into the area of international relations, and is therefore a responsibility 
of the central government, there is, in fact, a certain amount of decentralisation 
of aid policy to regional and municipal authorities in almost all of the EU states 
(see appendix 1 for details).
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 The external activity of sub-state bodies and their international legal position, 
especially in states with a significant degree of political decentralisation, and the 
interpretation of international relations as a central government prerogative of 
the central government, have given rise to important doctrinal debates in the field 
of constitutional and international law.
 The main issues in these debates have been the capacity of non-central gov-
ernments to be responsible for implementing international treaties in their own 
territory, the possibility of including regional representatives in central state del-
egations, which negotiate such treaties, and the representation of regions in inter-
national organisations.
 In relation to this question of external action by sub-state bodies, two main 
theoretical positions have been put forward (the ‘core’ theory of competencies and 
the autonomy theory). Despite their apparent contradiction, they, in fact, reach 
rather similar conclusions.
 The first theory argues that sub-state bodies do not have the capacity to par-
ticipate in activities of international relevance (mainly that they cannot sign 
international treaties or establish embassies), but they allow for international 
activities by NCGs, which do not have a legal-international status and which, 
therefore, do not generate central government obligations or, if they do, then only 
ones which are clearly defined by both sides. The second position openly defends 
the idea that whoever has responsibility for an issue has that responsibility both 
internally and externally. It therefore advocates the possibility that sub-state bod-
ies should be able to make external agreements that are fully valid under inter-
national law and the need to develop means of collaboration between NCGs and 
central states (Beltrán 2001).17
 In both cases, regional and local bodies can act at the international level, as 
long as their external activities do not compromise the area for foreign relations 
reserved for the state. According to Beltrán (2001), there may be an emerging 
international custom at the European level of protecting the right of regions and 
local governments to enter into agreements with foreign entities.
 In practice, the factors that determine the ﬁ eld of international action that is 
open to regional and local bodies include the intensity with which the state reserves 
its prerogatives in international relations, the formula used to divide responsibili-
ties into matters of development aid and the spending power of the bodies them-
selves. In some cases, state laws allow regions to have direct treaty-making powers; 
in others, the power is indirect or is totally nonexistent. But, in general, the central 
authorities in Member States certainly do not stop sub-state and non-state entities 
from making agreements with their counterparts in developing countries.
 It is fairly common for municipalities and regions of the EU that have suf-
ficient financial resources of their own to finance foreign initiatives and devel-
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opment aid to encounter no opposition from the central governments of their 
respective Member States. Hence, budgetary autonomy is one of the most deter-
mining factors in how the responsibility for aid is shared in practice.
 To translate these debates into the language of this paper, some decentral-
ised aid initiatives require state authorisation (as can be seen in appendix 1) but 
in most cases there is a tendency to recognise the right to external activity by 
sub-state bodies on matters in which they have competence. Countries such as 
Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain,18 the UK and the Netherlands 
(the last two at the municipal level) give a large degree of freedom to NCGs to 
carry out activities in other countries and pursue development aid initiatives,19 
while local authorities in Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Sweden, for instance have little freedom to engage in external activities, although 
it has already been argued that this does not necessarily mean that they are not 
involved in some instances of decentralised development aid.
 It seems clear that an area of competence like international relations, which, by 
definition belongs to central governments, is, in practice, becoming increasingly 
shared. This means, at least in states with considerable decentralisation, that gov-
ernments extend part of the responsibility for foreign relations to regional and 
local bodies, giving them considerable leeway to act in this sphere. Of course, the 
ability of these bodies to look beyond their borders remains subject to the prin-
ciples of inter-institutional cooperation, self-responsibility and constitutional 
loyalty (Pérez González 1998).
 Participation in decision-making or the existence of means of coordination in 
questions of aid between NCGs and their respective states is similar to relations 
between the European Community and its Member States in that it does not 
guarantee coherence between policies or that conflict between administrations at 
different levels can be avoided.
 In cases where decentralised aid is simply an extension of a central govern-
ment’s ODA (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, the UK 
and, possibly, France) few problems of this kind are encountered. In states with 
a greater level of political decentralisation, however, especially regional govern-
ments (for instance, Länder, autonomous communities, etc.) the model of the 
NCGs is more autonomous with independent policies, which display a greater 
variety of levels of coherence and coordination with the central government.
 The absence of institutional coherence between different administrations 
and the isolation of sub-national authorities that have their own aid policies 
occasionally provokes a situation in which the most decentralised aid policies 
show little desire to cooperate with their respective central governments (Des-
met and Develtere 2002; Ruíz Seisdedos 2005). In fact, the positions of the 
most autonomous and decentralised aid policies have increasingly come into 
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conflict with the foreign policies of their respective states or even of the Com-
munity.
 Recently there has been an increase in the bilateral and multilateral initiatives 
of NCGs as regional and local development funds have grown. Sub-national au-
thorities are using new forms of direct and delegated aid such as country-wide 
coordination of aid projects undertaken by the non-state actors which finance 
them; budget support to sub-state bodies; provision of resources to global or 
multilateral funds fighting poverty and providing development aid. These fit 
alongside the more traditional methods of financing non-state actor projects 
or collaborations between local governments from the North and South. This 
increase in direct aid from sub-state bodies may reopen constitutional debates 
about the external activities of sub-state entities and the extent of their compe-
tence in matters of development aid.
 However, sometimes both state and European Community authorities have 
been conscious that this apparent ‘invasion’ of their area of competence in inter-
national relations could work to their own benefit. When the EU and the Mem-
ber States enters into difficult negotiations with some governments in develop-
ing countries, they encourage the active participation of their sub-state bodies to 
keep of the channels intervention open in politically fragile contexts.
 Possible formulae for the participation of regions in Community aid 
institutions
On the basis of the principles of loyalty, inter-institutional cooperation and self-
responsibility mentioned above, effective and efficient, sub-state bodies should 
participate in the drafting of Community aid policy and respect the framework 
established by the authorities of the European Community in order to make the 
actions taken by different governments more coherent and complementary.
 However, as was emphasised above, the governments of the Member States, 
and their respective NCGs, have not shown much interest in making their re-
spective development aid policies coherent and coordinated. There are other di-
mensions besides the direct participation of NCGs in development aid in third 
countries, which need to be taken into account in the search for more coherence 
and coordination. Sub-state bodies should participate directly and indirectly in 
the creation and implementation of provisions and state and Community policies 
relating to development aid.
 Although the NCGs of the individual Member States participate in interna-
tional and development-aid related activities of many kinds, there are few formal 
means of coordination between administrations at the intra-state level. Even the 
states where decentralised aid is more institutionalised (i.e., Germany, Belgium, 
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Spain and Italy20) have not established formulae for the participation of sub-state 
bodies in the formation of national aid policies and have not developed any effec-
tive structures of coordination between different levels of government.
 This question has not been adequately dealt with in the European Commu-
nity either. Notwithstanding some improvements in the articulation between 
Community aid policy and the Member States’ bilateral policies, the programs 
of decentralised aid and the formation of a Commission within the Committee 
of the Regions specialised in decentralised cooperation have yet to find a place to 
develop and implement Community aid policy and there has been little effort to 
involve them.
 The Community institutions should use some of the EC’s international efforts 
(such as the EU’s contribution to achieving the MDGs or implementing the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness) as a basis for providing objectives and instru-
ments that are in tune with their respective states and the European Community 
to those who provide decentralised aid (Gómez Gil 2007). But this is not enough 
since it is necessary to develop a more elaborate view of the rationale for harmo-
nising decentralised aid with EU development policies.
 The current situation could be improved by instituting measures to make up 
for past neglect such as:
– strengthening the role of the Commission for External Relations and Decen-
tralised Cooperation of the Committee of the Regions in designing the EC’s 
cooperation policy;
– creating multilevel institutions for dialogue and cooperation between the or-
ganisations and European, Central and Non Central governments, which leg-
islate and implement international aid policies;
– regional and local bodies that fulfil the Community’s aid provisions;
– central and non-central governments participating in the development of a 
national position on aid-related questions and early participation in relevant 
discussions in the GAERC;
– developing indirect means for influencing other institutions that implement 
aid policies, which fosters the formation and implementation of Community 
aid actions and policies (influencing issues debated in the European Parlia-
ment, the Committee of the Regions and the EU-ACP joint Parliamentary 
Assembly; having a presence in the DG RELEX, DG DEV and EuropeAid; 
increasing exchanges between decentralised aid participants and the delega-
tions of the EU in third countries on aid matters).
These proposals can serve to stimulate confidence and strengthen cooperation 
between different administrations, creating greater coherence and coordination 
of development aid between various EU agencies.
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 Final Th oughts on Decentralised Aid in the EU
The fact that not enough attention has thus far been paid to official decentralised 
aid is a growing phenomenon in the EU.21 In spite of the recent formal recognition 
of the role of local authorities as actors in the field of aid, the European Com-
munity needs to undergo a profound change in its approach to decentralised aid 
and gain a better understanding of how the aid provided by sub-state actors is 
something more than just some thematic program within a financial instrument.
 Although the adoption of the new thematic program ‘Non-state actors and lo-
cal authorities in development’ is a step forward, it is clearly not enough, because 
the NCGs of Member States need to be more fully incorporated into the impor-
tant roles of Community aid.
 In other words, beyond envisaging decentralised cooperation from a more in-
dependent perspective that is closer to citizenship and more participative, EC 
institutions should understand that decentralised official aid has to be treated as 
equal to the aid provided by the bilateral agencies of the Member States. The fact 
that decentralised aid has developed differently in each country should not be 
used as an excuse to marginalise the sub-state bodies in the area of Community 
aid policy.
 Aid activities undertaken by sub-state administrations in the EU are also part 
of EU foreign policy and, as such, should be included when drafting Commu-
nity provisions, implementing EC aid policies and fulﬁ lling international develop-
ment-related undertakings by European institutions. Th erefore, the Community 
institutions should initiate a series of institutional reforms and measures designed 
to guarantee the full participation of NCGs in the EC’s development policy.
 Continual changes in the EU’s foreign policies have certainly made the in-
corporation of heterogeneous models of decentralised aid in the Member States 
more difficult. The diversity of the ‘modus operandi’ envisaged in the EU’s aid 
plans is made even more complicated by the differences between sub-state models 
of development aid, which, depending on their constitutional position and degree 
of institutionalisation, vary from highly integrated to highly autonomous.
 This diversity means that the formulae for the participation of regional and 
local authorities in Community aid policy have to be very flexible and adapted to 
the variety of decentralised aid contexts, which are found within the EU.
 In order to avoid incoherence and disloyalty, NCGs with more developed and 
independent aid policies should be given assistance in finding new channels of 
participation, which should be part of a reformed Community aid policy. Provid-
ing a feeling of participation in aid activities undertaken by Community institu-
tions and a commitment to particular objectives (such as the MDGs) could help 
increase coherence between decentralised aid policies and those of the EC.
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 The incorporation of this local approach could become a distinctive element 
in the EU’s model of development and international aid. It is well known that the 
Community institutions have attempted to maintain their own model of devel-
opment, emphasising the eradication of poverty, the importance of multilateral 
relations and the need to strengthen people’s capacities. This is in stark contrast 
to the conservative, unilateralist and developmentalist neoliberalism of other he-
gemonic actors in the aid field. Greater attention to the local processes of human 
development and the construction of new global links based on the active par-
ticipation of various local participants could produce an alternative vision to the 
hegemonic models of aid and development (Dubois 2007).
 Policies of decentralised aid that originate in regions and local corporations 
are based on their solidarity with less fortunate communities and peoples, while 
bilateral aid policies and Community aid are much more part of foreign policies 
and are influenced by other geostrategic, political and economic interests.
 Decentralised aid is, however, not exclusively motivated by disinterested val-
ues of solidarity. As bilateral and multilateral forms of aid from NCGs increase, it 
is possible that the aid policies of these sub-state bodies will become increasingly 
linked to economic and commercial interests or to the NCGs’ own international 
objectives.
 It is possible that the incorporation of NCGs in the EC’s aid policy may lead 
to contradictory results. Bearing in mind that the EU’s aid is still very closely 
related to the national interests of the Member States, decentralised aid could, 
on the one hand, contribute to an alternative vision of development aid, while, on 
the other hand, the development of mutual support between Community institu-
tions, the Member States and the NCGs would be no guarantee that Community 
aid policy would give priority to the development of people.
 Future changes in the EC’S aid policies will be closely linked to the defence of 
the interests of the Union and it is therefore likely that the general policy lines 
will depend on other Community policies (trade, security, migration, etc.). The 
present incoherence between different Community policies and aid policy is no 
more than a foretaste of what is yet to come.
 Considering the dominant paradigm in cooperation that focuses on achiev-
ing the MDGs and the effectiveness of aid, and without forgetting the limited 
reach of the local human development proposals and of disinterested decentral-
ised cooperation, the actors in this modality of cooperation, including NCGs, 
face three scenarios. The first scenario will be the maintenance of the current 
inertia, accepting dispersion and a lack of coordination on aid, and the negative 
consequences that will affect development. The second scenario is the ’centralisa-
tion‘ of decentralised aid, meaning its integration into bigger development coop-
eration frameworks, and attempts to influence international, communitarian and 
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national development policies. The third scenario entails NCGs following their 
own ways, keeping their distance from the crisis of the present official aid model, 
and trying to create an alternative vision to these hegemonic models of coopera-
tion.
 The last scenario looks like the preferred one, but it is necessary to harmonise 
and coordinate local aid with bilateral and EU development policies, fund the 
good practices of sub-state governments while also increasing collaboration be-
tween local and European institutions in initiatives that really contribute to the 
local human development of their counterparts.
 Notes
 This paper was written with funding from the University of the Basque Country (EHU 
/) and the Basque Government (IT--). I would like to thank Bob Sutcliffe, 
Dunia Marinas and Nestor Atxikallende for their comments and the English translation.
 In the decision-making process on Community development aid, as in other fields, the 
European Commission is a participant, proposing the general lines to be adopted, while 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union later approve or reject 
the proposals. In relation to the European Commission, two directorates general (of Ex-
ternal Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, DG RELEX, and of Development 
and Humanitarian Aid, DG DEV) have policy-making and administrative functions and 
are charged with preparing the decisions of the Council and the Parliament. Regarding 
the EU Council, the decision-making role is assumed by the General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC). In the case of the European Parliament, the Committee on 
Development (DEVE) deals with these types of questions. Meanwhile, other Community 
bodies and entities linked to the European Commission are responsible for managing 
Community development aid (particularly EuropeAid) and humanitarian aid (ECHO) 
and for representing the Community institutions in third countries (the EU Delegations 
in developing countries). There is also the EU-ACP joint Parliamentary Assembly, which 
oversees the agreements between the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
(ACP) and which makes proposals to improve these agreements.
 This lack of statistics makes determining the quantitative expansion of decentralised aid 
a complex matter. Nevertheless, some of the existing data suggests an increasing interest 
in this phenomenon. Appendix  verifies that decentralised aid already makes up  
of Spanish official aid, and more than  of German official aid. Other data shows the 
same tendency, including: the increase in cofinanced ‘City to City’ (CC) programs (for 
example, Asia Urbs and URB AL) which are financed by the European Commission, or 
the program ART-GOLD, which is dependent on the UNDP, that helps regional and 
local authorities in the South and the North to set up alliances and partnerships in sup-
port of local development and governance processes; greater activity by and the creation 
of new associations of local governments at national and international level, like for ex-
ample the United Cities and Local Governments that estimates that approximately  
of the cities of the world participate in initiatives of international cooperation (UCLG, 
).
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 In drafting these tables, we have used, information taken from the websites of the vari-
ous bilateral agencies of the Member States of the EU, the Council of European Mu-
nicipalities and Regions (CEMR) and other national groupings of municipalities and 
regions of various countries, in addition to the DAC report on ‘extended aid’ (DAC/
OECD, ).
 Although the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia are members of the OECD, 
only  of the  EU members are members of the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK).
 Some outstanding exceptions are the groupings of bodies (mainly municipal) of vari-
ous states which have a long history of international aid: Local Government Denmark 
(LGDK), the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities (Local Finland) , 
the International Cooperation Agency of the Association of Netherlands Municipali-
ties (VNG), the National Association of Portuguese Municipalities (ANMP), the Local 
Authorities Development Agency (SALA IDA) from the Swedish Association of Local 
Authorities and Regions (SALAR) and the UK Local Government Alliance for Interna-
tional Development (UK LGA).
 In this respect, it could be said there is increasing promotion of local North-South coop-
eration, which is being developed by different international associations of municipalities 
and regions like the council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR): http://
www.ccre.org and the United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG): http://www.cit-
ies-localgovernments.org.
 These interesting reports and documents on Community development policy can be 
found at: http://www.eu.int/comm/europeaid/reports/index_en.htm.
 On this see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/other/r_en.htm.
 The EC Regulation / identifies, in addition to traditional NGOs, the follow-
ing potential partners in decentralised aid programs: local public authorities (including 
municipalities), organisations of native populations, professional groups, local initiative 
groups, cooperatives, trade unions, organisations representing economic and social inter-
est groups, local organisations which work in the area of decentralised aid and regional in-
tegration, consumers’ organisations, women’s and youth organisations, teaching organisa-
tions, cultural organisations, research organisations, scientific organisations, universities, 
churches, religious associations and communities, communication media, all kinds of not 
governmental organisations and independent foundations capable of making a contribu-
tion to development.
 On this see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:::
::EN:PDF 
 On this see: http://www.observ-ocd.org/ 
 In COM ()  it was decided to replace the complex system of geographical finan-
cial instruments (PHARE and ACCESS, MEDA, TACIS, ASIA, AMLAT) as well as 
the theme-based ones with a new simplified system involving four instruments, including 
‘a development cooperation and economic cooperation instrument’. The other three are: 
an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, a European Neighbourhood and Partner-
ship Instrument and an Instrument for Stability. These in turn are composed of various 
theme-based and geographic programs.
 These countries are Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine.
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 By way of example, outside the EU-Latin America and Caribbean meetings, Spain and 
Portugal continue to participate in the ‘Iberamerican Summits’ making different aid pro-
posals, which do not necessarily have to concur with the EU-ACP agreements or other 
Community programs. 
 The pillars of the present development policy of the Community institutions can be 
summarised as follows: a) eradication of world poverty by including in their agenda the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and the undertakings on Aid Ef-
ficiency of the Paris Declaration (); b) integration of these countries in the world 
economy through the new Economic Association Agreements (EAAs) which aim to be 
compatible with WTO rules; and c) contributing to the consolidation of democracy, hu-
man rights and the rule of law in developing countries through political dialogue, the 
democratic clause and various specific instruments of this kind which the Community 
institutions have developed. 
 This author argues that this idea of the `core´ exclusive competence of the state in mat-
ters of international relations originates in the Italian doctrine which stresses that activi-
ties with international relevance, that is, those which have international legal implications, 
belong to the central state, while the autonomy theory has its origin in the idea of parallel 
competence found in the Belgian doctrine. (Beltrán, ).
 As an example, article . of the Spanish development aid Law / specifies the 
form of participation in such matters by autonomous communities and municipalities 
and, in that way, recognises the capacity of these sub-state entities to act in the field of 
development aid, as long as it is consistent with the main aims and priorities of Spanish 
development aid policy and respects the basic directions established by the Congress of 
Deputies, mainly through the multi-annual Directive Plans of the Government, and as 
long as it accepts the principle of collaboration between public administrations in mat-
ters of access to and the provision of information and maximum possible use of public 
resources.
 In the case of Belgium and Germany, the communities, regions and Länder are capable 
of signing international treaties in areas which fall under their jurisdiction. In the case 
of Austria, Italy and Spain it appears to be the case that, although the scope for external 
action is very wide on questions which are their own responsibility, there are some limits 
when it comes to international treaties.
 In Spain an Interterritorial Commission was created in which the state administration 
and the autonomous and local governments meet periodically to exchange information, 
collaborate and coordinate and participate in drawing up the Directive and annual plans 
for development aid. In spite of recent encouragement, the Commission has not been very 
active until now. In Germany an annual meeting is held between the federal government 
and the Länder. In Italy the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Directorate General 
for Aid and Development, establishes the means of cooperation with decentralised aid. In 
Belgium there are no provisions for participation and coordination. 
 This paper has analysed decentralised aid in the Member States of the EU from a legal-
institutional perspective. Other variables, such as the financing formulae of development 
projects could, however, be more relevant to understanding the reality of this phenom-
enon. Another pending task is a deeper study of the local counterparts of European de-
centralised aid in the South.
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Appendix 1 ODA from local governments reported in DAC statistics
Member Amount 
Reported 2002 
USD million
Amount 
Reported 2003 
USD million*
As % of 
bilateral
ODA Average 
2002-03
Systematic data collection 
from:
Spain 246.4 321.0 18.0 * Autonomous governments
Germany** 465.4 687.3 11.0 * Federal states
Belgium 46.6 59.8 5.0 * Regions, communities, 
provinces, municipalities
Italy 15.8 27.3 2.0 * Regions, provinces, 
municipalities
Switzerland 16.1 22.4 2.0 * Cantons
* Active municipalities 
(about 300); complete 
survey (2912 municipalities) 
every 5 years
Austria 2.7 3.9 0.9 * Federal states
* Most active municipalities
Canada 14.0 17.5 0.9 * Provinces
Portugal n.a. 1.0 0.5 * National Association of 
Municipalities
France 6.6 39.5 0.4 * In 2002: regions
* in 2003: regions, 
departments, 500 largest 
towns
Japan 5.2 9.9 0.1 * Prefectures, biggest cities
Australia 0.7 0.8 0.08 * State and territory 
governments
Greece 0.2 0.1 0.07 * Regions, active prefectures 
(29) and municipalities (65)
Source: DAC (OECD) 2005
* As a share if bilateral ODA committments (similar results are obtained if calculated as share of 
gross disbursements).
Over 90% of the amounts reported by Germany relate to imputed student costs.
Data on local governments was unavailable from: Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, United Kingdom, Denmark, European Commission, Ireland, Sweden, United 
States.
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St
at
e 
an
d 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
.
– 
 N
o 
da
ta
 fr
om
 re
gi
on
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
– 
 Th
e 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 F
in
ni
sh
 lo
ca
l a
nd
 
re
gi
on
al
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s c
oo
rd
in
at
es
 N
or
th
-
So
ut
h 
Lo
ca
l A
ut
ho
rit
ie
s P
ro
gr
am
m
e 
th
at
 
tr
y 
to
 b
ui
ld
 c
ap
ac
ity
 a
nd
 st
re
ng
th
en
 th
e 
ro
le
 o
f l
oc
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 w
or
ld
w
id
e.
 
M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 c
ov
er
 2
0%
 o
f c
ofi
 n
an
ci
ng
 
sc
he
m
e 
an
d 
th
e 
re
st
 is
 fr
om
 c
en
tr
al
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t.(
re
gi
on
s c
an
 a
pp
ly
)
Fr
an
ce
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 2
6 
re
gi
on
s (
w
ith
 re
gi
on
al
 
co
un
ci
ls
 e
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
un
iv
er
sa
l s
uff
 r
ag
e)
 +
 
10
0 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 (a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
ch
ie
f 
– 
pr
ef
ét
 –
is
 th
e 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
e 
of
 th
e 
ce
nt
ra
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t)
 +
 3
6,
77
8 
m
un
ic
ip
al
 
co
un
ci
ls
.
– 
 Lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s c
an
 m
ak
e 
ag
re
em
en
ts
 
w
ith
 c
ou
nt
er
pa
rt
s b
ut
 n
ot
 w
ith
 
fo
re
ig
n 
st
at
es
 (p
re
fé
t m
us
t a
ut
ho
ris
e 
ag
re
em
en
ts
).
– 
 Re
gi
on
s, 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 to
w
ns
 
pa
rt
ic
ip
at
e 
in
 d
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 a
id
. N
at
io
na
l 
Co
m
m
is
si
on
 fo
r D
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 A
id
 
(C
N
CD
) a
nd
 G
ui
de
 o
f d
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 a
id
 
(2
00
0)
 p
ro
vi
de
 lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 w
ith
 
pr
ac
tic
al
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
id
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
.
– 
 Fr
en
ch
 D
ev
. A
ge
nc
y 
(A
FD
) s
up
po
rt
s 
de
ce
nt
ra
lis
ed
 a
id
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
.
– 
 Ci
té
s U
ni
es
 fe
de
ra
te
s a
t t
he
 n
at
io
na
l 
le
ve
l, 
Fr
en
ch
 te
rr
ito
ria
l c
om
m
un
iti
es
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l a
id
.
– 
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
Fr
an
ça
is
e 
du
 C
on
se
il 
de
s 
Co
m
m
un
es
 e
t R
eg
io
ns
 d
’E
ur
op
e 
(A
FC
CR
).
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St
at
e 
Te
rr
ito
ria
l O
rg
an
is
at
io
n 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 A
id
 F
ro
m
 R
eg
io
ns
 O
r F
ed
er
al
 
St
at
es
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 A
id
 F
ro
m
 L
oc
al
 A
ut
ho
rit
ie
s
G
er
m
an
y
– 
 Fe
de
ra
l R
ep
ub
lic
: 1
6 
fe
de
ra
te
 st
at
es
 
(L
än
de
r) 
w
ith
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e,
 e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
po
w
er
s w
ith
 e
xc
lu
si
ve
 a
nd
 sh
ar
e 
co
m
pe
te
nc
ie
s +
 3
23
 d
is
tr
ic
ts
 (K
re
is
en
), 
an
 in
te
rm
ed
ia
ry
 le
ve
l w
ith
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
an
d 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
bo
di
es
 a
nd
 im
po
rt
an
t 
co
m
pe
te
nc
ie
s[
??
] +
 1
48
65
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
(G
em
ei
nd
en
 u
nd
 S
tä
dt
e)
.
– 
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
el
at
io
ns
 fa
ll 
un
de
r 
au
th
or
ity
 o
f F
ed
er
at
io
n,
 b
ut
 n
ot
hi
ng
 
hi
nd
er
s l
oc
al
 g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 fr
om
 h
av
in
g 
re
la
tio
ns
 w
ith
 th
ei
r f
or
ei
gn
 c
ou
nt
er
pa
rt
s.
– 
 Lä
nd
er
 (n
o 
co
un
tie
s a
nd
 c
om
m
un
es
) c
an
 
co
nc
lu
de
 tr
ea
tie
s w
ith
 fo
re
ig
n 
st
at
es
 o
n 
ar
ea
s w
hi
ch
 b
el
on
g 
th
ei
r j
ur
is
di
ct
io
n
– 
 Lä
nd
er
 h
av
e 
sp
ec
ifi 
c 
bu
dg
et
s a
nd
 
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 fo
r d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
id
. N
o 
la
w
s 
on
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
id
 a
t e
ith
er
 fe
de
ra
l o
r 
Lä
nd
er
 le
ve
l.
– 
 Lä
nd
er
 re
pr
es
en
t a
pp
ro
x.
 1
0%
 o
f G
er
m
an
 
O
D
A
.
– 
 Lä
nd
er
 c
oo
rd
in
at
e 
w
ith
 c
en
tr
al
 a
id
 
au
th
or
ity
 (a
nn
ua
l m
ee
tin
gs
 w
ith
 
m
in
is
te
r, 
Fe
de
ra
tio
n-
Lä
nd
er
 C
om
m
itt
ee
 
on
 d
ev
. a
id
 –
 B
LA
 E
Z-
an
d 
BM
Z 
– 
Fe
de
ra
l M
in
is
tr
y 
fo
r E
co
no
m
ic
 A
id
 a
nd
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t)
.
– 
 Fo
cu
se
d 
on
 tu
iti
on
 in
 G
er
m
an
y 
of
 
st
ud
en
ts
 fr
om
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
– 
 Tw
in
 to
w
n 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
in
cr
ea
si
ng
ly
 im
po
rt
an
t i
n 
re
ce
nt
 y
ea
rs
 
(A
ge
nd
a 
21
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
).
– 
 N
o 
st
at
is
tic
al
 re
co
rd
s a
re
 k
ep
t a
t t
he
 
m
un
ic
ip
al
 le
ve
l.
G
re
ec
e
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 1
3 
re
gi
on
s (
pe
rip
he
ria
) 
un
ifo
rm
 d
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 u
ni
ts
 o
f s
ta
te
 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
th
at
 im
pl
em
en
t d
iff 
er
en
t 
st
at
e 
po
lic
ie
s +
 5
0 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
 (n
om
oi
 
w
ith
 e
le
ct
ed
 c
ou
nc
il,
 c
om
m
is
si
on
 a
nd
 
pr
es
id
en
t f
oc
us
ed
 o
n 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
of
 th
ei
r t
er
rit
or
y)
 +
 9
00
 u
rb
an
 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 (d
im
oi
) +
 1
33
 ru
ra
l m
un
ic
. 
(k
in
ot
ite
s)
.
– 
 Lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
y 
bo
di
es
 c
an
 tw
in
 w
ith
 
co
un
te
rp
ar
t o
rg
an
is
at
io
ns
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
co
nt
ro
l o
f M
in
is
tr
y 
of
 F
or
ei
gn
 A
ff a
irs
.
– 
 Re
gi
on
s h
av
e 
no
 e
xt
er
na
l a
ct
io
n 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e.
– 
 Ce
nt
ra
l U
ni
on
 o
f G
re
ek
 M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
an
d 
Co
m
m
un
es
 is
 th
e 
m
ai
n 
in
st
itu
tio
n 
on
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l s
ce
ne
 (m
ai
nl
y 
tw
in
ni
ng
 
pr
og
ra
m
s)
.
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Ir
el
an
d
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 8
 re
gi
on
al
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
+ 
2 
re
gi
on
al
 a
ss
em
bl
ie
s c
om
po
se
d 
of
 
no
m
in
at
ed
 m
em
be
r o
f 2
9 
co
un
tie
s a
nd
 5
 
ci
ty
 c
ou
nc
ils
 (i
nt
er
m
ed
ia
ry
 le
ve
l) 
el
ec
te
d 
by
 u
ni
ve
rs
al
 su
ff r
ag
e;
 +
 8
0 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
(t
ow
n 
au
th
or
iti
es
).
– 
 Re
gi
on
al
, c
ou
nt
ie
s, 
ci
ty
 c
ou
nc
ils
 a
nd
 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 h
av
e 
no
t e
xt
er
na
l a
ct
io
n 
co
m
pe
te
nc
e.
– 
 Re
gi
on
al
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s a
nd
 a
ss
em
bl
ie
s 
ha
ve
 n
ot
 c
om
pe
te
nc
es
 in
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ai
d.
– 
 Th
e 
In
st
itu
te
 o
f P
ub
lic
 A
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
is
 
th
e 
Iri
sh
 n
at
io
na
l c
en
tr
e 
fo
r d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
of
 b
es
t p
ra
ct
ic
e 
in
 p
ub
lic
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
io
n 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 m
an
ag
em
en
t i
n 
th
ird
 
co
un
tr
ie
s.
It
al
y
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
s e
vo
lv
in
g 
to
w
ar
ds
 a
 sy
st
em
 
of
 te
rr
ito
ria
l a
ut
on
om
y:
 2
0 
re
gi
on
s (
5 
ha
ve
 sp
ec
ia
l s
ta
tu
s w
ith
 o
rg
an
is
at
io
na
l 
au
to
no
m
y,
 R
eg
io
na
l G
ov
er
nm
en
t a
nd
 
Co
un
ci
l) 
w
ith
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
po
w
er
s i
n 
al
l 
ar
ea
s n
ot
 e
xp
re
ss
ly
 a
tt
rib
ut
ed
 to
 th
e 
St
at
e 
+ 
10
3 
pr
ov
in
ce
s (
el
ec
te
d 
bu
y 
un
iv
er
sa
l s
uff
 r
ag
e)
 e
xe
rc
is
in
g 
de
-
co
nc
en
tr
at
ed
 p
ow
er
 o
f t
he
 S
ta
te
; +
 8
10
3 
M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
.
– 
 Co
ns
tit
ut
io
n 
as
si
gn
s r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
 o
f 
fo
re
ig
n 
po
lic
y 
ex
cl
us
iv
el
y 
to
 th
e 
St
at
e,
 
bu
t R
eg
io
ns
 h
av
e 
pa
ra
lle
l p
ow
er
s w
ith
 
th
e 
St
at
e 
w
ith
 re
ga
rd
 to
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
an
d 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 re
la
tio
ns
.
– 
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
is
 n
ot
 
ex
pl
ic
itl
y 
m
en
tio
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
Co
ns
tit
ut
io
n.
– 
 Re
gi
on
s m
ay
 c
on
ve
y 
th
ei
r o
pi
ni
on
s 
on
 th
e 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t’s
 fo
re
ig
n 
an
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n 
po
lic
y.
– 
 12
 o
f t
he
 1
5 
re
gi
on
s h
av
e 
eq
ui
pp
ed
 
th
em
se
lv
es
 w
ith
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
, p
la
ns
 
an
d 
Re
gi
on
al
 L
aw
s o
n 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
co
op
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
hu
m
an
ita
ria
n 
ai
d.
– 
 Th
e 
A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 It
al
ia
n 
Re
gi
on
s (
O
IC
S)
 
is
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n.
– 
 Th
e 
‘G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r D
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 
Co
op
er
at
io
n’
 e
la
bo
ra
te
d 
by
 d
e 
D
ire
ct
or
at
e-
G
en
er
al
 fo
r D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
(D
G
D
C)
 o
f t
he
 M
in
. 
of
 F
or
ei
gn
 A
ff a
irs
 fo
rm
al
is
ed
 th
e 
co
lla
bo
ra
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
D
G
D
C 
an
d 
lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 (a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 w
ith
 
pr
ov
in
ce
s (
U
PI
) a
nd
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
(A
N
CY
).
– 
 Pr
ov
in
ce
s a
nd
 M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 c
an
 e
ng
ag
e 
in
 in
te
rn
at
io
na
l r
el
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 th
ei
r 
co
un
te
rp
ar
ts
 u
nd
er
 S
ta
te
 c
on
tr
ol
.
– 
 Pr
ov
in
ce
s h
av
e 
be
co
m
e 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
co
fi n
an
ci
ng
 o
th
er
 a
ct
or
’s 
in
iti
at
iv
es
.
– 
 M
or
e 
th
an
 6
5%
 o
f m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 a
re
 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
id
 b
ut
 th
ei
r 
fi n
an
ci
al
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
ns
 w
er
e 
lo
w
.
– 
 Ita
lia
n 
lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s (
in
cl
ud
in
g 
re
gi
on
al
) a
re
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 P
ro
gr
am
s o
f 
H
um
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
t t
he
 L
oc
al
 le
ve
l 
(P
D
H
L/
U
N
D
P)
.
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St
at
e 
Te
rr
ito
ria
l O
rg
an
is
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io
n 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
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 A
id
 F
ro
m
 R
eg
io
ns
 O
r F
ed
er
al
 
St
at
es
 
D
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 A
id
 F
ro
m
 L
oc
al
 A
ut
ho
rit
ie
s
Lu
xe
m
-
bo
ur
g
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 1
16
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 
(c
om
m
un
es
)
Th
is
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
le
ve
l d
oe
s n
ot
 e
xi
st
.
– 
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
to
w
ns
 a
nd
 
m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 h
as
 so
m
e 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
ac
tiv
ity
.
– 
 To
ta
l a
m
ou
nt
 d
ed
ic
at
ed
 to
 d
ec
en
tr
al
is
ed
 
ai
d 
is
 v
er
y 
sm
al
l.
N
et
he
r-
la
nd
s
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 1
2 
pr
ov
in
ce
s w
ith
 le
gi
sl
a-
tiv
e 
bo
dy
 p
ro
vi
nc
ia
le
 st
at
en
 e
le
ct
ed
 b
y 
un
iv
er
sa
l s
uff
 r
ag
e,
 p
ro
vi
nc
ia
l e
xe
cu
tiv
e 
w
ith
 m
em
be
rs
 d
es
ig
na
te
d 
by
 th
is
 le
gi
sl
a-
tiv
e 
bo
dy
 a
nd
 th
e 
Q
ue
en
’s 
Co
m
m
is
si
on
er
 
el
ec
te
d 
by
 th
e 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t o
n 
pr
op
os
al
 
by
 th
e 
pr
ov
in
ci
al
e 
st
at
en
 +
 4
67
 m
un
ic
ip
a-
lit
ie
s (
ge
m
ee
nt
en
).
– 
 Lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 c
an
 ta
ke
 e
xt
er
na
l 
ac
tio
n 
in
iti
at
iv
es
.
– 
 Pr
ov
in
ce
s a
re
 n
ot
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 a
ct
iv
e 
in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
id
. T
he
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 
Pr
ov
in
ce
s o
f N
et
he
rla
nd
s h
as
 n
o 
re
le
va
nt
 
ac
tiv
ity
 in
 th
is
 fi 
el
d.
– 
 A
id
 a
ge
nc
y 
su
pp
or
ts
 lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
t 
ai
d 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 (n
ot
 v
er
y 
re
le
va
nt
).
– 
 A
id
 e
xt
en
de
d 
by
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 is
 n
ot
 
si
gn
ifi 
ca
nt
.
– 
 VN
G
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l i
s t
he
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
Co
op
er
at
io
n 
Ag
en
cy
 o
f t
he
 A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 N
et
he
rla
nd
s M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 (c
o-
fi n
an
ci
ng
 5
0%
 w
ith
 fu
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
M
in
. 
of
 F
or
ei
gn
 A
ff a
irs
) a
nd
 fo
cu
se
d 
on
 lo
ca
l 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t i
n 
th
ird
 c
ou
nt
rie
s.
Po
rt
ug
al
– 
 U
ni
ta
ry
 S
ta
te
: 5
 a
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
gi
on
s 
(R
eg
io
na
l A
ss
em
bl
y 
w
ith
 re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 
of
 M
un
ic
ip
al
 A
ss
em
bl
ie
s a
nd
 R
eg
io
na
l 
Co
m
m
is
si
on
) +
 2
 a
ut
on
om
ou
s r
eg
io
ns
 
(A
ço
re
s a
nd
 M
ad
ei
ra
 w
ith
 le
gi
sl
at
iv
e 
an
d 
ex
ec
ut
iv
e 
po
w
er
s)
+ 
18
 D
is
tr
ic
ts
 (C
iv
il 
G
ov
er
no
r, 
D
is
tr
ic
t A
ss
em
bl
y 
co
m
po
se
d 
of
 p
re
si
de
nt
s o
f m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 a
nd
 A
dv
i-
so
ry
 C
ou
nc
il)
 +
 3
08
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 +
 4
25
2 
pa
ris
he
s (
su
bd
iv
is
io
n 
of
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
).
– 
 Su
b-
st
at
e 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
io
ns
 a
re
 in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t a
id
.
– 
 Ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
re
gi
on
s a
re
 n
ot
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 
ac
tiv
e 
in
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t c
oo
pe
ra
tio
n.
– 
 A
id
 fr
om
 lo
ca
l g
ov
er
nm
en
ts
 is
 in
cl
ud
ed
 
in
 O
D
A
 st
at
is
tic
s.
– 
 Th
e 
Po
rt
ug
ue
se
 In
st
itu
te
 fo
r 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t A
ss
is
ta
nc
e 
(IP
A
D
) –
 u
nd
er
 
M
in
. F
or
ei
gn
 A
ff a
irs
 –
 c
oo
rd
in
at
es
 
de
ce
nt
ra
lis
ed
 a
id
 p
ro
gr
am
.
– 
 M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 p
er
fo
rm
 a
 re
gu
la
te
d 
ro
le
 
as
 p
ro
m
ot
er
s o
r e
xe
cu
to
rs
 o
f P
or
tu
gu
es
e 
ai
d.
– 
 Ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
N
at
io
na
l A
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
of
 
Po
rt
ug
ue
se
 M
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
 (A
N
M
P)
, m
or
e 
th
an
 1
50
 a
id
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts
 h
av
e 
be
en
 
re
co
rd
ed
 b
y 
Po
rt
ug
ue
se
 m
un
ic
ip
al
iti
es
.
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MDG  Millennium Development Goals
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